





CONSUL, WILSHIRE BUTTERFIELD.

HISTORY

of

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL

George Rogers Clark's

Conquest of the Illinois and of the
Wabash Towns from the
British in 1778 and 1779

With Sketches of the Earlier and Later Career of the Conqueror

By

CONSUL WILLSHIRE BUTTERFIELD

Author of the "History of the Discovery of the Northwest by
John Nicolet, in 1634;" "History of the Girtys;"

"History of Brule's Discoveries and Explorations,
1610-1626;" and Other Works.

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CONSUL WILSHIRE BUTTERFIELD —
HISTORIAN.

BY W. H. HUNTER, CHILLICOTHE, OHIO.

1902.

Consul Wilshire Butterfield, the famous Historian, was born near the village of Colosse, Oswego County, New York, July 28, 1824. He was of Knickerbocker stock, his father's people coming to America in 1634. His parents, Amroy Butterfield and Mary Lamb Butterfield, immigrated from Brattleboro, Vermont, to the State of New York.

Consul Wilshire Butterfield died at his home in South Omaha, Nebraska, on Monday, September 25, 1899. At noon Mr. Butterfield appeared to be in usual exuberant spirits and was apparently in good health. Shortly after two o'clock he decided to visit his near neighbor, Mr. O'Connor, and while he was ascending the steps to the O'Connor residence was stricken with a sinking spell, from which he never rallied. When it was known that Mr. Butterfield was seriously ill, neighbors conveyed him to his home and summoned a physician, who pronounced life extinct on his arrival.

Ripe in years he passed to his reward; and thus ended the earthly career of a man whose achievements marked him as a genius and his memory will be cherished as long as letters are a factor of progress. When he died a noble spirit took its "earthless flight;" a lovable husband was taken from a happy home; a kind father was separated from a daughter who cherished every fiber of his being.

Mr. Butterfield lived a long and busy life. He was even at work when came the summons that called his spirit hence.

While Mr. Butterfield stood alone as writer of American history that has relation to the American Indian and the Pioneer, he was the most modest of men. He never sought renown. He loved his fellows, and his work was his pleasure. In a letter to the writer he said his whole ambition was to record the truth; to this end his life was consecrated, and his many historical works, all recognized as authorities and to which all other writers must go for information, attest the sincerity of his statement.

While not so graphic in style as Parkman, he was always accurate. He never printed as a fact in history any incident or statement until he had examined every authority to ascertain the truth. His style was direct; he never employed a superfluous word and his work was always comprehensive.

A profound historical scholar, an indefatigable worker, he left as his monument numerous books invaluable to the student and the reader. Mr. Butterfield was a genius; he never worked for money. The word money seldom came to his mind; his achievement was not the accumulation of wealth. His masterful efforts directed along other lines of human endeavor would have procured a fortune, as the world understands fortune. But he wrote history as a patriot performs a service for his country, without pay, as the world understands pay. He devoted his life to work that few men could perform. Working night and day, he accomplished much, and the world of letters is richer because he lived. He was one of those sweet souls whose devotion to patriotic duty was a sacrifice of pleasure, as the world knows pleasure. He never made money, for his works were not of the popular-novel character demanded by the mass of those who read history. Indeed it took much of his time to correct the errors set forth by men who wrote history for the money results.

Writers of Butterfield's bent and attainments are so rare that, when discovered, the state should possess their talents and thus give the people the benefit of all their time, for it is too valuable to be given up to bread-winning; and men who write history, as Mr. Butterfield wrote history, cannot make money selling books.

The production of one of his works is an achievement greater than coining wealth; while thousands can coin money, only one could do the work Butterfield did. But Butterfield never received the one-thousandth part of the wealth that other men receive for like expenditure of nerve-force in other lines of labor. While rich men spend millions to establish libraries which reduce the sale of books such as he wrote, there are men writing books at their own expense, we might say, to fill the shelves of these libraries, who scarcely afford a roof they can call their own. There should be equity in philanthropy: It is easier for an iron king to put up library buildings than it is for men like Butterfield to fill their shelves.

Mr. Butterfield was admired not only for his great ability manifest in his literary achievements, but for his generous, kindly spirit and his sincerity as a friend. His was an unselfish life; his time was given for the benefit of others. It was always a pleasure to him to aid the student of history, and in response to a mere suggestion he wrote a chapter on Fort Laurens for the Pathfinders of Jefferson county, although at the time he was ill and was engaged on important work of his own; and this chapter was the labor of several days. He loved his friends of whom he must have had many, for no one of his great ability and kindly nature could pass in and out among the activities of life without gaining the appreciation of his fellowmen. He always spoke kindly of friends. The writer of this cherishes more than all else the kind words written of him to a mutual friend, and ever will be green the writer's memory of this man who is at rest.

Mr. Butterfield was always particularly fond of music and poetry, of children and of all kinds of pets. He considered Shakespeare the one great genius, but the poets he studied and most admired were Milton, and our own Bryant. In a letter to the writer after his death, Alice Butterfield said of her father: "Though not a church member, his faith in the immortality of the soul was strong, as evidenced by a great many little things easy to perceive, but hard to write about."

His home-life was quiet and uneventful. He loved his family, and his wife and daughter were devoted to him, and all were happy in their little circle.

Order was the keynote of his method of labor. He did not await the moving influence of the spirit, but wrote regularly a certain length of time, (preferably the morning hours) each day, much as any one would go about a business enterprise. At times, though, when becoming much engrossed in his subject he would keep right on until compelled to quit from sheer exhaustion.

Mr. Butterfield's writing was always done at his home. His desk was in the sitting-room, and he was not easily disturbed. His daughter, in answer to inquiry, wrote: "As to how father would come to select a certain subject upon which to write a book, I do not know; but imagine he would become interested in a particular historical character or event from general reading and then if he considered it inadequately

represented he would determine to elaborate upon the subject himself."

A correspondent writing to Mr. Butterfield, expressed surprise that any one living in South Omaha, in far away Nebraska, could write a book showing so much research as Brulé; but accepted it as a possibility if Mr. Butterfield had an extensive private library. Mr. Butterfield, in speaking of this, quoted "extensive private library" as a jest; for it is a fact, fifty to one hundred books would be the size of his library at any one time, though he was constantly changing it and a large number of books passed through his hands. In speaking of this incident Miss Butterfield said: "I remember having remarked at the time that there was not so much in having a lot of information at one's elbow as there was in knowing how to get what one wanted, and father responded, 'That's just it exactly;' and it seems to me that to this ability to get the information he wanted his merit as a historian is largely due." Mrs. Butterfield was his proof-reader, she being a person of literary attainments.

In 1834 Mr. Butterfield's father's family removed from New York to Melmore, Seneca County, Ohio. At the age of eighteen Butterfield commenced teaching a district school in Omar, Chautauqua County, N. Y. He afterward attended the Normal School in Albany for two terms, but his health failing, he left the school to take a trip to Europe. He returned in 1846 coming to Seneca County, Ohio, where his parents had located in 1834.

The next year he wrote a history of Seneca County which was published in 1848. In 1847 he was elected Superintendent of the Seneca County schools. Early in 1849 he resigned this position to make an overland trip to California. The next year he was an independent candidate in that state for Superintendent of Public Instruction, but was defeated by a few votes. He returned to Ohio in 1851 and finished a course in law which he had commenced in San Francisco, and in 1855 he entered upon the practice of his profession in Bucyrus, Crawford County, relinquishing it in 1875.

In 1854 he served as Secretary of the Ohio and Indiana Railroad Company, and while engaged in this occupation found time to write "A Comprehensive System of Grammatical and Rhetorical Punctuation," which was printed, but

afterward suppressed. An abridgement of the book was published in 1878, this publication becoming a very popular work and was introduced into many schools.

After quitting the practice of law he devoted his time to literary pursuits, having, however, previously written "An Historical Account of the Expedition Against Sandusky, under Col. William Crawford, in 1782." This book written in Bucyrus, Ohio, was issued from the press of Robert Clarke & Co., Cincinnati. The work gave the story of one of the most thrilling expeditions of the Revolutionary War, the death of Col. Crawford at the stake being perhaps the most tragic of all the incidents of border warfare during the struggle for American Independence. The story is told in Mr. Butterfield's direct style and is so thrilling of itself that the narrative needs no elaboration to interest the reader.

In 1875 he wrote, at Madison, Wis., where he had moved, in that year, a work jointly with Lyman C. Draper, a gentleman who had gathered many manuscripts and information of pioneer history, which he afterward presented to the Library of the Wisconsin Historical Society, on "Border Forays, Conflicts and Incidents;" but this book was never printed on account of some disagreement between the two authors; and the evidence as to this does not lay the least blame upon Mr. Butterfield. In the spring of 1877 was published "The Washington-Crawford Letters" edited by Mr. Butterfield, and issued from the press of Robert Clarke & Co., which is invaluable to the historical writer, for it contains information not to be found elsewhere, and like all of Butterfield's works must be read to find authority for many historical statements of fact. In it is given an idea of Washington's interest in the West and the immense tracts of land he secured for his military services as a Virginia officer during the French and Indian wars.

In the fall of 1875 Mr. Butterfield completed for an "Historical Atlas of Wisconsin," (which was published the next year) a "History of Wisconsin," assisting also in the preparation of the county histories and biographical sketches found in that atlas.

The "History of the University of Wisconsin" was written by him and published in 1879. His next work was one of the most important of all his books, being "Discovery of

the Northwest in 1634 by John Nicolet," which also contained a sketch of Nicolet's life. This is a remarkable book, but Mr. Butterfield, after his work on Brulé was published, insisted that the latter should be read first by the student of the French discoveries in America. The production of Nicolet gave evidence of Butterfield's complete knowledge of French, of his painstaking and wide research as well as his marked literary ability. It is a record of the indomitable perseverance and heroic bravery of John Nicolet in an exploration which resulted in his being the first of civilized men to set foot upon any portion of the Northwest, which is to say, any part of the territory now constituting the States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin. It is also shown how he brought to the knowledge of the world the existence of a fresh-water sea — Lake Michigan. It was always Mr. Butterfield's intention to rewrite this very remarkable work and make it more popular by eliminating the many French passages which were introduced for the purpose of adding to its interest by employing the language of the early French writers and explorers, but this he never found time to accomplish.

In 1882 he edited and published the "Washington-Irvine Correspondence," the work to which all historians must go for authority on the West in the Revolution. This work was published through the generosity of George Plumer Smith of Philadelphia who not only subscribed for numerous copies before it was printed, but furnished the maps in the book. This work, as its title indicates, consists of the official letters which passed between Washington and Brig.-Gen. Wm. Irvine and between Irvine and others concerning military affairs in the West from 1781 to 1783; these letters being arranged and annotated with an introduction containing an outline of events occurring previously in the Trans-Allegheny country. No other work has ever been published containing so much information of value to the student of Western history, and today no American library is considered complete without it. In speaking of Mr. Smith's part in the publication of this book, Mr. Butterfield wrote the writer of this in June, 1898, the writer having conveyed to him information of Mr. Smith's death: "I was pained to hear that George Plumer Smith was no more. I saw him last in Omaha some three or four years ago. He and I corresponded for a long

time. But for him, the 'Washington-Irvine Correspondence,' would, probably, not have been published. He subscribed for fifty copies and afterward purchased as many more, always insisting on paying for each copy, catalogue price. He also paid for the maps which you will notice in the book. I return you the letters written by him. How familiar is his handwriting to our whole household!" The "Washington-Irvine Correspondence" was revised by Mr. Butterfield and after his death the MS. was sent to the Chicago Historical Society Library in accordance with his desire.

In 1883 he edited a "Short Biography of John Leeth," followed by the "Journal of Capt. Jonathan Heart," published in 1885; this work being an account of the march to the West of the first troops under the government of the New Republic.

Meanwhile he wrote with Frank A. Fowler a series of biographical sketches entitled "The Giants of the West;" but the book was never given to the public.

While residing in Wisconsin he wrote, in chief, histories of the Counties of Rock, Fond-du-Lac, Columbia, Dane, Vernon, Crawford and Greene of that state. For the last three mentioned he furnished a "General History of Wisconsin," which was published as an introduction to those works; his previous "History of Wisconsin," published in the "Historical Atlas" already mentioned, appearing as introductory to all the other Wisconsin County Histories.

He was on the editorial staff of the "Northwest Review" for March and April, 1883, assistant editor of "Descriptive America" from December, 1884, to February, 1885, inclusive; and on the first day of January, 1886, he began editorial work on the "Magazine of Western History," afterward writing a large number of special articles for that magazine, principally historical and biographical. He severed his connection with that periodical in 1889.

Having removed to South Omaha, Nebraska, in 1888, he there finished the "History of the Girtys," for which he had gathered much material while a resident of Wisconsin. This work was published by Robert Clarke & Co. in 1891, and is, perhaps, the most important of Mr. Butterfield's later works. It contains a vast amount of information as to the border warfare of the Trans-Allegheny country with the three Girtys — Simon, James and George — as the central figures. The

work, as Mr. Butterfield has written to the writer of this and as well has printed in the preface of the book, was undertaken because of the notoriety they had obtained, and likewise because there was an apparent necessity for our Western annals to be freed, as near as possible, from error, everywhere permeating as to the part actually taken by these brothers—particularly Simon—in many of the important events which make up the history of the region immediately west of the Alleghenies. It had become the rule to give Simon Girty all the odium that came of diabolism practiced by American renegades employed by the British for this purpose, and while Mr. Butterfield does not relieve Simon of his proper place, he shows that he was not always responsible—not even always present, when atrocious acts credited to him by most of the writers of romance called history, were committed. In this work, as in all of his productions, Mr. Butterfield kept constantly in mind one object paramount to all others—the statement of facts, as he understood them, and the truth was reached after research that encompassed everything bearing on the subject. The reader must be impressed with the large numbers of documents and authorities quoted in the History of the Girtys; in fact nothing seems to be omitted that would aid in clearing up many of the mysteries of the border conflicts during and after the Revolutionary War which opened in the West in 1774 and continued until Wayne's Victory at Fallen Timbers twenty years after. He takes up matters published as fact by other writers and in a few words shows them to be only romance without foundation in history. He particularly takes Theodore Roosevelt to task for printing in his "Winning of the West" stories absolutely absurd, as history, when he might have printed truth. In this work some attention is given to the whole Girty family, the father, mother, and Simon's brothers, including Thomas, and a half-brother, John Turner, in whom interest is awakened because of the bearing their lives had upon the most notorious of their relatives. In all, the student of Trans-Allegheny history is lacking in information if he has not used the History of the Girtys as a text book. In it will be found all of interest in the Western country previous to, during and after the Revolutionary War. After reading this work one must be impressed with the fact that history is filled with statements

made without truth as basis. This work was revised before Mr. Butterfield's death, and the MS. complete throughout, when examined by his daughter was found to contain on the title page a note giving the manuscript to the Western Reserve Historical Society, to be held by it until the copyright of the first edition shall have expired, and then to be the absolute property of the Society. This MS. is now in the Western Reserve Library at Cleveland.

Brulé has already been mentioned in this sketch. This was the last work of Mr. Butterfield, published. The manuscript was presented to the Western Reserve Historical Society in 1897 and published by this Society the following year. Brulé is a narrative of the discovery by Stephen Brulé of Lakes Huron, Ontario and Superior, and of his explorations, the first by civilized man, of Pennsylvania, Western New York, and of the Province of Ontario, Canada. It is a most thrilling story and it reads like a novel. In the preface the author truthfully says, "Few, if any, of the early events properly belonging to the pages of American history are of more interest and importance after the discovery of the New World, than are those relating to the journeyings of Stephen Brulé." The achievements of this daring Frenchman (Norman) in the northern part of this country and the southern part of Canada, have not heretofore been given in detail, and it was well that the story remained for Butterfield to tell, for he has left no leaf unturned and no musty document unexamined that gave information on the exploits of Champlain's first interpreter, who came to America a mere boy to live among the Indians with the view of learning their language. He came to America at a very early period — he had discovered Lake Huron before the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock. All his work is followed closely and detailed in attractive historic style up to the hour Brulé was killed and eaten by the Hurons. Brulé is the most important work of recent years, and must attract the mind of the pupil who would know the early history of his country. There are copious notes and an extended appendix, all of the greatest value. Butterfield himself, as did his intimate friends, considered Brulé his best effort from a literary point of view, and the letters written to him in regard to this work and the reviews of it in the papers gave him great pleasure. He was so grateful for kindly mention of his

work that he frequently expressed his thanks, and this was the key to his whole life, ever considerate, ever generous.

In 1892 and 1893 he wrote a "History of South Omaha" which was printed in the last-named year as an annex to a "History of Omaha." Nearly all the biographical sketches appearing in the Omaha history were prepared by him.

Mr. Butterfield left several important works in manuscript, among them "History of Col. David Williamson's Expedition to the Tuscarawas River in 1782," this being a correct story of the massacre of the Moravian Indians, and is a most valuable contribution to the history of the West. It was left to the Western Reserve Historical Society Library which Society will no doubt have it published. But the most important of these works is the "History of Lieut. Col. George Rogers Clark's Conquest of the Illinois and the Wabash Towns from the British in 1778 and 1779." Mr. Butterfield had this book ready for publication in 1896, but as another work came out that year on the same subject, he concluded not to publish it, and he worked on it almost to the day of his death. In correspondence with the writer of this, Mr. Butterfield said that it was his intention to present it to the Chicago Historical Society; but when advised by the writer to give the manuscript to Washington and Lee University of Virginia on the ground that the supporters of the University were, many of them, descended from Clark's soldiers, he hesitated; but after his death his daughter gave the manuscript to the writer who was expected to have it published by the Ohio State Archæological and Historical Society, and if this society does not give it to the public, the manuscript will be sent to the Washington and Lee University. His note book used in gathering material for his Crawford's Sandusky Expedition was also presented to the writer.

He also left the manuscript, but incomplete, of "The West in the Revolution," which has been presented to the Chicago Historical Society. This book ought to be published, for it will fill the one vacant place in American literature.

He left several other manuscripts which he had designed publishing in pamphlet form, and these are still in possession of his family.

In speaking of her father's death, his daughter writes: "I never saw an old person in death look so 'like one who lies

down to pleasant dreams.' . . . The children in the neighborhood all came in to see and seemed startled. One little miss of six or seven, whom I did not know, came to the door all alone and asked, 'Please might I see Mr. Butterfield?' She looked earnestly quite a while and then smiled and said, 'That looks just like Mr. Butterfield.'"

Mr. Butterfield was twice married. His first wife was Elmira, daughter of John Scroggs of Bucyrus, Crawford County, Ohio, the marriage being May 8, 1854. She died May 15, 1857. He was again married March 30, 1858, to Letta Merriman, widow of James H. Reicheneker. Of this union four children were born: Minnie Bell, who died September 22, 1859, aged six months; a son and daughter both of whom died in infancy; and Alice, who now resides with her widowed mother, and who was a strong right arm to her father during his later years.

Of his father's family, a sister, Mme. Hyacinthe Loysen, of Paris, France; and Mrs. Cylvia Barry are still living. An adopted daughter, Mrs. W. J. White, is the wife of Major White, Chief Quartermaster in the army at Havana, Cuba.

CHAPTER I.

TO resist the tyrannical acts of the Mother country was the firm determination of a large portion of the people living upon the waters of the Ohio when the all-absorbing questions so deeply agitating the Colonies generally, were, early in 1775, fairly understood.

Swiftly traveled the news to Philadelphia and then to the westward in the latter days of April, that the controversy had, upon the soil of Massachusetts, ripened into actual war. It flew along Forbes's road — the main thoroughfare in Pennsylvania over the mountains west at that period — as if upon the wings of the wind, and was heard in Hannastown, county seat of Westmoreland county, that State, in breathless astonishment; so, too, the next day at Pittsburgh. Then Pennsylvanians in Westmoreland county, and Virginians and Pennsylvanians in Augusta county (Virginia, as claimed by the former) took counsel together. Meetings were called for the sixteenth of May. Invitations were sent into all the trans-Alleghany settlements; and, on that day, there gathered together borderers from far and near to give their views concerning British aggressions, and to concert measures such as the crisis seemed to demand. Neighboring discords caused by an unrun boundary line between the two Provinces, ceased. Patriotism very generally obliterated partisan hatred; for the liberties of the whole people were alike threatened.

As early as the fall of the year 1774, a number of North Carolinians, afterward known as the Transylvania Company, began arrangements which ended in

the following March in their purchasing from the Overhill Cherokee Indians, among other lands, the whole territory south of the Kentucky river, included within the present limits of the State of Kentucky.

The Company, of whom Richard Henderson was the head, proceeded immediately to make extensive preparations for the settlement of their Kentucky domain, resulting in the commencement of Boonesborough, at the mouth of Otter creek, on the south side of the Kentucky river, about one hundred and fifty miles up that stream, on the first day of April 1775. A few days previous, Harrodsburg, now county-seat of Mercer county, Kentucky, had been started independent of the claim of Henderson and Company.

But there was an Indian population (very thinly scattered it is true) northwest of the Ohio, which, if it became hostile, it was quickly seen, would be to the border settlements more terrible than a civilized army. An Indian war the year previous ended in a treaty not yet fully ratified, and there were just apprehensions of renewed hostilities; but prompt action on part of Virginia and the holding of a council in Pittsburgh, in October, 1775, with Mingoës, Shawanese, Wyandots, Ottawas and Munceys, averted the threatened storm. Meanwhile, Congress, in order to preserve peace and friendship with the savages generally, created three Indian Departments — the Northern, Middle and Southern. The West was included in the Middle Department.

Settlements down the Ohio in the Kentucky country — Harrodsburg (first known as "Harrodstown"), Boonesborough and other stations — were growing apace. Brave men and true were James Harrod,

Daniel Boone, and many more, thus to make this (then) distant and wilderness region their homes. And there was one among them transiently, and to most unknown, who, of all others, for some years thereafter, in that country, occupied the largest part of public attention. To him is now to be given that consideration which the annals of the West seem to demand.

GEORGE ROGERS CLARK was born the nineteenth of November, 1752, near Monticello, Albermarle county, Virginia, where he was a neighbor and favorite of Thomas Jefferson. He enjoyed some educational advantages from a noted Scotch teacher, Donald Robertson, in King and Queen county, among whose pupils was James Madison. He fitted himself for a surveyor, and, at the age of twenty, practiced for a short time his profession on the upper Ohio, though really more fond of roving than surveying, he having, in 1772, in the summer, gone on a journey "towards Kentucky." He was spoken of by the one with whom he traveled on that occasion, as "a young gentleman from Virginia, who inclined to make a tour in this new world."

In April, 1774, a party of eighty or ninety Virginians made a rendezvous at the mouth of the Little Kanawha, with the intention of descending the Ohio and beginning a settlement in Kentucky. Clark was one of the party. Reports of Indian hostilities broke up the meeting. Finally, actual war was brought on the events leading to which were afterward set forth by Clark (as he understood them) in a letter to one of the professors of Transylvania University.*

* This letter was published in *The Hesperian* (Columbus, O.: 1839), vol. II, p. 309; also in *Jacob's Life of Cresap*

Clark took part in this conflict of arms, and was commissioned a captain. His company belonged to the right wing of the army commanded by Lord Dunmore, Governor of Virginia, in person. He was engaged in little if any actual fighting, and at the close of the war was offered by Dunmore a commission in the English service; but the political troubles, already become very serious, induced him to decline the offer. "Lord Dunmore's War," as this contest is termed, was carried on between Virginia on the one side, and the Shawanese and Mingoës, principally, on the other. It terminated in favor of Virginia after a hard-won victory at Point Pleasant, where the Great Kanawha empties into the Ohio.

In the spring after the Virginia governor had dictated the terms of peace to the Shawanese and Mingoës beyond the Ohio, Clark again turned his thoughts to the region down that river and to the south of it, as one inviting — if not to the adventurer, at least to the surveyor; so it was that he journeyed to the Kentucky woods to practice for interested parties the art he had chosen as his calling for life. He remained in the wilderness until fall when for the first time he visited the incipient Kentucky settlements.

Many are the errors perpetuated not only in tradition but in history concerning Clark while in the Kentucky country in 1775. Prominent among these is the statement that he was placed in command of the militia there; but the answer to this is, there was no organization of militia in that country until 1777. If

(Cincinnati Re-print: 1886), pp. 154-158; and in Mayer's *Logan and Cresap*, p. 149. It is printed nearly entire in DeHass's *History of the Indian Wars of Western Virginia*, pp. 147-149.

any men were previously embodied in a military way, it was only for the time being and because of the presence (actual or reported) of hostile savages. Then a few settlers would volunteer for offensive or defensive operations. But, in none of these undertakings did he take part so far as known.* Again: it is often repeated that he became at once the most prominent man in the settlements. Documentary evidence conclusively shows the fallacy of this. As he left Kentucky in the fall of 1775 and returned to his home, it is altogether certain that little if any mention would have been made of his visit in after years but for the events which subsequently took place in the West in which he was a prominent actor.

It was at this period and in the dense forests south of the Ohio, that Clark first began to have some practical aspirations — some thoughts of paying attention to the interests of the country in which were the few infant settlements he was visiting. He soon learned that Henderson and Company were taking great pains to ingratiate themselves in the favor of the people; but, too soon for their own interests, they began to raise on their lands, which caused many to complain. A few gentlemen made some attempts to persuade the people to pay no attention to them. Clark was not slow in perceiving that they would work their own ruin; as the greatest security they had for success would be that of making it the interest of the people to support their claim.†

* Appendix, Note 1.

† *Memoir of General George Rogers Clark, Composed by Himself at the United Desire of Presidents Jefferson and Madison* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 115. That Henderson and Company had raised on the price of their

A deep impression was doubtless made on Clark's mind by the course which had been pursued during the Spring by the Proprietors in attempting to form a colonial government independent of Virginia—the new colony to be known as Transylvania. Delegates to a Convention were chosen—"for the town of Boonesborough, six members; for Harrodsburg, four; for the Boiling Spring settlement, four; for the town of St. Asaph, four"—to meet on the twenty-third of May. The "House," after passing several laws, adjourned to the first Tuesday of September. This effort to establish a Proprietary government was decidedly in opposition to the wishes of a portion of the settlers; and so rapidly did the disaffection increase that no further attempt was made toward organization. That Clark was one of the opposers when he came to know what had been done, is certain.

Concerning Clark's return home from this his first visit to the Kentucky country, no particulars have been preserved. Reasons for his leaving have sometimes been given by writers, but these are wholly conjectural. And, if true, that it was because of his intention to join the patriot army,† would be nothing to his discredit.

And now that the youthful Virginia surveyor and wanderer has returned to his father's fireside to recount the wonders of Western wilds to (it may be presumed) his interested parents, it is there we will

lands as stated by Clark, is confirmed by a letter of John Williams to the Proprietors from Boonesborough, January 3, 1776. (Hall's *Romance of Western History*, p. 387.) Concerning Clark's Memoir just cited, see Appendix to our narrative, Note II.

† *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, pp. 785, 786.

leave him for a season, to record events taking place far from his home; which occurrences, in the end, as our narrative discloses, have a bearing upon those hereafter to particularly engage our attention.

The ending of Lord Dunmore's War had left a zealous friend of the Royal Governor in command at Fort Pitt — or as he would have it called, "Fort Dunmore" — formerly a British fortress at the junction of the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers, but, in 1775 mostly in ruins. Its site then joined the village of Pittsburgh, but is now included within the city's limits. The favorite spoken of, of the Virginia Executive, was John Connolly. He proved to be an arch tory and laid extensive plans to assail the Trans-Alleghany region in order to restore British authority by force. He was commissioned "a Lieutenant Colonel of the Queen's Royal Rangers" and given full power to raise a battalion and as many independent companies as he could, to assist him in his projects. He had left Fort Pitt to confer with Dunmore previous to this, and now started for Detroit where he was to be greatly aided. Captain Hugh Lord, in command of the Illinois country, which lay on the east bank of the Mississippi and included Kaskaskia, Prairie du Rocher, St. Philips and Cahokia — towns occupied mostly by French Canadians — was to join him from the village first mentioned; however, the would-be Lieutenant-Colonel was captured in Maryland, and his career of military glory abruptly terminated.

Soon after his confinement, he began to make himself busy in conjecturing what would be the probable operations authorized by the American Congress, so far as the war was concerned. He imagined a body of men would be sent down the Ohio to capture the

small garrison at Kaskaskia (principal town of the Illinois), as he had information, which, however, was erroneous, that there was a great want there of stores and ordnance. He therefore wished very much to inform Captain Lord, commanding the post, of (this was his firm belief) the imminent danger which threatened him, and to advise him to quit the country. He afterward contrived to write two letters to the Captain and, putting them into the hands of John Smyth, one of his captured companions, found means to start the latter for the Illinois; but Smyth was retaken and the communications fell into the hands of the Americans,* who were not slow in publishing them, thereby calling public attention to that remote region.

"You must, agreeable to General Gage's order and Lord Dunmore's," were Connolly's words to the Illinois commandant, "proceed down the Mississippi and join Lord Dunmore at Norfolk, and the Fourteenth [regiment] which is now there. Lose no time, for fear the rebels should be upon you from Pittsburgh." And in the other letter he wrote: "Though your remote situation may have prevented you from hearing many particulars relative to the state of the Colonies, you yet must know enough to discover your own dangerous situation. You were to have joined me at Detroit, by the Wabash communication, and it was expected, by your advice and assistance, that we would have been able to penetrate through the colony of Virginia, and thus have divided the Southern from the Northern Governments."†

* See *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography*, vol. XII, pp. 416, 417; also Smyth's *Tour in the United States of America*, vol. II, p. 269.

† Connolly must have had discretionary orders as to Cap-

"I was made a prisoner," he says, in a letter which he also sent by Smyth to Captain Richard Berringer Loernoult, in command at Detroit, "on my way through the Government to your post, where I expected to have afforded you some assistance, and to have ordered Captain Lord, of the Eighteenth [regiment], to join us there also. I am now to inform you that I much fear his Majesty's enemies may attack you early in the Spring, and as Montreal is in their hands, I dread the consequences." "You were ordered," continues Connolly, "to raise all the French you could, which I hope you have done." "Take care," concludes the writer, "that there is not an improper correspondence carried on between your post and Pittsburgh."

Notwithstanding Captain Lord received no intimations of Connolly's designs, or commands, it was soon evident from advices at hand from Carleton, in whose jurisdiction the Illinois then was (it being, as claimed by Great Britain, a part of the Province of Quebec), that the disasters to the royal arms upon the St. Lawrence caused by the invasion of Colonial soldiers would make it necessary to have the Fort in Kaskaskia — Fort Gage, the British military post "upon the Mississippi" — evacuated by the regular soldiers stationed there; but, for the time, the Captain continued his force in that country.*

tain Lord's retirement. In the first place it was his idea to have that officer meet him with his command at Detroit; but now that he (Connolly) was a prisoner, he would have the Captain go down the Mississippi and take vessel to Norfolk.

* See as to Fort Gaze, Appendix to our narrative, Note XLVIII.

The War of the Revolution had but fairly commenced when the British Government turned its attention to the savage nations to the northward, westward and southward, of the Colonies. In previous contests between England and France in America the employment of Indians on either side as auxiliaries had been customary; and the idea of the British General, Thomas Gage, Commander-in-chief in America, who, writing to Sir Guy Carleton, just as the latter was to arrive at Quebec as Governor of Canada, asking to know what measures would be most efficacious to raise a body of Canadians and Indians to form a junction with the king's forces, was in accordance with these precedents; but it is clear that a remorseless savage war was not what he intended to suggest.

On the ninth of June, 1775, Sir Guy proclaimed the American borderers to be rebellious traitors. He established martial law. He summoned the French peasantry to serve under the old colonial nobility. He would have the converted Indian tribes and the savages of the Northwest take up the hatchet against New York and New England. Still it is doubtful if the Canadian governor contemplated in this anything beyond the service of the savages with British troops in legitimate warfare. La Corne Saint-Luc acted for the government generally, while Jacques Duperon Baby sent belts and strings of wampum to the various tribes, to join the British army. In this, he was assisted by Captain Lernoult, commanding the Detroit garrison. The savages were visited by British emissaries or harrangued at British posts to the southward and southwestward of Lake Erie and to the westward and northward of Lake Huron, even to the waters of

Lakes Michigan and Superior. Thus the Indians of the West began to hear of the trouble between Great Britain and her American colonies; and they had it made known to them that there was actual war existing in New England. But they were not urged to go in war parties against the border settlements.

The office of Lieutenant Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs had already been created for some of the most distant posts in Canada. It was a new office — unknown before in the West. It was believed by the British ministry that the Indians could by such offices, be made more powerful allies than by those having immediate command of garrisons. Henry Hamilton in April, of the year last mentioned, was appointed for Detroit and its dependencies at a salary of two hundred pounds sterling. The appointment was made by the Earl of Dartmouth as Colonial Secretary (Secretary of State for the Colonies), who was succeeded in that office by Lord George Germain (George Sackville) the next November. The Lieutenant Governor was to act under instructions from Governor Carleton, the Commander-in-chief of the Province of Quebec. The paramount idea was, that the savages were to be worked upon by him in such manner that they would be in readiness always to join the armies of Great Britain; his duties, however, being soon extended to aiding the Indians in making war, as will soon be seen, on the frontier settlements.

“At the time General Carleton thought proper to send me up [to Detroit],” wrote Hamilton subsequently, “the rebels had entered Canada, and I crossed the island of Montreal in a Canadian dress, and got the fourth day, in a wooden canoe, to Oswegatchie

[now Ogdensburg] unprovided with (I may say) everything.”*

Hamilton arrived out on the ninth of November, 1775.† He was immediately importuned by the Indians in the vicinity of his post for his “assent to their making inroads upon the frontiers of Pennsylvania”; but this, he declares, he declined, giving as a reason his “not having received orders on the subject.”‡ The desire of the savages, however, conclusively shows that their war-spirit had already been aroused against the settlers of the Trans-Alleghany country.

Hamilton was under the necessity of acting discretionary for a time after his arrival, because intercourse with the lower part of the Province of Quebec had been cut off “by the rebels possessing themselves of Montreal,” and he could not therefore confer with Governor Carleton. He did not feel authorized to advise the Indians (much less to assist them) to take up the hatchet then against the “rebels.” Still, his talk was calculated (notwithstanding his counsel to them was to sit still for the present) to promote their thirst for war; and there were some braves, whose desire for plunder was so great that they marched to Sandusky on their way to strike the settlements to the eastward, but were turned back by the importunities of John Dodge at that place.°

The Lieutenant Governor had had considerable experience in military matters. He had been a lieutenant

† Hamilton to the Earl of Dartmouth, Aug. 29 — Sept. 2, 1776. — Haldimand MSS.

* Hamilton to the Earl of Dartmouth, Aug. 29—Sept. 2, 1776. — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix, Note III.)

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, Germain MSS.

° Dodge's *Narrative* Alman's *Remembrances* (1779), vol. VIII. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note IV.)

ant in the Fifteenth Regiment of Foot, but had left the army upon the conclusion of peace between France and England, in 1763. Immediately on his arrival at Detroit, he appointed as his secretary, Philip Dejean, who was, besides, justice of the peace, judge, notary, auctioneer, and receiver of public money.

As, under the Quebec Act of 1774 — the one organizing the Province of Quebec, Canada — “all commissions, to judges and other offices were revoked, annulled and made void, from and after the first day of May, one thousand seven hundred and seventy-five,”* the acting as judge by Dejean after that date, even had he previously sufficient warrant for officiating in that capacity, was, notwithstanding the orders and approval of Hamilton, clearly illegal. Nevertheless, he continued to act, — he having in December, after all commissions had been by the law abrogated, caused a man to be apprehended for murder, sentenced him to death, and carried the sentence into execution, — the Lieutenant Governor aiding, by ordering out a guard of soldiers upon the occasion.

Far to the northward where the waters of Lake Michigan meet and mingle with those of the Huron lake, situated on the south side of the straits, was the post of Michilimackinac, in command of which, in the Spring of 1775, was Captain Arent Schuyler De Peyster, having a garrison composed of two companies of the Eighth regiment. His duties were not onerous. His time was divided between looking after the fur traders, holding long “talks” with the savages, and

* *British Statutes at Large* (London, 1776), vol. XII, pp. 184–187, where the Quebec Act is printed in full. It may be found also in the *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, vol. XI, pp. 53–60.

in "courting the muses" — he wrote some creditable poetry.* He had been advised of the appointment of Patrick Sinclair as Lieutenant Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs of his post and its dependencies.

But Sinclair, who was commissioned on the seventh of April, upon arriving at New York, was taken prisoner and on the third of August following was summoned before Congress on the charge of being commissioned to employ the Indians in the Northwest in coercing the Colonies. He was sent to Long Island as a paroled prisoner and the next year allowed to return to England. As no other person was appointed in Sinclair's place, it was a necessity for De Peyster to act as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, the duties of which office he had already attended to.

He was slow to enter upon the policy of arousing the Indians and inflaming them on the British side as against the Americans, being content at first to urge them only to a close friendship with his Government. His post and its dependencies were far removed from the strife on the seaboard. The Pottowattomies were scattered from near St. Joseph (formerly a French post of some note a considerable distance up the river of the same name emptying into Lake Michigan) to the mouth of the stream on which it was located, thence around Lake Michigan to the site of the present city of Chicago and to that of Milwaukee; and there had as yet appeared no one from Michilimackinac or Detroit with belts and wampum to excite them against the "rebellious Colonies;" so also the Winnebagoes around Winnebago lake, and the Menomonees upon

* See his *Miscellanies*, passim.

Green bay, had not been advised to hold themselves in readiness to go to war against the Americans. But the Chippewas were already aroused by the representatives of La Corne Saint-Luc; and the "talks" of their chiefs, with De Peyster during the first half of 1776, served to increase among them and contiguous nations the thirst for war; for it had been determined to raise warriors in that region to march to the St. Lawrence: and soon a band was on the march thither. But these savage allies were to aid the regular British forces; they were not to march against unprotected settlers.

On the same day of the appointment of Sinclair as Lieutenant Governor and Superintendent of Michilimackinac and its dependencies, Captain Mathew Johnson was named for a like office at the Illinois; but he was "never able to attend to his duty" there; indeed he did not reach his post at all, — for reasons, however, satisfactory to the British government, as he continued to draw his salary (two hundred pounds sterling) during the war.*

At the beginning of the Revolution, there were British armed vessels — an incipient navy — upon Lakes Erie, Huron and Michigan, which materially aided the military forces, gave efficiency to the labors of Indian agents, and everywhere on those waters protected the fur-trade. On the lake first mentioned were four armed schooners, built at Detroit, and four sloops. There was also one sloop on Lake Huron and one on Lake Michigan.

* Haldimand to Grey Cooper (Secretary of the Treasury), July 8 and the letter of the latter of May 8, 1781. — Haldimand MSS. The Receiver General's accounts, in May, 1782, also show a charge of £100, as "Lieutenant Governor of the Illinois" — being for 6 months salary.

The schooners on Lake Erie were the *Gage*, built in 1772, mounting sixteen carriage-guns and six swivels, requiring for her crew forty-eight men including officers;—the *Dunmore*, built the same year, carrying twelve guns and four swivels, requiring for her complement of men, thirty-six, including officers; the *Hope*, built in 1771, and taken into the King's employ on the twenty-fifth day of August, 1775, mounting four four-pounders, and two two-pounders, requiring a crew of eighteen men, including officers; and the *Faith*, built in 1774, carrying four swivels, and requiring for her complement, ten men, including officers. The sloops on that lake were the *Chippewa*, four swivels; the *Angelica*, six; the *Felicity*, number unknown; the *Adventure*, four. The sloop on Lake Huron was the *Welcome*; on Lake Michigan, the *Archangel*.

Early in the year 1776, Congress, in hopes of keeping quiet the various Indian nations of the West, appointed George Morgan to be Indian Agent for the Middle Department, Richard Butler having previously acted in that capacity.

At Detroit, the opening of Spring was followed by considerable activity. Hamilton busied himself in sending to surrounding tribes invitations to a treaty, accorded by De Peyster at Michilimack, who urged those near him to attend.

It was late in August before the savages assembled at Detroit at the Lieutenant Governor's call, deputies being present from the Ottawas, Chippewas, Wyandots, Shawanese, Senecas, Delawares, Cherokees and Pottawattomies. Five days were consumed and many speeches made. The conclusion of the Indians was (they being of course guided in this by Hamilton) that the "rebels" had imposed upon them by falsely

stating the cause of the dispute between them and the British; that they had misrepresented their own ability to cope with the mother country; and that they were not really well-disposed towards the several nations of savages, members of which were then deliberating. The Lieutenant Governor told the Indians to content themselves with watchfully observing the enemy's motions; that if the "Virginians" attacked them he would give notice to all the tribes; and that an attack on one was to be followed by all uniting against them.

Morgan, at Pittsburgh, was early informed of Hamilton's determination to assemble the Western Indians in council at Detroit and he resolved to thwart the Lieutenant Governor so far as lay in his power, by visiting a number of the nations within reach. He went as far beyond the Ohio as the Scioto and saw chiefs of the Delawares and Shawanese. Early in July, he left the lower Shawanese town on his way back to Pittsburgh. Deputies from some of the most friendly nations met commissioners at Fort Pitt, late in October; and the "talks" to some extent neutralized the efforts Hamilton had made with these Indians.

While at the lower Shawanese village, Morgan had other plans revolving in his mind beside those relating to the Detroit council. He had friends in the Illinois and he knew the previous condition of affairs in that country; besides, he had received a full account of Connolly's letters to Captain Lord. He wrote to two of his acquaintances at Kaskaskia, asking them as to the "exact situation of affairs" in that country; "and what quantity of flour and beef" they "could furnish a company or two of men with," on the twenty-fifth of the next December. The letter he entrusted

to an Indian who was known as "Silver Heels." Morgan added that he would depend on his two friends for the desired information by the return of Silver Heels, "who ought to be at Pittsburgh as early in September as possible, as there is a great treaty to be held in that month with all the Western nations. If one of you could come along with him, it may be much to your advantage but you should be very secret with respect to your business."*

It is doubtful if any man in the Trans-Alleghany region was better qualified to lead "a company or two of men" to the Illinois country than Morgan. His long and intimate acquaintance there, and his knowledge of the best method to adopt to have approached undiscovered the different settlements, peculiarly fitted him for successfully carrying forward an expedition against the Illinois towns. And that he should have planned such an undertaking clearly shows that he had a full understanding of the defenceless condition of those villages and the feasibility of their capture with a comparatively small force. However, his letter fell into unfriendly hands; for at least one of the parties addressed, was in sympathy with the Mother country; hence, no answer was received giving the desired information as to supplies obtainable at Kaskaskia; and the undertaking was abandoned.

Captain Lord and his garrison, under orders from Carleton, departed from Fort Gage on the first day of

* Morgan to Richard Winston and Patrick Kenedy, July 6, 1776.—Haldimand MSS. (Appendix, Note V.) An interesting biographical sketch of Morgan may be found in *The Canonsburg (Pa.) Notes*, of Dec. 19, 1891, by Julia M. Harding. See also Hildreth's *Pioneer History; Washington-Irvine Correspondence, History of the Girty's and Mason's Early Chicago and Illinois*.

May, 1776, to join the British forces by way of Detroit and the Lakes; but the fortification he did not dismantle — the ordnance and munitions of war he left behind. He had previously been instructed to intrust the administration of affairs in the Illinois to such person as he judged proper. He selected Philip Rocheblave, as his successor, leaving his family in care of the latter — a sufficient proof of his confidence in the man.*

It was the opinion of Rocheblave that the reason for the recall of Captain Lord from the Illinois was because the condition of affairs upon the St. Lawrence made it better to have him and his garrison nearer the center of hostilities, serving as an "aid in gathering together all his forces, which, as a skillful leader, he considered to be too far distant."†

"The unfortunate situation," afterwards wrote Rocheblave, "in which his Excellency, Mr. Carleton, found himself at the end of the year 1775, at the time of the invasion of the Province of Quebec by the Colonists, obliged him to recall the garrison of this country [the Illinois] in order to fall back on Detroit and Niagara. The General judged wisely that, under the circumstances, it were better not to have the few troops belonging to him widely dispersed, when, in consolidating them, lay his only chance of accomplishing anything. In consequence of his orders, Captain Hugh Lord, who had governed this country with general satisfaction, evacuated it, leaving me in charge

* See Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, pp. 360-381, for an interesting biographical sketch of Rocheblave.

† Rocheblave to Germain, Jan. 22, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

without troops, without money, without resources.”† The explanation, however, for Captain Lord's departure as stated by Carleton was, “to avoid unnecessary expense”.‡ It is probable, notwithstanding, that the reasons given by Rocheblave were such as the Governor had mentioned to the Captain, in his orders to the latter to leave the Illinois.

† Same to same, Feb. 28, 1778, in same.

‡ Carleton to Hamilton, September 15, 1777, in same.

CHAPTER II.

IT was in the Spring of 1776, that Clark, on foot and alone, again went to Kentucky — a particular scheme, in addition to his desire to continue his surveying, having this time drawn him thither.

Tradition has this account of his arrival: He was first met by a young lad who had gone a few miles from Harrodsburg to turn some horses out on the range. The boy had killed a duck and was roasting it by a fire he had kindled, when he was surprised by the near approach of a fine soldierly-looking man who said: "How do you do my little fellow? What is your name? Are you not afraid of being in the woods by yourself?" The stranger was evidently hungry; for, on being invited to eat, he speedily finished the entire duck; and when the boy asked him his name his reply was that it was Clark and that he had come out to see what "you brave fellows in Kentucky are doing, and to help you if there is need." *

But this story has evidently gathered unto itself what at first was foreign to it. The "fine soldierly-looking man" raises a suspicion of having been supplied by the relator, to whom, in after years, Clark became a hero; and, that he came out "to see what the brave fellows in Kentucky were doing and to help

* Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 37n., where it is printed for the first time, and as taken from the lips of the boy that was -- but then an old man. The story as related by Butler has, with more or less variation, been frequently repeated. (See *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 786; Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 610; Roosevelt's *The Winning of the West*, vol. I, p. 319.)

them if there was need," would hardly have been spoken to one so young; besides, these words induce the belief of their having been added as the result of knowing the visitor's subsequent career.

Clark was now greeted (if traditionary accounts are to be taken as veritable), with considerable distinction. His appearance "was well calculated to attract attention; it was rendered particularly agreeable by the manliness of his deportment, the intelligence of his conversation; but above all, by the vivacity and boldness of his spirit for enterprise, and the determination he expressed of becoming an inhabitant of the country. He fixed on no particular residence; was much in the woods; incidentally visiting the forts and the ostensible camps; he cultivated the acquaintance of the people, and acquired an extensive knowledge of the various objects presented to his curiosity or to his inspection."*

A considerable number of the Kentucky settlers, some of them of particular prominence, had already petitioned the Convention of Virginia to take them under their protection. "As we are anxious," they said, "to concur in every respect with our brethren of the United Colonies for our just rights and privileges as far as our infant settlements and remote situation will admit of, we humbly expect and implore to be taken under the protection of the Honorable Convention of the Colony of Virginia, of which we cannot help thinking ourselves still a part, and request your kind interposition in our behalf, that we may not suffer under the rigorous demands and impositions of the gentlemen styling themselves proprietors." At the

* Marshall's *Kentucky*, vol. I, p. 46. It is evident that some of this is overdrawn.

same time, these petitioners called in question the title of Henderson and Company to the lands, which had been purchased by them of the Cherokees.*

The petition was received by the Virginia Convention; and a counter petition was presented by Henderson and his partners. That the Assembly recognized the Kentucky settlements as being within the limits of Virginia is evident from its action. Commissioners were appointed to take evidence on behalf of the government against the several claimants under Indian purchases; but, in the meantime, it was ordered that actual settlers should not be disturbed.†

The scheme of Clark, which was one of the causes of his return to Kentucky, was (if his own words subsequently published are to be relied on) a political one. Having no faith in Henderson and Company's claim, it was, but natural he should reflect upon the condition of affairs in the new settlements so far as their government was concerned. "I left the country (Kentucky)," he wrote years after, "in the Fall of 1775, and returned in the Spring following. While in Virginia, I found there were various opinions respecting Henderson and Company's claim. Many thought it was good; others doubted whether or not Virginia

* "The Petition of the Inhabitants and some of the Intended Settlers of that Part of North America now Denominated Transylvania to the Honorable, the Convention of Virginia." (Hall's *Romance of Western History*, where, on pp. 381-385, the Petition is published in full; also in Morehead's *Address*, pp. 159-161; and in other works.) There were eighty-eight signers, headed by James Harrod and Abm. Hite, Jun. The language of the petitioners was unequivocal: they considered themselves Virginians and asked the protection of the Colony of Virginia.

† Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 449, 450.

could with propriety have any pretensions to the country. This was what I wanted to know. I immediately fixed on my plans, viz.: that of assembling the people — getting them to elect deputies, and send them to treat with the Assembly of Virginia respecting the condition of the country. If valuable conditions were procured, we could declare ourselves citizens of the State; otherwise, we might establish an independent government, and, by giving away a great part of the lands and disposing of the remainder, we would not only gain great numbers of inhabitants, but in a good measure protect them.” *

Such was the visionary plan of young Clark, formulated in his mind in ignorance of the claim of Virginia already put forth, and of the wishes of the settlers in Kentucky — at least, of a large portion of them — as clearly stated in their petition to the Virginia Convention.†

Besides, it is evident (if his statements just mentioned are to be taken as true) that his plan was deter-

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 115. The words used by Clark — “When I was in Virginia,” were intended by him to express only that he was then at his home over the mountains and not in the Kentucky country.

† “I told them [Jefferson and Wythe] that the Transylvania Company, suspecting that they might be misrepresented, had sent me to make known to the gentlemen of the Congress, our friendly intentions towards the cause of liberty, etc. etc. . . . They observed that our purchase was within their [Virginia's] charter and gently hinted that, by virtue of it, they might claim the whole.” — James Hogg to the Transylvania Company, January, 1776. (See Hall's *Romance of Western History*, p. 394.) Then, too, there was the action taken by the Virginia Convention upon the receipt of the petition of the Kentucky settlers, just mentioned.

mined upon while knowing nothing of the limits of Fincastle country to the westward as previously defined by Virginia.

In the scheme of Clark — idle and fanciful though it was — there can be seen an ambition not wholly to be despised. It was a conviction by no means of the baser sort that could prompt him at once to determine upon his plans and to return to Kentucky resolved, if possible, to carry them out. Did he see political preferment in their consummation? It would not have been surprising or disreputable if such were the fact, as it is evident he had not fully considered that his idea carried with it a menace which in the end surely would have denied the Kentucky settlers a hearing in the Virginia Convention. But, as will now be seen, these Kentucky pioneers were true to the principle set forth in the petition already sent forward to the Virginia authorities.

All that is known concerning the time of Clark's return to Kentucky is, that it was in the Spring of 1776. His coming was a surprise, as it was supposed he had left the country permanently. His designs, crude as they were, he confided to no one. Tradition says it was generally believed in the settlements that love of adventure alone had brought him back.

He subsequently (in his declining years) put upon record that, to carry his scheme into effect, he appointed a general meeting at Harrodsburg, for the sixth of June, asserting, at the same time, that something would be proposed to the people that very much concerned them. "The reason I had," are his words in his narration of the steps taken by him, "for not publishing what I wished to be done before the day was, that the people should not get into parties on the

subject; and as every one would wish to know what was to be done, there would be a more general meeting. But, unfortunately, it was late in the evening of that day (sixth of June) before I could get to the place. The people had been in some confusion, but at last concluded that the whole design was to send delegates to the Assembly of Virginia with a petition praying the Assembly to accept them as such — to establish a new county, etc. The polls were opened, and before I had arrived they had far advanced in the election, and had entered with such spirit into that I could not get them to change the principles — that of *delegates with a petition*, to that of *deputies under the authority of the people*. In short, I did not take much pains.”*

Evidently Clark, in thus claiming the honor of having called the Harrodsburg meeting, credited to himself what he was not entitled to.† “George Rogers Clark,” says a Kentucky historian, “came to Kentucky for the first time in 1775. His second visit was in the spring of 1776, when the minds of many of the inhabitants were agitated by the claim of the Transylvania Company to the tract of country, over which . . . they had attempted to establish a proprietary government. Dissatisfaction had arisen from numerous causes, which I need not pause to enumerate. They will be found embodied in a petition of the inhabitants

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 115, 116.

† The short-comings of Clark in his *Memoir* have usually been attributed to his age; but another cause hereafter to be mentioned, had more to do with them than his years. It becomes necessary to point out in this narrative many of his questionable statements, because of their having been so often relied upon as altogether truthful by writers of Western history.

and some of the intended settlers of that part of North America, now denominated 'Transylvania' addressed 'to the Honorable Convention of Virginia.' The Virginia settlers in general, did not recognize the validity of the Company's jurisdiction, and declined making investments in their land office. The emigrants from North Carolina, many of whom were brought by Col. Henderson to the country, were satisfied with the titles derived from him, and made their purchases accordingly. There were others, and a numerous class, with a proper foresight of results who preferred to take possession of such lands as suited them, and await the perfection of their claims, until the pending conflict of opinion should be determined, and the rightful sovereignty declared. On the 6th of June, 1776, a meeting was held at Harrodsburg *to take the subject into consideration.**

Another Kentucky historian says that Clark, after his arrival in the spring of 1776 in the Kentucky country, "reflected deeply on its value to Virginia as a frontier, as well as to the rest of the Confederacy. The result of these meditations suggested to him the importance of assembling the people of the country at Harrod's Town, as it was then called, to devise a plan for the public defense."† Now, this declaration of the Kentucky author is based solely upon Clark's scheme as already given. He overlooks the principal idea, which related to the Transylvania Company's claim, and sees only the one to protect the settlers from savage aggression; and he would have the plan formulated by Clark after his arrival.

* James T. Morehead: see his *Address*, pp. 52, 53. (The italicising in the extract is mine.)

† Mann Butler: *History of Kentucky*, p. 37.

Other writers have followed in the same strain, adding somewhat to these declarations; as, for instance: "His (Clark's) mind had been very early impressed with the immense importance of this frontier country (Kentucky) to the security of the parent State of Virginia, as well as to the whole Confederacy, and his reflections on this subject led him to perceive the importance of a more thorough, organized, and extensive system of public defense, and a more regular plan of military operations than the slender resources of the Colonies had yet been able to effect."*

A recent writer suggests that Clark, in view of the depredations which the Ohio Indians were committing on the settlements, called the Harrodsburg meeting to devise a plan of defense; and that his "plan was, to appoint delegates who should proceed to Williamsburg and petition the Assembly that Kentucky be made a county of Virginia."† The erection, however, of a new county to include the Kentucky settlements does not seem to have been any part of Clark's plan.

The readiness with which Clark gave up his own project for that adopted by the settlers, clearly evinces a determination not very deeply rooted in his mind to carry out his plan. But there was reason why, had he been ever so determined before hand, he should now be easily placated. The people had agreed to send two delegates to take a petition to the Virginia Assembly and were voting for Clark and John Gabriel Jones for that duty. They were elected, it seems, without opposition.

* Lewis Collins. (See his *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 133.)

† Dr. William Frederick Poole, in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 716

The prime object in view was for these two to endeavor, if possible, to have a new Virginia county established, which should include all the Kentucky settlements. It is plain that Clark equally with his associate, soon entered spiritedly into the settlers' scheme. Both accepted the position to which they had been elected, hoping not only to reach Williamsburg before the adjournment of the Convention, but that they might be admitted to seats therein.*

Before the adjournment of the Harrodsburg meeting, the credentials of the two delegates were made out and handed them, and a committee was appointed to draft a petition to the Virginia Assembly expressive of the views of the settlers as to the impending conflict and as to their desire for the formation of a new county. The document was dated the twentieth of June and was given to Jones and Clark to be presented to the Virginia Convention on their arrival at Williamsburg. It announced that, if the Kentucky county could be admitted as a separate and distinct county of Virginia (such, at least, is the inference to be drawn from the words used) the people would willingly and cheerfully aid to the utmost of their ability every measure to secure the public peace and safety; particularly, they said, would it be impolitic for "such a respectable body of prime riflemen to remain in a state of neutrality," while on the seaboard there was going forward on part of the patriot Colonists a desperate struggle for their liberties.†

* See Appendix, Note VI.

† Petition of the Committee of West Fincastle, June 20, 1776, printed in John Mason Brown's *Oration* — "Blue Licks" pamphlet. I have not attempted to follow closely the wording of the Petition.

With their credentials as delegates and the petition of the West Fincastle committee, Clark and Jones started for Williamsburg. "They selected the route through the southern wilderness, as it has generally been called, lying between the settlements of Kentucky and those of Virginia, under most distressing difficulties. Independent of losing one of their horses, the extreme wetness of the season, and the danger of kindling fires, amidst straggling parties of Indians the traveling through the mud, and over the mountains, brought on a most painful affliction, called by the hunters, the *scaldfeet*. In this complaint, the feet become useless from excessive tenderness, and the skin decays; so that the weight of the body becomes intolerable. While suffering in this manner, 'more torment than I ever experienced,' says Clark, 'before or since,' they found the old stations near the Cumberland Gap and Martin's Fort, where they fondly hoped to have found relief, both abandoned by the inhabitants owing to fear of the Indians. At the latter place, however, the desperate party determined to stay until their feet were recovered; when this was accomplished, they again prosecuted their journey." *

The two delegates, had they, without any mishap, made the quickest possible time upon their way out, could not have reached Williamsburg before the breaking up of the Assembly. That body, meeting on the sixth of May, 1776, was in session one day less than two months, having adjourned on the fifth of July, to meet again on the seventh of October following, at the same place; meanwhile the declaration of independence had been made, a State constitution had

* Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 38.

been adopted, and Patrick Henry elected governor. There was, therefore, no other alternative; the petition of the West Fincastle pioneers must be held until the Virginia Legislature should again convene.

Concerning the journey from Kentucky of himself and Jones, Clark wrote, years after, in these words: "In a few days (after his and Jones's election as delegates), we set out for Williamsburg, in the hope of arriving before the Assembly, then sitting, should rise. . . . We proceeded on our journey as far as Botetourt county, and there learned that we were too late; for the Assembly had already risen. We were now at a loss, for some time, to determine what to do, but concluded we should wait until the fall session — in the meantime, I should go to Williamsburg and attempt to procure some powder for the Kentuckians and watch their interests. We parted. Mr. Jones returned to Holston to join the forces that were raising, in order to repel the Cherokee Indians (as they had lately commenced hostilities) and myself proceeded to the governor of Virginia."*

"Mr. Henry, the governor," are the further words of Clark, "lay sick at his seat in Hanover, where I waited on him, and produced my vouchers. He appeared much disposed to favor the Kentuckians, and wrote by me to the Council on the subject. I attended them. My application was for five hundred pounds of powder to be conveyed to Kentucky as an immediate supply. After various questions and consultations, the Council agreed to furnish the supply; but, as we were a detached people, and not yet united to the State of Virginia, and uncertain until the sitting of the As-

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 116. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note VII.)

sembly whether we should be, they would only lend us the ammunition as friends in distress, but that I must become answerable for it in case the Assembly should not receive us as citizens of the State. I informed them that it was out of my power to pay the expense of carriage and guards necessary for those supplies — that the British officers on our frontiers were making use of every effort to engage the Indians in the war — that the people might be destroyed for want of this small supply — and that I was in hopes they would consider these matters, and favor us by sending the ammunition at public expense. They replied that they were really disposed to do everything for us in their power consistent with their office, which I believed. After making use of many arguments to convince me that even what they proposed was a stretch of power, they informed me that ‘they could venture no farther.’ An order was issued to the keeper of the magazine to deliver me the ammunition.

“I had for twelve months past reflected so much on the various situations of things respecting ourselves and the Continent at large, that my resolution was formed before I left the Council chamber. I resolved to return the order I had received, and immediately repair to Kentucky, knowing that the people would readily fall into my first plan — as what had passed had almost reduced it to a certainty of success. I wrote to the Council and inclosed the order, informing them that I had weighed the matter and found that it was out of my power to convey those stores at my own expense such a distance through an enemy’s country — that I was sorry to find we should have to seek protection elsewhere, which I did not doubt of

getting — that if a country was not worth protecting, it was not worth claiming, etc.

“What passed on the reception of this letter, I can not tell. It was, I suppose, nothing more than what might be expected by a set of gentlemen zealous in the welfare of their country, and fully apprised of what they might expect to take place in Kentucky. I was sent for. Being a little prejudiced in favor of my mother country, I was willing to meet half way.”*

Clark then gives correctly the result. What was done is shown by the record of the Council:

“In Council, Williamsburg, August 23d, 1776.

“Mr. George Rogers Clark having represented to this Board the defenceless state of the inhabitants of Kentucky; and having requested, on their behalf, that they should be supplied with five hundred weight of gun-powder;

“Ordered, therefore, that the said quantity of gun-powder be forthwith sent to Pittsburgh, and delivered to the commanding officer at that station, by him to be safely kept, and delivered to the said George Rogers Clark, or his order, for the use of the said inhabitants of Kentucky.

JOHN PAGE, *Pres't.*

“Test, Arch'd Blair, Cl. Coun.” †

Clark, it will be noticed, says he told the Council that the British officers on the frontiers were making use of every effort to engage the Indians in the war. This, he hardly would have said, for the reason that,

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 116, 117.

† Butler's *Kentucky*, ed. of 1834, p. 394; ed. of 1836, p. 488.

first, such was not the fact, and, second, he had not been in a position to find it out even if true. But his most absurd declaration is, that he at once resolved to send back the order he had received, and immediately return to Kentucky, knowing that the people would readily fall into his first plan, "as what had passed had almost reduced it to a certainty of success." He forgets that the people had not sent him to the Virginia Council at all. He forgets that he had not been requested by the Kentuckians to obtain powder in any quantity. He forgets that he had agreed with his associate Jones, to remain at Williamsburg until the Virginia Assembly had again met. The statement, also, that the Council suggested to Clark that the Kentuckians were a detached people and not yet united to the State of Virginia, and it was uncertain until the sitting of the Assembly whether they would be so united, — would hardly have been made, in view of what had already taken place in the Convention as to the determination of the western limits of Virginia in the constitution it had formed and particularly in view of the action taken upon the petition sent in by the Kentuckians some time before.

That Clark applied for the powder and after some trouble succeeded in getting it and also an order for its transportation to Pittsburgh is certain: but that the circumstances occurred in all the detail given by him years after his success, is inadmissible.

It is probable, however, that since the middle of the previous year, Clark had, as he asserts, reflected much on the various situations of things respecting the Kentucky settlements and "the Continent at large." It agrees with his previous declaration and with the course pursued by him after his return from over the

mountains. But that his reflections thus far had mostly been confined to the carrying out of his plans as developed at the Harrodsburg meeting is evident.*

Upon assembling, in the fall, of the Virginia Legislature, Clark and Jones laid before the members the petition of the Kentucky settlers. "I waited until the fall session," says Clark, "when I was joined by my colleague, Mr. Jones. We laid our papers before the Assembly. They resolved that we could not take our seats as members, but that our business should be attended to. Colonel Henderson, one of the purchasers of the Cherokees, being present, retarded our business. Colonel Arthur Campbell, one of the members, being also opposed to our having a new county, wished us annexed to the county, on the frontiers of which we lay, and which he represented. This caused it to be late in the session (December 7, 1776) before we got a complete establishment of a county by the name of Kentucky." †

The boundaries of the new county corresponded with those of the present State of Kentucky.

The marauds of the savages across the Ohio east and south into the border settlements of Pennsylvania and Virginia (including in the last-named State those of Kentucky), are now to be noticed to the end that a just idea may be formed of the danger, actual and imaginary, which, in 1776, threatened the settlers.

Two prisoners were captured in Kentucky by the Mingo and hurried across the Ohio — fortunately, however, before Morgan had left the Scioto, and they were rescued by him and brought safely to Pittsburg.

* See Appendix to our narrative, Note VIII.

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 117, 118. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note IX.)

Then followed the killing, by a party of Shawanese, of two persons near the Big Bone Lick and the taking of a woman prisoner; but the latter was rescued by a pursuing party of borderers, who killed and scalped two of the Shawanese. In September, it came to the knowledge of Morgan, at Fort Pitt, that a number of Wyandots, two Mingoës and one Ottawa were on the war path down the Hockhocking river, intending to strike the Virginians. The timely warning saved the borderers; for the proper precautions were at once taken, which the savages discovering they returned without striking a blow.

Notwithstanding the treaty at Fort Pitt with the savages late in October, the borderers did not slacken their efforts looking to protection against their inroads. All along the Ohio, on its eastern side, from a considerable distance below Wheeling to Pittsburgh, block-houses were erected at intervals, and the militia "scouted" in the woods in various directions. The most fear was from a gang of Mingoës living at Plug-gystown (now Delaware, Ohio), who had no representation at the Fort Pitt treaty. Before the close of the year, they had committed a number of depredations across the Ohio, killing and making prisoners of the borderers without distinction of sex and regardless of age. Their depredations were at points as far up the Ohio as Grave Creek and as far down that stream as the mouth of the Great Kanawha. At Fort Randolph, a Virginia post at the junction of the river last named with the Ohio, Captain Matthew Arbuckle, in command of its garrison, used his earnest endeavors to keep the Shawanese friendly; notwithstanding which, some of these Indians, in December, went upon

a maraud into the Kentucky settlements, killing three persons.

Such was the extent of the hostile acts of the Indians from the country northwest of the Ohio (among whom as we have seen were the Pluggystown savages, who were a lawless band, without any tribal relation). There was not yet "open war" on the part of any of the nations of that region against the border settlements of the Americans; that is, none of the nations, assembled in solemn council called by the British or their own chiefs, had taken up the hatchet, as yet, to go upon the warpath across the Ohio.

When Clark had finally succeeded not only in securing the five hundred pounds of powder asked for, but in getting it transported to Pittsburg at the expense of Virginia, he wrote to Kentucky giving information of what had been done and recommending that the ammunition be sent for and conveyed to that country by water; but his letter was not received; and, before the two delegates got ready to start home, they learned it had not left Pittsburgh; so they resolved to go that way on their return. They got the powder and with it hurried down the Ohio until a point was reached near where Maysville now stands, where their cargo was secreted. They then proceeded on their journey. At McClelland's Station, after their arrival a party of ten men (including Jones, who went as guide) under John Todd, all on horseback, set out to bring in the powder, Clark meanwhile going on to Harrodsburg. On the twenty-fifth of December they were attacked on the waters of the Licking by Indians, Jones and two others being killed,* and one taken

* See Clark's *Diary* printed in Morehead's *Address*, pp. 161-164. This *Diary*, in general, is very reliable; what few

prisoner. The residue escaped. A second attempt was more successful. On the second of January, 1777, James Harrod raised a company of about thirty men at Harrodsburg (where Clark had arrived some days before) to go after the hidden cargo. They returned without accident with their valuable freight.†

errors occur are mostly inadvertencies—mere slip of the pen. The entry concerning the disaster mentioned above is as follows: “Dec. 25—Ten men going to the Ohio for powder—met on the waters of Licking Creek by Indians and defeated—John G. Jones, William Graden and Josiah Dixon were killed.” (As to the injustice done the memory of Jones by several writers of Western history, see Appendix to our narrative, Note X.)

† Collin's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), pp. 466, 467, 552, 656. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XI.)

CHAPTER III.

SCARCELY had the year 1777 been ushered in when Hamilton, at Detroit, bestirred himself to keep awake the war-spirits of the savages. He was soon written to by Carleton from Quebec: "I am persuaded you will exert your best endeavors," said the Governor, "for the king's service. To your own prudence and judgment, at this distance, much must be left. The Legislative Council is met, but the times will not at present admit of any regulations being made for distant or remote situations. While the commotions continued, the power of the sword is chiefly, and indeed only to be trusted to. The keeping the Indians firm in the king's interest ought to be your first and great object." *

There were of the military force at Detroit, at this date, under command of Captain Lernoult, four companies of the Eighth (or King's) regiment, one company of the Forty-seventh, and two of Butler's Rangers — in all about five hundred. The policy as to the Rangers after Sir William Johnson's time was, to intermix them with the Indians when on service, and to have them commanded, not by regulars, but by "Indian officers;" that is, by officers from the Indian Department.† At first, none but those acquainted

* Carleton to Hamilton, Feb. 2, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.

† The Captains and Lieutenants in the Indian Department were known as "Indian officers" to distinguish them from officers in the regular service or in the militia. This distinction was kept up in all the correspondence of the commandants of the various posts with their superior offices. But it is to be understood those "Indian officers" were never Indians.

with the Indians and their language were admitted to the corps; — afterward, this distinction was not made.

The arrival of several bands of savages at Detroit from their “wintering,” gave Hamilton the strongest assurance that they would prove, in the end,, subservient to his will. Their behavior was such as to commend itself to the Lieutenant Governor, who had previously expressed his desire to meet them and other Indian Deputies of the various nations, in council. He was anxiously awaiting orders from Carleton as to what should be done in their management, and he wrote the Governor that he would detain them from the time of their assembling for a “talk” until he got advices from “below.” “As some of the Delawares appear wavering,” said he, “I have given one of their chiefs a belt with a present, to induce them to come to the council, when I make no doubt they will be influenced as I would wish.”*

The “talk” with the savages, proposed by Hamilton was necessarily delayed. By the middle of June, he wrote Carleton that the Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawattamies, Hurons (Wyandots), and Miamis had arrived; that there were also some Shawanese, Delawares and Weas, but they were few in number. “I shall keep them together,” he said, “as long as possible, in expectation of your Excellency’s orders. Although the majority should return home, I make no doubt of being able to assemble a thousand warriors in three weeks should your Excellency have occasion for their services.”* He did not know that “orders”

* Hamilton to Carleton, May 11, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.

* Hamilton to Carleton, June 15, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.

from even a higher source were on their way authorizing him to employ the savages in the work of devastation and death; such, however, was the fact, as will now be seen.

Before the ending of March, Lord George Germain had written Carleton: "In consideration," said his lordship, "of the measures proper to be pursued in the next campaign, the making a diversion on the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania, by parties of Indians conducted by proper leaders, as proposed by Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, has been maturely weighed. That officer, in his letter to the Earl of Dartmouth, dated at Detroit, the second of September last, said that he had then with him Deputies from the Ottawas, Chippewas, Wyandots, Shawanese, Senecas, Delawares, Cherokees and Pottawatamies that their inclination was for war; and that it was with much difficulty he had restrained them from hostilities, which he thought it his duty to do, finding by a letter from you dated the nineteenth of July, that you had sent back some Ottawas who had offered their services, desiring them to hold themselves in readiness next spring.

"There can be little doubt that the Indians are still in the same disposition and that they will readily and eagerly engage in any enterprise in which it may be thought fit to employ them under the direction of the king's officers; and as it is his Majesty's resolution that the most vigorous efforts should be made, every means employed that providence has put into his Majesty's hands, for crushing the rebellion and restoring the constitution, it is the king's command that you should direct Lieutenant Governor Hamilton to assemble as many of the Indians of his district as

he conveniently can, and placing proper persons at their head, to whom he is to make suitable allowances, to conduct their parties, and restrain them from committing violence on the well affected and inoffensive inhabitants, employ them in making a diversion and exciting an alarm upon the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania. And as there is good ground to believe there are considerable numbers of loyal subjects in those parts who would gladly embrace an opportunity of delivering themselves from the tyranny and oppression of the rebel committees; it is his Majesty's pleasure that you do authorize and direct Lieutenant Governor Hamilton to invite all such loyal subjects to join him and assure them of the same pay and allowances as are given to his Majesty's corps raised in America, and that such of them as shall continue to serve his Majesty until the rebellion is suppressed and peace restored shall each receive his Majesty's bounty of 200 acres of land.

"These offers it is hoped will induce many persons to engage in the king's service; which may enable Lieutenant Governor Hamilton to extend his operations, so as to dividẽ the attention of the rebels, and oblige them to collect a considerable force to oppose him, which cannot fail of weakening their main army and facilitating the operations directed to be carried on against them in other quarters, and thus bring the war to a more speedy issue and restore those deluded people to their former state of happiness and prosperity, which are the favorite wishes of the royal breast and the great object of all his Majesty's measures.

"A supply of presents for the Indians and other necessaries will be wanted for this service, and you

will of course send Lieutenant Governor Hamilton what is proper and sufficient.

"Inclosed is a lot of names of several persons residing on the frontiers of Virginia recommended by Lord Dunmore for their loyalty and attachment to Government and who, his Lordship thinks, will be able to give great assistance to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton through their extensive influence among the inhabitants." *

This letter was sent by Carleton to Hamilton for his "instruction and guidance." "I have only to add," says the Governor, "that Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger has similar orders for the savages of the Five Nations and others. You will, therefore, be careful not to attempt to draw off any destined for his command. Let me know what provisions you want; in the meantime some shall be sent you at a venture." †

The time had now come when the cruel suggestions of Hamilton to Germain — "the making a diversion on the frontiers of Virginia and Pennsylvania by parties of Indians conducted by proper leaders" — was to be acted upon, — the Lieutenant Governor being fully prepared to carry out his murderous plan. It had been devised by the latter with a full knowledge of what the awful consequences would be if adopted by the British government. To him and to him alone is to be charged the baleful proposal — destructive in its conception, and full of calamities and most deadly sorrow and woe.

* Germain to Carleton, March 26, 1777. — Haldimand MSS. (See as to the list of the names sent, of persons supposed to be loyal, *History of the Girty's*, pp. 32, 33.)

† Carleton to Hamilton, May 21, 1777. — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XII.)

The next day after the reception of Carleton's orders, Hamilton called together the savages in council and then delivered to them a war hatchet, which they accepted with a war dance. This was the real beginning of the WESTERN BORDER WAR — the letting loose the "horrible hell-hounds of savage war" upon the exposed frontiers. It was on the seventeenth of June. On the eighteenth he read to the assembled savages a proclamation intended for distribution upon the border.* "By virtue," were its words, "of the power and authority to me given by his Excellency, Sir Guy Carleton, Knight of the Bath, Governor of the Province of Quebec, General and Commander-in-Chief, etc., etc., I assure all such as are inclined to withdraw themselves from the tyranny and oppression of the rebel committees, and take refuge in this settlement, or any of the posts commanded by his Majesty's officers, that they shall be humanely treated; shall be lodged and victualed; and such as are officers in arms and shall use them in defense of his Majesty against rebels and traitors till the extinction of this rebellion, shall receive pay adequate to their former stations in the rebel service; and all common men who shall serve during that period shall receive his Majesty's bounty of two hundred acres of land." † A few of these proclamations, dated subsequently, found

* "Published [June 18th] the Proclamation encouraging the Royalists, to the nations in the Council." — Hamilton's "Journal" of June 16–July 3, 1777: Haldimand MSS. (The "nations" he refers to were the several Indian nations assembled at Detroit and then in council.)

† *Pennsylvania Archives*, First Series, Vol. V, p. 402. From the wording of the proclamation, it is evident that Hamilton based it upon the "Instructions" of Germain as given in his letter to Carleton of the twenty-sixth of March.

their way across the border, being left where incursions were made (and sometimes on the dead bodies of bordermen) by the savages or by Rangers accompanying them.* They were signed by Hamilton as "Lieutenant Governor and Superintendent;" and some were soon read by indignant Whigs in the settlements on the headwaters of the Ohio.

The Lieutenant Governor was not slow in his endeavors, by every means in his power, to engage the savages and fit them out for the aggressive Indian war against the "rebels" which had at his express suggestion and desire, been authorized by Germain. White officers were appointed to go with the warriors; and war-hatchets were sent to the various nations not in the immediate vicinity of Detroit. To the savages who accepted these, ammunition was immediately sent.

Near the middle of July, Hamilton wrote Germain: "Parties are daily setting off for the frontiers, which have with most of them interpreters and are furnished with placards inviting the well-disposed to have recourse to his Majesty's clemency; and towards the last of the month he sent his Lordship, "an account of Indians gone to war" from Detroit:

"Seven parties before the 18th of July..	178
"Interpreters and Rangers	22
"From the 18th to the 27th [of July]	
eight parties	III
"Indian officers and Rangers	8
"Total	319

"I have no particular account of the distant nations except the Miamis [at the head of the Maumee,] who,

* *Pennsylvania Archives*, First Series, vol. V, p. 741. Compare, in this connection, Farmer's *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 249.

I am told, are, most of them, preparing to set out with some volunteer whites from their villages.

Parties are forming daily [at Detroit], and a perfect cheerfulness and obedience has appeared hitherto.”*

Hamilton sent Germain another letter, early in September, wherein he said: “At the best computation which can be made eleven hundred and fifty warriors are now dispersed over the frontiers. Seven hundred are on the list who have had their equipment or at least ammunition from this place [Detroit]”

The officers [that is, white men — “Indian officers”] who have been appointed to the savages have gone to war with them, and some of them acquitted themselves well.”†

Now that Hamilton might better confer with Carleton concerning public affairs, he concluded to make a flying visit to Montreal and Quebec. He left Detroit in the early days of September, having been preceded a considerable time by Captain Lernoult.

Because of the success of the “rebels” to the eastward, Carleton became alarmed lest the Western posts

* Hamilton to Germain, July 24 and 27, 1777. — Haldimand MSS. “Hamilton, the lieutenant-governor of Detroit, in obedience to orders from the secretary of state [Lord George Germain] sent out fifteen several parties, consisting in the aggregate of two hundred and eighty-nine braves with thirty white officers and rangers.” [Bancroft — *History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 168.] This, it will be seen, is taken from the letter just cited; but, as given by that historian, it is indefinite. “White officers” might include Detroit militia or even regulars; whereas, as the letter shows, the whites were interpreters, “Indian officers,” and Rangers; the first and last mentioned may or may not have been officers.

† Hamilton to Germain, Sept. 5, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.

might be menaced; so he sent orders on the twenty-first to have Hamilton repair immediately to Detroit. "I shall order," said he, "Captain Lernoult there as soon as possible which will settle all matters that have been in dispute." * And three days after, he wrote the Niagara commandant [Lieutenant Colonel Mason Bolton] that he understood a disagreement had happened at Detroit, between the officer, Captain John Mompesson, who had commanded there in the absence of Captain Lernoult, and Hamilton, "which," said he, "must be attended with bad consequences to the king's service." "I am to desire," he continued, "you will order Captain Lernoult to return and take the command of that post, on whose judgment and discretion I can thoroughly rely to put an end to these animosities. I make no doubt he will be an aid and assistant to Mr. Hamilton in all things in his department and in forwarding everything else which may tend to the public good." †

In the first half of October Hamilton returned to Detroit, giving his whole time, immediately upon his arrival, to public affairs. And not long thereafter Captain Lernoult again was in command of the Detroit garrison.

* Carleton to Cramahe, Sept. 21, 1777. — Haldimand MSS. Hamilton was then in Quebec. See a letter of that date written there, but without signature (generally, although erroneously, ascribed to John Dodge), published in Almon's *Remembrances*, vol. VI, and in the *Virginia Gazette* July 17, 1779, concerning Hamilton's official oppression at Detroit. This letter is also printed in full in Farmer's *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 173.

† Same to Col. Bolton, Sept. 24, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.

Turning our attention from Detroit to the settlements upon the upper waters of the Ohio, we shall see that, early in 1777, small war parties of savages made their appearance therein. However, these marauds were only the casual droppings of the rain before the pitiless storm — Hamilton at Detroit, as already shown, not having, until the beginning of summer, sent his Indian allies, armed and equipped, against the border settlements to kill and destroy. The most serious trouble continued from the Pluggystown Indians. Preparations were set on foot to punish these savages, by Virginia; but the undertaking was finally laid aside for fear of offending the Delawares, upon the Muskingum and the neutral Shawanese farther to the westward.

As early as September, 1775, Virginia wisely garrisoned the dilapidated Fort Pitt and held possession of it until the first day of June, 1777, when General Edward Hand of the Continental army arrived and assumed the chief command of the Western Department. In August following, Mingoes from the Scioto, Wyandots from the Sandusky, with a few Shawanese and Delawares crossed the Ohio to attack Fort Henry (formerly Fort Fincastle) at Wheeling. It was the first attempt by the Indians against the frontier, in force, after Hamilton's virtual declaration of war against the borderers. Fifteen Americans were killed and five wounded. Soon after, at a distance below the fort, the Wyandots attacked, on the east side of the Ohio, a reconnoitering expedition sent out from Wheeling, killing twenty-one, wounding several, and capturing one. When, finally, the Shawanese all joined the hostile nations, there could no longer be any

doubt but open war had been resolved upon all the Ohio Indians (except the Delawares and possibly the Wyandots, notwithstanding Morgan had made strenuous efforts to induce them to hold another council with him at Pittsburgh.

At the date of Hamilton's being made Lieutenant Governor of Detroit, David Abbott was appointed to a like office for Vincennes; but he did not reach his post until the nineteenth of May, 1777. He met with a cordial welcome from the inhabitants, mostly French Canadians, whom he required to take an oath of fidelity to his Government. He formed three companies of militia; but the savages of the Wabash gave him considerable trouble. "The Indians are striving," he wrote, "to set the French [meaning the Vincennes people] against the English Government and have told many of them I should not live long. I am endeavoring to secure myself as well as I can, by stockading the cabin I am in. I have likewise desired Monsieur Rocheblave to send me four pieces of cannon from the Illinois, which he writes he has done." *

Towards the close of the year Abbott wrote that his stockade was half finished and would be completed in a fortnight.† It was named Fort Sackville.‡

* Abbott to Carleton, July 9, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.; and Rocheblave to the former, June 1, 1777 — in same. The cannon were iron and were sent on the second of June

† Abbott to Carleton, Nov. 23, 1777. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ The old cathedral at the end of Second street [in Vincennes] marks the spot of the beginning of Caucasian civilization in Indiana, while hard by it on the river bank stood the first rude fort in Indiana, and a little later the stronger Fort Sackville." (E. A. Bryan, in "Indiana's First

During the next January he determined to leave his post and return to Detroit. His reasons were to avoid the large expense for presents to the savages (who were soon expected from their "hunt") which he would be compelled to incur or exasperation on their part would follow. He started from Vincennes on the third day of February, 1778, and after a painful journey through the woods arrived with his family at Detroit on the seventh of March, — leaving J. M. P. Legras in command of the militia upon his departure.

While at Vincennes, Abbott used every effort to keep the Wabash Indians firm in their alliance with his Government, nevertheless, so much was he hampered with a scarcity of supplies that, in reality, as his letters to his superiors show, his aid amounted to little; hence it was that the savages near him were inclined to listen to Spanish emissaries, and were at times open in their declarations of friendship also for the "Long Knives." The borderers in Kentucky, therefore, (and Clark was of the number), put too much stress upon the help given the Indians at Vincennes. The Lieutenant Governor's policy had been not to directly encourage the savages to make war upon the inoffensive settlers on the border of Virginia; however, though he deplored their marauds, his giving presents of ammunition and other warlike stores to the Indians, helped them to carry on their murderous visitations.

Settlement" — *Magazine of American History*, vol. XXI, p. 394.) It was, however, some years after the abandonment of the French fort before Abbott erected Fort Sackville, and the two evidently did not occupy the same ground.

The policy inaugurated by Captain Lord at the Illinois and bequeathed by him, upon his retiring from that command to Rocheblave, was not to excite the savages to take up the hatchet against the Americans, but to hold them in the interest of his Government generally. Rocheblave continued to act upon it; and thus it was that no war-parties were sent out by him against the Kentucky settlements. Even had he been otherwise inclined, he was without supplies or funds to procure them to fit out Indians for war. To June, 1777, it had not been, as we have seen, the policy of any one in command in the West to send warriors against the American border across the Ohio; and the most that Rocheblave had done was, to encourage a war chief of the Kickapoos on the Illinois river, in the late spring of the year last mentioned, to visit Hamilton at Detroit. During the residue of the time the Illinois commander held his office — only a twelve-month — his hands were completely tied, so that at the end he could only aver that the Indians were in general well enough disposed toward the English, but that it was difficult to control them with the small militia force at his command; and that all he could do was to destroy the impressions made by the Spanish and by emissaries of the Americans upon their minds.*

As the Spaniards occupied the west side of the Mississippi at St. Louis and St. Genevieve, their proximity and evident leaning toward the Americans made them, particularly, objects of annoyance and alarm to Rocheblave. The movement also of Captain James Willing in an armed boat down the Ohio from Pittsburgh, on his way to attack the British planters be-

* Rocheblave to Carleton. — Haldimand MSS. (See Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 417.)

low, on the left side of the Mississippi, gave the Illinois commandant much uneasiness. He continued to keep the Governor of Canada well-informed of all things which to his mind seemed of interest or importance, down to the fourth day of July, 1778, when his letter-writing suddenly terminated. The "fraudulent neutrality" he declared, on that day, of the Spaniards, was what gave him still the most concern. What he denied above all things was, that a body of troops should be sent to the Illinois; as he plainly saw there was trouble ahead — "a numerous band of brigands" would establish "a chain of communication," not easily to be broken, between the Colonists and the Spaniards.* Little did he imagine, however, that almost within sight, marching down upon him, not with banners unfurled nor with drums beating, was a "band," not of "brigands" but of patriots, who would, all too soon for his quietude, fulfill his prophecy to the letter.

*Id. (The entire letter is translated into English, on pp. 412-418, of the work last cited.) In speaking of Rocheblave's career, Mr. Mason says (p. 368): "His services were especially valuable in regard to the Indians among whom his military experience and long association with them as a French partisan gave him influence, and *he kept the tribes in his neighborhood quiet*, and the routes of the Ohio and Mississippi open for a considerable time by personal efforts alone [the italicising is mine]."

CHAPTER IV.

Now that Virginia had erected west of the Big Sandy river and the Cumberland mountains, the county of Kentucky, the next step was its organization. This was effected in the spring of 1777 according to law and in the same manner as other counties had been organized. A county seat — Harrodsburg, as it was now generally called — was established; justices of the peace were appointed (who jointly constituted a county court), also a sheriff and clerk. A county lieutenant — John Bowman — was commissioned, but did not reach Harrodsburg until the second of September. Clark was commissioned major.* By the fifth of March, he had the militia enrolled. Owing to their small number (three companies: one at Boonesborough, under Captain Daniel Boone; one at Logan's Fort, under Captain Benjamin Logan; and one at Harrodsburg under Captain James Harrod) no lieutenant colonel was appointed and no colonel. Be-

* "In this visit [to 'Harrods town,' in 1775], he [Clark] either had a commission of major, or was from his service in Dunmore's War and prominent talents, voluntarily placed at the head of the irregular troops, then in Kentucky. He himself only speaks of settling in the fall of '77, the accounts of the Kentucky militia which would confirm the idea of his previous command, besides being known at that time as Major Clark." — Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 37. It is certain, however, that Clark had no commission whatever in Kentucky until that of major was given him in the early part of 1777. It is probable that his commission was dated before the tenth of March, as, on that day, Governor Henry speaks of a field officer of Kentucky militia see Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 44), in such was as to raise the presumption one had already been commissioned.

sides the three captains, there were commisisoned the usual officers under them. Finally, in order that the county might be represented in the Virginia Legislature, two burgesses — John Dodd and Richard Callaway — were chosen on the nineteenth of April.* They set off for Williamsburg on the twenty-third of May.†

The first blow, in 1777, of the savages in the West, fell upon the settlers of Kentucky county; but Clark was wide awake and used every exertion in his power in defense of the settlements. Not having the Delawares and those Shawanese who remained friendly to the borders, to interpose a barrier between themselves and the Indians already won over to British interests, as had the frontier men, to a certain extent, upon the upper waters of the Ohio, the inhabitants quickly felt the effects of Hamilton's insidious "talks," even before he had delivered the war-hatchet to his dusky allies. Governor Henry was not asleep to the danger threatening the Kentucky pioneers. He had reason to believe that, with the return of Spring, savage marauds across the Ohio would be frequent and he feared, as a consequence the few stations would be entirely broken up. However, he would avert the calamity if possible:

"You are to embody," he wrote the County Lieutenant of Montgomery county on the tenth of March, "fifty men of your militia under the usual officers, and order them to Kentucky. In conjunction with fifty others from Botetourt, they are to protect and defend

* Clark's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address*, p. 162.

† Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 615. But that writer substitutes, doubtless inadvertently, Richmond for Williamsburg.

the settlers there 'til further orders. In case it shall be judged impossible to hold the country with this reinforcement joined to the inhabitants there, they are to escort all the people with their effects to the nearest place of safety, and then to disband, if no other orders are given by me or by my direction.

"This detachment to Kentucky must be victualed there as I understand provisions are plenty and cheap.

"The great variety of war in which this State is engaged, makes it impossible to spare such a number of men for this expedition as I could wish; and also requires that you raise the men in the interior parts of your county least liable to invasion.

"You will give the officer you send orders conformable to the above. If a field officer of Kentucky should be on the spot, he will take the command; if not, the eldest captain that commands the reinforcement."

The Governor added: "There is powder, I hear arrived at Kentucky. Lead must be had with you. An order accompanies this."*

To the officers who would command the force marching to the help of Kentucky, the Virginia executive, on the twenty-ninth, gave explicit instructions: "The quantity of provisions," said he, "and the number of pack-horses are great, but the service being necessary, it must be done, though I hope it may be conducted on the cheapest terms circumstances will allow. I suppose the meat must be had in your parts, but the flour had better be obtained out at the Great Island, or purchased and taken with you and wagoned to that place, where there are a number of public

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 44.

horses that may be taken to carry it to Kentucky. Let the horses be brought immediately and left at such place as Col. Shelby directs, as they may be wanted again to visit the Cherokees; and without them great inconvenience may arise. The officer commanding your militia must pass his receipt for all the public property he receives.

“It is impossible to prescribe the time the reinforcements are to serve at Kentucky. They must stay as long as the preservation of the lives of the people make it absolutely necessary and no longer. I expect you will employ proper persons to get the provisions on the most frugal plan. Certainly some allowance might be made for wild meat, and so some abatement in the number of pack-horses and other charges. I need not tell you of the necessity of frugality, arising from the great extent and variety of military operations that altogether bring on monstrous expense to the State. I would send up ammunition but have no conveyance. If the quantity necessary can be had your way, it shall be replaced from here by the first wagon. Major Bledsøe has orders to deliver the pack-horses necessary out of the public horses near the Great Island. I hope less than you mention will do.”*

Clark's daily record of events while acting as major of the Kentucky militia is full of interest. These are the incidents he notes from February to (and including) the nineteenth of April following; he was then at Harrodsburg:

“February.— Nothing remarkable done.

* *Id.*, p. 53.

“March 5.— Militia of the county [Kentucky] embodied.

March 6.— Thomas Shores and William Ray killed at the Shawanese Spring [by Indians].

March 7.— The Indians attempted to cut off from the fort [Harrodsburg] a small party of our men. A skirmish ensued. We had four men wounded and some cattle killed. We killed and scalped one Indian and wounded several.

“March 8.— Brought in corn from the different cribs until the 18th day.

“March 9.— Express sent to the settlement [i. e., over the mountains, probably to Williamsburg]. Ebenezer Corn and company arrived from Captain Linn on the Mississippi.

“March 18.— A small party of Indians killed and scalped Hugh Wilson, about half a mile from the fort [Harrodsburg], near night and escaped.

“March 19.— Archibald McNeal died of his wounds received on the 7th inst. [in the skirmish at Harrodsburg].

“March 28.— A large party of Indians attacked the stragglers about the fort [Harrodsburg], killed and scalped Garret Pendergrast, — killed or took prisoner Peter Flin.

“April 7.— Indians killed one man at Boonesborough, and wounded one.

“April 8.— Stoner arrived with news from the settlement [east of the mountains].

“April 16.— Doran Brown and company arrived from the Cumberland river.

“April 19.—John Todd and Richard Callaway elected burgesses. James Berry married to widow Wilson.”*

While over the mountains as a delegate to the Virginia Convention the year previous, Clark made himself well acquainted with the contents of the letter captured in 1775, written by Connolly to Captain Lord at Kaskaskia.† The information thus obtained was not lost upon him. Besides, it is highly probable that while he was at Pittsburg, on his return with his companion Jones to Kentucky, he had a conference with George Morgan concerning the feasibility of attacking the British posts to the northwestward and westward; and that Morgan laid before him his plan for that purpose so far as the Illinois towns were concerned, informing him also of his endeavors just before to obtain information of affairs there. It is not at all surprising, therefore, that, while floating down the Ohio with his cargo of powder, he should have “brooded over the conquest of the land to the north of that river.”‡ Nor is it a matter of wonder that, in Harrodsburg, in the Spring following, we find him, notwithstanding his onerous duties in defending the settlements, pondering over, so far as he understood it, the true condition of the British posts on the frontiers, which, “since the beginning of the war,” he had taken pains to make himself acquainted with.

* Clarke's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address*, p. 162. Compare Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 615.

† Botta's *istory of the War of Independence*, vol. I, p. 250.

‡ Bancroft's *History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310. “While floating down the Ohio in 1776, being then twenty-four years of age, he [Clark] conceived the conquest of the country beyond [that is, northwest of]

In his reflections upon the condition of the various British posts northwest of the Ohio, Major Clark had his attention particularly called to Vincennes. This was the nearest white settlement held by the British; and it was his belief that numerous war parties were there fitted out to go against the Americans. This erroneous idea was the result of his knowing nothing of the state of affairs there, and of his ignorance of the temper of the Indians of the Wabash valley generally. While many of these savages expressed their interest in the new order of things, the war hatchet sent by Hamilton was not accepted by any of the nations on that river during the year 1777.

Clark soon made up his mind that the proximity of the hostile nations of the Wabash valley (for, as we have seen, he was fully persuaded of their evil intent against the Kentucky settlements) would make any undertaking against Vincennes extra hazardous. So he banished all thought concerning that town from his mind, giving his attention now to the Illinois. Evidently, from what knowledge he had previously obtained it seemed to him that that country might be successfully invaded by the Americans; and he would know more of the condition of things there, if possible; so, on the twentieth of April he "sent express to the Illinois" (as he says in his diary), two young men of the militia of Harrodsburg — Benjamin Linn and Samuel Moore, who went by canoe down the Cumberland* probably to avoid the Indians. They

the river." — Hinsdale's *The Old Northwest*, p. 153. But it is certain he laid no plans then and there to effect that conquest.

* Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 615.

returned on the twenty-second of June,* giving Clark late and valuable information.†

The Major was told by the two "spies," that the people of the Illinois had but little expectation of a visit from Americans, but that things were kept in good order; the militia trained that they might, should they be attacked, be prepared, "that the greatest pains were taken to inflame the minds of the French inhabitants against the Americans;" nevertheless, the two visitors discovered traces of affection for them in some of the inhabitants. They also reported that the Indians in that quarter were engaged in the war;‡ but this declaration could not have applied to such as were strictly Illinois savages: these had not taken up the hatchet, as already shown.

The situation at Kaskaskia and throughout the British Illinois, it is evident, had been intelligently observed by Linn and Moore; but there were several items of information communicated by them to Clark which the latter does not mention in his Memoir, but which, nevertheless, became subsequently of great importance to him. He was told, of course, that Rocheblave commanded there; that there were "many pieces of cannon" in Fort Gage, with considerable amount of military stores, and that the fort was occupied "by

* Clark makes these entries in his Diary as to Linn and Moore: "April 20. — Ben. Linn and Samuel Moore went express to the Illinois."

"June 22. — Ben. Linn and Samuel Moore arrived from the Illinois." (See Morehead's *Address*, p. 162.)

† Appendix to our narrative, Note XIII.

‡ Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 118, 119.

a very weak garrison."* Now, the two "spies" also reported the good intentions of Rocheblave's neighbors — the Spaniards — toward the Americans, which Clark forgot to mention in his list, as also that the Illinois commandant kept a close watch upon the Mississippi below, and also for some distance above the mouth of the Ohio.† But it is certain that the two men did not visit Vincennes on their trip, either in going to Kaskaskia, or on their return from that post. It is clear from all the evidence extant that Clark became more and more impressed as the months wore away, with the feasibility of attacking the Illinois towns — that they might be captured with a comparatively small force of Americans: it was an idea of his; and there can be no doubt it was "locked up in his own bosom;" but it was only an idea — no movement — no effort — no "overt act" — was there, on his part, towards carrying this idea into execution while attending to his duties as major in the Kentucky settlements, unless, indeed, the sending of Linn and Moore to the Illinois be considered such.

A Kentucky writer makes this showing as to Clark being thoroughly awakened to the necessity of conquering the posts in possession of the British beyond the Ohio:

"He [Clark] had, as an adventurer, visited Kentucky in 1775. As her delegate, he had claimed her

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 584, 585. At the very time of the departure of the two "spies" from the Illinois, as we have already seen, Rocheblave sent some of the cannon to Vincennes — leaving Fort Gage, June 2 (Rocheblave to Abbott, June 1, 1777: Haldimand MSS.

† But, in other parts of his *Memoir*, Clark discloses the fact that he had been put in possession of the two last items of information mentioned above.

recognition by the authorities of the parent State in 1776 — through his agency her institutions were established. He had returned to the frontier to participate in the struggles of the feeble stations for existence. The British government was then in possession of the military posts of Detroit, Vincennes and Kaskaskia, and diffused an influence among the north-western Indian tribes, which, if properly directed, might have operated most prejudicially to the American cause. With characteristic forecast, Clark perceived that, to these sources of influence, were mainly attributed the habitually inflamed passions and unre-mitted depredations of those savages, and especially the determined and systematic onsets which, throughout the year 1777, were made on the frontier stations. The reduction of these posts became, therefore, in his estimation, a cardinal object of his policy. He believed that upon their destruction the fate of the settlements depended. He had moreover become apprised that a plan had been conceived by the Governor of Vincennes to be carried into execution on the return of Spring, to combine a large British and Indian force for offensive operations against Kentucky, the consequences of which, if successful, years of persevering effort might not retrieve.”*

The unfairness, in this statement, of giving Clark (the writer not once mentioning Jones) all the credit for establishing Kentucky's institutions, is evident. As to “systematic onsets” being made in 1777 by the savages on the Kentucky settlements — they were generally very far from it. Neither did the reduction of the British military posts beyond the Ohio, be-

* Morehead's *Address*, p. 60.

come in Clark's estimation, a cardinal object of policy, nor did he believe that upon their destruction depended the fate of the settlements. There is no evidence of a contemporaneous character that Clark had been apprised of a combined movement from Vincennes; but, if he had really been so informed, it was a false report.

Fully to make plain the labor and responsibility resting upon Clark (finally shared by Colonel Bowman), it is necessary to record the principal events occurring during the spring and summer, in the settlements. Notwithstanding the fort at Harrodsburg, on the thirteenth of January,* had been strengthened by the refugees from McClelland's fort, it was attacked (or working-parties or others near it were) by hostile Shawanese three times during the month of March; also once in April, once in May, again in June, once in August, and still another time in September.† But none of these assaults can be considered, in any light, as regular sieges.‡ In the last, if tradition is to be realized upon, Clark was hotly engaged with the savages and killed one of their number.§

Boonsborough, on the twenty-fourth of April was attacked by a considerable number of Indians, but being destitute of artillery and scaling ladders, they could effect but little. Some of the settlers, however, were killed and the corn and cattle in the vicinity partially destroyed; but the savages met with so spirited a resistance as to compel them to retire with precip-

* Clark's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address*, p. 162.

† Id., pp. 162, 163. (See as to many particulars, Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), pp. 610-613.)

‡ See Appendix, Note XIV.

§ Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 44.

itation. The Indians made their appearance again on the twenty-third of May. Of this visit, Clark wrote: "A large party of Indians attacked Boonesborough fort; kept a warm fire until 11 o'clock at night; began it next morning and kept a hot fire until midnight, attempting several times to burn the fort; three of our men were wounded — not mortally; the enemy suffered considerably."* This nearest resembles a siege as carried on by civilized armies of any of the efforts of the savages against the stations during the year.

In June, a small party of Indians was pursued from the fort to the Ohio river, and one of their number killed.†

Logan's fort was assailed by Indians on the thirtieth of May. They killed and scalped William Hudson and wounded Burr Harrison and John Kennedy. Harrison died on the thirteenth of June. But the fort was beset by the savages only on the day first mentioned.‡

In attending to his duties as major of the Kentucky militia, Clark was constantly engaged until near the close of September, the principal direction of affairs having devolved upon him until the arrival, on the first of August, at Boonesborough, of County-Lieutenant John Bowman, who finally reached Harrodsburg, as before stated on the second of September.

* Clark's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address* p. 162.

† Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1882), vol. II, p. 528.

‡ Clark's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address*, p. 162. It was no siege, in the strict sense of the word, western historical accounts to the contrary, notwithstanding. (See Appendix to our narrative, Notes XIV and XV.) Some of the dates in Boone's *Narrative* (written by Filson) differ from those given in Clark's *Diary*; but the latter authority is the most reliable.

Towards the middle of September, it began to look as if there would soon be an end to all settlements in the new Virginia county. Savage incursions, it was plainly to be seen, were on the increase. It had already become evident that war-parties of Indians were being fitted out by Hamilton at Detroit and sent against the Kentucky stations. His proclamation, of the month of June, mention of which has previously been made, was found upon a borderer who had been killed and scalped, placed there so as to be seen by the settlers who might discover the body.*

“Commencing,” says a Kentucky author, “with the date of his (Clark’s) return from Virginia toward the close of the year 1776 [with his associate, Jones], he embodied in a journal some hasty memoranda of the principal occurrences of the year 1777, and the venerable relic has been kindly placed into my hands. The information communicated by it justifies me in repeating that the year 1777 was one of severe trial to the emigrants. Scarcely a day elapsed without bringing with it an attack on some one of the stations, or a skirmish with the savages, or the surprise of a hunting party — seldom unaccompanied with loss of lives. Boonesbor-

*“During 1777, the war bands organized at Detroit were sent against the country round Pittsburg; while the feeble forts in the far western wilderness [Kentucky], were only troubled by smaller war parties raised among the tribes on their own account.” (Roosevelt — *The Winning of the West*, vol. 11, p. 11.) But it is certain that some of Hamilton’s war parties of 1777, went against Kentucky as well as against the Virginia borderers farther up the Ohio and the Pennsylvania frontier settlements. (Compare, in this connection, Farmer’s *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 249.

ough, Harrodsburg and Logan's fort — the three prominent settlements — were successively besieged with great obstinacy. During a period of more than six weeks, the Indians seem never for a moment to have abandoned the country. They hovered around the stations — haunted the traces that led to them — skulked through the forests — concealed themselves in canebrakes — always ready to avail themselves of whatever advantages might occur. Yet the whole effective military force of the settlers consisted at this time of about one hundred men: Boonesborough contained twenty-two; Harrodsburg, sixty-five; Logan's fort, fifteen.”*

But this account, strictly speaking, is overdrawn in one particular: neither of the stations mentioned were, as we have before stated, besieged; although, as already shown, they several times suffered attacks — the latter not being in any sense sieges as carried on by civilized armies.

Additional conclusions may also be drawn from Clark's diary as to his career while in command of the Kentucky militia. It does not appear (and it is probably not the fact) that he engaged personally in many of the conflicts with the savages; his position did not require it; besides, as he had the general direction of affairs so far as the militia was concerned, in the absence of Col. Bowman, the county lieutenant, not yet arrived at Harrodsburg, it would have been out of place for him to have constantly risked his life. His activity was great, however, not only in directing parties against the savages, but as we have before said in sending expresses to various parts. Doubtless the

* Morehead's *Address*, p. 58.

one sent to Fort Pitt was for ammunition, as it was supposed by him that a Virginian still commanded there, he not knowing of the arrival of General Hand, a Continental officer. As to one matter, tradition is undoubtedly to be relied upon — that he enjoyed the full confidence of the settlers and was highly esteemed for his display of good judgment in the direction of military affairs. By no means, however, was he a hero — an idol — of the borderers, as enthusiastic and credulous writers concerning his efforts during the year 1777 in Kentucky, persistently declare. He acted thoughtfully, discreetly, gallantly, but not more heroically than others who fought in defense of the settlements.*

And now, caused by the arrival, on the thirteenth of September, of a company of forty-eight militia from the east at Boonesborough, bringing intelligence that one hundred and fifty more were on the way, there began to be a return of confidence among the borderers and a feeling of greater security in the settlements, increased materially by the appearance of Captain John Montgomery with thirty-eight militia at Logan's fort on the second of October, and of Captain Charles G. Watkins with fifty at Boonesborough a few days thereafter. Meanwhile, however, a militia company that had been sometime in the settlements started on their return home.† Thence forward to

* See Appendix, Note XVI, of this narrative.

† Clark's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address*, p. 163. "In October Clark, in his *Diary*, records meeting fifty men with their families, (therefrom permanent settlers), on their way to Boon [Boonesborough], and thirty-eight men on their way to Logan's." (Roosevelt — *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 18n.) But that writer wholly misconstrues Clark's entries.

the end of the year the appearance of savage war parties was less frequent, and the few stations had strengthened.

Sometime during the summer Clark had determined to leave the Kentucky settlements. He had, as he declares, just reasons known to few but himself that occasioned him to resolve not to have any farther command whatever, unless he should find a very great call for troops and his country in danger. In that event, he was determined to give his life rather than the cause should be lost. To carry out his newly-conceived plans, whatever they were, he would first go to Williamsburg and settle his accounts with the State as an officer of the militia of Kentucky county; and he would go before winter set in. What plans he had formulated in his mind for the future is not known. It is certain, however, that they had no reference to his holding any military office.*

Having arranged all matters in which he was interested, both of a public and private nature, Clark,

* Clark to George Mason, of Gunston Hall, Virginia, from "Louisville, Falls of the Ohio, Nov'r 19, 1779." See *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, (Cincinnati: Robert Clark & Co., 1869), pp. 21-23. I have not hesitated to follow this letter (written, as it was, so soon after the events which it describes and to one to whom he would most likely write with great care) with the greatest confidence in its truthfulness. It contains but very few errors and these only slips of the memory, or of his pen, with here and there slight exaggerations of facts. It is by far the most important of all the American documents extant bearing upon our narrative. It was written by Clark when at his best, and was wholly unknown to early writers of Western history. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XVII.)

on the first day of October,* set out on horseback† from Harrodsburg, on his journey to Williamsburg by way of the Wilderness Road, intending, after reaching the settlements, to stop at his old home to visit his parents and go thence to the Virginia capital. He started with a company of twenty-two men; all would have been on the way two days previous but for the fact of their horses having been lost in the woods. Clark was leaving Kentucky not intending to return, as his own statement clearly shows: "After disengaging myself from Kentucky, I set out for Williamsburg."‡ He celebrated the initiatory proceedings of bidding farewell to the West by "swapping" horses. The bold pioneers of the day had, many of them, a passion for horse-trading, from which, it seems from his own record, Clark himself was not exempt.§

On the third of October, there was a large addition to Clark's company — of men, women and children returning to their former homes, discouraged by the hardships they had encountered and particularly disheartened because of savage aggressions. On the Wilderness Road, they made slow progress, averag-

* By a slip of his memory, Clark in his letter to Mason of Nov. 19, 1779, gives the date as "in August, 1777" (see *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 21); but he had previously written in his Diary the true date (compare Morehead's *Address*, p. 163). And this is repeated in his *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 119.

† Lyman C. Draper, in Appleton's *Cyclopedia of American Biography* (art. "George Rogers Clark"), says the journey was made on foot. This is a palpable error.

‡ Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 21.

§ Clark's *Diary* — Morehead's *Address*, p. 163. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XVIII.)

ing from fifteen to twenty miles a day only. For food, their dependence was mostly on beeves, which were driven along to be slaughtered as occasion might require. At Rockcastle river, a buffalo was killed and two at Cumberland ford.

But we will let Clark himself give the particulars of his journey to the "ford:"

"Wednesday, Oct. 1.— I start for the settlement [i. e., for Williamsburg] — 22 men; got to Logan's 20 miles.

"Oct. 2.— Captain [John] Montgomery arrived at Logan's with 38 men, and says that Capt. [Charles G.] Watkins would be in, in a day or two.

"Oct. 3.— Started on our journey; Capt. Pawling and company likewise — 76 in all, besides women and children, and took beeves from Whitley, of G —; camped at Pettit's, 16 miles.

"Oct. 4.— Rain in the morning; camped on Skagg's creek, 18 miles.

"Oct. 5.— Early start; spies killed a buffalo; camped one-half mile from the Hazle Patch, 9 miles cross Rockcastle river; 20 miles — *all safe*.

"Oct. 6.— Early start; camped on Laurel river; marched 14 miles; killed a beef.

"Oct. 7.— Waited for Skaggs; — he not coming to us, we killed a few deer.

"Oct. 8.— Skaggs came to us and went back for his skins.

"Oct. 9.— Lost our beeves; marched three miles; crossed Laurel river and camped on the bank.

"Oct. 10.— Early start; camped on Richland creek, 17 miles, where we met Capt. Charles G. Watkins on his march to Boone's with fifty men and [some] families; scarce of food.

“Oct. 11.— Marched to Cumberland ford, 18 miles; killed two buffaloes; Indians about us.”*

But Clark was not yet out of the interminable woods. On the twelfth he makes this entry in his diary: “Crossed the R. and C. mountains; encamped in Powell’s valley, 4 miles from the [Cumberland] Gap; in the whole 19 miles. On the thirteenth he writes: “Late start; got to Martin’s, 18 miles.”†

After getting fairly out of the wilderness, Clark no longer traveled with the returning emigrants, but left them on the sixteenth. Alone he pursued his journey until meeting “Captain Campbell,” with whom, for a considerable distance, he kept company. He paid little regard to houses of entertainment, — “taverns,” as they were called; “hotels” were unknown; — but “put up” at any settler’s house which might be near when night came on. From Harrodsburg to his father’s residence was six hundred and twenty miles, by the route he traveled. He was on the road a month before reaching the paternal roof. He had brought a gun with him but had no use for it, now that he was at his home; so he disposed of it for £ 15.

After one day’s stay with his parents, he renewed his journey, reaching Wililamsburg on the fifth of November. Upon his arrival, he “lodged at Anderson’s and had a confirmation of Burgoyne’s surrender.” The next day he bought a ticket in the State lottery which cost him three pounds sterling. He then called upon the Auditors of State to settle his acocunts as to the Kentucky militia; but, in doing this, he was detained from the seventh to the eighteenth.

* *Clark’s Diary* — Morehead’s *Address*, p. 163.

† *Ibid.*

The cause of the delay was this: When his pay rolls were laid before those officers, although they were properly authenticated, there were scruples in the minds of these functionaries as to the issuing of warrants for payments of the militia, because, instead of being on actual duty, they had been "obliged, for their own personal safety, and the security of their wives and children, to keep themselves in forts, and remain on the defensive against parties of Indians continually infesting that country, too numerous to permit the inhabitants to return to their plantations." The Governor was appealed to decide the matter and he at once referred it to the House of Delegates,* — that body ordering their payment, amounting to £ 726.†

Again Clark went to his father's home, which he reached on the twenty-second of November‡ — to make a long visit during the winter, shall we say? Thus to conclude would be natural enough, in view of his recent journey through the almost interminable woods of the West; but his (as will presently be seen) was the spirit of unrest — of action — and there were plans revolving in his mind that would necessarily call him away; but "they were known only to a few." That they were not in any way appertaining to public affairs is all that is now to be learned of them.

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 116. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XIX.)

† Appendix, Note XX.

‡ Id. There is no contemporaneous evidence — no declaration of Clark himself given at the time — that, in thus returning to his father's house, it was "to get a glimpse of his people before again plunging into the wilds," on some daring expedition, as a recent writer informs his readers (see Roosevelt, in *The Winning of the West*, vol.

CHAPTER V.

SCARCELY two weeks had elapsed after Clark's leaving Williamsburg before he returned, to make arrangements concerning some business affairs wholly his own. "On my arrival in town," he says, "I found, to appearance, friends in many gentlemen of note, who offered their influence to me in case I should apply for any post. Many were surprised that I would not solicit for some berth. I must confess that I think myself often to blame for not making use of influence for my promotion, but to merit it first is such a fixed principle with me that I never could, and I hope never shall ask for a post of honor; as I think the public ought to be the best judge whether a person deserves it or not: if he does, he will certainly be rewarded according to the worth he has."*

That Clark was not slow in learning the condition of affairs concerning the war (so far as those best informed at the capital of the State understood it) there can be no doubt. "Finding," says he, "that we were in [an] alarming situation, the Indians desperate on one side, the Britains on the other, immediately resolved to encourage an expedition to the Illinois."†

II, p. 36.) Such an inference can only be drawn from Clark's words written years subsequent to his return to his home and which are not entitled to any evidence. (See the following chapter.)

* Clark to Mason—*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 22.

† Ibid. (See concerning Clark's erroneous statements made years subsequent to this as to his purpose in leaving Kentucky and as to the reasons why he made known his design against the Illinois, Appendix to our narrative, Note XXI.)

The resolve of Clark to suggest the propriety of an undertaking against the Illinois and to urge a speedy movement looking to its organization, was a determination of momentous import should the scheme meet with approval and the undertaking he crowned with success. But to make public the plan, would, in the judgment of the projector of it, be almost certain to defeat it, as word, doubtless, would reach the Illinois in time to enable the making there of a proper defense. Clark, therefore, very wisely confided his ideas, only "to a few gentlemen" whom he could trust, and they communicated them to Governor Henry.* "At first, he [the Governor] seemed to be fond of it," are the words of Clark's Memoir, "but, to detach a party at so great a distance (although the service performed might be of great utility), appeared daring and hazardous. As nothing but *secrecy* could give success to the enterprise, to lay the matter before the Assembly, then sitting, would be dangerous, as it soon would be known throughout the frontiers; and probably the first prisoner taken by the Indians would give the alarm, which would end in the certain destruction of the party."†

One of Clark's suggestions (according to his Memoir) that, in case of misfortune, there could be a retreat from the Illinois towns across the Mississippi

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 22. Three of the Virginia gentlemen spoken to by Clark were George Wythe, George Mason, and Thomas Jefferson.

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 119. Dillon has evidently given the words a wrong punctuation, which impairs Clark's meaning; I have, therefore, changed the pointing somewhat, as otherwise, the whole carries the idea that the scheme was not, in any manner, laid before the Assembly — which is error, as will hereafter be shown.

into the Spanish territory, seemed to those with whom he consulted as removing one of the principal objections to the enterprise. "After giving," says Clark, in his letter to Mason, "the Council all the intelligence I possibly could, I resolved to pursue my other plans. But, being desired by the Governor to stay some time in town [Williamsburg], I waited with impatience — he, I suppose, believing that I wanted the command and being determined to give it to me."

Clark had proposed the expedition; he would be glad to see it set on foot; but he did not desire to lead it: "it was far," he declares, "from my inclination at that time".*

It was not long before the enterprise was determined on, to be put in execution so soon as an act could be passed to enable the Governor to order it. Such a bill was accordingly introduced into the Legislature, vague enough not to arouse any suspicion of its real import, and it soon became a law, though but few of the members knew of its hidden meaning. It authorized the Governor, with the advice of the Privy Council, at anytime within nine months after its passage, to raise a number of volunteers not exceeding six hundred, to march against and attack any Western enemies — he to appoint the proper officers and give the necessary orders for the expedition.†

After some time had elapsed, Clark was summoned to attend the Executive Council. The instructions and necessary papers were ready for putting in the name of the person who was to lead the expedition. Clark

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 23.

† Hening's *Virginia Statutes at Large*, vol. IX, pp. 374, 375. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XXII.)

fully believed it was expected by Governor Henry and his advisers, that he would apply for the position, but he resolved not to do so for reasons already given; and he did not; thereupon he was informed that he had been appointed chief of the proposed "little army." He finally accepted the command after being told it was designed for him; and, as a consequence, he "got every request granted."* He was commissioned at the same time, a Lieutenant Colonel, that is, of Virginia militia, not, however, being in any way restricted to Kentucky.†

It was on the second of January, 1778, that final action was taken by the Governor and his Council as to the proposed expedition: "Present, his Excellency, John Page, Dudley Diggs, John Blair, Nathaniel Harrison and David Jameson, Esquires.

"The Governor informed the Council that he had had some conversation with several gentlemen who were well acquainted with the western frontiers of Virginia and the situation of the post at Kaskaskia held by the British King's forces, where there are many pieces of cannon, and military stores to a considerable amount; and that he was informed the place was at present held by a very weak garrison, which induced him to believe that an expedition against it might be carried on with success, but that he wished the advice of the Council on the occasion.

"Whereupon they advised his Excellency to set on foot the expedition against Kaskaskia with as little

* Clark to Mason—*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 23.

† Dr. Poole, in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 717, erroneously declares that "Clark received from Gov. Henry the rank of colonel."

delay and as much secrecy as possible, and for the purpose to issue his warrant upon the treasurer for twelve hundred pounds payable to Col. George Rogers Clark, who is willing to undertake the service, he giving bond and security faithfully to account for the same. And the Council further advised the Governor to draw up proper instructions for Colonel Clark.”*

Public and private instructions were, on the same day, drawn up: the first, for Clark to show the people, “written designedly for deception”; the other, for the guidance of the Colonel. Those for the public eye notified Clark that he was to proceed, without loss of time, to enlist seven companies of men, officered in the usual manner, to act as militia, under his command. They were to proceed to Kentucky, and there obey such orders and directions as he should give them, “for three months after their arrival at that place;” but, they were to receive pay in case they remained on duty a longer time. The Colonel was empowered to raise these men in any county in Virginia; and the County Lieutenants, respectively, were “requested to give all possible assistance in that business.”†

Much more at length, and with considerable minuteness, were the private Instructions given Clark. He was not only to proceed with all convenient speed to raise seven companies of soldiers to consist of fifty men each, officered in the usual manner and armed most properly for the enterprise,‡ but, with this force, he

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 584, 585.

† Butler's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1834), p. 394. *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 95. Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, p. 588.

‡ Many writers (see particularly, Mann Butler — *History of Kentucky*, pp. 47, 48) have erroneously stated

was to "attack the British post at Kaskaskia,"* in the Illinois.

"It is conjectured," said the Governor, "that there are many pieces of cannon, and military stores to a considerable amount, at that place, the taking and preservation of which would be a valuable acquisition to the State." "If you are so fortunate, therefore, as to succeed in your expedition," continues Henry, "you will take every possible measure to secure the artillery and stores and whatever may advantage the State."

To transport down the Ohio, the troops, provisions, and other supplies, Clark was to apply to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt, Pittsburgh, (General Hand), for boats. During the whole "transaction," the Colonel was to take especial care to keep "the true destination" of his force secret. Its success, the Governor declared, depended upon this. Clark was informed that orders had been issued to one who was to recruit for him and who would soon be in Kentucky, to secure the two men from Kaskaskia. These were, it is reasonably certain, the same men (Linn and Moore) who had been sent by Clark some months previous to "spy out" the Illinois, the information

that Clark was to raise his force in the Western counties of Virginia, that is, west of the Blue Ridge, "so as not to weaken the Atlantic Defense;" but there was no restriction laid upon him in this regard by the Governor, in his private instructions; and, in his public instructions, it is, as we have seen, especially stated, — "You are to raise these men in any county in the Commonwealth."

* Not "the British forts of *Vincennes and Kaskaskia* [the italicising is mine]," as stated by Robert F. Coleman, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 789. And see, also, E. A. Bryan, in *Magazine of American History*, vol. XXI, p. 399, for a similar statement.

brought back by them having doubtless now been repeated to the Virginia Executive. "Similar conduct," added the Governor, "will be proper in similar cases."*

It was earnestly desired by Governor Henry, that Clark should show humanity to such British subjects and other persons as might fall into his hands. "If the white inhabitants at the post and the neighborhood," said the Executive, "will give undoubted evidence of their attachment to this State — for it is certain they live within its limits — by taking the test [oath] prescribed by law, and by every other ways and means in their power, — let them be treated as fellow citizens and their persons and property duly secured. Assistance and protection against all enemies whatever shall be afforded them, and the Commonwealth of Virginia is pledged to accomplish it. But if these people will not accede to these reasonable demands, they must feel the miseries of war, under the direction of that humanity that has hitherto distinguished Americans, and which it is expected you will ever consider as the rule of your conduct and from which you are in no instance to depart."

Clark was further instructed that the men he was to command were to receive the pay and allowance of militia, and to act under the laws and regulations of Virginia then in force as to that arm of the service.† He was required to inform the inhabitants of Kaskaskia that, in case they acceded to the offers of becoming citizens of the State, a proper garrison would be maintained among them and every attention bestowed "to render their commerce beneficial, the fairest prospects

* See Appendix, Note XXIII.

† This made them *de facto*, as well as *de jure*, Virginia militia.

being opened to the dominions of both France and Spain."

"It is in contemplation," the Governor also said, "to establish a post near the mouth of Ohio. Cannon will be wanted to fortify it. Part of those at Kaskaskia will be easily brought thither or otherwise secured as circumstances will make necessary."

It is evident that the proposition to build a fort at the point indicated by Henry was for the purpose and desire of commanding both the Mississippi and the Ohio and of making a definite claim by Virginia to territory as far west as the river first mentioned. Theoretically, at least, it was a politic measure and seems to have been the conception of the Virginia governor; certainly he was the first to make it public.*

The concluding words of the private Instructions furnished Clark were these: "You are to apply to General Hand for powder and lead necessary for this expedition. If he cannot supply it, the person who has that which Captain [William] Linn brought from New Orleans can. Lead was sent to Hampshire by my orders and that may be delivered you".†

* It was finally determined to put the plan in execution; but whatever may have been the reasons for the subsequent carrying out of Governor Henry's idea as to the fortification, by Jefferson as his successor, it is clear that its inception was to further the purposes and desires of Virginia only, as above mentioned. Clark's idea as afterward expressed was, that by the erection of "a strong fortification there [near the mouth of the Ohio], it would immediately be the mart and key of the Western country."

† Coleman, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 789, says the officer at Fort Pitt was "directed to give him [Clark] every assistance in procuring stores and boats." But Gen. Hand (a Continental officer) was not "directed"

Both instructions were dated the second of January, and both were signed by Governor Henry. In those not intended for the public to see, there is much, so far as the exhibition of humanity is concerned, to commend on part of the Virginia executive. His words are in striking contrast, in this regard, with the cruel mandate, already mentioned, of Germain to Carleton "that the most vigorous efforts should be made and every means employed that Providence has put into his Majesty's hands, for crushing the rebellion," referring, particularly, to the employment of savages against the frontier settlements.*

Verbal instructions were also given Clark which would materially extend any plans of conquest (if fortune favored him in his attempt against Kaskaskia) he might be disposed to enter upon. "I was ordered," he says, "to attack the Illinois [and] in case of success to carry my arms to any quarter I pleased".†

to give any assistance; he was, simply, to be applied to—that is, requested—to furnish "powder and lead necessary for the expedition."

* Both the Public and Private Instructions are printed entire in Butler's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1834), pp. 394, 395; in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 95-97; and in Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 585, 586 and 588. In Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, p. 415n, the Private Instructions may also be found. As given in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, they contain two or three verbal mistakes. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XXIV.)

† Clark to Mason—*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 23. But in his Memoir Clark carries the idea that Vincennes was particularly an object of attack by him—that he had thoughts of assailing it first; but this is clearly error, another lapse in his memory. (See Appendix, Note XXV.)

An instrument of writing was drawn up, signed and delivered to Clark, wherein three of the gentlemen who were aiding the expedition (Wythe, Mason and Jefferson) promised to use their influence to procure from the Virginia Assembly three hundred acres of land for each one who enlisted, in case of the success of the expedition.*

Clark, now that he was really engaged in the enterprise, was as determined to prosecute it with vigor as he had been before indifferent about the command. "I had," he subsequently declared, "since the beginning of the war, taken pains to make myself acquainted with the true situation of the British posts on the frontiers; and I since find I was not mistaken in my judgment." "I was ordered," he adds, "to attack the Illinois; in case of success, to carry my arms to any quarter I pleased." This latitude, it seems was granted him in verbal Instructions; there was no such authority given him in the written ones. "I was certain," he continues, "that, with five hundred men, I could take the Illinois; and, by my treating the inhabitants as fellow citizens and showing them that I meant to protect rather than treat them as a conquered people, and by my engaging the Indians to our interest, it might probably have so great an effect on their countrymen at Detroit (they already disliked their master) that it would be an easy prey for me. I should have mentioned my design to his Excellency, but was convinced or afraid that it might lessen his esteem for me; as it was a general opinion that it would take

*The writing was dated January 3d, 1778, and signed by George Wythe, George Mason and Thomas Jefferson (Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 47). See Appendix (Note XXVI) to our narrative.

several thousand [men] to approach that place. I was happy with the thoughts of a fair prospect of undeceiving the public respecting their formidable enemies on our frontiers."* It is evident that the goal of Clark's ambition was Detroit. He had, it is true, the welfare of the Kentucky settlements at heart and of those along the northwestern border of his State; and so had Governor Henry: but, with both, there was something prompting them to action besides what might reasonably be expected concerning the effect on the Indians in case of the success of the expedition. Clark, as his own words show was ambitious as well as patriotic; and to capture Detroit from the British would not only end to a great extent savage marauds upon the Western border, but would prove a severe blow to the English generally.

Governor Henry, subsequently, was explicit in giving the principal cause actuating him in promoting the enterprise: "The executive power of this State having been impressed with a strong apprehension of incursions on their frontier settlements from the savages situated about the Illinois, and supposing the danger would be greatly obviated by an enterprise against the

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 23, 24. In his Memoir, Clark says that, finding from the Governor's conversation in general to him on the subject, he did not wish an implicit attention to his Instructions should prevent his executing anything that would manifestly tend to the good of the public, he felt himself clothed with all the authority he desired. [Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 120.] The "general opinion" as to the force necessary to capture Detroit was, beyond all question, a sound one. Clark, really, had but little idea of the strength of that post; and it was even more formidable than Governor Henry was aware of.

English forts and possessions in that country, which were well known to inspire the savages with their bloody purposes against us, sent a detachment of militia . . . commanded by Colonel George Rogers Clark, on that service.”* However, as a matter of fact, the savages of that region, as already explained, had not actually taken up the hatchet as allies of Great Britain, although they were, all of them, considered by Clark, from the knowledge he had obtained from that quarter, as being generally hostile.†

Beyond the probability that success in the proposed expedition would in some measure put an end to the Indian war on the western frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia, Clark did not trouble himself greatly to look. It would not be surprising, surely, if he occasionally indulged in reflections as to what might be “the remote bearings of such an achievement.” But Governor Henry was more outspoken in his anticipations should the result be what was hoped for. He

* Governor Henry to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, Nov. 10, 1778. See Butler's *Kentucky* (2d ed.), p. 532; also a *Life of Patrick Henry* (American Statesmen Series), by Moses Coit Tyler, pp. 230, 231. Consult, too, Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. II, p. 16 and vol. III, p. 200. But the Governor over-estimated the influence exerted there to induce savage aggressions on the frontiers.

† In the sketch of the Life of Clark, in Collins's *Kentucky*, (ed. of 1877, p. 135), it is said: “On their return [that is, on the return of the ‘spies’ which Clark sent to the Illinois], they brought intelligence of great activity on part of the garrisons, who omitted no opportunity to promote and encourage Indian depredations on the Kentucky frontier.” But what they told Clark was, according to the latter's statement, simply, “that the Indians in that quarter were engaged in the war.” [See Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 159.]

having already in contemplation the securing of a firm foothold for Virginia (if not for the General Government) on the Mississippi below the mouth of the Ohio, as before alluded to, the capture of Kaskaskia would be a valuable aid in completing the undertaking.*

And here it may be said that far too much stress has heretofore been laid by writers of Western history upon the fact that Clark had given the subject of the British forts in the West considerable thought. More had evidently been given by George Morgan at Fort Pitt. And much more information had been obtained concerning them (Kaskaskia alone excepted) by the General Government than what had been gleaned by the inquisitive young Virginian.

Governor Henry delivered to Colonel Clark, on the day they were written, both the public and private instructions. Twelve hundred pounds, in accordance with the recommendation of his Council, were handed Clark by the Governor to be used in the enterprise, but the money was in depreciated Virginia currency;† and Henry, also, authorized him to draw on Oliver

* Several writers of Western history, by mistaking the date and import of a letter written by Jefferson to Clark (only a fragment of which has been preserved), conclude that that statesman put himself early on record as foreseeing what might be the consequences resulting from the favorable issue of the proposed campaign — “the remote bearings” being much plainer to his vision than to Clark’s. This matter is more fully discussed in a subsequent chapter.

† C. C. Baldwin’s *A Centennial Lawsuit*, in *The Western Reserve and Northern Ohio Historical Society’s Tract*, No. 35, December, 1876; reprinted in the *Magazine of Western History*, January, 1885, p. 230. “The governor [Henry] . . . gave the young captain a small supply of money.” [*The Old Northwest* (Hinsdale), p. 154.] But it is certain Clark was not commissioned captain.

Pollock, Virginia's fiscal agent in New Orleans, for additional funds to aid him in his undertaking, at the same time writing Pollock to draw bills on France for \$65,000.* The Colonel was given, likewise, a written request, directed to General Hand at Fort Pitt, asking him, if he could, to furnish Clark with the necessary quantity of powder and lead.†

It was on the fourth of January that the Colonel left Williamsburg,‡ going alone to his point of destination on the frontier. We now see him, for the first time, in a position to develop some of the prominent traits of his character. He at once gave evidence of those qualities of mind fitting him to direct and lead a military expedition made up of men who were all sharp-shooters and accustomed to hardships. He knew little or nothing of the laws of war or of military tactics. Two peculiarities he, however, very soon showed himself to be possessed of in a marked degree: celerity in movement and firmness in carrying out determinations once fixed upon. He made "as quick

* Compare *Magazine of American History*, vol. XXII, pp. 415, 416 and Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 603-605.

† In his Memoir Clark erroneously states that Governor Henry gave him "an order on Pittsburg, for boats, ammunition, etc."

‡ Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 120. In his letter to Mason, Clark incorrectly gives the 18th as the day of his leaving (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 24). That he started previous to the date last mentioned is proven by Instructions delivered to David Rogers on the 15th of January by Governor Henry and by a letter written the same day to Clark (Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 606, 607; Butler's *Kentucky*, pp. 102, 103). Besides, as will presently be seen, he could not have accomplished before the end of the month what he did had he left Williamsburg as late as the 18th.

dispatch as possible to the frontiers;" that is, to Redstone (now Brownsville, Pennsylvania) on the Monongahela, the rendezvous agreed upon, then in Virginia as claimed by that State, but subsequently confirmed to Pennsylvania; which Commonwealth was then strenuously contending for all that region; and, by the end of the month, he had recruiting-parties located "from Pittsburgh to [North] Carolina," ready to work under the public instructions issued by the Governor.* For this service, Captain William Harod and a number of other officers were appointed.† Clark also contracted for flour and other stores wanted — except powder and lead.

Captain Leonard Helm of Fauquier county and Captain Joseph Bowman of Frederick county, were to raise each a company to be marched to Redstone, where they were to join Clark at a stipulated day in February. The Colonel had advanced to Captain William B. Smith, one hundred and fifty pounds to recruit four companies on Holston, which force was to meet him in Kentucky.‡

Now however, trouble arose. "Many leading men in the frontiers," says the Colonel, "had liked to have

* *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, loc. cit. It was no thought of Clark, in fixing at Redstone the point where he was to collect his force, that he was locating his headquarters upon Pennsylvania territory. He still called the region now constituting Southwestern Pennsylvania and a part of West Virginia, "The District of West Augusta, Virginia," — not even recognizing the fact that his State had previously (in 1776) formed it into the three counties of Gohogania, Monongalia, and Ohio. He believed that Fort Pitt and Pittsburgh were within Virginia's jurisdiction.

† See Appendix, Note XXVII.

‡ Id.

put an end to the enterprise, not knowing my destination".* It was not apparent to many that there was a great necessity for such an undertaking as suggested in Clark's public Instructions; for these were only the four infant settlements down the Ohio (as they understood it) to be guarded, while a far greater number upon its upper waters needed equal protection.†

"I received information from Captain Helm," are likewise the words of Clark, "that several gentlemen took pains to counteract his interest in recruiting, as no such service was known of by the Assembly. Consequently, he had to send to the Governor to get his conduct ratified. I found, also, opposition to our interest in the Pittsburgh country. As the whole [population] was divided into violent parties between the Virginians and Pennsylvanians respecting the territory, the idea of men being raised for the State of Virginia affected the vulgar of the one [that is, of the Pennsylvania] party; and as my real Instructions were kept concealed and only an instrument from the Governor written designedly for deception was made public wherein I was authorized [inferentially] to raise men for the defence of Kentucky, many gentlemen of both parties conceived it to be injurious to the public interest to draw off men at so critical a moment for the defence of a few detached inhabitants, who had

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 24. That is to say, "not knowing 'his *real*' destination."

† Clark's Public Instructions, as they knew, showed clearly that the men when enlisted were to proceed to *Kentucky* and *there* obey such orders and directions as he should give them for three months after their arrival; the inference being that protection of the Kentucky settlements was the object of the expedition.

better be removed. These circumstances caused some confusion in the recruiting service".*

In view of his public instructions, it was certainly uncharitable for the Colonel to declare, as he did afterward, that "through a spirit of obstinacy many leading men combined and did every thing that lay in their power to stop those that had enlisted, and set the whole frontiers in an uproar; even condescending to harbor and protect those that deserted." †

The disgusted commander concluded his "case" was "desperate." The longer he remained the worse it became. "I plainly saw," he subsequently wrote, "that my principal design was baffled. I was resolved to push to Kentucky with what men I could gather in West Augusta." ‡

The Colonel had been joined by Captains Bowman and Helm, "who had each raised a company for the expedition;" but two-thirds of their men were induced to leave by "the undesigned enemies to the country," as Clark styles those who opposed his expedition.§ The officers only secured such as had friends in Ken-

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 120. That some Pennsylvanians enlisted there can be no doubt. (See also Appendix to our narrative, Note XXVIII.)

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 24.

‡ Id., p. 25. Clark still adhered to the name of "West Augusta," for the region claimed by Virginia, including the then recently erected counties of Yohogania, Monongalia and Ohio.

§ Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 25. Bancroft, in his *History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310, says: "There [at Redstone] . . . he [Clark] was overtaken by Captain Leonard Helm of Farquier, and by Captain Joseph Bowman of Frederic, each

tucky or such as were induced to enlist because of private interests or a desire to see the West.*

On the twelfth of May, Clark embarked at Redstone for the Falls of the Ohio,† with about one hundred and fifty men, formed into three companies, under command of Captains Bowman, Helm and Harrod.‡ With Clark went a number of families (but they accompanied the Colonel much against his will), in all twenty — “following in his train” — who contemplated settling in Kentucky.§

Before the departure of Clark, he had received word from Captain Smith “on Holston” (it was on the twenty-ninth of March), informing him that he intended to meet him at the Falls with near two hundred men. Another express — one from down the Ohio — gave him the intelligence that the Kentucky settle-

with less than half a company.” In this, the word “overtaken” conveys an impression (which is erroneous) that Clark was *then* on the move.

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 121.

† Appendix, Note XXIX.

‡ Appendix Note XXX.

§ Appendix, Note XXXI. Some writers have stated that Clark floated down the Ohio in a flat-boat, and that in this single boat went all his force and effects, including the families who joined him at Redstone. (See an article in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, Aug. 2d, 1883, by R. T. Durrett.) Evidently this is error. That the Colonel had supplied himself with, and actually went down the river in row-boats is sufficiently certain. “You are,” says Gov. Henry to Clark in his private instructions, “to apply to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt for *boats*, etc.” The italicising is mine.) See Appendix to our narrative, Notes XXXII and XXXVI, also the two following Chapters (VI and VII), as to Clark having *row-boats*.

ments had gained considerable strength since he left that quarter. Such news had the effect to raise the drooping spirits of the Colonel; as, with Smith's promised reinforcements, he had no doubt of being able to successfully accomplish the object of his undertaking.

On his reaching Pittsburgh, Clark found in the Fort Pitt commander (General Hand) a warm friend to the enterprise. He declares that the General was not only pleased with his intentions but furnished him with all the necessaries he wanted. "Taking in my stores at Pittsburgh and Wheeling," Clark subsequently wrote, "I proceeded down the river with caution." But the "stores" at Wheeling, taken in by the Colonel upon his arrival there, were included in the supply furnished by General Hand.*

Leaving the Colonel afloat on the Ohio below Wheeling with his three companies of recruits and their officers — acting as convoy to several families of emigrants, we will turn our attention to the Kentucky country whither they were bound (as all supposed but the commandant), to remain, some permanently, but the larger part only for a three-months' service.

Although Clark had received encouraging reports from the Kentucky settlements, indicating that he might be able, owing to the increase in their population, to obtain a considerable number of recruits there, yet, the year 1778 had really opened with prospects not at all cheering to them. On the first day of January Daniel Boone went with a party of thirty to the Blue Licks on Licking river, to make salt for several different garrisons from which his men had been collected. That necessary commodity had always

* Appendix, Note XXXII.

been brought into the settlements at much trouble and expense. On the seventh of the following month, having previously sent back three of his men with salt, Boone, while out hunting to procure meat for his company, met one hundred and two Indians, principally Shawanese (eighty of that nation and twenty-two Miamis), led by Charles Beaubien and Pierre Lorimer from the Miami town at the head of the Maumee, the white men with their Miami Indians having gone first to Piqua and Chillicothe where they gathered the Shawanese,—the whole force being on the march against Boonesborough, “that place being particularly the object of the enemy.”

Beaubien and his party pursued and took Boone, and brought him, on the eighth, to the Licks. As they approached the place, Boone realizing how impossible it would be for his twenty-seven men to escape with their lives if attacked, called out to them, when some distance away but in full view, informing them of their situation and ordering them not to resist but to surrender themselves prisoners; with which command, they at once complied. Fortunately, the two Frenchmen could not prevail upon the Indians to attempt Boonesborough; which, doubtless (so thought the two white men) might have easily been taken “by means of their prisoners.” The savages were satisfied with what they had already accomplished.*

Boone and his men were taken, first to “Old Chillicothe, the principal Indian town on Little Miami,” in what is now Greene county, Ohio;† thence they took him and ten of his men to Detroit, where they arrived

* Appendix, Note XXXIII.

† See, as to this “Old Chillicothe,” the *History of the Girtys*, p. 76.

on the thirtieth of March,—except four, who did not reach that post until two days thereafter.* The party left Chillicothe on the tenth.

Hamilton received Boone kindly and proceeded to examine him as to affairs in the settlements south of the Ohio. His prisoner was very communicative, but he exaggerated matters. He told the Lieutenant Governor that the people had been incessantly harrassed by parties of Indians, which was true, but he added, they had not been able to sow grain and would not have a morsel of bread by the middle of June, which was an exaggeration. Clothing, he said, was not to be had, and they did not expect relief from Congress. He thus unwittingly inspired Hamilton with confidence that his barbarous policy was producing the desired effect, inducing him to greater exertion against the border settlements of the Americans. "Their dilemma," he wrote, "will probably induce them to trust to the savages, who have shown so much humanity to their prisoners; and they will come to this place before winter."

Four of the men taken at the Blue Licks were delivered up to Hamilton by the Indians; but Boone, although Hamilton offered to ransom him, (proposing £100 sterling as the sum), they would not part with,—they "expecting, by his means, to effect something," † He supposed that the reason why he was

* Hamilton to Carleton, Jan. 26 — April 25, 1778. —Haldimand MSS.

† Id. "A Major [Captain] Daniel Boone, who commanded Boonesborough, was taken with twenty-six men, some distance from his fort, by the Indians, who carried them to Detroit, without killing a man. This gentleman expressed his gratitude for the good treatment received,

still kept a prisoner was because the savages had formed a friendship for him. He did not fully understand that Indians were adepts in the art of dissimulation. He was taken back to "Old Chillicothe," leaving Detroit on the tenth of April, and reaching the Shawanese town on the twenty-fifth,* "after a long and fatiguing march."

The presence, at Chillicothe, in June, of a large number of savages "ready to march against Boonesborough," determined Boone to escape, the first opportunity. "On the seventeenth, before sun-rise," he says, "I departed in the most secret manner and arrived at Boonesborough on the twentieth, after a journey of one hundred and sixty miles, during which I had but one meal." † The escape of Boone, was the cause it seems, of the Indians postponing their march for the time, as they did not make their appearance as expected. The interval was well improved by the garrison in strengthening their little fortress. It was a wise precaution, as subsequent events demonstrated.

During all these months — the first half of 1778 — strange as it may seem, the Kentucky settlements were increasing their strength. Nothing could stay the tide of emigration to that region. Cheap lands, an excellent soil, and a mild climate, were enough to induce the emigrant to brave all dangers of the tomahawk and scalping knife. And then because of the determination of the Ohio Indians to strike as a rule the borders in force, small parties of savages had not,

with his men while with us [at Detroit]." — Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 192. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XXXIV.)

* Boone's *Narrative*, before cited.

† Id.

to so great an extent, crossed the Ohio since the capture of Boone; besides, a grand council at Detroit (hereafter to be noted) had engaged the attention of many of the Indian warriors; but, the principal reason for the falling off for the first six months of the year of savage marauds was owing to the fact that Hamilton had become rather tired of such a desultory warfare and longed as he had already hinted to Carleton, to have an opportunity to send his dusky allies upon some important expedition in a body. He was not as active as in 1777 in his murderous work.

And there was still another reason. The Indians were finding a more inviting field for their aggressions in the Western Pennsylvania settlements and along the Virginia border south of them, as will hereafter be shown.

CHAPTER VI.

CLARK once upon the "Western waters" was, for the first time, actually on the move with troops toward the Illinois. He left the Pittsburgh country "in great confusion, much distressed by the Indians" arriving at the mouth of the Great Kanawha (Point Pleasant) past the middle of May, — to the great joy of the garrison in Fort Randolph; as they were weak and had just before been attacked by a large body of Indians.* He was importuned by the commandant of the post to join him in pursuit of the savages who had gone against the interior settlements. "The temptation of success was great, but the importance of his own expedition was greater; and fortunately for his country, Clark knew his duty too well and discharged it too faithfully, to be diverted from his purpose."

Before leaving Fort Randolph, the Colonel was joined by Captain James O'Hara's company on its way to Ozark (as the settlement, at the mouth of the Arkansas, under the rule of the Spanish, was then called). This was one of two Independent Virginia companies stationed on the Ohio — the other being that of Captain Henry Heath.†

* See Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 25; *Washington-Irvine Correspondence*, pp. 18, 19; Capt. Joseph Bowman to Colonel John Hite, July 30, 1778 [*Almon's Remembrances* (1779), vol. VIII, p. 82]. Clark says he reached the fort the day after the attack; but Bowman (in this instance the better authority) says the garrison had, upon Clark's arrival, been confined eight days, "in which time, there had been an attack."

† Appendix, Note XXXIV.

After spending a day or two at Point Pleasant, Clark again started down the Ohio. He had a very pleasant voyage to the mouth of the Kentucky where he landed. His first employment was to send expresses to stations on that river for Captain Smith to join him immediately at the Falls, as he had no doubt the Captain had reached that stream and was awaiting him. But, he soon learned that that officer had not arrived; that all his men, except a part of a company, under a Captain Dillard, "had been stopped by the incessant labors of the populace," "some on the march being threatened to be put in prison if they did not return." This information, the Colonel declares, made him as desperate as he was before determined.

"Reflecting," Clark says, "on the information that I had, of some of my greatest opponents censuring the Governor for his conduct in ordering me, as they thought, to protect Kentucky only — that, and some other secret impulses occasioned me, in spite of all counsel, to risk the expedition to convince them of their error, — which expedition to that moment was secret to my principal officers. I was sensible of the impression it would have on many to be taken near a thousand miles from the body of their country to attack a people five times their number and merciless tribes of Indians their allies, and all determined enemies to us. I knew my case was desperate, but the more I reflected on my weakness, the more I was pleased with the enterprise."* Clark thereupon wrote

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 26. Clark's words I have not followed closely, but I have endeavored to give his meaning. His language is vague, especially in reference to disclosing his secret to his principal

to County Lieutenant John Bowman, at Harrodsburg, informing him, in words although vague yet calculated to awaken enthusiasm, of his intention to fix a post at the Falls; and that, having an object in view of the greatest importance to the country, he desired that officer to meet him at that place, with all the men recruited by Smith that had reached Kentucky, and, with as many others as could be spared from the interior stations.*

It was on the twenty-seventh of May, on what was afterward named "Corn Island," opposite the shore where Louisville now stands, that Clark finally rested,—choosing the island, instead of the southern shore, as a place where he could readily secure any of his men who would attempt to desert when it should be made known to them that the expedition was intended for the Illinois. There was, at this time, no settlement on the main land, although two thousand acres, a part of the site of the present city of Louisville, had, on the sixteenth of December, 1773, been patented by John Connolly. The Falls could easily be reached from the interior stations; which fact, probably, with the advantage of the place being a considerable distance down the Ohio, directly on the route to Kaskaskia, had previously determined Clark to make it his final rendezvous.

The men who had been embodied by County Lieutenant Bowman at Clark's request, including also those officers; and an erroneous impression is conveyed when he speaks of the "merciless tribes of Indians" being then "their [the creoles'] allies" and "all determined enemies," to the Americans.

* Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 49. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XXXV.)

brought in from Holston by Captain Dillard, reached Clark in due season; whereupon, he made known to all on the island his determination to march against Kaskaskia.* It was, of course, a great surprise to those officers to whom the secret had not before been revealed, as well as to the rank and file. Eagerly they listened to the Colonel as he read his private instructions, also the promise of Nythe, Mason and Jefferson as to a bounty in land. The commander soon found that, so far as the Kentuckians were concerned, it would not answer to take many of them with him, owing to the weakness and exposed condition of the settlements. He therefore engaged but twenty; and even these it was expected would be replaced by militia which would afterward reach the country from over the mountains. The residue afterward returned to the various stations whence they had marched.

Clark now began, for the first time, to discipline his men, "knowing that to be the most essential point towards success." Most of them determined to follow him; and "as the rest saw (at first) no probability of making their escape," he "soon got the desired subordination." †

* So well had the secret been kept that a prisoner taken from Kentucky by the Indians and examined by Hamilton at Detroit reported that *the Kentuckians had recently been reinforced* by three companies. (See Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 5, 1778—Haldimand MSS.) Little did the Lieutenant Governor dream, when he got this information, who constituted the three companies or that their destination was the Illinois, although he had already learned the result of their expedition.

† Clark to Mason—*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 27.

Now that the Colonel had revealed his real destination, the time for starting was soon determined upon and made known to all under his command as well as to Colonel Bowman and others from Harrodsburg, who resolved to stay until the expedition left the island. The defection already hinted at was mostly in Captain Dillard's company. His men, of course, had not enlisted for any service beyond the Kentucky settlements — they not being aware, as was Governor Henry, that the Illinois towns were within the limits of Virginia; and the greater portion of them under Lieutenant Hutchins, determined, as they had been refused leave to return, to make their escape at all hazards; which they effected before daylight in the morning of the day fixed upon for the departure of the army down the Ohio.* “Luckily,” says the Colonel, “a few of his (the Lieutenant's) mēn were taken the next day by a party sent after them.” † Those in pursuit were mounted on “the horses of the Harrodsburg gentlemen,” overtaking the fugitives about twenty miles from the island, on the trace to Harrodsburg. Not less than seven were captured; the residue “scattered through the woods.” Clark had given orders that all who resisted should be shot; but none were killed. The men who were taken were brought back to the rendezvous; the others “suffered most severely every species of distress. The people of Harrodstown felt the baseness of the Lieutenant's conduct so keenly, and

* Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 50. Butler also says: “The boats were . . . ordered to be well secured and sentries were placed where it was supposed the men might wade across the river to the Kentucky shore.”

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 27.

resented it with such indignation that they would not for some time let him or his companions into the fort. On the return of the detachment from the pursuit, a day of rejoicing was spent between the troops about to descend the river and those who were to return on a service little inferior in danger and privation — the defence of the interior stations.”*

The twenty Kentuckians who, it was arranged, were to go with Clark, were put under command of Captain John Montgomery, the same officer who had the previous fall brought to the settlements a company of Virginia militia from Holston. “In 1777,” wrote Montgomery several years after, “being ordered with my company from Holston to the Kentucky country for its defense, I remained there until the year following, when Colonel Clark arrived at the Falls of the Ohio with a body of troops on his way to the Illinois. I joined him.”† Among those under the Captain were Edward Worthington and Simon Kenton.‡

There was one event of which the Colonel had heard, that gave him much satisfaction. In a letter written by Colonel John Campbell at Pittsburgh, and brought down the Ohio by Captain William Linn, who had overtaken Clark before his final rendezvous had

* Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 50. Butler says that Clark generously withheld the name of the lieutenant who deserted; but that author had not seen the Colonel's letter to Mason of November 19, 1779, already frequently cited. (See, further, as to the escape of the men from the island, Appendix to our narrative, Note XXXVI.)

† *Montgomery to the Board of Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accounts, Feb. 22, 1783.* (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 441); Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 352.

‡ Appendix, Note XXXVII.

been reached, he was informed of the acknowledgement of the independence of the United States on the sixth of the previous February, by France, and of the conclusion between them of a treaty of alliance. "If war should break out between France and Great Britain, were the words of the compact, "during the continuance of the present war between the United States and England, his Majesty (the King of France) shall make it a common cause, and (France and the United States shall) aid each other mutually with their good offices, their counsels, and their forces, according to the exigencies of conjunctures, as becomes good and faithful allies." Clark, of course, was not slow to perceive what use could be made of the information in the event of his success against Kaskaskia. Linn joined Clark's force as a volunteer.*

Before leaving the island, Clark erected thereon "a block house" (as he terms it, but which in reality would not strictly answer the description), in which to deposit such stores as were not to be taken along. The Colonel says it was to secure his provisions;† but, at the same time, it would serve to protect from the Indians those left in charge of them. It is evident that, had he intended to take with him all stores he had brought down the Ohio, no structure of any kind would have made its appearance. It was no part of the Colonel's plan to stop on his way to Kaskaskia for the purpose of establishing a military post for the

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 122; Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 50; Hall's *Romance of Western History*, p. 109. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XXXVIII.)

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 27.

protection of the Kentucky settlements at any point, or of the prospective river trade on the Ohio. Nor was it his idea that, on the presumption of being successful in his expedition it would be prudent to put up, on the island, a defensive work for the convenience of communication between the Illinois towns and the Kentucky settlements, as one of his officers afterward erroneously stated, in substance.* Clark did not choose the Falls for his stopping place, or the island for a "station," because of any other considerations than such as had reference to his expedition in going and coming, whatever may have, afterwards, induced his efforts towards making a permanent lodgment there. His words to Colonel Bowman of his intention to fix a post at the Falls were (if not intended to apply to what, in the future, he might accomplish) only to secure prompt and efficient action from that officer.†

Having got everything in readiness, the Colonel with "about one hundred and eighty" officers and men, mostly Virginians and all in the Virginia service, consisting of four companies, under the command of Captains Helm, Bowman, Harrod and Montgomery, set off for Kaskaskia‡ (intending to drop down the Ohio to the deserted Fort Massac on the north side of the river, and march thence by land), leaving not less than ten families of the twenty who had accompanied him from Redstone (the residue

* Col. John Montgomery to "B'd of Com'r for Settlement of Western Accts," *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, p. 441. (See also Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 352.) Montgomery's declaration was evidently an afterthought.

† Appendix, Note XXXIX.

‡ See, further, as to Clark's force leaving the island, Appendix, Note XL.

having gone into the Kentucky settlements), on the island also seven soldiers "judged not competent to the expected fatigue." The whole were to guard the military stores not taken along by the Colonel.*

"As I knew," are the subsequent words of Clark, "that spies were kept on the river below the towns of the Illinois, I had resolved to march part of the way by land, and of course left the whole of our baggage, except as much as would equip us in the Indian mode;" that is, each one would carry only his rifle and a supply of ammunition, together with a knife and hatchet (tomahawk), and provisions deemed sufficient for the march.†

The start was made on the twenty-fourth of June — a month and two days after the arrival at the rendezvous. "We left," says Clark, "our little island and ran about a mile up the river in order to gain the main channel, and shot the falls at the very moment of the sun being in a great eclipse."‡ With oars

* See Appendix, Note XLI.

† Clark's *Memoir* in Dillon's *Indiana*° (ed. of 1859), p. 121. It must not be supposed from Clark's language that he and his men were to dress themselves as Indians; that is, as the savages do before going on the war path. Butler, however, followed the *Memoir* closely: "All the baggage beyond what was necessary to equip the party in the barest Indian manner, was left behind, as the commander had determined, in order to mask his operations, to march to Kaskaskia by land from the nearest point on the Ohio." (*History of Kentucky*, p. 50.)

‡ Clark's *Memoir*, in Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 121. This is another instance where his *Memoir* corrects the Colonel's letter to Mason. In the latter, he gives the date of his departure as June 26th (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 28); but the eclipse was on the 24th. The correction is first to be found in Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 50.

double-manned, the Colonel proceeded day and night until, on the twenty-eighth, he ran into the mouth of the Tennessee river. Here he landed on an island to prepare for the march by land to Kaskaskia. Clark had no one with him, it seems, who had previously gone over the proposed route, but it was understood to be a four-days' journey. Provisions were therefore, to be prepared for that length of time.

A few hours after landing, the men took a boat of hunters but eight days from Kaskaskia. Before the Colonel would suffer them to answer any person a question, he asked them to take the oath of allegiance which they did, and he then examined them particularly. They were English — not French — and appeared to be in the American interest. Their intelligence was not favorable. They asked leave to go upon the expedition, which Clark granted them. The Colonel then ordered them what to relate to his men, on pain of suffering if they deviated from his instructions. They carried out Clark's orders, in this regard, to the letter, which put his soldiers in the greatest spirits; sure, by what they heard, of success. In the evening, Clark ran his boats into a small creek on the north side of the Ohio, "about one mile above old Fort Massac."*

It was a total eclipse. Hinsdale (*The Old Northwest*, p. 154) fails to correct Clark's date — June 26th. (See further as to Clark's leaving the island, Appendix to our narrative, Note XLII; and as to the erroneous assertion to be found in his Memoir, that he had thoughts of attacking Vincennes before going against Kaskaskia, see Note XLIII.)

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 28; not "at" 'Fort Massac,' as Lyman C. Draper asserts, in Appleton's *Cyclopedia of American Biography*, art.

Years after, thus wrote Clark: "As I intended to leave the Ohio at Fort Massac, three leagues below the Tennessee, I landed on a small island in the mouth of that river, in order to prepare for the march [by land]. In a few hours after, one John [McEl] Duff and a party of hunters coming down the river, were brought to, by our boats. They were men formerly from the States and assured us of their happiness in the adventure. . . . They had been but lately from Kaskaskia, and were able to give us all the intelligence we wished. They said that [Lieutenant] Governor Abbott had lately left Vincennes and gone to Detroit on some business of importance;—that Mr. Rocheblave commanded at Kaskaskia; . . . that the militia was kept in good order and spies [were kept] on the Mississippi; . . . that all hunters, both Indians and others were ordered to keep a good look-out for the rebels; and that the fort [at Kaskaskia] was kept in good order as an asylum; . . . But they believed the whole to proceed more from the fondness of parade than the expectation of a visit [from the Americans]; that if they received timely notice of us, they would collect and give us a warm reception, as they were taught to harbor a most horrid idea of the barbarity of the rebels, especially the Virginians; but that if we could surprise the place, which they were in hopes we might, they made no doubt of our being able to do as we pleased; that they hoped to be received as partakers in the enterprise, and wished us to put full confidence in them and they would assist the guides in conducting the party. This was agreed to, and they proved valuable men.

"George Rogers Clark." "Massac" is a corruption of "Massiac," the name of the first French commander of the post.

“The acquisition to us was great, as I had no intelligence from these posts since the spies [returned, whom] I sent twelve months past. But no part of their information pleased me more than that of the inhabitants viewing us as more savage than their neighbors, the Indians. I was determined to improve upon this, if I was fortunate enough to get them into my possession; as I conceived the greater the shock I could give them at first, the more sensibly would they feel my lenity, and become more valuable friends. This I conceived to be agreeable to human nature, as I had observed it in many instances.

“Having everything prepared, we moved down to a little gully a small distance above [Fort] Massac, in which we concealed our boats.” . . . *

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 122, 123. “Thence [that is, from the island], we continued down the Ohio, moving day and night . . . till within sixty miles of the mouth [when] we ran our boats up a small creek to hide them, not having men enough to leave a sufficient guard [to watch them].” — Bowman to Hite, July 30, 1778. (See further as to the hunters “brought to” by Clark, also as to Fort Massac, — Appendix to our narrative, Note XLIV.)

CHAPTER VII.

CLARK and his companions-in-arms, after reposing themselves upon the soil of what is now the State of Illinois for the night, commenced their march by land toward Kaskaskia, on the morning of the twenty-ninth of June, having a distance to travel northwestward of about one hundred and forty miles. The Colonel declares he had a very fatiguing journey for about fifty miles, when he reached "those level plains that are frequent throughout this extensive country." His route had thus far been "through a low, flat region, intersected by numerous streams and ponds, and entirely covered with a most luxuriant vegetation." All were on foot. They had no implements of warfare save their guns and their knives and hatchets: no horses, no tents or other camp equipage. Clark marched thoughtfully on, "at the head of his gallant and determined band, with his rifle on his shoulder and his provision up on his back." "As I knew my success depended on secrecy, I was much afraid," he declared, "of being discovered in these meadows, as we might be seen, in many places, for several miles." The weather was favorable but water in some parts was scarce, and the men at times suffered from thirst.*

On the third day of the march, John Saunders, principal guide to the expedition, got lost, — "not being able," says the Colonel, "as we judged by his confusion, of giving a just account of himself." It put the whole force in the greatest confusion. "I never in my life," is the emphatic declaration of Clark, "felt such a flow of rage, — to be wandering in

*Appendix, Note XLV.

a country where every nation of Indians could raise three or four times our number, and [to suffer] a certain loss of our enterprise by the enemy getting timely notice [of our approach]. I could not bear the thoughts of returning. In short, every idea of the sort put me in such a passion that I did not master it for some time. Soon, however, our circumstances had a better appearance, for I had determined to put the guide to death if he did not find his way that evening. I told him his doom. The poor fellow scared almost out of his wits, begged that I would stay a while where I was and suffer him to go and make some discovery of a [hunter's] road that could not be far from us; which I would not suffer for fear of not seeing him again, but ordered him to lead on the party; that his fate depended on his success. After some little pause, he begged that I would not be hard with him, that he could find the path that evening." The bewildered Saunders then took his course, and in two hours got within his knowledge.*

On the fourth of July, in the evening, the Colonel and his men got within three miles of Kaskaskia, — having marched the last two days "without any sustenance." † They now halted until dark, out of sight of the town, at the same time sending spies ahead. The Kaskaskia river was to be crossed before the town could be reached and Fort Gage assailed.‡ "In our

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 29, 30. *Clark's Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859, p. 124. Appendix to our narrative, Note XLVI.

† Bowman to Hite. Compare Marshall's *Kentucky*, vol. I, p. 67. See also Appendix to our narrative, Note XLVII.

‡ Bowman to Hite. Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 30. *Clark's Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana*

hungry condition," says Captain Bowman, "we unanimously determined to take the town or die in the attempt." * "After making ourselves ready for anything that might happen," are the words of Clark, "we marched after night to a farm that was on the same [east] side of the river, about a mile above the town, took the family prisoners and found plenty of boats to cross in." † The commander was informed that the people of Kaskaskia had had some suspicion of being attacked and had made some preparations, keeping out spies. However, as no discoveries had been made, they "had got off their guard." This sufficiently disproves a tradition "that a hunter has discovered the American troops, and apprised the inhabitants of the place of their approach, but that his story was considered so improbable as to obtain no credit." It was the time of year for more than the usual number of men of the creole population to be at their homes in the village, and many were present;‡ so, too, there seems to have been a considerable number of Indians

(ed. of 1859), p. 124. Appendix to our narrative, Note XLVIII.

* From his letter to Hite, just cited.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 30. It is a tradition that the family home was a ferry-house and that the farmer was also keeper of a ferry across the Kaskaskia river. But this tradition (which has frequently been printed) needs evidence to support it. I have never met with any mention in contemporaneous accounts, of a ferry on that stream at that date. The words of Clark imply there was none; — he "found plenty of boats to cross in;" — evidently there was no crossing on a ferry.

‡ This fact is brought out in Clark's Memoir in these words, "that at that time there was a great number of men in town" (see Dillon's *Indiana*, ed. of 1859, p. 124, and Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 52.)

in the town a short time before the Colonel's approach, but now they had, most of them left, and all was quiet. In two hours' time, the Kaskaskia was crossed in the greatest silence, and final orders were given as to the attack.

"I immediately divided my little army into two divisions," are the words of the Colonel, "ordered one to surround the town, with the other I broke into the fort, and secured the Governor, Mr. Rocheblave," * who, at the time, had no suspicions of the immediate presence of a force from Virginia, nor indeed from any other quarter. Fort Gage had no garrison to speak of, not even of local militia — a sentry or two was all.

The "Governor, Mr. Rocheblave," was, it seems, when Clark and his division "broke into the fort," asleep in bed. But he was quickly aroused by the unusual noise. He sprang up, and, half-dressed, rushed to the door of his quarters to inquire into the disturbance. He was met by the Colonel who informed him he was a prisoner to the Americans. The "Governor" at once yielded to a "rebel" force under command of "Mr. Clark" — a "self-styled Colonel," as he subsequently called the American commander; and the "Commandant of all the English part of the Illinois" was no longer in power. — Hard fate! During the day, his ever-watchful eyes had been upon the Ohio

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 31. Here, again, Clark's letter just cited differs from his Memoir. In the latter, he says he divided his army into *three* divisions: "with one of the divisions, I marched to the fort, and ordered the other two into different quarters of the town." — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859) p. 124. I have followed his letter to Mason.

— the “Beautiful River” — but he discovered no immediate danger in that direction. He had seen, in his imagination, bateaux following each other upon that stream in quick succession from Fort Pitt, loaded with provisions destined for New Orleans — that was all. Although “a numerous band of brigands” might soon attack him, yet they were not to come from Virginia.* He had never heard of one George Rogers Clark. He knew George Morgan and he had heard of William Linn; but the former had gone to Philadelphia from Pittsburgh according to his latest information; and as to the last named — he knew nothing of his whereabouts. But Linn was not so ignorant of Rocheblave.†

“The commanding officer, Philip Rocheblave,” says Captain Bowman, “we made prisoner.” The Captain also says they secured “all his instructions which he had received from time to time from the several Governors at Detroit, Quebec and Michilimackinac, to set

* “On this very day,” says a recent writer, “Rocheblave, the commander of the post, all unconscious of the impending danger, was pouring forth the vexations of his soul in a pathetic appeal to Gen. Haldimand [Sir Guy Carleton, who, he (Rocheblave) supposed, was still] Governor of Canada. He depicted the discouragements of settlers, the disloyal conduct of those of British birth — enlarged upon the urgency of the need for troops, the jealousies of the inhabitants, Spanish encroachments, and expatiated upon the ‘brigandage’ of Capt. Willing upon the Mississippi, fearing lest the latter might surprise and capture a position [Kaskaskia] regarded [by Rocheblave] as of great importance.” — John Moses: *History of Illinois*, vol. I, pp. 148, 149. (For Rocheblave’s latter in full, translated from the French, see Mason’s *Early Chicago and Illinois*, pp. 412–418. See also ante, Chap. III of our narrative.)

† See further as to the capture of Fort Gage, Appendix, Note XLVIII, before cited.

the Indians upon us, offering great rewards for our scalps; for which service, he has a salary of two hundred pounds sterling a year."* However, what was really secured was, besides letters of De Peyster and Governor Carleton, those of Hamilton from Detroit, some of which directed him to stimulate the Indians to hostility; but neither of the writers authorized him to offer rewards for scalps.†

It was arranged before hand that in case Clark met with no resistance at the fort, he and his men were to signal the other division (which, tradition says, was commanded by Captain Helm), by giving a general shout, when the town itself was to be assailed.‡ The signal was promptly given, and the men had matters all their own way in the village.§ In

* Bowman to Hite. A Kentucky historian says: "Written instructions from Detroit were found in the possession of the commandant Rocheblave, directing him to unite the Indians to commit depredations on the citizens of the United States and to promise them rewards for scalps, while the conduct of the savages, conforming to these instructions, left no doubt of their having been complied with." (Marshall's *Kentucky*, vol. I, p. 68.) It will be noticed that Marshall follows Bowman closely. Evidently he had knowledge of what the latter had written.

† Copies of these letters or "Instructions," as Bowman calls them (and most of them had the force of instructions), were kept by the writers and they are now among the Haldimand MSS. They show no such "offering," (Appendix to our narrative, Note XLVIII, already cited, may be consulted in this connection.)

‡ Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 124, 125.

§It is not difficult to understand the exact affairs at the movement when Clark found the fort in his possession with-

fifteen minutes, the Colonel declares, he had every street secured; he sent runners through the village ordering the people on pain of death to keep close to their houses, which they observed, and before daylight had all the people disarmed.* Meanwhile, every avenue was guarded to prevent any escape to give alarm to the other villages; and all the while, for the effect it might have, the greatest noise was kept up by the troops through every quarter of the town.† “The place,” wrote Captain Bowman, “consists of two hundred and fifty families, sufficiently fortified to have resisted a thousand men.”‡

Clark sent for several of the citizens during the night for the purpose of obtaining intelligence; however, but little information could be obtained beyond what had already been procured from the hunters who were “brought to” at the mouth of the Tennessee, except that a body of Indians lay at this time in the neighborhood of Cahokia, sixty miles up the Mississippi, and that Gabriel Cerré, a principal merchant of Kaskaskia, was then one of the most inveterate enemies of the Americans.§

The Colonel's first act on the morning of the fifth was the withdrawing of all his men from the town out resistance — at that moment the other division of his command was marching to occupy the village.

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 31.

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 125.

‡ Bowman to Hite.

§ Butler's *Kentucky* pp. 53, 54. See also that author in *The Western Journal*, vol. XII, p. 168. And the tradition is sufficiently confirmed by Monferton to Cerré, Sept. 22, 1778, in the Haldimand MSS.

(except enough to garrison the fort) to different positions around it. "During these movements, as all intercourse with the soldiers by the Kaskaskians had been forbidden by Clark under heavy penalties, and even those who had been sent for had also been ordered to have no communication with anyone else, — distrust and terror overspread the village.

The result of the removal of the troops was, that the citizens were permitted to walk about freely; when, finding they were busy in conversation with one another, a few of the principal residents, mostly militia officers highest in command, Clark apprehended and put in irons, without assigning any cause or his order, or suffering any defense to be made. "This immediately produced general consternation;" and the people expected the worst consequences from the Americans.

After some time, Pierre Gibault, the Roman Catholic priest of the place (Vicar-General of the Bishop of Quebec for the Illinois and adjacent countries), got permission, with five or six elderly gentlemen, residents of Kaskaskia, to wait upon Clark.* "Shocked as the citizens had been by the sudden capture of their town and by such an enemy as their imaginations had painted, the party were, evidently, still more shocked when they entered Clark's quarters, at the appearance of him and his officers. Their clothes dirty and torn by the briars, their others left at the [Ohio] river, — the appearance of the chiefs of this

* According to Clark, Father Gibault had, while in Canada (from which country he had lately come), made himself somewhat acquainted with the dispute between Britain and America, and was, unlike a brother who resided there, rather inclined to favor the United States. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 33, 34. See also Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 126, 127.

little band was indeed frightful and savage (as Clark himself admits) to any eyes." *

It was sometime after entering the room where Clark and his officers were seated before the callers could speak; and this they did not do even, until their business was demanded. They asked which was the commander — "so effectually had this backwoods expedition confounded the difference of rank." The priest then said the inhabitants "expected to be separated perhaps never to meet again." Giving up all for lost, their lives were all they could dare beg for, which they did with the greatest subserviency. They were willing to be slaves to save their families.

Clark told them it did not suit him to give them an answer at that time. He gave permission, however, to the citizens generally to go once more to their church to take leave of each other — a request which had humbly been made by their representatives — at the same time telling his auditors, the people must not venture out of town. Some further conversation was attempted by the Kaskaskians present, but it was repelled by the Colonel who told them there was no longer leisure for further intercourse. † This he did

* "How much more so," says Butler, "to *this* deputation, may be easily conceived by those who are acquainted with the refinement and delicacy of the ancient French [*History of Kentucky*, p. 55]." But the "refinement and delicacy of the ancient French" of the Illinois may well be questioned.

† The recollection of Clark many years thereafter was to the effect that the people of the town suspected their religion was abnoxious to the men under his command, and that therefore he told the priest, carelessly, that he had nothing to say against his church — it was a matter Americans left for every man to settle with his God (Butler: *History of Kentucky*, p. 55; Dillon: *History of Indiana*, pp.

that the alarm might be raised to its utmost height. The deputation departed and the whole village assembled at the church — the houses being deserted by all who could leave them. Orders were given to prevent any soldiers from entering the buildings left without occupants. The people remained in the church for a considerable time, when they repaired to their houses, trembling as if being led to execution. It did not require a lengthy reflection on part of the American commander to determine his course toward these inoffensive people. It was his original idea to treat them leniently should they fall into his hands and, if possible, attach them to his interest; indeed, as he declares, his principles would not suffer him to distress such a number of persons, unless through policy it was necessary; — his instructions, also, from Governor Henry were of a like spirit; and he now, in view of the fact that Cahokia and Vincennes remained to be secured and that there were numerous Indian tribes in the vicinity attached to the French, who were yet to be influenced in favor of the Americans, — resolved to carry out his first intentions. In fact, the Colonel, as he himself asserts, was too weak to treat the inhabitants in any other manner.*

Clark now sent for all the most influential men in the town, not under arrest, to meet him at headquarters. They “came in as if to a tribunal that was to determine their fate forever,” says the American com-

125, 126). In his letter to Mason, Clark does not mention this conversation, nor that the people generally went to the church, upon his leave, to bid farewell to each other.

* Consult, again, as to what immediately followed on the taking of Kaskaskia, Appendix to our narrative, Note XLVIII.

mander, "cursing their fortune that they were not apprised of us time enough to have defended themselves. I told them that I was sorry to find that they had been taught to harbor so base an opinion of the Americans and their cause. I explained the nature of the dispute to them in as clear a light as I was capable of. It was certain that they were a conquered people, and by the fate of war were at my mercy." But the Colonel here declared that the American principle was to make such as were reduced free instead of slaves. He likewise told them that, if he could have a surety of their zeal and attachment to the American cause, they should immediately enjoy all the privileges of the Government and their property be secured to them. He assured them that it was only to stop the farther effusion of innocent blood by the savages under the influence of Rocheblave that made them an object of his attention; and now that the king of France had united his powerful arms with those of America, the war would not in all probability continue long.*

The citizens, from the deepest gloom, "fell into transports of joy." They assured Clark they had always been kept in the dark as to the dispute between America and Britain; that they had never heard anything before but what was prejudiced and tended to incense them against the Americans; and that they were now convinced that it was a cause that they ought

* Although the reference to the alliance between France and the United States is not mentioned by Clark in his letter to Mason, it is spoken of in his Memoir; and, as it would hardly have been overlooked by the Colonel on the occasion, it is given in the text as a verity. Clark had reached a conclusion not fully warranted by what he had learned, that the savages under Rocheblave's influence were shedding "innocent blood," — at least, to any particular extent.

to espouse; that they should be happy of an opportunity to convince the Colonel of their zeal; and they would think themselves the happiest people in the world if they were united with the Americans: they begged Clark that he would receive what they said as their real sentiments. In order to be more certain of their sincerity, the American commander told them an oath of allegiance would be required of them; but to give them time to reflect on it, he would not administer it for a few days; in the meantime any of them who chose were at liberty to leave the country with their families (except two or three particular persons); that they might repair to their homes and conduct themselves as usual, without any dread.*

Gibault, the priest, asked the Colonel would he give him liberty to perform his duty in his church. Clark told him he had nothing to do with churches more than to defend them from insult; that by the laws of Virginia, his religion had as great privileges as any other.

"This," says Clark, "seemed to complete their happiness. They returned to their families, and in a few minutes the scene of mourning and distress was turned to an excess of joy — nothing else was seen

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 33. Who the two or three particular persons were that were not permitted to leave the country at that time will presently appear. "Perfect freedom was now given to the inhabitants to go or come as they pleased, so confident were our countrymen, that whatever report might be made, [it] would be to the credit and success of the American arms." (Butler: *History of Kentucky*, p. 57.) How this freedom was subsequently abused, will hereafter be seen. The first to leave for Detroit to carry the news to Hamilton was Francis Maisonville. (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.)

or heard." They adorned the streets with flowers, hung out flags of different colors, and completed their happiness by singing and other demonstrations of delight.* The oath of Allegiance to Virginia and the United States was soon after taken by them.†

The action of the Colonel in imprisoning a few Kaskaskians was a precaution taken not to let the most influential of his enemies (if, really, they should prove such) escape. But the throwing them and Rocheblave in irons (for such was the treatment accorded to the latter also) was an excess of caution, if nothing more.‡ Notably among those deprived of their liberty was M. Cerré, the merchant who had been accused of being a most determined foe to the Americans. He too, was ironed.§

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 33, 34. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XLIX.)

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 35. "In a few days" are Clark's words, "the inhabitants of the country took the oath subscribed [authorized] by law, and every person appeared to be happy." That the citizens took the oath of allegiance both to Virginia and the United States is evident. In his Memoir [Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 127], Clark says it was to Virginia. But, that the United States was included, Bowman to Hite, makes it sufficiently evident. And corroborative is Hamilton to Carleton, Aug. 8, 1778; also De Peyster to Haldimand, Aug. 31, 1778 and January 29, 1779: Haldimand MSS.

‡ Nowhere in any writing by Clark does he say that Rocheblave was ironed; but such was the fact. Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 54) apologizes for Clark in these words: "These measures [the putting in irons of Kaskaskians] were taken from no wanton cruelty; for, of all men, Colonel Clark enjoyed the mildest and most affectionate disposition; and he severely felt, as he says, every hardship he believed himself compelled to inflict."

§ As to the ironing and imprisonment, see De Peyster

The treatment given Rocheblave on his being captured, was according to British reports, such as to approach the verge of barbarity. He was not only ironed but was confined in an outbuilding inside the pickets of the fort, where hogs had been kept. The commander's wife, it was also alleged, was offered indignities.* However, the putting in irons and imprisonment of citizens was only for a few hours duration, except as to Rocheblave and Cerré.† And even they, it is probable, were only ironed for a short time, though they were still kept in close confinement.‡

to Haldimand, Aug. 31, 1778 and Monferton to Cerré, Sept. 22, same year.—Haldimand MSS. An account sent by one Chevalier, a Frenchman from St. Joseph, to De Peyster, that Rocheblave and Cerré were put in irons because of having refused [to take] the oaths of allegiance to the king of Spain, the French king, and the Congress" was, of course, a ridiculous report. (De Peyster to Haldimand, Aug. 31, 1778—Haldimand MSS.) See Appendix to our narrative, Note XXV.

* Hamilton to Carleton, Aug. 8 and De Peyster to Haldimand Aug. 31, 1778—Haldimand MSS.; also, especially, Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781—Germain MSS. The words of the Lieutenant Governor are, as to Rocheblave, that he "was laid in irons and put in a place where hogs had been kept, ankle deep in filth." But, probably, this was an exaggeration. See Appendix, Note —.

† Such, at least, is to be inferred from Clark's *Memoir*—Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 126. They were probably all released before the night of the fight, except Rocheblave and Cerré.

‡ A month after he was captured, the prisoner wrote to Carleton: "I say nothing to you of my prison, which there is nothing like in Algiers." (Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 419.) If credit is to be given to tradition, there was some excuse for the ill treatment accorded Rocheblave, as he did not hesitate to continually denounce the American commander.

Cerré, upon regaining his freedom (he having been finally set at liberty), immediately crossed the Mississippi to St. Louis, leaving his family and an extensive assortment of merchandise in Kaskaskia.* It then occurred to Clark that a person of so much importance must, if possible, be gained over to the cause of the United States; for his influence, the American commander quickly saw, would be of the utmost consequence if exerted in the right direction. A guard was therefore soon placed around his house to the end that none of his family or property should be disturbed; but he gave out that the object was to secure boats because Cerré by fleeing had virtually acknowledged himself an enemy, and that he had been guilty of inciting the Indians against the Americans. Clark then patiently awaited developments.† The Colonel had already turned his attention to Cahokia. He prepared on the afternoon of the fifth, a detachment on horseback — Illinois horses, of course, had to be used — under Captain Bowman “to make a descent” on that village which was, as we have seen, about sixty miles “up the country.” The Kaskaskians assured the American commander that one of their own townsmen was enough to put him in possession of the place “by carrying the good news” of the treatment they had received; but Clark “did not altogether choose to trust them.” As it was, the Captain and his men were attended by a considerable number of the Kaskaskia citizens.‡ Bowman “got into the middle of

* Butler has it, that, at the time of Clark's arrival, Cerré was in St. Louis, which, of course, is error.

† Butler in *Western Journal*, loc. cit.

‡ Clark's recollection years after was, that these Kaskaskians were commanded by former militia officers of the

the town before they were discovered; the French gentlemen calling aloud to the people to submit to their happier fate, which they did with very little hesitation. A number of Indians being in town, on hearing of the 'Big Knives,' immediately made their escape."

"I was ordered by our commanding officer (Colonel Clark)," says Captain Bowman, "with thirty men on horseback to attack three other French towns up the Mississippi. The first, called Prairie du Rocher, is about fifteen miles from Kaskaskia, the town we had in possession; and before they had any knowledge of my arrival, I was in possession of the place, which was no small surprise to them; in consequence of which, they were willing to comply with any terms I should propose."

"Thence," continues the Captain, "I passed to St. Philip's, about nine miles farther up the river, which I likewise took possession of; and as it was impossible for them to know my strength (the whole being transacted in the night) they also came to my own terms. I proceeded thence to Cahokia, about forty or fifty miles above St. Philip's, which contained about one hundred families. We rode immediately to the commander's house and demanded a surrender of him and the whole town, which was at once complied with. I then possessed myself of a large stone house, well fortified for war. I was immediately threatened by a man of the place that he would call in one hundred

town (Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 58); rather vaguely expressed by Dillon (*History of Indiana*, p. 127) as being "a volunteer company of French militia." It is said that "all set off in high spirits at this new mark of confidence under the free government of Virginia."

and fifty Indians to his assistance and cut me off. This fellow I took care to secure; but we lay upon our arms the whole night, this being the third night without sleep." *

"In the morning," the Captain goes on to say, "I required the inhabitants to take the oath of allegiance to the States or I should treat them as enemies, which they readily agreed to; and before ten o'clock there were one hundred and fifty who followed the example. In less than ten days, there were three hundred who took the oaths, and they now appear much attached to our cause." †

The inhabitants of the two principal towns having thus sworn fealty to the United States and to Virginia and the smaller villages having submitted to the Virginians, — "the British Illinois" become at once (and, it may be premised, permanently) American. And all

* Bowman to Hite. Clark's subsequent assertion that Bowman's force was made up of the Captain's company and part of another, is at fault; although there was in the detachment, doubtless, men from two companies — principally from Bowman's. It was not strictly true that Clark ordered Bowman "to attack" the other towns. He was "to make a descent" on Cahokia, it being well understood by both the Colonel and the Captain that, in all probability, no resistance would be offered.

† Bowman to Hite. The above was written almost at the very time of the expiration of the ten days. In an "Account of the French Forts Ceded to Great Britain in Louisiana," written before the English occupation of the Illinois, is the following with reference to Cahokia: "Fifteen leagues from Fort Chartres, going up the Mississippi, is the village of Casquiars [Cahokia]. There is a small stockade fort; I don't know if there is any cannon. There may be about 100 inhabitants."

this had been accomplished without the shedding of a drop of blood!

Clark's success, thus far, extraordinary though it was, cannot be said to have been because of any great display of military genius. He had not encountered an enemy of any strength either inside a fortification or in the field. At the start, it had been his faith in previous information gained by him that determined him to undertake the expedition; and once undertaken, his firmness and resolution would not permit him to yield to any discouragement. But there was one element in his success that the greatest and wisest of Generals do not fail to invoke as one of the most important factors in military science — and that was secrecy. Much was due to his suavity of manners — much to his readiness to share to the fullest extent with his men their trials and hardships, — but it was the secrecy which he so completely maintained as to the real object of his undertaking that, in the end, insured his triumph. What he had accomplished (had he subsequently done no more) would not have, henceforth, given him the prestige for a capacity for great military talents or sagacity; nevertheless, there was already enough to his credit to entitle him to the distinction of having his acts spoken of as heroic.

But writers of Western history, in the past, have been prone to exaggerate the troubles and trials — the fears and sufferings — which from the commencement of the expedition to the capture of the Illinois villages, beset the Colonel and his men. Says one of these chroniclers:

“A law had been passed for the raising of a regiment; the troops had been enlisted, officered and

equipped, transported thirteen hundred miles by land and water, through a wilderness country, inhabited by Indian allies of the enemy, and marched into a garrisoned town, without the slightest suspicion, much less discovery, of the movement. When we observe the amount of time and labor which is now expended in making a journey from Virginia to Kaskaskia [this was written before there was railway communication between the two], with all our improvements, and reflect how incalculably greater must have been the difficulties of such a journey at that time, when there was no road across the mountains, nor any boats in which to navigate the rivers but such rude craft as the traveler might construct for his own convenience; and when we take into consideration the difficulty of transporting provisions and ammunition through a wild region, the successful expedition of Colonel Clark [in capturing the Illinois towns] will present itself as a brilliant military achievement." *

Strictly speaking, Clark did not travel, on his journey from Williamsburg to Kaskaskia, through any portion of a country inhabited by Indians; and it can hardly be said he marched into a garrisoned town when he reached the objective point of his expedition. Not much difficulty could have been experienced by the recruits in reaching Redstone; and the force there collected dropped down the Monongahela and Ohio to the Kentucky rendezvous with little trouble and in boats far from being rude in their construction. From the islands to just above "Old Fort Massac," with oars doubled-manned, surely there was not

* Hall: *Romance of Western History*, p. 296.

much hardship encountered. Thence, however, to Kaskaskia there was real suffering for the last two days from hunger. Now, in all this journey from its beginning to its end, with the surrender of the Illinois villagers, no events happened — no difficulties were overcome — that could stamp the enterprise thus far as “a brilliant military achievement.” But, it may be premised, Clark’s campaign was far from being ended. Heroic valor — “military achievement” of acknowledged force (to say the least) — is yet to be chronicled; and under such circumstances was success finally assured, that it cannot fail to be considered almost beyond the reach of human energy.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE occupation of Kaskaskia and Cahokia by Clark's force was at once followed by friendly demonstrations from the Spanish side of the Mississippi. This was so marked that Clark opened a correspondence with Fernando de Leyba, "Captain in the Infantry Regiment of Louisiana, Commander-in-chief and Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana, headquarters at St. Louis." "Our friends, the Spaniards," says Clark, "did everything in their power to convince me of their friendship."*

It was now that Vincennes began to engage no small share of Colonel Clark's attention; and why not, seeing that the Illinois towns had submitted to his authority? He knew that the people there had learned of his presence in Kaskaskia, but he concluded he was by no means able to march against them, although Abbott, the lieutenant-governor, had left the place. The American commander was determined, if possible, to conquer them in a peaceable way (as they were now left to themselves) by winning their affections. But he must first know their sentiments — what their feelings were toward the Americans.

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 35. "Clark sent the Lieutenant-Governor [De Leyba] a number of letters. [*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 35.] They are in Spain as are all of De Leyba's papers and probably have not been inspected for three quarters of a century. [Brymner: *Report on Canadian Archives* 1883, p. 14.] Who can speak as to their contents?" [Oscar W. Collett, in *Magazine of Western History*, vol. I, (Feb., 1885) p. 273.]

To execute his plans, the Colonel pretended he was about to send an express to the Falls of the Ohio for a body of troops to join him at a certain place in order to attack the town. This soon had the desired effect. Advocates immediately appeared before Clark in its behalf. Father Gibault, as if to convince the latter of his attachment, offered to undertake to win the village for the American commander if permitted to make the trial, only requesting that a few Kaskaskians go with him. There seemed to be no doubt among the people of their being able peaceably to gain the inhabitants there to the Colonel's interest. Gibault gave Clark to understand that, although he had nothing to do with temporal business, he would hint to his friends upon the Wabash enough to be very conducive to success.

Gibault named as his associate, a Dr. Le Font. The whole plan, which was perfectly agreeable to Clark and was what he was then secretly aiming at and had been for some days, was immediately settled. The priest and the doctor with a small retinue (of whom one was an American spy) started on the fourteenth, going on horseback* and taking with them instructions to be followed in case of success, also an address to the inhabitants of Vincennes, authorizing them to garrison their town themselves, to convince them of the confidence reposed in them by the Amer-

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Aug. 8, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. It is also stated in a letter written by him to the General on the 11th. It seems that Gibault before starting went to Cahokia, going thence by way of Kaskaskia, which he left on the 14th. It was from Cahokia that he started on horseback, but there is no doubt he journeyed from Kaskaskia in the same way.

ican commander. Verbal instructions from Governor Henry, as we have seen, authorized this attempt, now that the Illinois was reduced, even had it been determined to use coercive measures.

Upon the arrival of the party at Vincennes, a short time was spent by the Kaskaskians in explaining matters to its inhabitants. They (with the exception of a few disaffected ones, mostly traders, who from interest were attached to Governor Abbot and the government he had represented on the Wabash, and who immediately left the country) acceded to the proposal to make common cause with America. The citizens went in a body to the church where the oath of allegiance was administered to them in the most solemn manner. An officer was elected, Fort Sackville immediately garrisoned, and the American flag displayed to the astonishment of the Indians. Hamilton subsequently learned from an Indian report that the British flag left there by Abbott was, when taken down, wrapped around a large stone and thrown into the Wabash.*

The savages in Vincennes were informed that their old father, the French King, had come to life again. A Piankeshaw chief of great influence among his nation, known as the "Big Gate," or "Big Door," and called by the Indians "The Grand Door to the Wabash" (controlled, as he did, the lower portion — the "gate" or "door" — of the river), received a spirited

* *Proceedings of the Rebels at Vincennes, as Related to Lieut. Gov'r Hamilton by Neegik, an Ottawa War Chief, Oct. 14, 1778.* — Haldimand MSS. But this Indian report confounded the subsequent arrival of a "rebel" officer to take command of Fort Sackville, with the previous visit of Gibault when the British flag was taken down and the American flag raised.

compliment from Father Gibault, who was much liked by the Indians; and, through the chief's father, known as "Old Tobacco,"* Big Door returned the compliment, which was soon followed by a "talk" and a belt of wampum.†

Gibault and party, accompanied by several gentlemen from Vincennes, returned to Kaskaskia about the first of August "with the joyful news."‡

There was one who did not go back with Gibault. This was the American spy, Simon Kenton, who had with him dispatches from Clark to Colonel Bowman, the County Lieutenant of Kentucky county, giving a full recital of his success in the Illinois. Kenton was also enjoined to make a close observation of all the incidents connected with the visit of Father Gibault and send back an account of the same to the American commandant at Kaskaskia. This was done and Kenton then made his way to Kentucky, reaching Colonel Bowman at Harrodsburg in thirteen days from Vincennes. After delivering his dispatches, he went to Boonesborough.

But the journey of Kenton from Kaskaskia to Harrodsburg, by way of Vincennes, has been, in many particulars, distorted in the Annals of the West. The principal errors to be noted in these traditionary accounts are, that Kenton reached Vincennes before Gibault; that he reconnoitered the place undiscovered;

* See Appendix, Note LXVI.

† Compare *Western Annals*, pp. 173, 174.

‡ See also as to the winning of Vincennes to the American interests, under management of Gibault, Appendix, Note L.

and that he then sent Clark a statement of what had come under his observation.*

Soon after his release, the merchant, Cerre', at St. Louis, became uneasy that his family and property should be kept under guard at Kaskaskia; and fearing to venture into Clark's power without a safe-conduct, procured the recommendation of the Spanish Lieutenant-Governor at the first mentioned place, also that of the commandant at St. Genevieve,—supported by the influence of the greater part of the citizens of both places. It was all in vain. The American commander peremptorily refused giving him the desired security, at the same time intimating that he wished to hear no more such applications. He understood, he said, that Cerre' was a sensible man, and if he were innocent of the charge of inciting the Indians against the Americans, he need not be afraid of delivering himself up. Backwardness would only increase suspicion against him.

Cerre' soon crossed over from St. Louis and boldly repaired to Clark's headquarters in Kaskaskia, and inquired of the Colonel what crimes he stood charged with. He was informed that he was accused of encouraging the Indians in their murders and devastations on the American frontier. This, Cerre' flatly denied and declared his willingness to meet any such charges at once. His accusers were sent for, but upon confronting the accused they had little to say—in short, they could bring no proof whatever against him, and the French merchant was honorably acquitted and his family and goods immediately restored to him. It

* See Appendix, Note L. Consult as to a fiction concerning a contemplated attack from Kaskaskia, Vincennes and Detroit against Kentucky. Appendix, Note LI.

is hardly necessary to add that he at once took the oath of allegiance and became a most valuable friend to America.*

While Gibault was making a bloodless conquest of Vincennes for Virginia, Clark, at Kaskaskia was "exceedingly engaged" in regulating matters in the Illinois. Three months, the period for which his men had enlisted, had expired. Something must be done and done speedily. The commander was, at the time, at a great loss how to act — how far, indeed, he might venture to strain his authority. His instructions were silent on many important points; for it was, of course, impossible for Governor Henry and his Council to foresee all the events that had taken place. To abandon the country and all the prospects that opened to view for the good of America, for want of instructions in certain cases, the Colonel thought would amount to a reflection on the Government which had entrusted him with charge of the expedition. He resolved, therefore, to usurp all the authority necessary to retain the fruits of his success.

"I now found myself," says the commandant, "in possession of the whole [of the Illinois and of Vincennes], in a country where I could do more real service than I expected, which occasioned my situation to be the more disagreeable, as I wanted men;" for the

* Mann Butler, in *The Western Journal*, vol. XII, pp. 168, 240, 241. Mention of Cerré is made in Rocheblave to Carleton, [Aug. 3?], 1778 — Haldimand MSS., where, it is intimated, he was then on good terms with Clark. [As to Butler's account to be found in his *History of Kentucky*, of the meeting between Clark and Cerré see Appendix, Note LII. In a subsequent note (LVIII) will be found also opinions from British accounts of the treatment accorded to Cerré and Rocheblave in putting them in irons.]

greatest part of those under his command "was for returning, as they were no longer engaged." Surrounding him, though at a considerable distance away, most of them, were numerous nations of savages, whose minds had been poisoned by the English; notwithstanding this many of his men, whose term of enlistment had expired, insisted on leaving the service. "It was," says Clark, "with difficulty that I could support the dignity that was essential to give my orders the force that was necessary" — such was the disquietude of his mind.

The Colonel soon had about one hundred of his men reënlisted for eight months, but this was brought about by "great presents and promises" only. To give color to his remaining with so few troops, he made a feint of returning to the Falls of the Ohio, as though he had sufficient confidence in the people to trust them with the management of affairs, hoping they would remonstrate against his leaving. This they did in the warmest terms. They represented the necessity of troops remaining at Kaskaskia, declaring they were fearful if the town was vacated and the commander returned to the Falls with his men that the English would again possess the country. So the Colonel, seemingly by their request, consented to remain with two companies — though he hardly thought (he pretended) that so many were necessary. If more were wanted, he declared, he could get them at any time from the Falls, where, the citizens were made to believe, there was a considerable garrison.

As soon as possible (it was probably the fourth of August) the Commander sent off all those — seventy in number — who "could not be got to stay," — William Linn taking charge of the returning troops, all of

whom were to be discharged at the Falls. He also took with him an order to have the post there removed from the island to the mainland on the Kentucky side of the river. This was, in reality, the founding of the present city of Louisville. And while Clark is not entitled to the distinction of having been the founder of Kentucky so frequently given him, he is properly credited with being the father of its chief city.

Captain Montgomery was, at the same time, ordered to proceed to Williamsburg with letters entrusted to him, directed to the Virginia governor, giving a full account of the success thus far of the expedition; the situation of affairs at the date of writing; and the necessity there was for more troops. With him, Rocheblave was sent a prisoner (there were none others) to the Virginia seat of government.*

* Monnette's *History of the Mississippi Valley* vol. I, p. 422; Rocheblave to Carleton, Aug. 3, 1778 — Haldimand MSS.; *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 36, 37. "I came off with the volunteers, having instructions from Colonel (now General) Clark to wait on his Excellency, the Governor [of Virginia], as soon as possible with letters and verbal messages." (*Montgomery to the Board of Commissioners for the Settlement of Western Accts.*, Feb. 22, 1783 — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, Vol. III, p. 441; Mason's *Early Chicago*, p. 352.) That Montgomery probably started on the fourth of August, is to be inferred from the letter of Rocheblave to Carleton of the day previous. "As Clark had secured the friendship of the Spanish commandant at St. Louis, he felt secure from molestation for the present, and sent a party home to Virginia with the news of his bloodless conquest." — Fiske: *The American Revolution*, vol. II, p. 106. It is evident, however, that the friendship spoken of had nothing to do with the Colonel's act in sending off any of his men. Mr. Mason, in his excellent work,

The throwing of Rocheblave in irons upon his capture in Fort Gage was not the only harsh treatment accorded him: there was a confiscation of much of his private property, — his slaves in particular being sold for five hundred pounds sterling, which was distributed among the troops as prize money. It was an unwarranted proceeding.

The day before Rocheblave's departure for Williamsburg, he "stole a moment" from his guards in order to write Carleton, giving him information as to his having been captured by "Mr. Clark, the self-styled Colonel."

"The majority of the inhabitants," continued Rocheblave, "knowing the maneuvers which had occurred on the lower part of the Mississippi, were resolved to defend themselves; but the dealings of our neighbors, the Spaniards, and the abuse of the treacherous English. . . prevented them from doing it. There remained to me, for a resource, Mr. Legras, who prepared himself with forty men to come and join me from Fort Vincennes, where he is captain of militia; but the rebels having landed on the [north side of the] Ohio sixty leagues from here, crossed the neck of land which separates that river from this place, and prevented that."

"Uselessly," further wrote the prisoner, "I have, for two years past, been representing the necessity of cutting off the communication between the Ohio and the Mississippi carried on with the Spaniards. It is

Early Chicago and Illinois, p. 373, inadvertently says that "Clark sent those of his men whom he could not persuade to reënlist to carry letters to Gov. Patrick Henry at Williamsburg and with them went Rocheblave across the Alleghanies in custody," — citing *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 37.

open; and I hope that there does not result more inconvenience than I had predicted.

"I beg your Excellency," added the now disconsolate writer, "to pay the expenses for which I have drawn on Mr. Dunn. I entreat you to have pity on the family of Captain Hugh Lord left with mine, without resource, their effects and mine having been, for the most part seized and sold. I leave here a wife and seven children deprived of the first necessities of life. They [The Americans] say that I depart tomorrow for the Congress. I recommend myself to you to be exchanged. I say nothing to you of my prison, which there is nothing like in Algiers. I have lost between Mr. Lord and myself in slaves, animals, goods and utensils, nine thousand piastres. I hope that your Excellency will have regard for our families and will cause them to receive some aid by the way of Mr. De Feive, merchant of Montreal, who could give his orders to M. Cerre', a merchant here. I have neither a good pen nor any other paper. Your Excellency will excuse a prisoner who writes upon his knees. Sick as he is, the time has come when he must depart from the country."*

Just before Montgomery's departure, Captain Bowman returned to Kaskaskia from Cahokia, leaving a guard at the last mentioned place on account of its remoteness from the other towns, and because the In-

* Rocheblave to Carleton Aug. 3, 1778.—Haldimand MSS. (See Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*; pp. 418, 419.) But Rocheblave, as already shown, was not sent a prisoner to Congress, but to the Virginia authorities. (As to Rocheblave being conducted to Williamsburg, see Appendix, Note LIII.)

dians, not far away, were constantly receiving supplies from the British.*

Clark now commenced raising recruits in the settlements. Many of the young people seemed fond of the service, and "the different companies soon got complete." At Cahokia, where the stone building — really a fortification, as already suggested — had been taken possession of and named "Fort Bowman," was a garrison to be commanded by Captain Bowman; one was also formed at Kaskaskia to occupy Fort Clark, as Fort Gage was now named,† and was put in charge of Captain John Williams. In Vincennes, Fort Sackville was still in possession of the local militia with the American flag flying over the fortification; but, as will hereafter be shown, the command of the post was soon turned over to one of Clark's officers.

Now that the Colonel had arranged matters so far as the military was concerned to the best of his ability, he next gave his attention to Indian affairs. This was of great importance, as there were a number of nations to the northward and northeastward that would be, in the nature of the case, a menace to him, as many of them were already at war on the side of Great Britain against the United States. But the friendship of the French and the Spaniards to the "Big Knives" confused them. They counseled with the French traders to know what they had better do now that the American flag was flying at Kaskaskia and Cahokia.

* See Appendix to our narrative, Note LIII, just cited.

† The earliest information of the changing the name of Fort Gage to Fort Clark is found in the so-called "Bowman's Journal" (March 15, 1779). As to particulars concerning this Journal see Note CXXXII, in Appendix to our narrative.

These traders were not slow in advising them to make peace with the Virginians. Three tribes — the three nearest to the Illinois towns — did so at once; they were the Kaskaskias, the Peorias, and the Michigamies.

It was the opinion of Clark that Indian treaties (as before that time conducted) had not been carried on by the whites in a proper manner; — soft speeches and presents, in his judgment, should give place to a stern demeanor and a fearless attitude, to be tempered with kindness only when an exhibition of it would tend to conciliate. “It may appear otherwise to you,” said the Colonel, in writing to a friend, some months after, “but I always thought we took the wrong method of treating with Indians, and I strove as soon as possible to make myself acquainted with the French and Spanish mode, which must be preferable to ours, otherwise they could not possibly have such great influence among them. When thoroughly acquainted with it, it exactly coincided with my own idea, and I resolved to follow that same rule as near as circumstances would permit.”*

In after years, Clark wrote: “I had always been convinced that our general conduct with the Indians was wrong; that inviting them to treaties was considered by them in a different manner to what we expected, and imputed by them to fear; and that giving them presents confirmed it. I resolved to guard against this, and I took good pains to make myself acquainted fully with the French and Spanish methods of treating Indians, and with the manners, genius and disposition of the Indians in general. As in this quar-

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 38.

ter [the Illinois] they had not yet been spoiled by us, I was resolved that they should not be.”*

The Colonel soon held a great council at Cahokia. “It was with astonishment,” he says, “that we viewed the amazing number of savages that soon flocked into the town of Cahokia to treat for peace and to hear what the ‘Big Knives’ had to say;—many of them came from five hundred miles distant.” There were Chippewas, Ottawas, Pottawattamies, Winnebagoes, Sacs and Foxes, and a number of other nations,† all being east of the Mississippi and many of them at war against the Americans. Clark “was under some apprehension among such a number of devils;” and it proved to be just, for the second or third night, a party of Winnebagoes and others endeavored to force by the guards into his lodgings to bear him off, but were happily detected and made prisoners by the alacrity of the sergeant. The town took the alarm and was immediately under arms, which convinced the savages that the French were in the American interest.

* Clark's *Memoir*—Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 131. It is evident that Clark exaggerates somewhat as to his preparations to deal with the savages, as, from what follows, it is certain he had not time to accomplish so much before entering upon negotiations with them. One of his assertions, however, throws light upon what is not sufficiently explained in his letter to Mason; and that is, that he was opposed to *inviting* Indians to treaties.

† For “Chippewas,” Clark writes “Chipoways;” for “Ottawas,” he gives “Ottowas;” for “Pottawattamies,” he has “Petawatomes.” Instead of “Winnebagoes,” he gives the more ancient name of “Puans.” He has “Sayges” which is but a synonym for “Sacs.” “Tanways” are given, but these were “Ottawas.” He writes “Mawmies” for “Miamies” or “Miamis.”

The Colonel was determined to follow the principle he had at first acted upon, which was, to show a bold and fearless front to the savages; he therefore immediately ordered the principal chiefs to be put in irons by the French militia. But the former insisted that it was only to see whether the French would take part with the Americans or not; that they had no ill design. This treatment of some of their greatest chiefs caused great confusion among the assembled Indians. The prisoners, with great submission, solicited to speak to the Colonel, but were refused. They then made all the effort they possibly could with the other Indians (who were much at a loss to do, as there were strong guards through every quarter of the town) to get to speak to him; but he told the whole that he believed they were a set of villians, that they had joined the English, and that they were welcome to continue in the cause they had espoused, but that he (Clark) was a man and a warrior; that he did not care who was his friends or foes; and that he had no more to say to them. Such conduct, by the Colonel, alarmed the whole town; but he was sensible that it would gain him no more enemies than he had already; and that, if they afterward solicited for terms, it would be more sincere, and probably have a lasting good effect on the Indian nations. Distrust was visible in the countenance of almost every person during the latter part of the day.

To show the Indians that he disregarded them, Clark remained in his lodging in the town about one hundred yards from the fort, seemingly without a guard; but he kept fifty men concealed in a parlor adjoining, and the garrison under arms. During the night there was great counselling among the savages.

But to make them have the greater idea of his indifference about them, he assembled a number of gentlemen and ladies and danced nearly the whole night. In the morning he summoned the different nations to a grand council.

As a preliminary, Clark released the chiefs he had ironed and invited them to attend the meeting, that he might speak to them in presence of the whole assemblage. After the usual ceremonies were over, he produced a bloody belt of wampum and made a speech upon it.

"I told the chiefs that were guilty," says the Colonel, "that I was sensible their nation was engaged in favor of the English, and if they thought it right, I did not blame them for it, and exhorted them to behave like men and support the cause they had undertaken; that I was sensible that the English were weak and wanted help; that I scorned to take any advantage of them by persuading their friends to desert them; that there were no people but Americans but would put them to death for their late behavior; and that it convinced me of their being my enemies."

"But it was beneath the character of Americans," continued Clark, "to take such revenge; that they were at liberty to do as they pleased, but they should behave like men and not do any mischief until three days after they left the town; that I should have them escorted safely out of the village, and after that expiration of time, if they did not choose to return and fight me, they might find Americans enough by going farther."

And the Colonel added "that if they did not want their own women and children massacred, they must leave off killing ours and only fight men under arms,

which was commendable; that there was the war belt: we should soon see which of us would make it the most bloody. I then told them it was customary among all brave men to treat their enemies well when assembled as we were; that I should give them provisions and rum while they staid; but, by their behavior, I could not conceive that they deserved that appellation, and I did not care how soon they left me after that day.”*

Clark observed that their countenances and attitude favored his real design; for the whole looked like a parcel of criminals. The other nations rose and made many submissive speeches, excusing themselves for their conduct in a very pretty manner. The Colonel thought there was something noble in their sentiments. They alleged that they were persuaded to war by the English and made to harbor a wrong opinion of the Americans; but they now believed them to be warriors and could wish to take them by the hand as brothers; that they did not speak from their lips only, but that the American commander would find that they spoke from their hearts; and that they hoped he would pity their blindness and their women and children. They also solicited pardon for their friends that had been guilty of the late crime.

The Colonel told them he had instructions from the Great Man of the Big Knives not to ask peace from any people, but to offer peace and war and let them take their choice, except a few of the worst nations to whom he was to grant no peace; for, as the English could fight no longer, he was fearful his young warriors would get rusty without they could

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 44.

find somebody to fight. He then presented them with a peace belt and a war belt, and told them to take their choice, — excepting those who had been imprisoned. They, with a great deal of seeming joy, took the belt of peace. Clark then told them he would defer smoking the peace pipe until he heard that they had called in all their warriors, and then he would conclude a treaty with all the ceremony necessary for so important an occasion.

The savages immediately solicited of Clark some persons to go with them to be witnesses of their conduct; and they hoped the Colonel would favor their guilty friends. But this the American commander refused, by which he was pleased to see them set trembling as persons frightened at the apprehension of the worst fate. Their speaker then rose and made a most lamentable speech (such as Clark wished for) begging mercy for their women and children; for the French gentlemen of Cahokia had given them lessons that favored the Colonel's purpose. Clark recommended them to go to their English father, who had told them he was strong; perhaps he might help them, as he had promised; that they could blame no person but themselves when they should, with the English, be given to the dogs to eat.

When the Indian orators had tried their eloquence to no purpose, they pitched on two young men to be put to death as an atonement for the rest, hoping that would pacify Clark. It was surprising to see how submissively the two presented themselves to suffer for their friends, — “advancing into the middle of the floor, sitting down by each other, and covering their heads with their blankets to receive the tomahawk.”

This submission at once conciliated the Colonel. "For a few moments," he declares, "I was so agitated that I do not doubt but I should, without reflection, have killed the first man that would have offered to hurt them."* It is needless to say the two were not tomahawked.

Clark obtained such a treaty as he wished for, confirmed by all present; for peace with all the savages was what he wanted, if it could be secured on his own terms. He came to an understanding with representatives of not less than ten nations. This carried American influence, for the time, far up the Mississippi, and up the Illinois to the very borders of Lake Michigan,—five tribes, the Winnebagoes, Sacs, Foxes, Pottawattamies and Miamies, having previously received presents from the English and taken up the hatchet against the Americans.†

"In a short time," Clark subsequently wrote concerning the negotiations with the Indians at Cahokia at that period, and what followed immediately thereafter, "our influence reached the Indians on the St. Joseph and the border of Lake Michigan. The

* *Id.*, pp. 44-46. Dillon in copying Clark's Memoir is silent as to this whole transaction; but Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 72-75) gives the particulars, although, in some instances, varying considerably from Clark in his letter to Mason, which, as it is nearly contemporary with the event related, is the better authority. (As to Butler's account, see Appendix to our narrative, Note LIV.)

† Patrick Henry to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, Nov. 14, 1778. (See Butler's *Kentucky* (2d ed.), p. 532; also Tyler's *Life of Patrick Henry*, p. 230, 231; and Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. II, p. 16 and vol. III, p. 200.)

French gentlemen, at the different posts that we now had possession of, engaged warmly in our interest. They appeared to vie with each other in promoting the business; and through the means of their correspondence, trading among the Indians, and otherwise, in a short time the Indians of the various tribes inhabiting the region of the Illinois, came in great numbers to Cahokia, in order to make treaties of peace with us. From the information they generally got from the French gentlemen (whom they implicitly believed) respecting us, they were truly alarmed; and, consequently we were visited by the greater part of them, without any invitation from us: of course we had greatly the advantage, in making use of such language as suited our interest. Those treaties, which commenced about the last of August, and continued between three and four weeks, were probably conducted in a way different from any other known in America at that time." He declares he began the business fully prepared, having copies of British treaties in his possession.*

Clark did not fail to make the most of his success. "I sent," he declares, "agents into every quarter." To a chief of the Winnebagoes, he gave this writing as a pledge of his friendship:

* Clark's *Memoir*. The writer (already cited) in the *North American Review*, vol. XLIII, p. 21, says, concerning these treaties: "By means of such cautious management [as employed by the Colonel of Cahokia in his dealing with the savages there] Clark succeeded in undermining the British influence among the Indian tribes from the Mississippi to the Lakes, and impressing them with a respect for the Americans hitherto unknown." But this "undermining," among many of the tribes, proved. it may be promised, of short duration.

“By George Rogers Clark, Esq., Colonel and Comandant of the Eastern Illinois and its Dependencies, etc, etc., etc.

“Whereas Courachon, Chief of the Puans [Winnebagoes], and his nation living at the Rock river have entered into alliance and friendship with the United States of America, and promised to be true and faithful subjects to the same;

“In consequence whereof, I have given him this writing as a remembrance that he and his said nation are to treat all the subjects of the said States of America with friendship and receive all those they may meet with as their brothers.

“Given under my hand and seal at Fort Bowman, in the Illinois, this 22d Aug't, 1778.

G. R. CLARK, [Seal]”

And, in nearly the same words, as will be seen, he afterward gladdened the heart of a Fox chief:

“By George Rogers Clark, Esq., Colonel of the Virginia troops and Comamndant of the Eastern Illinois and its Dependencies:

“Whereas, Kinaytounak [written, also, Kindinack], a chief of the Fox nation of Indians, has entered into a friendly alliance with the United States of America and promised to be a true and faithful subject thereto;—

“In consideration of this, I give him this writing as a remembrance, he agreeing that he and his nation will treat all the subjects of the said States with friendship, and receive them at all times as their brothers.

"Given under my hand and seal, at Fort Bowman, in Cahokia, this 28th day of August, 1778.

"G. R. CLARK.

"[Seal]."*

Much fatigued because of his labor with the Indians, Clark, after about five weeks absence, returned to Kaskaskia. He left Captain Bowman not only in charge of the garrison but of affairs generally at Cahokia. In attending to matters in which he was entrusted, the Colonel declares the Captain "did himself much honor."

On arriving at Kaskaskia, Clark found everything as well as he could have expected. Afterward, "the great Blackbird, Chippewa chief. . . sent a belt of peace to Colonel Clark, influenced, he [the Colonel] supposes, by the dread of Detroit's being reduced by American arms."† It seems that, subsequently, the American commander sought an interview with this Indian and obtained from him every assurance of future friendship; but, what promised much because of the chief's power over his nation, proved, in the end, of little value, on account of British influence.

*Haldimand MSS. But, it may be said, both these chiefs soon returned to their British allegiance, giving over these tokens to the English. (See concerning Clark's Council with the Indian tribes at Cahokia, Appendix, Note LV.)

†Patrick Henry to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, Nov. 14, 1778. Blackbird's interview (for this, it is claimed, actually took place) with Clark, is described with minuteness by Butler in his *History of Kentucky* (see Appendix to our narrative, Note LVI). But his assertion that the conference was the result of Clark having first made advances to the chief, is clearly erroneous.

Having now "fixed matters" so as to enable him to have "a moment's leisure," the Colonel gave his affairs deeper reflection than he had before attempted. His situation and weakness convinced him that more depended on his own behavior and conduct than on all the troops under his command — far removed as they were, from the body of his country, and among French, Spaniards and numerous bands of Indians; all watching his actions, and ready to receive impressions favorable or otherwise of the Americans, which might be hard to remove and which would, perhaps, produce lasting good or ill effects. It was now that he saw his work was only begun; and he naturally examined every circumstance that had transpired since leaving Williamsburg, fixing upon proper resolutions, so that if misfortune or loss of interest should come, it might be chargeable to want of judgments only.

It was, as the Colonel looked upon it, of the greatest consequence to have strict subordination among his troops and this he soon effected. It gave him much pleasure to harrangue them on parade, all "raw and undisciplined" as they were. He told them of his resolutions and the necessity of strict duty as a means of their own preservation. They returned answer that it was their zeal for their country that induced them to engage in the service; that they were sensible of their situation and danger and that nothing could conduce more to their safety and happiness than good order, which they would try to adhere to, and they hoped that no favor would be shown those who would neglect it. In a short time, his garrison in Fort Clark, was in a high state of efficiency — "perhaps," declares the enthusiastic commander, "no garrison could boast of better order or of a more valuable set of men."

Clark now became aware that Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton at Detroit, finding British influence on the wane among many of the Indian nations, was sending out messengers through their country (so far as they dare venture) to awaken a renewed spirit in them for the cause of Britain. But he felt assured that that officer was redoubling his presents and insinuations to little purpose; as he (the Colonel) had a number of persons well acquainted with the Indians he had treated with, to reside among them; and he had spies continually in and about Detroit for some time. However, the American commander under estimated the potency of Hamilton's Indian diplomacy and of his largeness dealt out with a liberal hand.* Besides, there were many tribes to the eastward and northward of the Wabash and Illinois rivers that had not made treaties with the Colonel and were now in close alliance with the British—closer, in fact, than he thought possible, or, at least, had knowledge of.

Clark spared no effort within his reach to conciliate the Illinois people and by so doing to bring them heartily to espouse American interests. "They," he said, "know no other kind of government than what might be expected from the lust of power, pride and avarice of the officers commanding in that country, whose will was a law to the whole and certain destruction to those who disobeyed the most trifling command,—nothing could have been more to my advantage, as I could temper the government as I pleased; and every new privilege appeared to them as fresh laurels to the American cause.

* But the Lieutenant Governor never offered a stated reward for scalps. (See *History of the Girtys*, pp. 65, 69, 70.)

“I, by degrees, laid aside every unnecessary restriction they labored under. As I was convinced that it was the mercenary views of their former governors that established these restrictions, paying no regard to the happiness of the people and those customs, which, when strictly observed, was most conducive to good order, I made it a point to guard the happiness and tranquility of the inhabitants, supposing that their happy change reaching the ears of their brothers and countrymen on the lakes and about Detroit, would be paving my way to that place and have a good effect on the Indians. I soon found it had the desired effect, for the greatest part of the French gentlemen and traders among the Indians declared for us; and many letters of congratulation were sent from Detroit to the gentlemen of the Illinois, which gave me much pleasure.”*

Between the American commander in Kaskaskia and Don Leyba at St. Louis, there was the most cordial understanding. The Spanish Lieutenant-Governor omitted nothing in his power to prove his attachment to the Americans; and this, too, with such openness as to leave no doubt of his sincerity. “As I was never before in the company of a Spanish gentleman,” says Clark, “I was much surprised. Instead of finding that reserve thought peculiar to that nation, I here saw not the least symptom of it. Freedom almost to excess gave me the greatest pleasure.”†

“There lately arrived from New Orleans, wrote the Colonel to Governor Henry, the middle of September,

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 49, 50.

† Id., pp. 46, 47. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note LVII.)

“dispatches from the Governor General to Mr. Leyba, Lieutenant-Governor, residing at St. Louis, which [dispatches] brought, [contained] a parcel for the Commercial Committee and Congress, with instructions to send it by express, except it could be given into the hands of an officer belonging to the States. A few days ago, I received these letters from Mr. Leyba, who requested that I would send them immediately, as he says they are of importance and require expedition. Having a fit person [William Meyers], I have dispatched him with orders to make no delay until he arrives at Williamsburg. This express answers my purpose very well as an opportunity of informing you of what has past in this country since my last letters to you by Captain Montgomery, which I hope you have received.”

“Mr. Leyba,” continues Clark, “requested of me that I would, by letters, present his compliments to you. This gentleman interests himself much in favor of the States — more so than I could have expected. He has offered me all the force that he could raise in case of an attack by the Indians from Detroit, as there is now no danger from any other quarter.”*

* Clark to the Governor of Virginia, Sept. 16, 1778. (Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 194.)

CHAPTER IX.

BY the middle of January, 1778, Hamilton was enabled to inform Governor Carleton of the general success of his war parties sent out from Detroit; but in March, he wrote: "I am humbly of the opinion that it must be impossible for the Wabash Indians to be kept in order without a vast expense in presents, or the presence of some troops. Indeed, in all those posts where the French had settled a trade and intercourse with the savages, an officer's presence, with troops, is much wanted; for the minds of the Indians in remote posts are poisoned by the falsehoods and misrepresentations of the French. As to the Indians of the Wabash, they have been out of the way of knowing the power of the English; and, from a presumption of their own importance, will be arrogant and troublesome." However, he was gratified with the appearance of a large body of warriors — Mingo, Shawanese and Delawares — but, as they had with them their wives and children, of course they were not ready to go upon the war-path against the Americans. "The savages," he wrote on the ninth of June, "will, in a few days, meet in Council."* And that Council proved to be one of the largest ever held with Indians in the West. It was opened at Detroit on the fourteenth. There were sixteen hundred and eighty-three Indians of both sexes present — Ottawas and Chippewas, Wyandots and Pottawattamies, Delawares and Shawanese, Miamis and Mingo (the latter

* Haldimand MSS.

consisting of Mohawks and Senecas) ; also Kickapoos, Weas and Mascoutins.*

The burden of Governor Hamilton's speeches, to the large assemblage of Indians was an urgent request that the good feeling of the year previous might be continued between them and his government, — made effective, upon the occasion, by a liberal bestowal of presents. The responses of the Indian orators were all re-assuring. So the claim of friendship was brightened between them; war axes were given anew and sharpened; war songs were sung; and war dances danced. On the seventeenth of June, it is recorded: "Some Delawares are this day arrived, who are desirous of showing their intention of joining their brethren, and have presented me [Hamilton] two pieces of dried meat (scalps); one of which, I have given to the Chippeways, the other to the Miamis, that they may show in their villages the disposition of the Delawares." There is no possibility of mistaking this brutality; nor can it be denied that the Lieutenant-Governor, by this deed placed himself upon record as acting in a manner at once barbarous and blood-thirsty.†

* British interests were represented by Lieutenant Governor Hamilton; Lieutenant Governor Abbott (recently, as we have seen, from Vincennes); Jehu Hay, Indian Agent; Alexander McKee (a Tory who had fled from Pittsburgh); Captain Lernoult and Lieutenant Caldwell, of the King's regiment; William Tucker, Joseph Drouillard, Isidore Chêne, Dupéron Baby, and Charles Beaubien, Interpreters.

† The Record of the Council is a long one. There were meetings on the 14th, 15th, 17th, 18th, 19th, 20th and 29th of June, and on the 3d of July. Little did Hamilton imagine, at its close, that a hardy band of "rebels" was even then rapidly approaching Kaskaskia to nullify, as the events after—

The latter part of June General Frederick Haldiman reached Quebec,* the successor of Carleton as Governor of the Province and Commander-in-Chief of the troops therein.† But it was a long distance from that town to Detroit, and of necessity the news of his arrival was unknown to Hamilton for a considerable time.

In midsummer, there was a flying report at Detroit indicating that French and Spanish emissaries had been at St. Joseph, with belts and messages for the Pottawattamies at that place.‡ “Every intelligence,” wrote Hamilton to Carleton, “confirms what I had the honor to mention to your Excellency about a year since, that the Spaniards are doing their utmost to alienate the savages, by promises and presents. By Mr. Rocheblave’s letter to me, it appears that, hitherto, they have not gained their good will or confidence.”§

wards disclosed, a good share of the proceedings of his Council.

* Haldimand to Germain, June 30, 1778, from Quebec. — Haldimand MSS.

† Germain to Haldimand, Aug. 7, 1777.—Haldimand MSS. The Province of which General Haldimand was appointed governor, was, of course, that of Quebec; and, as Commander-in-chief therein, his authority in a military (as well as civil) way extended over all the West, except, strictly speaking, the country (Kentucky) south of the Ohio. The General came to America first in 1757 as Lieutenant Colonel; was in the French and Indian War, being in Amherst’s army at the capture of Montreal; and had command in Florida in 1767.

‡ Located on the right bank of the St. Joseph river, of Lake Michigan, not a great distance below the site of the present city of South Bend, Indiana.

§ Hamilton to Carleton, August 6, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

Two days after sending this information to Carleton, the Lieutenant-Governor received intelligence of the success of Clark at Kaskaskia and Cahokia. The news was of the most startling character to him. He at once dispatched expresses with all possible speed to inform the Commander-in Chief at Quebec, Colonel Bolton at Niagara, and Major DePeyster (he was no longer Captain) at Michilimackinac.

"An express is arrived from the Illinois," is his language to Carleton, "with an account of the arrival of a party of rebels, in number about three hundred, who have taken Mr. De Rocheblave prisoner — have laid him in irons, and exacted an oath from the inhabitants, binding them to obedience to the Congress." "There is an officer," added Hamilton, "with thirty men detached by the rebels to Cahokia to receive the allegiance of that post; and I have no doubt that, by this time, they are at Vincennes, as when the express came away, one Gibault, a French priest, had his horse ready saddled to go thither from Cahokia to receive the submission of the inhabitants in the name of the rebels . . . Monsieur de Celoron sets off this day with belts for the Wabash Indians, whose deputies went from this place not long since, well satisfied with their reception, and took along with them three war belts."

"I beg leave to observe to your Excellency," continues the Lieutenant-Governor, "that, if the Wabash Indians are supported properly, it will entail a considerable expense; at the same time, it is well known to your Excellency that these nations are the only barrier to be opposed at present to the inroads of the

rebels and the attempts of the French and the Spaniards."*

It was not long before the Lieutenant-Governor again wrote Carleton. In speaking of Clark's force, he declared that it was reported to be three hundred strong; — "but I cannot think they are so numerous," said he, "since, by what the express has related, it seems they are but a part of those marauders who left Fort Pitt last January under the orders of one Willing, a man who is of one of the best families in Philadelphia, but of infamous character and debauched morals, a proper head for the band of robbers he has conducted down the Mississippi. I should judge that the repulse he met with at the Natchez, where one of his boats with six swivels was taken and thirty of his people killed or taken, joined to the news of four English frigates being in the river's mouth, has altogether induced him to return without getting ammunition at New Orleans, which was probably the principal object of his expedition."

"After having taken the submission and oaths of fidelity from the inhabitants at Kaskaskia," continues Hamilton, "they sent an officer and thirty men to Cahokia to do the like there; and, unless they fear the savages, [they] will probably send to Vincennes for the like purpose. I yesterday sent away Monsieur de Celoron with belts and speeches for the Miamis [lo-

* Hamilton to Carleton, Aug. 8, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

(For additional accounts, from the British side, of the treatment accorded Rocheblave, see Appendix, Note LVIII.) De Celoron, commandant at Wea, a post (one of the dependencies of Detroit) situated upon the Wabash, did not leave with belts for the Indians there until the tenth, as Hamilton the next day mentioned in another letter to Carleton.

cated mostly at the head of the Maumee] and Wabash Indians and a particular order to have four iron cannon which are at Vincennes spiked and the trunnions knocked off; for if they [the 'rebels'] think of fortifying themselves there, the very name of cannon would deter the Indians from attacking them."*

Hamilton also again urged the necessity of supporting the Wabash Indians and how expedient it would be in case of a rupture with the Spaniards to keep [these] frontier Indians in good temper, — "who will no doubt be courted by them." "Their deputies," he repeated, "who were lately at Detroit, and took up the ax were well pleased with their reception and promised to act with vigor against the rebels."†

* Hamilton to Carleton, Aug. 11, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. "Monsieur de Celoron was sent off directly for Ouia-tanon [Wea] with belts and speeches for the Miamis Indians and those of the River Ouabache [Wabash]. His orders, which were given in writing, as was the case with all partizan officers, directed that he should as soon as possible give me information of the dispositions of the Indians; the number and, if possible, the views of the rebels; and that he should not fail to have the few small cannon at Fort Sackville spiked and the trunnions knocked off." — Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Hamilton to Carleton in his letter of August 11th. It is evident that supporting the Wabash Indians was what was uppermost in Hamilton's mind as being of paramount importance at this juncture. To effect this was, to interpose a barrier to further inroads of the "rebels" who had planted themselves in the Illinois, and to thwart all aid and comfort to the enemy that might be proffered by the French and Spaniards. It is not improbable that he saw, if vigorous and prompt means were taken to secure the active coöperation of these tribes, recapturing the Illinois from the "rebels" would surely follow.

When Hamilton was informed of the arrival at Quebec of General Haldimand he made it a point to write him.* "As soon as possible," he said, "I shall have the honor to transmit a statement of this settlement and of the different posts dependent on it, as also of the militia, the Indian department, volunteers, and other matters. A plan of the fort, with the alterations which have been made since the month of November, 1775, shall be prepared and sent off this autumn if possible."

"The Indian nations in general," Hamilton continued, "who resort to Detroit, have acted with great cheerfulness and unanimity. The Delawares are least to be depended on, though lately some of them have declared their resolution to act against the rebels; and, but a few days since, one of their parties which had been at war brought in fifteen scalps to this place." "Many of the war parties," he further declared, "bring in prisoners and have shown a humanity hitherto unpracticed among them; they never fail of a gratuity on every proof of obedience they show in sparing the lives of such as are incapable of defending themselves."

"A prisoner," the Lieutenant-Governor also wrote, "brought in here by the Shawanese lately, who was

* Hamilton had accounts, as already shown, of Haldimand's arrival, as early as Aug. 11, 1778, but he did not consider them of sufficient reliability to risk a letter to the new Commander-in-chief. However, on the fifth of September, he wrote:—"Having just received an account of your Excellency's safe arrival at Quebec, I take the earliest opportunity of presenting my dutiful respects and of congratulating your Excellency on the choice his Majesty has made in appointing you to the distinguished post of Commander-in-chief of this Province."

taken near one of the forts on the Kentucky river, tells me the rebels were lately reinforced with three companies, each of seventy men."

"A letter," added Hamilton, "sent by Major De Peyster from Michilimackinac confirms the account of the rebels have taken possession of Kaskaskia and Cahokia, on the Mississippi. As to the Spaniards, however willing to take part against the English, I apprehend the depredation of the rebels in their neighborhood may make them backward in encouraging them, for I hear that some Spaniards were at a conference between some of the Indians from St. Joseph and the rebels at Kaskaskia; that they listened to what passed without saying a word till the rebel speakers went away, when they told the Indians not to listen to those people, for they were unable to perform the promises they had made them."*

As to the French inhabitants at all the out-posts in the West — the Lieutenant-Governor had little confidence in them. "I firmly believe," were his words, "there is not one in twenty whose oath of allegiance would have force enough to bind him to his duty; added to this [is the fact] that the greatest part of the traders among them who are called English are rebels in their hearts." Hamilton thought it a most unfor-

* Hamilton to Haldimand [Sept. 5], 1778. — Haldimand MSS. The reinforcements mentioned by the prisoner brought into Detroit, as consisting of three companies, each of seventy men, which had arrived in Kentucky, were the troops of Clark, who, of course, had not left the island at the Falls of the Ohio when the informant was captured. That the Kentucky prisoner supposed this force was really a reinforcement for the Kentucky posts, shows how important it was that Clark kept his real destination so long a secret. Clark never learned how close a risk he ran of being discovered.

tunate circumstance for his Majesty's interest in the Illinois that Rocheblave had fallen into the hands of the "rebels" — "his understanding, experience and authority over a troublesome set of people, rendered him thoroughly capable of managing such subjects."

General Haldimand was informed further that, except the confirmation of the news of Clark having taken possession of Kaskaskia and Cahokia, there was no intelligence from either the Illinois or Vincennes. But I shall not be surprised," said Hamilton, "to hear that the rebels are driven away; nor shall I be surprised to hear they are well received. The Indians are very well able to effect the first; the French very capable of the last, and they would gladly revive the idea of a French father with the Indians, though they have enjoyed advantages under an English government they were formerly strangers to."*

"I have the honor to assure your Excellency," again wrote Hamilton to Haldimand, "that every means in my power shall be used to second your intentions with regard to the Indians of the Wabash and the invaders at the Illinois and Vincennes (for intelligence has arrived from the Miamis that the rebels had sent three persons to that place and have nominated three Frenchmen of that settlement to act for them: Mayette, as commandant; Bosseron, as mayor; and Monbrun, as lieutenant). I have this account from Monsieur de Celoron."†

* Hamilton to Haldimand, just cited.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 16, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. It will be noticed that Hamilton says "that the rebels [Col. Clark] had sent three persons" to Vincennes to occupy Fort Sackville; such was the fact as will hereafter be explained — one officer and two of the rank and file of his force

It was some comfort to the Lieutenant-Governor to learn that, on the twenty-fifth of August, a party of fifteen Miamis from the head of the Maumee went to war towards the Ohio and on the fifth of September another party, consisting of a chief and thirty men. Even Charles Beaubien, "the King's man," there, on the next day, with five Chippewas and fifteen Miamis started for Vincennes, but his undertaking was a failure.

There were many in Detroit even to so late a date as September after the appearance of Clark at Kaskaskia, who were confident the occupation of the Illinois by the "rebels" would be a transitory one, even if it had not already been given up. But Hamilton and Hay thought otherwise. "I am of a very different opinion," wrote the latter. "They [the 'rebels'] certainly had bills upon the Spanish governor," he continued, "which were answered on their being produced." "And as we have but too much reason to believe," he added, "they were well received by the inhabitants, they will not lose their hold so soon, particularly while they can get provisions [and other necessaries] for their parties that are or may be on the Ohio."* So the Lieutenant-Governor, sharing in the opinion of his Indian Agent, resolved to attempt the recovery of Kaskaskia and contiguous villages as well as Vincennes. This he would accomplish with his In-

at Kaskaskia were the "three persons," the main dependence being, as before, upon the Vincennes militia.

* Hay to Brehm, [Sept. —, 1778]. — Haldimand MSS. Hay's reasoning had, in reality, no foundation at the time, except that Clark and his men had been well received by the inhabitants of the Illinois. (Hay's letter is given in full in Appendix, Note LIX.)

dian allies, and he would go with them for that purpose. It would only be a scout on a large scale. Of his own motion, however, he soon changed the "scout" into an "expedition" against the Americans at Vincennes and in the Illinois, to be regularly organized to capture the country.

Hamilton's first idea — that is, of *going with* the Indians was strictly in accordance with Haldimand's views already sent to the Lieutenant-Governor; — he would approve such steps as the latter found necessary to take in supporting the Wabash Indians; and Hamilton would go along to see that his aid was made effective. And the further words of Haldimand were not lost upon the Lieutenant-Governor, — "And I must observe that, from the great expense to which Government has been put by the Indians in general, it might be expected that some of them might easily be induced to undertake expeditiously to clear all the Illinois of the invaders; and if the efforts of the parties which you send out and have proposed to send out to the Ohio were properly directed, the retreat of the rebels and especially the communication and intercourse which they want to establish, by that river, with the French and Spaniards might be so disturbed, if not entirely cut off, as to render the object of their expedition [to the Illinois] . . . entirely fruitless." How, then, could the war-party he now proposed to send out be more properly conducted than for him to go along and direct their movements? Would not this be in strict accordance with the instructions (or, rather, suggestions) of General Haldimand? Evidently Hamilton so thought, and he acted promptly upon his conviction. But the words of Haldimand

were not, strictly speaking, an authorization for an "expedition" against the "rebels" in the Illinois and at Vincennes, to be undertaken by Hamilton, bringing whites and Indians to his aid: Indian war-parties with white leaders was one thing; British expeditions against Americans with Indians as allies, quite another. And the Commander-in-chief did not intend to give the Lieutenant-Governor authority for such an undertaking.* But the questions asked by the General concerning the practicability of such an enterprise † only confirmed Hamilton in his resolution to go on with the expedition. He did not wait orders from Haldimand. He would anticipate them. Vincennes was first to be occupied.‡

"Captain Lernoult," wrote the Lieutenant-Governor, "has promised me every aid in his power; and, as I purpose going with the Indians, I hope to be able to keep up their good disposition. I rely much on the

* Haldimand to ———, June 17, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. The assertion afterward made by Clark to the contrary falls to the ground.

† In Haldimand to Hamilton, Aug. 27, 1778, before mentioned.

‡ "It is evident," says a Western writer "that his [Hamilton's] first purpose was to proceed at once to Kaskaskia, where Clark's force was stationed, for he urges Major De Peyster to send him assistance." — C. I. Walker, in *The North-West During the Revolution*, pp. 20, 21. But Hamilton's correspondence, as will presently be seen, clearly shows that Vincennes was his first objective point; — to recover this place from the "rebels," his *first* purpose: after this had been accomplished, he would proceed against Kaskaskia and the other Illinois towns. He did not propose to march against the latter by way of St. Joseph and the Illinois river, but would take the other route, up the Maumee and down the Wabash to Vincennes.

experiences and zeal of the gentleman [Jehu Hay], who has been deputy agent here and is well regarded by them.”*

Hamilton, at the same time, wrote Major De Peyster at Michilimackinac, acquainting him that he would set off in about twelve days to attempt to dislodge the “rebels” at the Illinois; at the same time requesting him to engage his Indians to coöperate by way of the Illinois river, in the undertaking.† He soon after sent a message to St. Joseph to the same effect.

Hamilton also informed the Commander-in-chief, that the water of the Miamis [river, now known as the Maumee], was reported to be extraordinarily low; but the weather having lately changed, it might be expected to rise, and by the time the equinoctial gales are blown over, he thought there would be water sufficient for his purpose. “As I expect to get off by the first of October,” he also wrote the General, “I am to re-

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 16, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id. “On the 16th and 17th of September, with an enclosure from M. Celoron of the Miamis [should be, “of Wea”] he [Hamilton] acknowledges the receipt of my letters of the 26th and 27th August, and says that he will fulfil my intentions concerning the rebels who have taken Post Vincennes. He will accompany the Indians. Captain Lernoult gives him all the assistance possible. He [Hamilton] gives notice of his intention to Major de Peyster and asks him to engage his Indians to coöperate with him by the River Illinois.” (*Remarks of Haldimand on Hamilton's Letters*: Haldimand MSS.) “Sept. 15th. I had the honor of a letter from your Excellency [referring to Haldimand's letter of Aug. 26th], and in consequence, wrote to Major De Peyster, at Michilimackinac, informing him of my design of attempting to dislodge the rebels from the Illinois.” (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781: Germain MSS.)

quest of your Excellency that any letters you may please to send with a design to be first read by Captain Lernoult, may have a flying seal."

Hamilton then gave to the Commander-in-Chief more of his intentions. "Finding," said he, "from correspondents at Ouia Tanon [Wea] and the Miamis,* that the Wabash and other Indians are averse to the Virginians settling at the Illinois, I concluded no time was to be lost in supporting and encouraging them, especially as by the letter I receive from the Miamis, it appears that the French are too much disposed to favor the rebels. I purpose carrying a present for the savages as little bulky as possible. Several articles necessary for such an enterprise had been forwarded long since, so that the time necessary for convening the chiefs and settling matters for departure may be easily calculated. Your Excellency is no doubt aware that in an undertaking depending so much on Indians, and in a settlement where I am but too sensible there are many disaffected persons, secrecy is impracticable, I hope notwithstanding to second your Excellency's views by preventing the rebels from confirming themselves at Illinois. . . . Captain Lernoult and Captain Grant give me every possible assistance, and I see none but cheerful faces since the 'scout' has been mentioned.—I am to meet the chiefs in council this morning, after which Captain Lernoult will send off the *Angelica* to Fort Erie. As I mean to consult with the headmen on the numbers necessary to be taken with us, I hope to leave for your Excellency a return of the effectives for the enterprise.

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 16, 1778.—Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix, Note LX.)

“Since last May the Indians in this district have taken thirty-four prisoners (seventeen of whom they delivered up) and eighty-one scalps: several prisoners taken and adopted are not reckoned in this number.”

As to the assertion here that “several prisoners taken and adopted are not reckoned,” it is certain the Lieutenant-Governor misstated the facts. Well enough did he know they had not all been adopted, although possibly a very few had been. Then, too, instead of “several” he certainly was aware many had been captured that had not been given up. “Seventeen of the above prisoners,” wrote the Indian agent at Detroit, referring to those mentioned by Hamilton, “were delivered up here, but there are many more among them that as yet we know nothing of.”*

“We have many . . . [Indian] parties out,” are the words of the Detroit agent of Indian affairs, at this time, “but Governor Hamilton, for want of fresh instructions or orders has confined himself to the tenor of those he has first received, namely: carrying continual alarms to draw the attention of the rebels to the frontiers; preventing the re-setting of the country already abandoned; and harrassing those destined to keep up a communication between the small forts which you may imagine they have done, as three different parties sent from this [place — Detroit —] since spring have taken thirty-three prisoners and eighty scalps, with the loss of eight principal Hurons [Wyandots], one Ottawa, and one Pottawattamie. Fourteen of the different nations were wounded.”†

* Hay to Brehm (Sept. —, 1778). — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix, Note LIX.)

† Hay to Brehm, just cited. I find nowhere else the policy of Hamilton so clearly set forth as in this letter.

The continued asseverations of Hamilton and Hay as to the lack of barbarity on part of the Indians in their forays into the border settlements, because of instructions from both to forbear their bloodthirstiness, was a sham — the merest delusion. That the protestations of the Lieutenant-Governor and his Indian agent had some restraining influence on the Lake Indians — the Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawattamies and Detroit Wyandots — is true; at most, however, it was but slight. On the Sandusky Wyandots, the Mingoes, and particularly the Shawanese, it amounted to nothing. Hay, in his desire to promote every effort on part of the savages, wholly lost sight of the real contest — that between the Mother country and her rebellious Colonies. To his mind it was, in the West, an Indian War pure and simple. Hear him:

“The four nations of the Lakes — The Ottawas, Chippewas, Hurons [Detroit Wyandots], and Pottawattamies — have shown great attachment to his Majesty and Government. The Shawanese, Mingoes and part of the Delawares, have been very active. They are stimulated as much by the late incursion of the Virginians under Lord Dunmore and their cruelties since as anything else. Some of them took up the hatchet before they were asked; the rest upon deliberation and in assurance of their being supported by Government. And I must confess there never was known an Indian war carried on with as little of their wanton cruelty. Indeed, the sparing of the lives of prisoners, the aged men, women and children, was insisted on from the first; and they have

paid great attention to it; and they never went without some reward for their compliance.”*

It was not a question with Hamilton, in giving instructions to white partisans who led savage war-parties or to the Indians themselves, as to whether the borders, when attacked, were in arms — were in fact combatants — but were they able to defend themselves; just as though the bloodthirsty warriors would discriminate between the middle-aged and the aged! And here it may be said that the gratuities bestowed by the Lieutenant-Governor were by no means confined to those savages who spared the lives of such as were incapable of defense; but they were given whenever prisoners and scalps were brought in, and with a delight that was always manifest by the words and actions of the giver; and these donations, as before suggested, had exactly the effect of a standing reward.

The reasons brought forward by Hamilton that the French inhabitants of the Illinois were too much disposed to favor the “rebels,” and that the Wabash and other Indians did not relish the idea of Virginians settling there, were indeed weighty as inducements for his undertaking to recover that country; but Hay doubted the sincerity of the Wabash Indians in that regard. He thought they would probably remain neutral until they found themselves sufficiently supplied with necessaries by the Virginians and that then it might be expected they would be at least overbearing and perhaps insolent, which would affect those nearer Detroit, in so much as to require more expense and great diligence to keep them to their duty.†

* Hay to Brehm, before cited.

† Id.

CHAPTER X.

AFTER the middle of September, Hamilton made almost daily report of progress in his undertaking. On the twenty-second, he wrote the Commander-in-Chief "that the preparations" for his "little enterprise" were forwarding with alacrity. But surely it was to be something besides a "scout;" — instead of his going with the Indians they were to go with him. He was now profiting by the hint given him by the Commander-in-Chief as to the number and disposition of the militia of his district, and the company he had raised at Detroit "and put on actual pay for service."*

"Having reviewed the companies of militia," Hamilton subsequently wrote, "I found there would be as many of them turn out volunteers as (with the regulars, Lamothe's company and the Indians) would employ what little craft we had."† The "little enterprise" was assuming large proportions. Fifteen pirogues capable of transporting from eighteen hundred to three thousand pounds each, having had a thorough repair, set off for the rapids of the Maumee, where cattle and wheels had likewise been sent to expedite the carriage at that portage. "Biscuit is baked, provisions packed in small barrels or bags, the militia companies drafted, artillery stores prepared, boats mending, and all that can be thought of, put forward," are the words of the Lieutenant-Governor. "If it be possible," said he, "to

* Haldimand to Hamilton, Aug. 27, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

move off on the first of next month, I shall use my best endeavors to do it. I can not foresee, though I shall provide against any inclemency of the weather which ought to prevent our taking and maintaining Port Vincennes till reinforcements can join us. Light cannon and an able engineer (as I must confess my own want of knowledge in a branch which requires abilities which I could never pretend to) are capital points [to be considered in this connection].”

“I purpose,” continued Hamilton, “taking presents not only for the Wabash and more Western Indians, but to encourage the Delawares, Mingoës and Shawanese to keep good watch towards the banks of the Ohio during the winter season, when the savages are usually dispersed for hunting. If the Western Indians express their resentment for the inroad of the rebels into their country, this will be a noble opportunity to build a fort on so important a spot as the forks at the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi, which may be, in future a bridle on the Americans of whatever denomination or interest. The Falls on the Ohio are another important pass, which I believe the rebels will not omit to secure and fortify. The forks of the Kankakee are a third object, with the mouth of the Missouri, for keeping the savages in temper. . . .

“As there are points perhaps,” are the further words of the Lieutenant-Governor, “too difficult to be attempted in our present situation, perhaps liable to objection in any, I mention them with that distrust and diffidence which my humble station and abilities demand—it would however make me very happy to think a proposal of the kind should meet with your Excellency’s approbation and that I could be in the

slenderest degree a means of promoting the honor and interest of my king and country. The Spaniards are feeble and hated by the French, the French are fickle and have no man of capacity to advise or lead them, the rebels are enterprising and brave, but want resources, and the Indians can have their resources but from the English if we act without loss time in the favorable conjuncture. This may appear a picture with strong lights and little or no shade, but as the effects of pushing a force supported by the zeal of the Indians (who have hitherto acted with perfect compliance) have not yet been tried, I hope to be excused if perhaps too sanguine. The most considerable of the French in this settlement have shown a very good example, and it is better followed than I had expected. The appearance of a reinforcement from Niagara will fortify them in their good disposition.

“I design forming a depot at the Miamis [head of the Maumee], but shall take a survey of the portage before I fix on its being on this or the other side of the carrying place: should the Indians act with zeal for us, it shall be on the other side, if coolly, on this. An account of the numbers which leave this place shall be transmitted to your Excellency by the next vessel which goes to Fort Erie. The savages are to give their answer this day. Some working oxen and horses set off at once for the Miamis to forward the transport of provisions at that carrying place.”*

The next day, Hamilton again wrote Haldimand: “This day, I met the Ottawas, the Chippewas and Potawattamies in council by their own appointment,

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 22, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

present Captain Lernoult, Lieutenant [Daniel] Shourd and the interpreters. The Hurons [Wyandots] were to have come, but the bad weather prevented them; however, the Ottawas spoke with a sort of resentment at their failing to meet as agreed upon. Some days ago, I had called the chiefs together and without directly asking them to join me, had told them I was going to rise up to keep my word with the Wabash Indians, who had taken up the axe of their father the King, and who had accepted his medals and professed their attachment to the English. I further informed them that my hands were loosed by your orders; that I should no longer consider myself a village chief and that Captain Lernoult would act the part of a father in my absence. This, with the mustering the militia, pressing all the craft on the river, and other preparations, informed them sufficiently of my design of going to war."

The oath of allegiance to the officers and the rank and file of the militia, who came forward from the different companies as volunteers to the number of seventy-five, was tendered on the twenty-fourth. In the afternoon of the same day the Indians had an ox roasted and Captain Lernoult with several of the officers and principal inhabitants assisted at the feast.*

The next day, Hamilton wrote Haldimand that a chief of the Pottawattamies had just taken charge of a letter and message to St. Joseph. The letter was to Louis Chevalier. As Major De Peyster at Michilimackinac had full confidence in the Frenchman, the Lieutenant-Governor wrote him in a style to prompt him to deserve it also from the latter. But Hamilton

* Same to same, Sept. 24, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

was skeptical on the point. However, as there was no other person there to engage the Pottawattamies to act, he made a virtue of a necessity in writing him; at the same time declaring to the Commander-in-Chief that as interest was his (Chevalier's) Deity, perhaps he might reconcile his worship with his duty.*

Of the officers of the Indian Department at Detroit, one — Captain and Interpreter Alexander McKee, who had joined Hamilton because there was “a prospect of uniting the Western and Southern Indians and engaging them in his Majesty's service — was dispatched in advance, on the twenty-sixth, with a message to the Shawanese asking them to send warriors to aid him in his enterprise, and a present of ammunition to be forwarded from the Ohio wilderness to a party of the same nation, which, under the lead of a white man, was besieging one of the Kentucky forts; and he was particularly enjoined to make inquiries as to what was doing at the Falls of the Ohio, as Hamilton had quickly seen, upon being informed that the Americans had a lodgment there, how important (should it develop into a strong fortification) it might become in controlling the Ohio.†

On the evening of the day last mentioned Charles Beaubien, government agent at the head of the Maumee, reached Detroit, bringing letters which mentioned

* Same to same, Sept. 25, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† For a list of officers in the Indian Department who went upon the expedition, see Appendix to our narrative, Note LXIII. The fort mentioned as being besieged, it may be premised, was Boonesborough, and the white leader of the Shawanese, Lieut. Fontenoy Dequindu, of the Indian Department at Detroit. That Hamilton's message to the Shawanese was for the purpose mentioned above is sufficiently evident from what afterward transpired.

that one Clark, with eighty men, was at Vincennes, where the French received them well.* Notwithstanding the Indians at Wea had been represented to Hamilton as undecided and timorous, yet, — “I shall lose no time,” said the Lieutenant-Governor, “to encourage them.” It was his belief should he reach there time enough to speak to the chiefs before they took a decisive part, the sight of the lake chiefs would determine them as he could wish.

On the twenty-seventh, Hamilton received from De Celoron, at Wea, a letter, giving him information that Jean Baptiste Chapoton, late a captain of militia at Detroit, but then in Vincennes, was very intimate with the “rebels.” “He had been dismissed at his own request, on the pretence of being too old to fulfill the functions of his place,” are the indignant words of Hamilton. Then there were others friendly to the Americans — especially Bosseron and Legras. The latter, the Lieutenant-Governor bitterly denounced: “He is on the best terms imaginable with the rebel officers at Vincennes. He had been equipped at Detroit, was in partnership here; and had received favors at the hands of the English and French at this place, to say nothing of Governor Abbott’s kindness to him.” He and Chapoton were, in Hamilton’s estimation, worthy associates in perjury, treason and ingratitude — both had exceeded the terms expressed in their passes, which they had sworn not to do.

The Lieutenant-Governor, on the day last mentioned, ordered a lieutenant in the Indian department, with a small party of militia, to the Miamis — head of

* Who this “one Clark” really was, and what his business at Vincennes was “with eighty men,” will hereafter appear.

the Maumee — giving him written instructions. His party was to assist the workmen in repairing the portage; also to aid the master carpenter, boat builder and others at the same place.

“My determination is,” wrote Hamilton to Haldimand, “to set out as soon as possible. Captain Lernoult will send forward any reinforcement; thus the time spent in Indian councils (which are sometimes very deliberate) may be employed at the Miamis in fortifying that depot [“Fort Miami”], calling in the Indians, building craft and store houses and procuring intelligence.”

Relative to the post at the head of the Maumee — “the Miamis” — the Lieutenant-Governor said:

“There will be a store of provisions, perhaps of ammunition and Indian goods at that place. As soon as I arrive there, I shall order a redoubt to be thrown up, the houses to be fortified, or such other precaution taken for its defence, as may appear best suited to the number of inhabitants and nature of the ground. If the rebels at Fort Pitt, with the assistance of the Delawares in their interest, could effect the surprise of such a place, they would not only possess themselves of our magazine but *cut off one* of our communications with Detroit, as we might in that case be obliged to return by the way of St. Joseph and be distressed for provision. I shall represent this to Capt. Lernoult, who will judge how far a detachment sent to the Miamis, will be a cover to Detroit, and facilitate and secure our correspondence and communication.

“The weakness of the garrison of Detroit is known to your Excellency. I need not, therefore, dwell on that subject, but at *all events* I shall proceed, guided

by the best information I can procure. Among several persons very capable of informing as to the nature of the country and character of the inhabitants, Mr. Alexis Maisonville is perhaps the most so; and I must render that justice to his zeal and good will which they merit. He has been very forward on this occasion and every other to act the part of a good subject. I beg leave to recommend him to your Excellency's favor. When we shall arrive at the Illinois, I expect great advantage from his enterprising spirit."

"Favorable rains," added Hamilton, "for some days past and the good temper and disposition of the Indians, encourage me to hope our little enterprise may be attended with some advantage. When Mr. Beau-bien left the Miamis, there was no notion there of any preparation; so that the first reports at the Illinois will gain but little credit."*

"We have found it a difficult matter," is the language of the Lieutenant-Governor to the Commander-in-Chief, on the second of October, "to find savages to express with letters to Niagara, they are so desirous of going towards the Wabash; I hope, however, to procure them to-morrow. On account of all the vessels being absent, the repairing our craft goes on but slowly; the master-builder is this day to give in the return of those in condition, and a second brigade will set off on the fifth instant. The violent rains which were so necessary for raising the waters of the Miamis [Maumee] river, have retarded us in many particulars. Your Excellency will please to observe, that, on the list of volunteers for the enterprise, several per-

* Id.

sons are employed who must carry arms when occasion calls; as to the high pay — wages are so extravagant here that the common men receive but half what they might earn were they to stay at home; this encouragement was, therefore, necessary.”*

On the third, Hamilton again wrote: “Last night the savages assembled, when I sung the war song and was followed by Captain Lernoult and several officers and others, and by warriors going on the enterprise.”†

“The best disposition and alacrity,” the Lieutenant-Governor added,” are shown by all. Two Indians set off this day [for Niagara], with letters. As Captain Lernoult can not spare men from the garrison [to handle the pieces], I leave two small howitzers behind, as they would be but lumber without people to work them. I have, for the six-pounder which we take, two artillery men, one sergeant, one corporal and twelve of the volunteer militia, — under the orders of Lieutenant Du Vernet, who has exerted himself in providing and preparing the many necessaries coming under his direction. I shall set off for the Miamis river the 16th without fail.”‡

* Hamilton to Haldimand. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id. (See Appendix, Note LXI.)

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand. — Haldimand MSS. “Orders having been given in time for putting the carrying-place at the Miamis [head of the Maumee] in order and for repairing the carriages, etc.; the proper artificers having been engaged, craft overhauled, and the weight of the provisions, ammunition, stores, Indian goods, etc., calculated; the Indians being found well-disposed and messengers sent to the different nations resorting to Detroit, apprising them of my design and exhorting them to send out frequent parties upon the frontiers; — the day was fixed for our departure.” — *Hamilton to Haldimand*, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

“The sixth, our tents were struck,” says the Lieutenant-Governor, before day and most of our stores embarked, when three Hurons [Wyandots] from Sandusky arrived with a very circumstantial account of the approach of the rebels by several different routes; that the advance guard of their main body was eight hundred strong; that they were provided with cannon to come against Detroit; with various particulars calculated to alarm and disconcert the Indians. I told the messengers, however little credit I gave this account, it should be communicated to the four neighboring nations — [Ottawas, Chippewas, Pottawattamies and Detroit Wyandots] — but that I had engaged to assist the Wabash Indians and I would keep my word. The Indians being assembled in the afternoon, heard my opinion of the intelligence and with the utmost cheerfulness agreed to accompany us. During our meeting, the vessels hove in sight.”

“The seventh, at eight in the morning,” adds Hamilton, “Captain Bird, with fifty of the King’s regiment from Niagara, were landed. Captain Lernoult has permitted Lieutenant Shourd, with two sergeants and thirty [one] men [of the regulars] to accompany us; which, considering our hasty levies, will be a reinforcement of consequence. The true spirit of the service prompts Lieutenant Shourd, his sergeants, and, I think, the greater part of his men, to present themselves on this occasion. Our strength will now consist of one lieutenant of artillery with two gunners; one lieutenant of the King’s regiment, two sergeants and thirty-one rank and file and the volunteers and militia, as mentioned in a former letter. The Indians

are about seventy; several of them chiefs, the rest picked men. My satisfaction is, all are volunteers.”*

Hamilton was now ready to march. His force was made up besides that of the regulars, who were to overtake him (they could not get ready to leave for some little time, but would join Hamilton at no distant day;† of Captain William Lamothe's volunteer company, numbering (besides the captain), one lieutenant, two sergeants and forty rank and file, “being,” says Hamilton, “volunteers, who had been disciplined in the best manner we could compass for about one year;” of eighty-five militia—volunteers selected from those who presented themselves at the reviews of the militia companies of the settlement; of ten “Indian officers” and employes from the Indian Department; and of seventy Indians.‡

Pierre Potier, a Jesuit missionary, “a man of respectable character and venerable figure,” now made his appearance on the Detroit common, at the head of the Lieutenant-Governor's encampment, “and, having attended to the reading of the articles of war and the renewal of the oath of allegiance to his Britannic Majesty, gave the blessing to the Catholics present, conditionally upon their strictly adhering to their oaths, being the more engaged thereto as the indulgence and

* Haldimand MSS. (Appendix, Note LXII.) There was much more truth in the report brought to Hamilton by Wyandots, than the Lieutenant Governor was disposed to accept. It was in reality an account of the first movement made by General McIntosh from Fort Pitt to erect, down the Ohio, Fort McIntosh.

† This fact only appears in a letter written by Hamilton after his departure.

‡ See Appendix, Note LXIII.

favor of their prince merited the best service and had exceeded their most sanguine expectations."*—

"On the seventh of October," are the words of Hamilton written some years after, "various necessaries for a winter movement of six hundred miles being provided, by the activity and good will of Captains Lernoult and Grant, the latter of whom had attended to everything afloat, and by the assistance of Major Hay and Mr. Fleming, the commissary, we struck our tents and embarked with one field piece, which was all could be spared from the garrison. Only one single person, (he an Indian) was affected with liquor.†

By the middle of August, De Peyster at Michilimackinac, not yet having heard of Clark's success in the Illinois, wrote the Commander-in-Chief that he was informed reports had been circulated there in all the towns that the French would soon take possession of that country. He declared—which was true, as had been discovered—that there were no troops to prevent the Virginians from going there, not dreaming that the latter had already captured those villages. "The French," said he, "have it in their power to spread reports and poison the minds of the Indians so as at least to make it very dangerous to traders."‡

At the same time, the Michilimackinac commandant gave some interesting information as to Chevalier, with whom he had been in correspondence and had recently received a letter from him giving information that forty of the savages living near St. Joseph he per-

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Id. (As to what Hamilton meant by "a winter movement of six hundred miles," see Appendix, Note LXIV.)

‡ De Peyster to Haldimand, Aug. 15, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

suaded to remain at home after their making all preparations to go to "West Illinois" to see the Spaniards.* "Mr. Louis Chevalier, at St. Joseph," said he, "holds the pass [from the Illinois] to Detroit, and can also give the first intelligence of the enemy's motion on the Wabash [as it was not a great distance across to that river].

"This gentleman is so connected with the Pottawattamies that he can now do anything with them, having lived upwards of thirty years, at that place. A young Indian named Aimoble, at present at Montreal, is his son. If some mark of distinction were given to this young man, and if he, with a few of his comrade Pottawattamies, were persuaded to remain another year at Montreal, it would be of great service; as those at St. Joseph would never misbehave whilst any of their friends were down the country."

"In the year 1763," added De Peyster, "when St. Joseph was cut off, Mr. Chevalier, two days before it happened, informed M. Schlosser of the Indians having bad intentions, which he [Schlosser] did not believe at his cost. Chevalier, happening to be present, it gave some designing people a handle against him, as his innocence was not generally known. I have since my arrival here [at Michilimackinac] inquired particularly into all these matters, and finding that affair no wise to his disadvantage, and seeing the great attention paid to him by the Indians, I thought it necessary

* Chevalier to De Peyster, July 20, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. Chevalier does not say the Pottawattamies were going to see the Spaniards, but "the enemy." However, it is probable he intended to mention them, as they had been tampering with these Indians; and Chevalier had not then heard that Clark had reached the Illinois.

to render him useful by giving him some authority at St. Joseph, which he has hitherto exerted with great discretion.”*

It was on the very last day of August that De Peyster, through a letter received from Chevalier, was put in possession of (to him) the astounding news that the whole Illinois country was in possession of the “rebels;” — “the traders in that country,” he wrote Haldimand, “and many from this post [Michilimackinac], are plundered and the whole country [is] in the greatest confusion, being at a loss to know what route the rebels will take next.”†

But the news of Clark's success had already reached the Commander-in-Chief by way of Detroit, and the latter soon wrote De Peyster. “This dispatch,” said he, “was intended to have been sent you by a Mr. St. Hubert, a missionary going to the Illinois; but the unfortunate change which has taken place in the affairs of that country, for the present puts a stop to his journey, — the gentleman, Mr. J. B. de Grosselier, with whom Mr. St. Hubert was to have gone up, proceeding nevertheless; and he being a man who is well acquainted with that country and very well spoken of, I entrust my letters to his care and recommend him to you both as a man who deserves to have favor shown him in his private concerns and as one that is capable of furnishing you with advice that may be useful to follow in those of the public, upon the present situation of the Illinois.

“I enclose you a copy of a letter which I have written to Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton as necessary for

* De Peyster to Haldimand, Aug. 15, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Same to same, Aug. 31, 1778.

your information, and desiring that you will correspond with him upon the occasion, and assist him as far as you may have opportunities in whatever he shall undertake in this emergency. In the meantime, I must desire you will communicate to me as expeditiously as possible, and by the safest conveyance your sentiments, whether from the confidence to be placed in the Indians, the inhabitants, and the resources and difficulties of the country, you think there are any means to be employed with a probability of success to recover that country and what those means are if your opinion on this object be in the affirmative.”*

Three days subsequent to this, Haldimand again wrote the Michilimackinac commandant: “Since writing my letter of the thirtieth of August, I have had some conversation with Mr. de Grosselier, who thinks it will be practicable to send some trusty Indians into the Illinois with letters or messages to the missionary [there, Father Gibault] and by that means to learn the true state of the country, which Mr. de Grosselier tells me might be conveyed to me during the winter. I have, therefore, thought it necessary to recommend this matter to your attention.”†

The first counter-movement attempted by De Peyster after learning that the “rebels” had gained the Illinois, was, to dispatch a person to St. Joseph (who was well acquainted with the Illinois Indians), with a speech and large belt, who was to go through their different villages, insisting that they should not suffer his Majesty’s enemies to keep possession of their country. “This, I hope,” wrote the commandant, to his

* Haldimand to De Peyster, Aug. 30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Same to same, Sept. 2, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

Commander-in-Chief, "will have a better effect than if I had an expedition to send against the rebels, as the Illinois Indians are in constant dread of the Ottawas and other nations dependent on this post, — as they some time ago earnestly entreated I would make peace for them, which I effected to their great satisfaction."*

The next thing done by De Peyster after hearing of the "rebel" success in the Illinois was to endeavor, if possible, to prevent the various savage tribes dependent on his post from being tampered with by emissaries sent by Clark; so he procured a large belt with directions to the Menomonees, Sacs, Winnebagoes and Sioux, who had arrived from the St. Lawrence, that it be taken to the different villages of the various nations which had been employed by government and who had been so long protected by his Majesty." "It is my earnest request," were the words of De Peyster, to the assembled savages at his post, "that they have not the least connection with the rebels, but keep themselves quietly at home" for the present. With this specious speech was given the hint that, if they did anything prejudicial to the traders among them, or entered into any alliance with the enemy, goods intended for them would be sent back to Montreal — a threat which seemed to have "great force with the Indians present." "I have," wrote De Peyster, "as much as possible instilled into the Indians the idea that, although the rebels may perhaps be able to make a show of presents at first, that they can by no means be able to furnish the different nations with their necessary wants."

An estimate made by the Michilimackinac commandant as to the rapidity with which a light canoe

* De Peyster to Haldimand, Sept. 16, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

(such an one as was then dispatched with his letter to the Commander-in-Chief) might be urged forward, gives the quickest time between his post and Montreal and return. He thought, if the crew were not detained on Lake Huron by contrary winds, they might reach the last-mentioned place in eleven days, or fourteen at farthest. Twenty-five days for a light bateau-canoe, manned with an active guide and eight men would be sufficient for the return to the mouth of French river on Lake Huron, thence to Michilimackinac ten days would be required. The weather was usually favorable to about the middle of November at his post for such navigation.

De Peyster now began to revolve in his mind whether Indians might not, at once, be sent down the Mississippi to harrass the "rebels" in the Illinois. However, he concluded it was too late in the season for much to be accomplished.

There were two men of the West, who, of all others, were the best calculated to arouse the Indians and lead them upon such an enterprise. These were Langlade ("the zealous") and Gautier; but both these men were below at this time. "The Indians," wrote De Peyster, "have already declared that were Gautier here to lead them, they would penetrate the Illinois country this winter. As I suppose you will also send orders to Detroit in the winter, I shall send off an express to be ready there, as my Indians will know the road, and I shall be able to depend upon them and the person I shall send with them."

The Major thought it would scarcely be in his power to put any orders for the movement of the Indians of La Bay (Green Bay) into execution; as Lang-

lade would not be able to undertake so active an enterprise (should he be sent for that purpose) so late in the season.*

De Peyster had not yet received from Hamilton notice that the latter would soon go against the Illinois towns in person, requesting his coöperation in sending savages by way of the Illinois river, although he afterward declared that he got the request "about the same time."†

* Id. — I have not used the exact words of De Peyster, but have endeavored to convey his meaning.

† De Peyster to Haldimand, Oct. 24, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

CHAPTER XI.

THE establishing by Clark of two garrisons — those of Forts Clark and Bowman in the Illinois, was followed by his sending Captain Helm to Fort Sackville, in Vincennes, to command there. “I plainly saw,” subsequently wrote Clark, “that it would be highly necessary to have an American officer at that post.” The Colonel had entire confidence in Helm’s fitness for the position; — he was past the meridian of life and was well acquainted with the Indian character and disposition. Two men of the American force were all that were spared to go with him, reliance being placed in the friendly attitude of the citizens of the place, to assist in defense of the fort; hence, “uncommon pains” were taken by Clark in all regulations concerning the relations to be entered into by the Captain with the inhabitants there, to attach them to American interests.

But it was not the French inhabitants of Vincennes only who were to be dealt with in a friendly spirit — there were also the Piankeshaws Indians and the other savages upon the river — all must be conciliated — all made, if possible, fast friends. Helm, therefore, besides being appointed to the command of Fort Sackville, was commissioned Agent of Indian Affairs for the Wabash country. In the first half of August, the Captain set out for his post.* He was cordially received by the citizens, — thanks to the effective work of Father Gibault.

* See Appendix, Note LXV.

Fort Sackville was found in possession of the Vincennes militia and was at once, and for the first time, occupied (though it could scarcely be considered in any other light than a nominal occupation) by American troops — three in number: one commandant and two rank and file. But Captain Helm nominated officers of the militia of the place, so that he was soon able to form a respectable garrison out of four companies organized, and numbering something over two hundred citizens, with J. M. P. Legras as Major. Of the four captains, Francis Bosseron was the most influential.

Helm found the fortification a fort in little else but a name. It had, however, the four iron cannon sent Governor Abbott by Rocheblave from Fort Gage; but these could not be used to advantage, they were so badly mounted; besides, the commandant had not with him any one skilled in the use of artillery.

The Captain was fortunate in reaching Vincennes before De Celeron could present his belts and speeches to the savages of the Wea Indian towns; for, although the latter made all haste, intent on carrying out the instructions delivered to him by Hamilton, yet, at the head of the Maumee, he was detained by illness. There were just arrived Indian reports from Vincennes of the presence there of Virginians, which to DeCeleron's mind must have made the destruction of the cannon in Fort Sackville according to Hamilton's orders, somewhat of a doubtful matter. Other rumors reached the ears of De Celeron while at the Miamis; one concerning the harsh treatment of some of the inhabitants of Vincennes by the Virginians particularly Legras, who, after his merchandise had been seized by

them had (so ran the report) been sent to the Illinois. But this was very far from the truth, although promptly sent to Hamilton.* There was considerable merchandize, however, at Miamis from Detroit, which Beaubien refused to let go across the portage to the waters of the Wabash, it being intended for Vincennes.

When De Celeron finally reached Wea, he learned that the "rebels" had already secured the cannon he had been instructed to render useless. Hamilton expected much from the Wabash Indians in view of their promises recently made him at Detroit by warriors from that section. And De Celeron was not slow in stirring up the war-spirit among those occupying the villages near his post

Captain Helm was fully empowered by Clark to treat with the Wabash Indians, — the Colonel having sent letters and speeches by him to the Kickapoos and Piankeshaws "desiring them to lay down the tomahawk." But if they did not choose so to do, they "should behave like men and fight for the English, as they had done; but they would soon see their 'Great Father,' as they called him, given to the dogs to eat." Clark used boasting to supply the place of men; soft speeches to the Indians, under the circumstances, would, he believed, be a mistake. At the same time, he wrote them that, if they thought of giving their hands to the Big Knives to give their hearts also; and that he did not doubt but after becoming acquainted, that they would find the Virginians of better princi-

* De Celeron to Hamilton, Aug. 28, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. Legras, it will be remembered, was left in command of the militia of Vincennes, by Governor Abbott, when the latter returned to Detroit.

ples than what the bad birds, the English, had taught them to believe.*

One of the first duties to fulfill by Helm upon his arrival in Vincennes was to receive all Indians of whatever nation who desired audience. Some Shawanese on their way to the Creek Indians were early callers. The Captain took advantage of the knowledge of their journey to send to the principal chief of that nation a letter asking him to keep his people at home — not to let them go against the Americans, adding (which was not all true, however,) that the Shawanese and Wabash Indians were the friends of the Virginians. He also asked him not to give ear to what he might be told by the English. But, as the sequel shows, this letter was never delivered.†

Captain Helm lost no time in arranging for a grand council with the Piankeshaws. At the meeting, he delivered the Colonel's speech and the wampum sent by the American commandant, and then gave them a "talk" of his own. The principal chief — the "Big Door" — gave expression to the views of his nation after some consultation. They had resolved to take the Big Knives by the hand and would conclude a peace with them. He said the Americans must be warriors and no deceivers, or they would never have spoken as they had. They liked such people. "The

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 38-40. The Colonel gives an extended relation of portions of his speech, which is an attempt on his part to explain to the Piankeshaws, in hyperbolic language, the nature of the war then existing between Britain and the United States (pp. 39, 40). He was careful to refer to the aid given by France to the latter.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-28, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

English were liars and they would listen to them no longer." The Big Knife was in the right. He would tell all the Indians on the Wabash to bloody their hands no more for the English; and, jumping up and striking his breast, said, he was a man and a warrior; that he was now a Big Knife, and shook the hand of Captain Helm — his example being followed by all present.* As a result of this council, there was friendship with the savages on the lower Wabash.†

Elated with his success in dealing with the Piankeshaws, Helm endeavored to bring about an understanding with the up-river savages. Here, however, he was foiled. M. De Celeron at Wea, counteracted any effort put forth by him. Although a Frenchman, De Celeron was not inclined to make terms with the "rebels."

French traders at Vincennes felt aggrieved at the action of Beaubien, in retaining their goods at the Miamis, and they made representations of their troubles to Captain Helm, who afterward exerted himself to raise men for an expedition to re-take their goods, hoping to be joined at Wea, by a number of volunteers and Indians; but the undertaking fell through; as the up-river Indians did not, from accounts, seem as friendly as he had been led to believe they would prove.‡

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 36. As to Clark's account of Helm's council with the Piankeshaws, as given in his Memoir, see Appendix to our narrative, Note LXVI.

† Not, however, as far up as Wea, as Clark affirms in his Memoir.

‡ See the information obtained from Charles Beaubien by Hamilton at Detroit concerning the Upper Wabash savages, Appendix, Note LXVII.

“One of the British agents [De Celeron], residing at Wea,” wrote Clark, subsequently, “hurt our growing interest much, the Indians in that quarter being inclined to desert the British cause, but in some measure kept from their good intention by that person.”*

Clark resolved, if it could be done, to capture De Celeron, — in his own expressive language, “to take him off.” He sent, during the first half of September, a detachment of eighty men from Kaskaskia† under command of Lieutenant John Bayley, to join Captain Helm at Vincennes, and, if possible, surprise him. The Captain, with about one hundred men — part “French militia and Indians” — set out by water for that purpose.‡ But De Celeron was on the alert. He heard of the designs against him and at once collected a few Indians that he could depend on, determined to give battle to the American officer. However, the latter had not advanced far up the Wabash before the valorous De Celeron concluded to make good his es-

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 48.

† This was the force which Hamilton mentioned (in his letter to Haldimand of the 26th of September) he had heard of through the arrival on that day at Detroit of Charles Beaubien, from the Miamis — head of the Maumee, and described as “one Clarke with 80 men being at Vincennes, where the French receive them well.”

‡ By the fifth of October, Hamilton had received an exaggerated account of the number of men that marched under Helm: “Mr. Bellestre who has been sometime amongst the Spaniards is said to be at the head of 200 French who have joined the rebels on their march: 100 from the Illinois, the rest from Vincennes.” That about one-half of Helm's force was made up of “French militia” of Kaskaskia and Vincennes, there can be no doubt.

cape, leaving his friendly Indians to defend the Wea stockade as best they could, or meet the enemy in open field if they chose so to do. The savages soon assembled in grand council to determine what was best to be done. But they neglected to shut the gate of the fort or to keep sentinels posted, not supposing the enemy to be near. In the hight of their deliberation, Captain Helm entered the fortification and ordered them to surrender. Being taken entirely by surprise, little or no resistance was offered; about forty were taken prisoners; but these were soon set at liberty. A treaty followed; and the Upper Wabash savages were conciliated for the time (only, however, for some weeks) to "rebel" interests.

The fort, as it was called, which had fallen so easily into the hands of Captain Helm, was "a miserable stockade, surrounded by a dozen wretched cabins called houses." The Indians in the vicinity were numerous — about a hundred cabins, with a population of nearly five hundred. The French settlers were few and of course, needed not many arguments to be advanced by the militia accompanying Helm, to convince them of the justice of the cause the latter had espoused.

The American flag was now floating at Vincennes and Wea on the east and at Kaskaskia and Cahokia on the west, marking what was then the extreme limits of territory which had fallen under military sway of Virginia; nevertheless, it had been secured without the shedding of a drop of blood.

Hamilton, when he first heard of De Celeron's flight "on horseback, from Wea to the Miamis," was disposed to be lenient in his remarks as to the event:

“Mr. De Celeron’s expeditious movement rather surprises me; but, in this country, where indulgence plenièrè takes place, there can be but slender confidence on protestations or even stronger ties. However, his own account may throw a different light on his actions.”* . . . But subsequently he severely criticised him for his sudden departure;—he could “find no excuse for his extraordinary conduct, unless his being deserted by common sense or common courage,” could plead his cause. “He might have staid in perfect security a few leagues from . . . [Wea], where he would have found that his fears were entirely groundless and that he had fled from a shadow.”† But Captain Helm’s force of determined men was something more than a “shadow,” as the frightened Frenchman would, had he refused to leave Wea, doubtless have discovered.

“On the fifth of October [1778], late in the evening,” wrote the Lieutenant-Governor, “Messieurs Charles and Nicholas Gouin came to Detroit, the latter [sent as an] express from the Miamis with an account that Mr. De Celeron was at Wea when one De Couagne . . . arrived with five other persons having belts and speeches from the rebels addressed to the Wabash Indians nearly in the following terms:

“‘You Indians living on the River Wabash! We are not come with design of taking your lands from you; we only desire to pass through your country to Detroit to turn out your Father who is there; for now your late Father, the King of France, is come to life

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Oct. 7, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Same to same, Dec. 4, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

and will recover the country he lost to the English. Here are several belts for you to consider : a white one for the French ; a red one for the Spaniards, who mean to assist them ; a blue one in the name of the Colonies ; a green one offering peaceable terms from the Americans, if you allow them to pass freely ; and, lastly, a red one offering you war, if you prefer that. We desire you to leave a very wide road for us, as we are many in number and love to have room enough for our march ; for, in swinging our arms as we walk, we may chance to hurt some of your young people with our swords.' ”

“Mr. De Celeron, as I am informed,” continued Hamilton, “contented himself with hearing this much and without waiting to hear what reply the Indians made to this flourishing speech, mounted his horse and rode off for the Miamis, who have sent a chief and some men to meet the rebels, I suppose with friendly overtures, as they are reputed but a dastardly nation and have done nothing this war, though treated as well as the bravest.”*

It was a wise policy on part of Captain Helm in sending this speech in advance, so far as conciliating the Wea savages was concerned, especially in announcing to them (although it was far from his intention) his determination to march on Detroit ;† but De

* Hamilton to Haldimand.—Haldimand MSS. As Couagne and his five companions were undoubtedly favorable to American interests, it is highly probable their representations, after De Celoron's fight, had a good effect upon the Wea savages. It is, indeed, not impossible that the fort gate was intentionally left open, and that the Indians were willingly captured.

† See Appendix, Note LXVII, concerning this speech.

Celeron was too wary to throw himself into the arms of "rebels."*

After three months of occupation of Vincennes by Captain Helm, it became suddenly apparent to him that all was not well with affairs up the Wabash. There came rumors of disaffection among the Wea Indians. More alarming however than this, was the report that the British were on their way to re-take Fort Sackville. However, because of the lateness of the season, the Captain was disposed to be skeptical as to such a movement being on foot. By the first of December news came which seemed to confirm what he had already been told; still he did not think it of sufficient reliability to justify his sending an express to Clark with the information. But the month had not far advanced before it was made known to him with certainty that the enemy in large numbers was approaching. This information was brought to him by one Fouche a Frenchman residing in Vincennes.† His garrison of seventy men, nearly all of Towns people, seemed ready to defend the fort to the last; and they showed much zeal, in so far as words were concerned. Finally, the American commandant dispatched a lieutenant with three men to reconnoitre up the Wabash, giving him written instructions to watch for the English and to hasten back with his intelligence when any was gained.

* Concerning the march of the detachment sent by Clark against Wea, so far as relates to the journey from Kaskaskia to Vincennes or the return from Wea to the Illinois, particulars are wholly wanting.

† Deposition of John Cornwell taken at Detroit, July 28, 1779. — Haldimand MS. Also a P. S. to the same by Capt. R. B. Lernoult.

Anxiously did Helm await the return of the four militia; but some days elapsed and they had not yet made their appearance. He then learned they had been taken prisoners. On the seventeenth, it was reported that the enemy was within three miles. Then the Captain wrote in great haste to Clark:

"At this time there is an army within three miles of this place. I heard of their coming several days before, and I sent spies to find out the certainty. The spies being taken prisoners, I never got intelligence till they [the enemy] got within three miles of the town. As I had called out the militia and had all assurance of their integrity, I ordered at the firing of a cannon, every man to appear; but I saw but few. Captain Bosseron behaved much to his honor and credit, but I doubt the reliability of a certain gent. Excuse haste, as the army is in sight. My determination is, to defend the garrison though I have but twenty-one men, but what has left me. I refer you to Mr. Williams for the rest. The army is in three hundred yards of the village. You must think how I feel — not four men that I can really depend on, but [I] am determined to act brave. Think of my condition! I know it is out of my power to defend the town, as not one of the militia will take arms, though before sight of the army [there were] no braver men. There is a flag at a small distance. I must concede."*

Two men — one an American,† the other a Frenchman — hurried across the river, urged by Helm

* Helm to Clark [Dec. 17, 1778]. — Haldimand MSS. I have not attempted to give the exact words of Helm; but I have preserved his meaning as I understand it.

† Mr. Williams, the same mentioned in Helm's letter. He was a brother of Captain John Williams of Clark's force.

to make all possible speed to Kaskaskia. Immediately after, all but three of the militia deserted their post. Then it was that the Captain was summoned to surrender—to whom? The sequel will show.

Turning our attention from the Wabash to the Kentucky settlements, we shall discover that, during the last half of the year 1778, affairs there were not encouraging. It had been conjectured when Clark left the island at the Falls of the Ohio, that there would be no cessation of savage marauds. The times were indeed perilous. The news, however, brought by Kenton, of the success of the Americans against the Illinois, was cheering.

Although, after the escape of Boone from the Shawanese the warriors of that nation thought best not to immediately march against Boonesborough, yet they did not relinquish the undertaking. On the seventh of September, the fort was beset by nearly three hundred Indians and ten white men,—the whole under the command of Captain (and Interpreter) Fontenoy De Quindre, an "Indian officer" in the Indian Department at Detroit. One of the white men was Captain and Interpreter Isidore Chesne of the same department. On the eighteenth, the enemy abandoned the siege, De Quindre going with the Shawanese to their towns north of the Ohio. The loss of the garrison was two men killed and four wounded. The enemy had two killed and three wounded. However, the failure of the Shawanese in their attempts against Boonesborough did not, for reasons hereafter ex-

("Bowman's Journal," of Feb. 20, 1779. Department of State MSS.) He is the one who is erroneously mentioned as "Willing" in the same Journal in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 102.

plained, lessen the severity of savage attacks throughout the settlements generally; and their numbers seemed (strange enough to the settlers) to increase rather than diminish as the winter advanced.

CHAPTER XII.

IT was only a short distance down the Detroit river that Hamilton moved, on the seventh of October, 1778, on his enterprise against the Illinois, before he made his first camp. "I shall observe once for all," are his subsequent words, "that camp duty was as strictly attended to as the slender knowledge I possessed would admit, and that the guards, pickets, and advanced sentries were regularly visited from the setting the watch, which was usually at sunset, till broad daylight; that the boats were loaded, manned and arranged in such a way as to be perfectly secured within our sentries every night; [and] that the Indians camped and decamped as regularly as could be wished."* . . .

On the ninth, a snow-storm having subsided, it was debated whether or not the passage of the lake (Erie) from the mouth of Detroit river to the entrance to the Maumee should be hazzarded; but, considering the advanced season and that contrary winds or the freezing of the lake would frustrate his design, Hamilton resolved "to make the push." The distance across is thirty-six miles; and it was noon before the swell on the lake had fallen sufficiently for the force to proceed.

The description given subsequently of the voyage by the Lieutenant Governor, was this: "The night proved extremely dark; the head boats with guides carried lights for the direction of those astern. About eleven o'clock the wind shifted; it began to rain;

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

a heavy swell rolled in; we were on a lee shore; and all was at stake: what I suffered, on this occasion, may more readily be conceived than expressed. After rowing some time, we lay on our oars with our sterns to the swell, till we judged the most distant boats could discern our lights, and then rowed in shore, when, happily, we made an oozy beach within a mile of the entrance of the Miamis [that is, the Maumee] river. It blew so hard all night we could neither pitch a tent or make a fire, and yet we were happy in our escape; for if, providentially, we had not passed an extent of rocky coast before the storm arose, we had all inevitably perished."

"This day," continues Hamilton, "Monseur de Celeron met us on his return. He made his report aloud that the rebels were already arrived at the Miamies [head of the Maumee]. I affected indifference though astonished at his imprudence, and said I had already heard of it. I ordered him to proceed to Detroit. It soon appeared that his design in giving the false intelligence was deliberately treacherous, as he had been industrious, in passing the Indian settlements on the way, to spread the alarm. I apprised the commandant at Detroit of this message."*

On the eleventh, the force arrived at the foot of the rapids of the Maumee, where Hamilton found Captain Grant, who, in the sloop *Archangel*, had brought fourteen tons of provision to expedite the journey of the little army. On this day, the detachment of the King's regiment of one subaltern, one sergeant and thirty-one rank and file, joined Hamilton.† The next day, their commander, Lieutenant

* Id.

† Same to same, Oct. 14, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

Ghourd, "by the accident of his piece going off, which shattered his leg," was obliged to return. Dr. McBeath, the surgeon, was sent back with him in a light boat to Detroit, where he suffered amputation of his limb; but mortification ensuing, he lost his life.* The doctor returned subsequently, overtook the expedition, and went on with it.

The Lieutenant Governor made slow progress. He was delayed by bad weather. His first resting-place was at Rocher de Bout, on the Maumee, less than four miles above what is now Perrysburgh, Ohio, but on the west side of the stream,† which point he reached on the thirteenth.‡ The water in the river he found higher than usual at this time of the year. The next day, he got up the greatest part of the provisions which had been brought by Captain Grant.§

A considerable number of Indians had, by this time, made their appearance as auxiliaries, and every one was in the best of spirits. Late in the evening a trusty savage arrived, who had been sent forward for intelligence. He brought an account that the propositions of the "rebels" at Vincennes, which had been made by them to the Indians had been rejected; and that, although they had no knowledge of the lake savages marching to their assistance, they answered the Americans with a determined spirit. This information

* Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† See Washington-Irvine Correspondence, pp. 93, 355, and accompanying map.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, Oct. 14, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

§ Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

left Hamilton no room to doubt all would go well on his arrival upon the Wabash.*

Here, again, Hamilton wrote the Commander-in-chief as to the conduct of M. de Celeron. "He has acted," said the Lieutenant Governor, "in a manner very unprecedented," and which he hoped, for the honor of human nature, would never be followed. "Treachery, ingratitude, and perjury," he said, "are heavy charges to lay to the account of a man reputed a man of honor, but I am bold to say they can be but too well supported." "He had the effrontery," added Hamilton, "to repeat to me by word of mouth and in hearing of the people in my bateau, that the rebels were at the Miamis [although they had not arrived at Quiatanon (Wea)] when he precipitately left there, bringing with him, notwithstanding his haste, some packs of peltry. He ranged about for three days at the mouth of the Miamis [Maumee] river, among the Indians, spreading this report, which however, they did not credit."†

Hamilton now got news of the return to the Shawanese country from the attack on Boonesborough of Lieutenant Dequindre, who was to join the Lieutenant Governor, on the march of the latter, with others who had previously gone out from Detroit;‡ and that one hundred Shawanese were still at war. Forty "rebels" were reported as being at Vincennes; and Hamilton wrote the Commander-in-chief that he expected these

* Same to same, Oct. 14, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id.

‡ Dequindre did not join Hamilton after the siege of Boonesborough. Captain Chêne, however, reached the Lieutenant Governor while the latter was on the march.

would call for help from Kaskaskia as soon as they heard of his approach, but he would send from the head of the Maumee, on his arrival, some Indians to cause an alarm down the Wabash as far as that place, in hopes this might divide the attention of the Virginians there.*

By the twenty-fourth, Hamilton had reached "Miamistown" — the head of the Maumee — "after the usual fatigues attending such a navigation, the water being [here] remarkably low."† On the twenty-eighth, he wrote that he had hopes of passing forward, on that day — "fifty-seven days' provisions for three hundred men." He declared the savages were in good health and temper and that their restraint on their passion for rum had improved their disposition. "Our own people," said he, "are in perfect health and spirits." The indecision of the Wabash Indians, was attributed by the Lieutenant Governor to the influence of interested advisers. He believed they were only waiting the motions of the Lake Indians to take an active part against the "rebels."

The good news Hamilton had received of the war-like attitude of the Shawanese and the account which had just reached him of so large a force of that nation being upon the war-path, induced him to send them from "Miamistown" a quantity of ammunition as a reward for their activity and to aid them against the Virginians. He had, the day previous,

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Oct. 14 and 15, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. It is highly probable that most of the forty "rebels" reported as being at Vincennes were the men forming the detachment sent by Clark against Wea, but who, undoubtedly, had already returned to Kaskaskia.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

held a council with about two hundred chiefs and warriors, and he declares their behavior was such as he wished. "Since it is likely," said the Lieutenant Governor, "that I shall pass the winter to the southward of Detroit," and the Indians having desired him to apprise their friends of the fact, he would have General Haldimand send him forward orders and instructions for his conduct.* In his letter to the Commander-in-chief at this date, he again refers to the supposed wrong-doings of De Celoron. "Every intelligence I have procured," he wrote, "confirms my suspicion of M. de Celoron's treachery."†

While the Lieutenant Governor was at "Miami-town," Louis Chevalier reached there from St. Joseph, with two chiefs and thirteen warriors — Pottawattamies; "this," wrote Hamilton afterward, "and his future behavior may efface his [Chevalier's] former conduct." One of the Pottawattamie chiefs, it seems, had on his person a French medal, which, in the presence of all the savages there, numbering about two hundred, he gave up to the Lieutenant Governor. The latter regarded the arrival of Chevalier as "a step of consequence to the service at present." He added that he had been joined by several savages on

* Same to same, Oct. 28, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. "Here [at 'Miami town'] we met several tribes of the Indians previously summoned to meet here, and held several conferences; made them presents, and dispatched messengers to the Shawanese, as well as [to]the nations on our route, inviting them to join us, or at least watch the motions of the rebels upon the frontiers; for which purpose, I sent them ammunition." — Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Oct. 28, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

his way out; and he was persuaded he should get as many as he could "manage or wish for."*

Having passed the carrying place, or portage, of nine miles,† "we arrived," is Hamilton's subsequent record, "at one of the sources of the Wabash, called the Little River."‡ The stream was so uncommonly low that bateaux could not have floated but for the fact that, some distance below, a beaver dam kept up the water. This they cut through to give a passage to their boats, and, having taken in the lading at the landing, they passed them all.§ The Lieutenant Governor now sent forward twenty-two wagons with provisions and stores, under the command of Lieutenant Duvernot, who was ordered to encamp at the forks of the Wabash and there remain until the arrival of the main force, or until further orders. This was on the first of November.||

The numerical strength of Hamilton's little army was now nearly as follows: the detachment from the

* Id. Also same to same, Nov. 1, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. Hamilton's order to Chevalier to raise Pottawattamies and conduct them to the head of the Maumee, was dated October 15th.

† In crossing the portage, there were ten carts employed: there were also six carriages; two with four wheels to transport the bateaux, and four with two wheels for the pirogues. Captain McLeod's company took over a part of the provisions; the rest got over in six days — from the twenty-ninth of October to the fifth of November. ("Report of Henry Duvernet, Second Lieutenant of Artillery." — Haldimand MSS., where the wrong months are mentioned in giving the dates.)

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. He gives for "Wabash" — "Ouabache"; and for "Little River" — "Petit Riviere."

§ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

|| Same to same, Nov. 1, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

King's (Eighth) regiment, non-commissioned officers included, thirty-two; with the artillery were two gunners, four of the King's (Eighth) regiment, and seventeen from the two Detroit militia companies; — the latter companies had each forty-four, officers included. Lamothe's company numbered forty-two. There were forty Ottawas, twenty Chippewas, four Wyandots, thirty Pottawattamies (of whom fifteen were from St. Joseph), and thirty Miamis Indians: in all, one hundred and eighty-five whites and one hundred and twenty-four savages — an entire force of three hundred and nine men.* We were assured by the Lieutenant Governor that women are not included in this his "Return" of the savages.

The portage which Hamilton had just crossed attracted his attention. "This carrying-place," he wrote, "is free from any obstructions but what the carelessness and ignorance of the French have left and would leave from generation to generation. An intelligent person, at a small expense, might make it as fine a road as any within twenty miles of London. The woods are beautiful; [there are] oak, ash, beech, nutwood, very clear and of a great growth." He declares he found in a ridge near the road, a sea fossil. "To find," said he, "marine productions on this *hauteur des terres*, is, to my mind, more curious than their being found in the Alps. There are no mountains in view, from Detroit to this place, so these fossils can-

* Moses, in his *Illinois: Historical and Statistical*, vol. I, p. 154, says: "With a force of thirty regulars, fifty French volunteers, and four hundred Indians, he [Hamilton] started down the Wabash." But this estimate is clearly erroneous.

not readily be accounted for from volcanoes, of which there is no trace to be observed.”*

As yet no Shawanese had joined Hamilton's force; however, now a war party of that nation under Captain Alexander McKee was hourly expected, but which, it seems, did not arrive. McKee had written that a few of that tribe had “attempted” a fortification built by the rebels at the Falls of the Ohio, but only succeeded in destroying “a parcel of tools.” “I shall,” wrote Hamilton, “endeavor to cut off the communication from that place to the Illinois, and perhaps shall find the taking that fort an object well worth attention.” McKee subsequently joined the Lieutenant Governor while the latter was moving down the Wabash — proving himself a valuable assistant to Deputy Agent Hay.

Hamilton had not only been informed that the “rebels” had built a fort at the Falls of the Ohio, but he had what was to him much better news, that the Miami Indians of Eel river would join his force. “We have had,” he continued, “pretty sharp frosts, but fine clear weather. By damming up the water of the Little River four miles below the landing, the water is backed and raised an inch here. At the dam, it rose an inch the first hour. The beavers had worked hard for us, but we were obliged to break down their dam to let the boats pass that were sent forward to clear the river and a place called the ‘Chemin Convert.’”† The beaver,” Hamilton subsequently declared, “are never molested at this place by the traders

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Nov. 1, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id.

or Indians and soon repair their dam, which is a most serviceable work upon this difficult communication.”*

Hamilton, as he found himself upon the waters of the Wabash, again revolved in his mind what he had learned of the flight of the commandant at Wea; and once more he unburdened himself concerning the matter to the Commander-in-chief: “Mr. de Celoron has a brother in the rebel service, and I have no room to doubt his treasonable design in spreading reports that might delay us till next spring, when reinforcements from the Colonies might effectually frustate our attempts to regain the Illinois or keep the Indians in our interest. Double pay, I take it, has been his seducer; and as to his reward, I hope to have your Excellency’s orders. In the meantime I have ordered his suspension.”† This, seemed, for a while to relieve the thoughts of the Lieutenant Governor.

Hamilton started with his regulars down Little river, with seven loaded boats, having with him seventy-two Ottawas. The next day—the second of November—the Pottawattamies and the Miami Indians under Major Hay, with the last of the bateaux,

* Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. “Between the Miamie [Maumee] and the Ouabache [Wabash] there are beaver dams, which when water is low, passengers break down to raise it, and by that means pass easier than they otherwise would. When they the [travelers] are gone, the beavers come and mend the breach; for this reason they have been hitherto sacred, as neither Indians nor white people hunt them.” — *Road from Detroit to the Illinois*, etc. — Haldimand MSS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Nov. 1, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

followed.* All reached, finally, a swamp then known as "Les Volets," which was passed with great labor. Beyond this, they came to the little "Riviere a Boeté," which joins the one they had descended. The shallowness of both streams obliged them to build a dam across each, by which means the water was backed into the swamp. When there was a sufficient accumulation, they cut their dykes and floated all their boats down the channel. The same obstacle occurred at Riviere a l' Anguille (Eel river) and the same work had to be done.†

In the progress of the expedition down the Wabash difficulties increased. The setting in of the frost lowered the river; the floating ice cut the men as they worked in the water to haul the boats over shoals and rocks. The bateaux were damaged and had to be repeatedly unloaded "caulked and payed." Ninety-seven thousand pounds of provisions and stores had to be carried by the men, in which the Indians assisted cheerfully when the boats were to be lightened. It was sometimes a day's work to get the distance of half a league. It was necessary to stop frequently at the Indian villages to have conferences with the savages, furnish them with necessaries, and engage a few to accompany the expedition. At length, the force got into a good depth of water, a fall of rain having raised the river; but this advantage was succeeded by fresh difficulties, the frost becoming so intense as to freeze the river quite across; however, by hard labor, the men made their way onward.‡

* Id.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

‡ Id.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE arrival of Hamilton at Wea was not attended with any demonstration of surprise or hostility on part of the Indians present. They knew of his approach and remained passive. "Since my leaving Detroit," said the Lieutenant Governor in writing to his superior officer, "I have been joined on the way by savages from different quarters — the Ottawas of the Grand Glaize [now known as the Auglaize river], the Pottowattamies of St. Joseph, the Miamis of Riviere a l'Auguile; the Pottawattamies of Shippecon, the Ouiatanons [Weas], and lastly the Kickapoos. Their number is small, not amounting to two hundred; but I shall be sorry to have the number increased, as the expense of provisions must be considerable, and this wretched place is little capable of furnishing a supply." Having an eye single to the prospects ahead — a large reinforcement of savages, especially Shawanese, and of capturing Fort Sackville and, possibly, going into winter quarters in Vincennes, — it was with no little concern, evidently, that the Lieutenant Governor viewed the coming prospects: "We are told they are in a miserable condition at Post Vincennes for want of provisions, the last year's crop having sprouted on the ground. They have sent to the Illinois for seed grain."

Hamilton informed General Haldimand that his savages were on good terms with each other, — a matter of much importance, as dissensions would have seriously impeded his progress. He also wrote that the accounts of the strength of the rebels at Vincennes

varied so much that he was at a loss to form a judgment of it. However, he did not believe it to be such as should cause the least dread.

On the third of December, some people from Detroit reached Hamilton at Wea. By a letter they brought him, he learned that Mr. Macomb, a merchant of the place first mentioned, had forwarded some Indian goods to the Miami fort at the head of the Maumee, agreeable to directions left him by the Lieutenant Governor before starting on his enterprise, but then were, "notwithstanding any order that may have been given for the furtherance of his merchandise from Deer Island, fifty bateau-loads at that place." Hamilton took the liberty of mentioning this to his superior officer at Quebec, as the supplying of all the Indians within his reach would depend greatly on the speedy arrival of goods at Detroit early in the spring. "We are," said he, "nearly exhausted at present, though we do our best to content the savages at little expense. Arms, in particular, there is a great demand for."

One matter was looked upon by Hamilton with considerable disquietude — the progress the "rebels" were making at the Falls of the Ohio. But he consoled himself that, by what he could learn, if there was any fort there, "it was very insignificant in its present state." As to Wea, he wrote dispondingly, "The fort (as it is called) at this place is a miserable stockade, surrounded by a dozen wretched cabins called houses. The Indians hereabouts are numerous, there appear ninety-six of their cabins, which, allowing five even to a house makes the number four hundred and eighty." "The French settlers," continues the Lieutenant Governor, "are few and as inconsiderable as debauchery

and idleness can make them. As to their attachments, it is difficult to pronounce. Interest, I believe, is the Grand Monarch with them; however, I have formally administered to them the oath of fidelity to his Britannic Majesty, and left in the care of *one* honest man the St. George's flag, to be hoisted on Sundays and holidays, giving the Indians to understand it was a signal of his Majesty having resumed his rights and again taken them under his protection."*

In council with the Indians at Wea, the British commander destroyed the copy which had been furnished him of the "grant — or, rather, deed of sale" — made over three years previous by the Piankeshaws to the Wabash Land Company — of two large tracts of land lying on both sides of the Wabash below Wea. He assured the savages present that the transaction was contrary to the express desire of the British king and without the consent of the principal chiefs concerned, — the Indians of the Wabash were now to consider those lands as restored to them by order of his Majesty.†

While Hamilton was at Wea, the Indian chiefs who had received the American colors from Captain Helm, "came in from their hunting, acknowledged their error, gave up the flags, and accused Monsieur de Celoron of having deserted them; besides, that he never distributed to them the goods entrusted to him for the Indians."‡

There was one piece of information received by the Lieutenant Governor from the hands of those recently

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 4, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† See Appendix, Note LXVIII.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. •

from Detroit which bore heavily upon his mind; so he wrote the Commander-in-chief: "A letter from Mr. Gary, the deputy sheriff at Montreal, acquaints me that some legal process has been commenced against Mr. Dejean for acting under my direction in regard to criminal matters. I beg leave to recommend him to your Excellency's protection as a man who has created enemies by doing his duty and who has had the misfortune to fall from good circumstances into indigence. I hope I shall be responsible for any malversation of his, as he has only acted by my orders, and I have had reason to be satisfied with his behavior as an honest man and loyal subject. Should any complaint against myself be lodged judicially, I am perfectly at ease, persuaded your Excellency will allow me to vindicate my conduct without encountering the *chicane* of the law."*

Hamilton kept steadily in view the words of Haldimand as to the propriety of sending out parties of Indians to cut the communication so much desired by the "rebels" to be kept open between Fort Pitt and the Mississippi river. But now the Lieutenant Governor had an expensive scheme in his mind to aid the savages. As far as he could judge, it would be practicable to establish a post and build a fort in any part of the Indian country eastward of the Mississippi as far as the Ohio; but, for this, aids of men and merchandize would be necessary, to support such an undertaking as well as to keep up the good disposition of the Indians. The savages with him at Wea living in the Wabash country, gave him their promise to raise all their warriors during the next spring "to

* Same to same, Dec. 4, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

spread themselves in all directions "in their attacks upon the frontier settlements of the Americans. "I have recommended to them," are the words of the commander to his superior, "the example of the Lake Indians for courage and humanity."

But Hamilton could not give Haldimand before leaving Wea, any satisfactory idea as to the steps he would take after proceeding onward toward Vincennes. "The rigor of the season," said he, "which has in some places frozen the river quite across; the delays occasioned by the lowness of the water; the repairs necessary for our craft; and the usual tardiness of the Indians, who, being our main-spring, must be attended to; — all conspire to the tediousness of the journey." "The health and good temper," he added, "of all the various colors and characters that compose our little band, give me encouragement to hope the best."*

It was in the after part of the fourth of December, that Hamilton left Wea to continue his march down the Wabash. A reconnoitering party from the main force, seized, on the fifteenth, the lieutenant and three men sent by Captain Helm from Fort Sackville for intelligence.

The American officer acquitted himself but poorly, — "having taken so little precaution as to be surprised himself," says Hamilton.† The officer had in his pocket, two commissions, — one from Lieutenant Governor Abbott, the other from Colonel Clark.‡ "He

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 4, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30th, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. Hamilton adds that the lieutenant was "in the pay of Con-

showed no apprehension of being hanged on the next tree," says the Lieutenant Governor, "which he certainly deserved; and observing the savages offered him no violence, he was presently quite at his ease.*

From his prisoners, the British commander learned that Captain Helm had permitted "almost all his people to return to their homes," — depending for the defence of Vincennes on the French militia, "who had all taken an oath of fidelity to the States."† The arms of the lieutenant and his three men were given to the Indians. Hamilton declares he did not proceed vigorously with his prisoners, wishing to gain the Vincennes people by lenity, and apprehensive that an instance of severity might arouse the ferocity of the savages, which he wished of all things to avoid.‡

Having learned from his prisoners the state of things at Vincennes the Lieutenant Governor, on the sixteenth, sent off two parties of Indians with each an "Indian officer," with instructions to lie on the roads leading from that town to the Illinois and to the Falls of the Ohio — one on each side of the Wabash, to intercept any intelligence of his arrival that might be sent to those places. They had orders to keep their sta-

gress." This, of course, was erroneous. In his letter to Haldimand last cited, the Lieutenant Governor confuses matters: "He [the lieutenant sent out by Helm] was furnished with two commissions: one from Lieut. Gov. Abbott, the other from the commandant for Congress."

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30th, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id. The information regarding Capt. Helm permitting "almost all his people to return to their homes," related, really, to the return to the Illinois of the men sent out by Clark against Wea.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

tions till they should discover the English flag flying over Fort Sackville, and to secure any messengers and their letters, but to do no violence to the persons who might be captured.*

Major Hay, also, was detached with Captain Lamothe's company, Lieutenant Duvernet of the Royal Artillery, with the six-pounder, and the regulars of the King's regiment to fall down the river and enter Vincennes. Hay had with him Antoine Bellefeuille (the interpreter), and several chiefs of the different nations who formed a part of Hamilton's force, to conciliate the Piankeshaws residing in the town, and to show the French what they might expect if they attempted to resist. "Had our whole force moved forward together," says Hamilton, "it would probably have been impossible to have restrained the savages from destroying the settlement. As it was, the young men took alarm that they should have no share in the business and threw themselves hastily into their canoes to follow. They were, however, prevailed upon to return."†

Major Hay was given orders to secure, if possible, the craft lying before the place by sending a party in

* *Id.*; also Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30th, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. Hamilton, in the first mentioned letter, speaks of the Falls of the Ohio, as the place where (at the time of his approaching Vincennes) the "rebels" had a fort and a number of families had lately come to settle. He refers in his letters to Haldimand of Nov. 1 and Dec. 4, 1778, as well as in that of July 6, 1781, doubtless, to the defensive work on the island; as the new fort to be built on the mainland was, when his informants were there, only just commenced.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.; and same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

the night in boats to pass the town and stop any people who should attempt to escape by water.* A placard was sent to the inhabitants, cautioning them to avoid acting in the offensive, as the consequences would be fatal to them.† If, as Hamilton expected, there was not any resistance made, and that Hay found the report of the prisoners to be true, he was to order the St. George's ensign to be hoisted at the fort as a signal for the parties before sent out to join him. He was likewise empowered to receive the submission of the French inhabitants who should lay down their arms; but, should he find that the "rebels" had been reinforced, he was to take post to the best advantage possible, send off an express to the Lieutenant Governor, and await his arrival.

Having taken these precautions, the British commander, on the seventeenth, fell down the river from the distance of seven leagues. It snowed and blew fresh from daybreak till one o'clock, when to the surprise of Hamilton, he plainly saw the "rebel" flag was still flying at the fort. He concluded the American commander had been reinforced; and he felt certain such was the case, upon finding Lieutenant Schiefelin, with all the boats lying in a little cove about a mile above the town. But he soon learned the true state of affairs.

Captain Alexis Maisonville and Captain McLeod were ordered to land their men — the Detroit volunteer militia, leaving one man to each boat as a guard, and march slowly towards the town. At the same time, a

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30th, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id. — Corroborated by same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

flanking party was ordered forward, as the brushwood was thick on the left of the line of march.

When Hamilton came in sight of the town, he posted sentries and halted his men.* Just then a messenger from Major Hay reached him, desiring the sending to him of the St. George's flag, also informing the Lieutenant Governor that his men were advantageously posted, and that the gun was mounted. The flag was sent as required; and the commander at once started to join the Major, whom he soon found with his men drawn up and the French militia of the village bringing in their arms.

Hay informed Hamilton that the American commandant was deserted by those in whom he had reposed confidence and did not intend to hold out, but would not strike his colors until he knew what terms he was to have.† The six-pounder being ready, Lieutenant Duvernet was ordered to proceed with it towards the fort, six men with a sergeant of the King's regiment marching before with fixed bayonets, followed by the remainder of the detachment and the volunteers and militia under Major Hay.

As Hamilton approached the gate of the fort, he sent a person forward to summon the commanding officer to surrender;‡ but Captain Helm desired, by a written paper, to know who made the demand. The

* Appendix, Note LXIX.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18–30th, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. Hay probably obtained knowledge of Helm's determination from those who had just deserted him.

‡ It was this person who carried the flag mentioned by Captain Helm, in his hastily written letter to Clark (finished and dispatched immediately before he was summoned to surrender), — which flag he says was "at a small distance" away.

British commander sent for answer verbally: "The King's Lieutenant Governor from Detroit." Hamilton then advanced to the wicket. Helm soon presented himself — "for, indeed," says the Lieutenant Governor, "he was almost alone" — having but five men left — and asked what terms he should have.* He was answered, humane treatment for himself; that no other terms would be mentioned. Hamilton was then admitted.† "The officer who commanded in the fort (Captain Helm)," is the subsequent language of Hamilton, "being deserted by the officers and men who to the number of seventy had formed his garrison and were in pay of the Congress, surrendered his wretched fort on the very day of our arrival, being the seventeenth of December, 1778. Thus we employed seventy-one days in coming only six hundred miles, which is to be attributed to the extraordinary difficulties of the way, owing to an uncommon drought; the severity of the season; and the inevitable delays at the Indian villages, particularly at Ouitanon [Wea]."‡

* See Appendix, Note LXIX.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, loc. cit. But Hamilton is silent as to the number of Helm's garrison. Although "humane treatment was mentioned only in connection with Helm's name, the Captain seemed fully assured it would be extended also to his five men and in this, as will be presently seen, he was not mistaken. It is altogether certain, from what immediately transpired, that Helm did not leave the fort, nor any of his men.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. But the Lieutenant Governor was in error in saying Captain Helm's garrison was in pay of the Congress. It was from Virginia they expected pay for their services, as already shown.

So soon as the British commander entered the fort, he posted sentries at the gate to keep out the savages; but while he was attending to this, some of them got in at two gun posts, which had not been secured.

Hamilton called to the interpreters and used his best entreaties with the chiefs, who really did all in their power to restrain their men, "but the torrent was too strong for such feeble barriers." The Indians bore down the sentries, and seeing one posted at the door of Captain Helm's quarters, they went to the windows which they broke in and then fell to plundering. The soldiers, in the meantime drew up in the fort and were quiet spectators of this scene of disorder, "which lasted," as the Lieutenant Governor affirms, "until the curiosity (I cannot say avarice) of the savages was gratified."

The Indians upon being requested so to do, restored to Captain Helm his private property. Thirty-two stout horses which had lately been purchased for the Kentucky settlements were inside the fortification and these were soon secured by the Indians, "which I would not deprive them of," says Hamilton, "as they had not committed a single act of cruelty, and have treated the inhabitants with the humanity which was recommended to them." "Had a single shot been fired," adds the Lieutenant Governor, "probably the settlement would have been destroyed in an hour's time."*

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. The Lieutenant Governor was under the impression that the horses found inside the fort, had been purchased for the use of Congress, but this was not the case. ("Bowman's Journal" — Department of State MSS.) It is evident that Hamilton had no idea that the "rebels" under Clark were, along with the Colonel, Virginia troops: he supposed the whole were under Congressional direction.

For some time Captain Helm "hesitated to take down the Continental flag;" but, at length finding it was expected of him, ordered it to be lowered, and the St. George's was run up instead; "which signal," says Hamilton, "drew in our parties, one having taken two prisoners (an American and a Frenchman), who had Captain Helm's letter to Colonel Clark."*

In the fort, Hamilton found, besides the horses, two iron three-pounders mounted on truck carriages, two swivels not mounted and a very small quantity of ammunition. As to the fortification, it was, the Lieutenant Governor declares, "a miserable stockade, without a well, barrack, platform for small arms, or even lock to the gate."†

Although to Captain Helm was accorded humane treatment, and although no violence was offered his five men, yet all were held prisoners of war. That such would be the result, they must have anticipated.

Outside the fort, the day was spent on part of some of the soldiery and Indians in taking proper precaution to secure their boats and canoes, and in landing and conveying inside the pickets, provisions and baggage. Thus it was that Fort Sackville again

* Hamilton to Haldimand, loc. cit. See, also, same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS: It is the declaration of Hamilton that the letter from Captain Helm was "to Colonel Clark, commandant (under the Congress) of the Eastern Illinois." Who Clark was "commandant under," although not then understood, as before explained, by the Lieutenant Governor, was, not long afterward, it may be premised, made clear to him. Hamilton sent a copy of Helm's letter to the Commander-in-chief, declaring to him what was true enough, that it showed "what confidence was to be placed in men [meaning the citizens of Vincennes] who have once violated a sacred engagement."

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

passed into the possession of the British; and the inhabitants of Vincennes again bowed in submission to a fate which they could not avert. Everywhere in the town, there was a complete surrender to the Lieutenant Governor. "There is nothing flattering," he wrote the next day, "to win such submission."*

The official report of Hamilton puts the number of those who surrendered to him at Vincennes, as "one major, four captains, two lieutenants, two ensigns, one Indian agent, one adjutant, one commissary, one interpreter, four sergeants, and two hundred and sixteen rank and file; of the last one hundred and sixty were volunteers." This return included all the citizens of the place who had been enrolled in the militia companies, together with their officers.

Hamilton had fully earned his success at Vincennes. It is evident his journey from Detroit had been one of considerable hardships and of not a little suffering. "I must say," are his words, "to the praise of the officers and men, they supported the fatigues and hardships of their tedious journey with the utmost cheerfulness." "As to the poor savages," adds the Lieutenant Governor, "their not firing a single shot on the day of taking possession of the place, nor injuring or even insulting a single soul (except a poor miller, whose house they plundered, being half a league from the fort) reflects disgrace on some well-instructed Christian regulars who have not held hospitals as asylums from their fury."†

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

†Id. (For some published errors concerning the march of Hamilton to Vincennes from Detroit, and the taking of the first-mentioned place, see Appendix, Note LXX.)

Afterwards, in commenting upon the behavior of the savages upon this occasion, the British commander says: "Such was the moderation and good order observed by the Indians, that not a single person had the slenderest cause of complaint; not a shot was fired nor any inhabitant injured in person or property."

"It is remarkable," adds Hamilton, "that although on our arrival at this place our number was increased to five hundred men, there was not one sick, nor had there been a single instance of drunkenness among the Indians or soldiery from the day we left Detroit, though rum was delivered out on every occasion when the fatigues or bad weather made it necessary."*

As to the cause of the detention by the way, the Lieutenant Governor gives certainly very reasonable explanations.

And thus, too, sometime after these events transpired, wrote an officer of Lamothe's company:

"On the seventh of October, 1778, Lieutenant Governor Hamilton took his departure from Detroit, with a detachment of the King's VIIIth regiment, the Detroit volunteers, a detachment of artillery, two companies of militia, and a number of savages, under his command, to retake the posts the rebels had taken possession of in the Illinois; that, after suffering the greatest hardships, cutting the ice to make [a way] for their boats, transporting their stores, provisions, etc., on the soldiers' backs at different places, where

* Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. The "five hundred men" included Indians, regulars and militia — his entire force.

the bateaux could not get over, they reached Vincennes on the Wabash, in December.”*

There was a negligence on the part of Haldimand so far as replying to the correspondence of Hamilton was concerned, clearly indicating his disapproval of the whole movement of the Lieutenant Governor against the Illinois. Finally, however, he answered his letters which had been sent before starting, as also all those to the close of the year. “I received,” he said, “your several letters previous to your departure from Detroit. The suddenness of your resolution to march against the rebels that had invaded the Illinois, made it impossible for me to give you any orders; but, from the knowledge of you and the spirit your letters breathe, I am persuaded you have executed what appeared to you best for the King’s service; and, in that light, the measure you had pursued was stated to the secretary of state in my letter last fall.

“I had since, by your dispatches of the 18th December last, which come to hand the 19th of March with their several enclosures, learned that you have taken possession of Fort Vincennes. Long before this reaches you, you will have been satisfied whether the rebels seriously intended an attack upon Detroit, and acted in consequence, or seen what further could be done for the King’s service, in those parts, with the force at present with you. . . .

“By accounts which bear every mark of authenticity, his Majesty’s arms have been attended with success to the southward; the province of Georgia is once more reduced to obey their lawful sovereign and great

* Schieffelin: *Loose Notes (Magazine of American History, vol. I, p. 186).*

hopes are entertained of the royal forces being able to penetrate further that way. It is likely this will engage the southern Indians to make such a diversion on their part as may tend in future to facilitate your operations. In the uncertainty of all things here, uninformed how far this war may spread, it is impossible for me at this distance to give you orders and directions respecting the further measures to be pursued by you; of the possibility or practicability of those you embrace, you must be the best judge, and on your doing what is best for the king's service I must and do fully rely.

“Before you undertake anything considerable, I must recommend you weighing well the difficulty and expense, that must attend the transportation of every article you are to be furnished with from here, and whether they are likely to be compensated by the advantages expected to accrue from such an undertaking.

“When you write this way, I should be glad to receive the best information you can procure in regard to the most likely measures to be pursued for conciliating the Indians, preventing the rebels' designs, and securing the upper country, that when my spring dispatches reach me, I may be better enabled to judge of what is best to be done for those purposes.”*

* Haldimand to Hamilton, April 9, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

CHAPTER XIV.

HAMILTON convened the inhabitants of Vincennes in the church, on the second day after his arrival and having "in pretty strong terms painted their poltroonery, ingratitude and perfidy," he "read them an oath, to be subscribed only by those who, being sensible of their fault, should publicly acknowledge it, and thereby have a claim to the protection of the government. The chief people of the place have either in an underhand manner or openly embraced the rebel party."*

"Having summoned the inhabitants to assemble . . . " the Lieutenant Governor afterward wrote, "I went to meet them, reproached them for their treachery and ingratitude, but told them since they had laid down their arms and sued for protection, that, on renewing their oath of allegiance, they should be secured in their persons and property." "Lenity," adds the British commander, "I thought might induce the French inhabitants of Kaskaskia to follow their example, though the conduct of the Canadians at large was but poor encouragement. I read twice to them the oath prepared for them to take, explained the nature of it, and cautioned them against that levity they had so recently given proof of":

"We, the undersigned, declare and avow that we have taken the oath of allegiance to Congress, and, in so doing, we have forgotten our duty towards God and have failed towards men. We ask the pardon of God,

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

and we hope for the mercy of our legitimate sovereign, the king of England, and that he will accept our submission and take us under his protection as good and faithful subjects, which we promise and pray to be able to become before God and before men.”*

“The oath,” says Hamilton, “which I read in the church aloud and explained to the inhabitants, I told them was not forced upon them but offered for the consideration of sober people convinced of their fault, who, in their repentance, might be once again received under the protection of their king.” “Humiliating as the oath is,” adds the Lieutenant Governor, “one hundred and fifty-eight signed it in a few days.”†

It is difficult to determine who was the most disgraced: Hamilton in dictating the oath, or the people of Vincennes in taking it. The Lieutenant Governor was still laboring under the erroneous belief that Congress had directed all affairs terminating in the conquest of the Illinois towns and those upon the Wabash and that the creole population had taken the oath of allegiance to that body only.

An account was taken of the inhabitants of Vincennes of all ages and either sex, showing the number in the village to be six hundred and twenty-one, of whom two hundred and seventeen were “fit to bear arms on the spot;” but there were several men absent, hunting buffaloes for their winter provision, not included in the enumeration. The entire population was, probably, a little less than six hundred and fifty souls. Those who had accepted commissions under Virginia,

* Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Same to same, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.
(See Appendix, Note LXXI.)

now delivered them up;* and all who had laid down their arms and renewed their oath of allegiance, received theirs again, and, on application, had passports given them to go hunting. A strict search was made for gunpowder; all that was found in the town was put into the magazine in the fort; and a heavy fine was laid on those who should be found to conceal any; nevertheless, much of what belonged to the inhabitants, Hamilton failed to discover.

It had already become a point of consideration with Hamilton whether he should proceed directly to attack the "rebels" in the Illinois or be content to establish himself in Fort Sackville for the winter. He soon decided to remain in Vincennes. Late rains had so swollen the rivers as to make it probable he might be stopped so long as to consume his provisions before he got half way. The condition of the fort was such that, to make it tenable, all his available force would have to be called into requisition. To leave the fortification in such a state with a small garrison would be to invite the enemy to go against it, as the Lieutenant Governor believed, to be joined again by the inhabitants notwithstanding their recent oaths. The Wabash Indians he found were wavering and it would require the presence of some force to keep them to what they then professed. Such were Hamilton's reasons for not moving onward to the attack of

* The Lieutenant Governor says "those who had accepted commissions under Congress delivered them up;" he should have said, "under Virginia;" but, as just explained, he was still ignorant that the American conquerors in the Illinois were Virginia militia only, the probability being that the commissions written out by Captain Helm were loosely worded.

the Illinois until a more favorable season. Then, too, there would be the advantages of commanding the Ohio, of cutting off "rebel" communication by land between the Illinois and the Falls of that river, and of being situated so as to encourage the Delawares and Ottawas on White river, who showed marked hostility to Americans. There was fear, also, if the march against the Illinois was continued, and from any cause much prolonged, his Indian auxiliaries would leave him in a body.*

The information sent by Hamilton from Detroit to De Peyster, the middle of September, as to his determination to set off in a few days for the Illinois towns, and the request that the Michilimackinac commandant should engage his Indians to coöperate with him by way of the Illinois river,† were duly received by that officer. And the Lieutenant Governor again wrote the Major just before starting, leaving directions to have his letter forwarded after his departure. But Hamilton, even in the first instance, wrote too late for immediate action on part of De Peyster. "Had the Indians not been gone to their several homes before I received Mr. Hamilton's letters," were the words of the latter afterward to the commander-in-chief, "it would have been in my power to have seconded his attempt, which he tells me he directs in person to dispossess the rebels at the Illinois."

"The Indians at present," he also wrote, "are too much dispersed for me to assemble them in a body sufficiently strong to go down that river; and I am persuaded they would not leave their wives and chil-

* See Appendix, Note LXXII.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 16, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.; and same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

dren in their wintering grounds, their having been no previous provision made for them. I shall, however, send express to the Grand river and on the borders of Lake Michigan to endeavor to spirit up the young men to join Mr. Hamilton by the most expeditious route, ordering them to call at St. Joseph for further information of his situation. I shall also write to Mr. Chevalier to give Mr. Hamilton every assistance in his power, which I fear cannot be much, as the Indians mostly are gone to their hunting grounds.”*

In referring further to Chevalier, the commandant said: “I have long since by civil treatment, apparently secured that gentleman to his Majesty’s interests, foreseeing that he would become useful before those troubles could be at an end. The different representation of him by Mr. Hamilton and myself must appear extraordinary. I can assure your Excellency that I never heard anything that could be proven to his disadvantage; on the contrary, whilst at this post, he, with a becoming decency, set his enemies at defiance. Should he however prove faithless the disadvantages arising from my credulity will be greatly overbalanced by advantages that may occur by putting some

* De Peyster to Haldimand, Oct. 24, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. What little assistance Chevalier was able to give Hamilton in bringing to him a few Pottawattamies, has already been mentioned.

The Indians that De Peyster would “spirit up” were Ottawas and Chippewas. As Grand river flows into Lake Michigan on the eastern side, the Indians upon that stream and upon the eastern border of the lake, at that time, would, in going south to the aid of Hamilton (especially if intending to take the route of the Illinois river) reach St. Joseph on their way, where, naturally, further information as to the movements of the Lieutenant Governor would be attainable.

confidence in him. This much I am obliged to say in vindication of my judgment, as Mr. Hamilton, notwithstanding my representation to him, writes me that he has represented him to your Excellency in a very unfavorable light."

"I shall take every possible method to procure intelligence of the present state of the Illinois," continues De Peyster, "and transmit (if I receive any) by way of Detroit during the course of the winter."*

The request which had been sent by General Haldimand to De Peyster to give him his views as to whether he thought there were any means that might be employed with a probability of success to repossess the Illinois and what those means were, if in his opinion, it might be accomplished, was now answered by the Michilimackinac commandant:

"I have now to offer my sentiments agreeable to your Excellency's request, whether anything can be done for the recovery of the Illinois:

"Provided your Excellency's instructions relative to stopping the communication of the Ohio be vigorously put in execution, I am persuaded that Mr. Gautier or some other active person may assemble a body of Indians in his direct road from La Bay [that is, from Green Bay] to Prairie du Chien and in the river St. Peter, to go down the Mississippi early in the spring, which may be performed from the mouth of the Wisconsin in seven or eight days. That country is full of resources, but the Indians must have presents. Whenever we fall off in those, they are no more to be depended upon. The past is soon forgotten by them,

* De Peyster to Haldimand, Oct. 24, 1778. — Haldimand MSS., just before cited.

except when they do us a favor. Give the Indians of this country a present and they will immediately strive to make some trifling return, which, however, we must give them four times the value for. To second the above mentioned Indians, the Pottawattamies must be also ordered to move down the Illinois river followed by the Ottawas and Chippewas; those latter will be rather late, but, by sending belts before them to assure the Illinois Indians that they came in friendship to them provided they join in driving out the rebels, it will have great effect; even the brent of their intended march will settle them. The inhabitants of that country are not to be depended upon should the French offer to interfere; otherwise, should they join the rebels, it would be through fear of being plundered by the stranger Indians.”*

On the twenty-fifth of October, Langlade and Gautier, who had been returned to De Peyster from the St. Lawrence, to attend on his orders, arrived at Michilimackinac. The commandant immediately determined to send them off “to give every assistance in their power to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton.” He provided them with some goods which, he believed, with their presence among the savages, would do more good than could be expected by sending “belts by the hands of Indians.” Orders were issued to both, to arouse the savages for the purpose of aiding Hamilton.

Langlade was to go among the Ottawas and Chippewas who were wintering at Grand river “to make them assemble without loss of time,” while Gautier was to proceed to St. Joseph, where he was to confer with Chevalier, requesting him to assist Ainsé, De

* Id.

Peyster's interpreter, whom he would send to that place, in gathering the Pottawattamies of the neighborhood together.

"Gautier," was the order of the commandant, "must do his best to get information of the situation of Mr. Hamilton, making report of the same to Mr. Langlade. They will do their best to join him by the shortest route, or to descend the Illinois river if it is possible and more likely to assist the operations of Mr. Hamilton.

"Since events cannot be foreseen, in case Mr. Hamilton has yielded and returned to Detroit, then, if you do not believe yourself strong enough in men to attack Kaskaskia or Cahokia, you will send the Indians home to their winter quarters and will, by the shortest route gain your different posts, Mr. Langlade at the Bay and Mr. Gautier at the Mississippi, there to try to keep the nations well disposed for the service until new orders.

"In this enterprise, it is recommended to you to say to the warriors to use humanity towards the prisoners and others who may be found without arms, because there are several English traders retained by force amongst the rebels. The prisoners will be paid for.

"Since the nations in general have had many presents from his Majesty before, it is recommended to you to make as little expense as the nature of the service will allow, not giving them anything but what is absolutely necessary."*

* *Instructions of Major A. S. De Peyster to Capt. Langlade and Lieut. Gautier, Oct. 26, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix, Note LXXIII.)*

De Peyster felicitated himself (and he so wrote the Commander-in-chief) that Hamilton would not meet with any impediments from want of such assistance as it was in his power to give him. At that juncture, the Major would have found the aid of the sloop *Welcome* of much advantage, as he was obliged to press into his service a man of the place "to make out a canoe" for St. Joseph.*

Langlade, Gautier and Ainsé being detained by contrary winds, did not reach the mouth of Grand river (which stream falls into Lake Michigan at the present town of Grand Haven) until the thirteenth of November. There Langlade landed, but Gautier and Ainsé proceeded on to St. Joseph, not arriving there because of bad weather until the second of December. They found there Chevalier, who had been twenty-two days from Hamilton's little army, which passed the portage from the Maumee to the waters of the Wabash before he left.

The news that Hamilton had got so far the start being received at Grand river, where Langlade had succeeded in raising eighty Indians (notwithstanding the Ottawas there, because of not having previous notice, had already declined the service), they refused to follow at so great distance; so his efforts proved a failure and he went no farther. Gautier, too, finding that Chevalier had already taken the few Pottawatamies, which could be raised at that advanced season to Hamilton, was constrained to make no attempt to gather any of that nation for a movement in aid of the Lieutenant Governor. Langlade then proceeded to

* De Peyster to Haldimand, Oct. 27, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

Green Bay and Gautier to Prairie du Chien, both carrying belts and speeches, exhorting the Indians to be ready in the spring, if called upon.*

De Peyster was subsequently informed by Chevalier that the Pottawattamies who had joined Hamilton were returned home to pass the winter, and that they brought him a letter from the Lieutenant Governor informing him that he did not intend to leave Vincennes until spring. However, the Michilimackinac commander concluded not to postpone any help which could possibly be sent him; so he again ordered the Ottawas and Chippewas at the Grand river to march to his (Hamilton's) aid; and he also sent an express to Gautier to move down the Mississippi with all the Winnebagoes and Sacs and Foxes he could raise, suggesting, it seems, that he take with him any Canadians that could be prevailed upon to march with him.†

But the first order he soon countermanded, as he learned Detroit was threatened. The savages properly called the "Grand River Indians," De Peyster advised to go directly to that post, as it was but a short cut across the country; while a band was sent from Thunder Bay, on the west side of Lake Huron, likewise "to hearten the Indians about Detroit." In the last days of March, the Michilimackinac commandant wrote that, by that time, Gautier "should be on the march, joined by some active Canadians."‡ He

* Same to same, Jan. 29, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

† Same to same, March 29, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. But no aid had been or was sent to Detroit or by way of that post, to Hamilton to assist him on his expedition, by the Michilimackinac commander or by any of the subordinates of the latter.

‡ De Peyster to Haldimand, March 29, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

did march it is true; that is, he floated down the Mississippi, with two hundred and eight Indians—Winnebagoes, Menomonees, Foxes, Ottawas and Chippewas — as far as the mouth of Rock river, but did not get below that point.

Langlade, on his arrival at La Bay (that is, at Green Bay) from his unsuccessful attempt to reinforce Hamilton with Indians wintering at the Grand river, received information from the Lieutenant Governor at Vincennes, acquainting him of his determination to winter at that place, and was ordered to join him early in the spring by way of the Illinois river. He attempted to do so with some Indians, but got no farther than Milwaukee.*

* Same to same, May 13, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

CHAPTER XV.

NOW that Hamilton had determined to winter in Vincennes, he quickly made up his mind to provide coverings for his men, provisions and stores; and, as soon as these were finished, he would change the form of the fort to that of a triangle, having a blockhouse at each angle to project over the picketting. He proposed to do all the work with his own men, carrying it forward to completion during the winter without any aid from the inhabitants. "Though this should be done," wrote the commander, "the village is built in such a manner (a space of one hundred feet to two hundred feet and more being left between house and house), that most of the buildings might be maintained by a dozen men, and they might distress the largest garrison the fort could contain. Some houses are near the fort and it would be very expensive to purchase them and ruinous to particular persons to destroy them. [But] the garrison might have it in their power in case of treachery, to burn the whole town, either by making sallies in the night or firing red-hot bullets."*

A week after his arrival at Vincennes, the Lieutenant-Governor made a return of his white force to General Haldimand, showing his whole number of

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. The Commander-in-chief, on this information from the Lieutenant Governor, says: "He [Hamilton] finds . . . the village a detriment to the fort now building; and immediately after, he thinks it secure, by proposing means to destroy said village; but he gives no reason why he does not remove the fort from so disadvantageous a situation."

men including commissioned officers, non-commissioned officers and privates to be one hundred and seventy-six.* He also gave to the commander-in-chief, the prices of necessaries which ruled in the town. Flour sold at an exorbitant rate, so also Indian corn; but fresh beef and buffalo meat were cheap. "Wine made here" had a market value of nearly five dollars a gallon.†

On Christmas, Hamilton sent off an express to "Mr. [John] Stuart, the agent of Indian affairs to the Southward," with a letter informing him of the good disposition of the Indians at the north and asking those of the south to act vigorously the ensuing spring; also with belts for the Chickasaws and Cherokees, proposing a meeting with them in the Spring, at Vincennes or at the Tennessee river, the object of which was, to reconcile the Southern Indians with the Shawanese and other Northern nations, and to concert a general invasion of the "rebel" frontiers; which invasion had not been mapped out by him when he left Detroit, although there was a prospect at that time of uniting the Western and Southern Indians and engaging them to act in concert against the Americans — but on what lines was only the remotest conjecture.‡ What prompted the sending of this express was, a report he had just received that four hundred Shawanese, Delawares, Ottawas and Cherokees were then assembled at the mouth of the Tennessee with design to intercept "rebel" boats passing and repassing the

* Appendix, Note LXXIV.

† Id.

‡ Alexander McKee to Haldimand, July 16, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

Ohio.* But he soon learned what confidence was to be placed, as a general thing, in Indian accounts.

Hamilton had, previously, sent out scouts towards Kaskaskia; these now brought in two prisoners from the Illinois, who gave information that no boats had lately arrived from New Orleans; that the "rebels" did not exceed eighty at Kaskaskia, or thirty at Cahokia; that there had been a recent arrival of Pottawattamies at the Illinois; and that there was no discipline among the "rebel" soldiers enforced. Prompted by this information, doubtless, the Lieutenant-Governor at once sent two Pottawattamie chiefs of Detroit on a mission to those of their tribe just mentioned. The two savages promised they would return as soon as they could execute their orders.†

The Lieutenant-Governor informed his superior officer that Captain Helm remained at Vincennes on his parole and would not leave until it could be known if the Governor of Virginia would permit his exchange for Rocheblave then supposed to be in Williamsburg. He suggested to General Haldimand that "the arrival of a reinforcement of troops from Detroit early in the Spring," would enable him to send home the volunteer militia who accompanied him only for the campaign.‡

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.; and same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. This last-mentioned "design" was exactly in accordance with Haldimand's views as expressed in his letter to Hamilton of the 26th of August previous. It did not contemplate a "general invasion of the rebel frontiers."

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 28-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. "He [Hamilton] mentions a reinforcement next

Hamilton again called the attention of the Commander-in-chief to De Celoron, declaring him unfit to remain as commandant at Wea; — "his pusillanimity drove him four hundred miles from his post; and he never waited to have certain accounts verified, but forged such as his fears or credulity suggested."*

A barrack of logs and boards capable of receiving fifty men was the first thing built for the soldiers. Two companies at once moved in, while the residue of the troops remained tented in the fort, until lodgings could be prepared for them. A well was commenced and a magazine for powder soon finished.

"This day" (Hamilton was writing on the twenty-seventh of December) "two Delawares came in, who heard the morning and evening gun, as they say, at the distance of three days' march."† "They say belts are gone," continues the Lieutenant-Governor, "from the Chickasaws and Cherokees to the Shawanese and Delawares asking them to forget former quarrels and to unite against the Virginians. The messengers are expected to be here in a few days. These Delawares

Spring from Detroit, but does not mention what number he wants, neither if he has ordered said reinforcement, or if the Commander-in-chief is to order it." — Haldimand's *Remarks on Lieut. Gov. Hamilton's Letter*: Haldimand MSS.

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. "He [Hamilton] thinks De Celoron unfit to remain commandant at Ouiatanon [Wea], as if he was there again, which he ought to mention, but says he left it in a fright and went 400 miles from it" — Haldimand: *Remarks on Lieut. Gov. Hamilton's Letter*.

† "He [Hamilton] speaks . . . of Indians who arrived and told they had heard a morning and evening gun three days' march off. If it is his, he must have a great deal of powder to waste during the winter." — Haldimand.

confirm the accounts of a number of Shawanese, Ottawas, Chickasaws and Cherokees being assembled at the Tennessee river. They add that some one employed for his Majesty has invited all the Southern nations to convene at the same place next Spring to come to Vincennes to drive out the rebels and their friends; that the people now there were to intercept the rebel boats on the Ohio and Mississippi; and the rebels were dispossessed lately of a settlement of the river last mentioned by the English."

On the same day, the British commander continued his letter to the Commander-in-chief:

"This day a party of Kickapoos went to war toward Kaskaskia. This makes me easy as to the Indians of this [the Wabash] river, who will follow implicitly the example of the Kickapoos — the most warlike and cruel of them all." But the going "to war toward Kaskaskia" by no means implied that Hamilton had authorized the savages to attack any of the creoles of the Illinois villages; on the contrary he had given express orders that none should be killed. They might be taken prisoners and brought to him; that was all. But any Virginians might be tomahawked and scalped that could be found. As a consequence of these instructions by the Lieutenant-Governor, the garrisons under Clark were in reality in little or no danger from the Indians going from Vincennes as they would almost certainly be discovered by the inhabitants of the towns if attempting to approach near to either of them.

"As I had engaged the volunteer militia of Detroit for the campaign," wrote the Lieutenant-Governor, "they were . . . advertised that they would

be allowed to return with twenty days' pay from the date of their discharge."* The truth was, Captain McLeod's men, also Captain Maisonville's, had nearly all began to murmur and complain;—they "had testified so much uneasiness and willingness to remain," are Hamilton's words, "that I chose to send them away rather than keep them against their inclination." All of the two companies returned to Detroit except five privates, the major, one captain, one lieutenant, the surgeon and boatmaster.

"Several persons," the Lieutenant-Governor wrote, "who had been on pay as partisans with the Indians I believe fomented this discontent, which I attributed to their surmizing that France would join the Americans." "These people," adds the commander, "I discharged and sent away." There were four lieutenants and one commissioner of provisions, of those he thus gladly permitted to return to their homes.

Two hundred and fifty of the militia of Vincennes made their appearance on the same day of the departure of the Detroit militia, under arms, with their officers. All of them had previously taken the oath of allegiance and renounced their late connection with the "rebels." "They are, of course, pardoned," wrote Hamilton. "I hope your Excellency," he added in his remarks to General Haldimand, "will approve of this act of oblivion. If a sense of interest can move them, they will adhere to it. As to courage, honor, or gratitude, if they were of the growth of this soil, it would have been exhibited on the occasion of a handful of rebels coming to take away the possessions of three

* Appendix, Note LXXV.

hundred men used to arms as hunters and to the mildest government under heaven."

"It will be a great satisfaction to me," are the further words of the commander to Haldimand, "to have your Excellency's orders, and as soon as possible, to resign to the person you shall send to command here"* — Hamilton being satisfied that the prestige or interests of Britain could only be maintained in Vincennes by military force.

Hamilton ended his lengthy letter to the commander-in-chief by giving him information on a number of subjects:

"I have taken up all the spirituous liquors in the place, which is better, surely, for the good behavior of the inhabitants. . . .

"Tomorrow [he was still writing on the twenty-seventh] I shall destroy two billiard tables, the sources of immorality and dissipation in such a settlement.

"Could I catch the priest — Mr. Gibault — who has blown the trumpet of rebellion for the Americans, I should send him down unhurt to your Excellency, to get the reward of his zeal.

"The Pottawattamies whom I sent towards Kaskaskia are returned; 'the waters being out,' as they say, prevented their progress. They brought in a Frenchman, prisoner, who had nothing new to tell.

"Several chiefs and warriors are returned to their villages seemingly well satisfied, and have promised to return if it should be necessary. The diminution of our numbers is a necessary step as the consumption of provisions during their stay is very considerable.†

* Id.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 18-30, 1778. — Haldimand MSS. "Vincennes, Dec. 30th, 1778, the express sets out."

The general plan devised by Hamilton to be carried out in strengthening Fort Sackville was, at the suggestion of Major Hay, soon changed. The fortification was to be left in a square form with a blockhouse to be erected at the northwest angle and one at the opposite angle, each commanding two sides of the square, — the small salient angle in each face of the square to be removed. This proposition, if carried out, it was believed would reduce the expense considerably and make the fort capable of being more easily defended with a small force. The block houses were to be musket proof, and each to have five forts. In them, were to be mounted the three-pounders found in the fort when surrendered by Captain Helm. The other angles were to be loop-holed and lined, having platforms for musketry. The work, as thus finally determined upon, was carried forward with considerable rapidity.

The information received by the Lieutenant-Governor concerning the assembling of the Southern Indians at the Tennessee river was by no means lost sight of by that officer. By a careful comparison of all reports which had reached him, he was able to understand clearly the design of these savages. They were to make four several parties for the ensuing spring: one to go towards Kaskaskia to attack the "rebels" there; another to go up the Ohio to assist the Shawanese; a third to go to the Vincennes to make peace with the Wabash Indians and drive the Amer-

are the last words of the Lieutenant Governor's letter. Singularly enough, Haldimand did not comprehend the meaning of the words — "the waters being out" — made use of by the Indians to convey the idea of the overflow of the streams and consequent inundation of the country.

icans out of their country (they not knowing of Hamilton's presence there at the time), and the fourth to remain at the mouth of the Tennessee river to intercept any boats coming up from the Mississippi or going down the Ohio. The nations reported to the commander as having formed this plan were the Chickasaws, Cherokees, Choctaws and Alabamas.* It was also reported that they were to start out during the month of January, having with them four white officers, who have spent the winter thus far, on the Tennessee.

Hamilton, of course, was much elated at the news. He had already detached from his force an officer with thirty soldiers, also a party of savages with a chief, to go to the Tennessee river to acquaint the savages assembled there of his being in possession of Vincennes and to encourage them to persevere in their designs against the "rebels." At the mouth of the Wabash, they were met by some Delawares and Peorias who had lately come from the Tennessee, who informed them that the Indians were dispersed, hunting three hundred miles up that river.† Thereupon the officer and white soldiers, after losing a corporal and seven

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-28, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXVI.)

† These savages, for certain reasons hereafter mentioned, did not meet subsequently at the mouth of the Tennessee. It may be premised that whatever action was taken by the British because of the letter sent south by Hamilton, to Stuart, British agent of Indian Affairs, nothing to the injury of the Americans came of it. It has been asserted that stores and goods to a large amount (£20,000) were soon collected at the Chickamauga Indian towns, on the Tennessee, for distribution at the grand council to be had with Hamilton and the Northern Indians; but this is now known to be error.

men by desertion, and capturing some Frenchmen, in a boat loaded with flour on its way from Kaskaskia to Vincennes, returned up the Wabash, informing Hamilton that the deserters, who were all from Lamothe's company, went off in the night, taking the canoe and their officer's baggage with them; and that they had probably gone to Kaskaskia, where some of them had relatives. But the Indians with the chief (an Ottawa) did not at once return to Vincennes. They determined upon "a *decouverte*," as Hamilton expresses it, to Kaskaskia. With this war-party were Charles Beaubien, interpreter to the Miami Indians and Hypolite Boulon who had reached the mouth of the Wabash on their way to Kaskaskia or its vicinity. Hamilton had intrusted to them written messages and letters to the inhabitants of the Illinois,* to be delivered should circumstances be found favorable for so doing; hence their desire to go with the Ottawa chief on his "*decouverte*" to Kaskaskia. Now, there was one message — a copy of a written proclamation — intrusted to Beaubien, directed to the people of the Illinois generally, that was intended to work upon their fears, but which proved, as the sequel shows, far-reaching in its effect for evil — not upon the Illinois people, but upon Hamilton himself. He gave in detail a list of savage nations whom he declared were already leagued with him to wage war on the frontiers.†

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† But if you will be so good as to recur to the address of [Hamilton to the people of] the Illinois, which you refer to, you will find that although it does not in express terms threaten vengeance, blood and massacre, yet it proves that the Governor [Hamilton] had made for us the most ample provision for all these calamities. He then gives in detail, the

The war party of savages from the mouth of the Wabash were not successful in its march against Kaskaskia. "The Indian chief," wrote Hamilton, "who is not yet returned from Kaskaskia, had nearly taken prisoner Colonel Clark, the commandant of the rebels there, but some negroes discovered the chief and he was obliged to retire without effecting his purpose.* But further mention of this expedition is hereafter made.

There were other matters besides repairing Fort Sackville and attending to Indian reports which engaged the earnest attention of Hamilton. One was the attitude of the Spanish towards the English on the Mississippi. The aid given by the former to the "rebels" at New Orleans and the sympathy extended to them (if nothing more) at Ste. Genevieve and St. Louis were well understood by the Lieutenant-Governor even before his leaving Detroit and additional facts had now reached him from the disclosures of prisoners which gave him much uneasiness. He resolved, after giving the subject much thought to write two letters: one to Captain Bloomer, the English commandant at the Natches, whose principal business was to intercept succour from New Orleans to the "rebels;"

horrid catalogue of savage nations, extending from south to north, whom he had leagued with himself to wage combined war on our frontiers; and it is well known that the war would, of course, be made up of blood and general massacre of men, women and children." — (Jefferson to the Governor of Detroit — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 322.)

As this proclamation was dated Dec. 29, 1778, the sending of the force intended for the Tennessee, could not have been much, if any, later than that date.

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-30th, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

and one to the Spanish governor of the place last mentioned. As he had some suspicion what he wrote to Captain Bloomer might be carried to Governor Galvez, he wrote, he declares in such a manner "as must dispose the Spaniards (if it should chance to fall into their hands) to keep close at home."

"Though I have no doubt at this minute," said Hamilton in conveying the foregoing intelligence to the commander-in-chief, "of the existence of a Spanish as well as a French war, still I have as yet no account by which I may venture to act on the offensive against the subjects of Spain, which I ardently desire, as there would be so little difficulty in pushing them entirely out of the Mississippi. They have had but one boat from New Orleans this autumn and that loaded with liquor. The garrisons in their posts are inconsiderable and our alliance with the Indian nations so extended that the Spaniards can have but a slender influence with them. The rebels have had every succour and encouragement from them they could expect; and I believe their hatred and jealousy of the English nothing abated since their disgraceful check at the Havana."*

"Mr. Le Comte having desired permission to pass to New Orleans," said Hamilton, in his letter to Governor Galvez, "I embrace the opportunity of kissing your Excellency's hands and at the same time of acquainting you with the circumstance which procures me that honor. The rebel Americans having got footing in the Illinois country, and having opened communication to the colonies by taking post there and

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-30, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

at this place, I thought it my duty to dispossess them as soon as possible. For this I set out with a small force from Detroit so late as the seventh of last October and arrived here on the seventeenth of December, having a few chiefs and warriors of thirteen different nations along with me. Having taken possession of the fort here and having received the submission of the inhabitants, who laid down their arms and swore allegiance to his Britannic Majesty, I have contented myself this winter with sending out parties to different quarters."

"Your Excellency," continued the Lieutenant-Governor, "cannot be unacquainted with what was commonly practiced in the time of your predecessor in the government of New Orleans, — I mean the sending supplies of gunpowder and other stores to the rebels then in arms against their sovereign. Though this may have been transacted in a manner unknown to the governor, by the merchants, I must suppose that, under your Excellency's orders, such commerce will be positively prohibited. The several nations of savages who accompanied me to this country may, if this traffic be continued, forget the instructions I have given them from time to time with relation to the subjects of his Catholic Majesty; and the nations inhabiting the banks of the Ohio river must be particularly jealous of strangers coming through their country to supply the rebels, with whom they are actually at war."

"At the same time," added the commander, "that I mention this to your Excellency for the sake of individuals who might suffer from their ignorance of the English being in possession of this post and of the communication by water to the Mississippi, — I think

it incumbent on me to represent to your Excellency that the rebels at Kaskaskia being in daily apprehension of the arrival of a body of men from the upper posts accompanied by the savages from that quarter, have declared that they will take refuge on the Spanish territory as soon as they are apprized of their coming."

"As it is my intention," are the concluding words of Hamilton, "early in the spring to go towards the Illinois, I shall represent to the officers commanding several small forts and posts on the Mississippi for his Catholic Majesty, the impropriety of affording an asylum to rebels in arms against their lawful sovereign. If, after such a representation, the rebels should find shelter in any fort or post on the Mississippi, it will become my duty to dislodge them, in which case their protectors must blame their own conduct, if they should suffer any inconvenience in consequence.—Perhaps I may be favored with a letter from your Excellency before the arrival of the reinforcements I expect next spring; and that the officers acting under your Excellency's orders may receive from you how they are to act — whether as friends or enemies to the British empire."*

Strengthening Fort Sackville was continued by Hamilton, his attention being especially directed to the finishing of the blockhouses, which were being built of squared oak logs. Indian war-parties continued to be sent out towards the Kentucky settlements and to watch the road to the Illinois. As the month of January was wearing away, the Lieutenant-Governor became anxious as to his situation. "I impatiently wait your Excellency's orders and instructions," are his

* Hamilton to Galvez, Jan. 13, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

words to the Commander-in-Chief; "and I hope to see a few troops here,—without them, most certainly there will be no hold on the French or Indians and nothing can be done of what ought to be against the Americans."*

The commander determined that as soon as the season would permit, he would send up to the head of the Maumee for the provisions which had been received there in November previous from Detroit,—sent forward by Captain Lernoult not a great while after the departure of Hamilton. "Vincennes," wrote the Lieutenant-Governor, "is incapable of furnishing a quantity, and everything is so intolerably dear that I am afraid of incurring more expense than I can possibly avoid. Our men off duty, go over the river for wood, but cannot cut enough for their consumption, so that it is purchased from the inhabitants at two dollars for four-fifths of a cord."

"Lieutenant Du Vernet," added the commander, "has desired leave to return to Detroit. I could wish to detain him, but he urges it; and, as he came thus far voluntarily, I do not choose to insist on his remaining."†

In his own room on Fort Sackville, the commander, on the twenty-sixth of January, held a council with his Indian allies and with others who now seemed inclined, to all outward appearance, to become such. There were present Shawanese, Ottawas, Chippewas, Wyandots (Hurons), Miamis, Piankeshaws, Kickapoos, Weas, Delawares and a man from the Creek nation.

* Same to Haldimand, Jan. 24-30, 1779.—Haldimand MSS.

† Id.

An Ottawa chief opened the proceedings. Rising to his feet, he saluted "the British King, the great chief at Quebec [General Haldimand], the Lieutenant-Governor of Detroit, all the King's subjects, and the several nations of Indians," — all in the name of the chiefs then present. He then addressed himself to the Shawanese and Delawares, in particular, exhorting them to exert themselves and be firm in their attachment to their father [Hamilton] and all the Indians his children. "It is the pleasure," said this Indian orator, "of the Great Spirit that we should all meet this day in friendship. Let us then continue in these good dispositions and be of one heart and mind in acting in concert with our father for the defence of our lands. You see our father has it at heart, since he is come thus far with that design. You have seen the attempts of the Virginians to dispossess us."

And thus continued the Ottawa chief: "Brethren! You know that the great tree under whose shade we consult together is not planted here, but at Detroit. Let us take care to prop that tree that it may not lean to one side or the other. Let us keep it well watered that its branches may shoot up to the clouds. Who is there so daring as to cut the bark of that tree? No one.

"Brethren! You may remember that last spring some Chickasaws and Cherokees came to Detroit to water that tree. Be advised by our father; he is doing all he can to maintain us in the possession of those lands on which the Master of Life has thought to place us."

A Shawanese then spoke. "Father and you my brethren! Five months are now passed since we left

our own village to go to the Creek country, whence we are just returned. On our leaving this place, the commandant of the fort [Captain Helm] gave us a letter for the chief of the Creeks; but, as we apprehended it might contain something which would make the Indians uneasy, we did not deliver it, but have brought it to our father sealed. We met on our road hither, Kissingua and a white man [those that were sent to Mr. Stuart by Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton] on their way to that country. Kissingua desired us to tell the Indians of this [the Wabash] river to assemble all the prisoners they may have belonging to the Creeks, as he designed bringing in exchange any of them which might be in that country."

The Shawanese then delivered the letter to the Lieutenant-Governor, which was addressed to the chief man of the Creeks, requiring him to keep his people quiet and not to give credit to what he should be told by the English; and that the Shawanese and Wabash Indians were in friendship with the Virginians, and referring him to the bearers for an account of the state of affairs in America.

The same Shawanese then produced a long, white belt, sent by the great chief of the Creeks, which he had desired might be delivered at Vincennes; then sent up to Wea; and thence to the Lake Indians; that all the Indians might know the design of the Creeks, namely: to be in friendship with them and at war with the Virginians; that, by that belt they opened a road which should be kept free and open so that a child might walk safely in it. He then delivered to the Grande Couette, the principal Piankeshaw war chief, a roll of Creek tobacco for him and his al-

lies to smoke, adding in the name of the Creek chief, that he smoked of that tobacco when he thought on good things, and had pity on his women and children.

The Shawanese then told the chiefs present that the upper town of the Creeks had not taken up the hatchet against the Virginians till the last Spring, but that now they were all joined; that they had ravaged the frontiers as far as the old Shawanese villages; that they had taken several small forts; that the English had eight forts besides a great one of stone (perhaps meaning the one at St. Augustine); that the "rebels" had made an attempt on that one, but that the Indians had assembled and forced them back; that eight hundred of the inhabitants of the Colonies had come for protection to the English, almost naked; that they had quarreled among each other and several had been killed; that the Indians were taken great care of by Mr. Stuart, the Indian agent; that they wanted for nothing, having never before been so well supplied; and that the "rebels" said they were not alone — the French and the Spaniards having joined them.*

Three days thereafter, the Grande Couette, a Piankeshaw chief, delivered to Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton a string with a scalp hanging to it, and said that he spoke in the name of all the Wabash Indians, who had now found their father; that they had received his hatchet and would use it with all their hearts; that they saw with pleasure the messengers from the Creeks, Choctaws and Chickasaws, and the belt which they brought would open the eyes of all their people, men, women and children, who might

* Substance of a Conference with the Indians at Vincennes, Jan. 26, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

now see an open sky and a clear road; that the Great Spirit certainly had compassion on the Indians as he had brought them together in peace; that he (the Piankeshaw chief) would acquaint the Wabash Indians of the treaty of peace presented by the Southern Indians; and, that it might be known to the northward, he delivered their road belt to the Miamis. The Miamis said they would deliver it to their elders, the Ottawas, who would forward it. The string with the scalp was then delivered by Hamilton to the Chippewas to carry to Detroit to be shown to the Lake Indians.*

On the twenty-sixth of January, Hamilton wrote the commander-in-chief that almost all the Indians were gone to their home or were on the point of moving off. The most of them, he declared, promised to return to Vincennes soon or send others in their room. "It is remarkable," said the Lieutenant-Governor, "that not a man has died of either whites or Indians since our setting out [from Detroit], which circumstance has great weight with superstitious people such as these are [under my command]."

"Your Excellency will pardon me," continued Hamilton, "if I mention the necessity of a supply of arms, ammunition and clothing sufficient for keeping in their present disposition such a number of Indians as we wish to have dependent on us and of course cannot be clothed, armed or fed but at a very great expense. I have it not in my power, as yet, to procure an estimate of the numbers which will make their applications at this place; but I am humbly of opinion no

* Hamilton's *Report*, Jan. 29, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix, Note LXXVII.)

time should be lost in sending them from below, as the passage of the Miami river [Maumee] is very precarious even in May, from the scarcity of water, which is so great sometimes as not to admit of pirogues.

“However inconvenient and disagreeable my staying at this place may be, I shall content myself as long as your Excellency may judge it necessary or in any way conducive to the service; and if there should be a call for my going further on this communication, I shall always be ready to act for the best.”

The next day Hamilton continued his relation: “The Ottawas,” said he, “came to me this day with their chiefs, who told me they were determined to stay with me and go wherever I should order them; and that if I meant to go to Kaskaskia, they would go also.

“The Chippewas almost all go home; but they tell me I may expect a number of them in the spring.

“The Hurons [Wyandots] also go home; but they promise to give such an account of their treatment and of what has passed as will induce their people to come this way in the spring.

“The Shawanese are inveterate against the Virginians. A party of them sets off to-morrow towards the Falls of the Ohio, which river they purpose crossing.

“The Delawares [or Loupes] hereabouts have lost some relations lately killed by the Virginians. One of them has a rebel passport which he makes use of to get through the settlement.

“The Wabash Indians are to be expected to act only from the motive of fear of the other confederate Indians — not having the spirit of either the Southern or Northern nations. Their situation makes them

apprehensive of another visit from the Virginians. Nothing but a force sufficient to protect them will engage them to act steadily.”*

Major Hay, as Deputy Indian Agent, had assiduously applied himself to the duties of his office since his arrival in Vincennes. Before the ending of January, he wrote to the Agent at Niagara: “We are,” said he, “at so great a distance from one another at present that it is impossible to communicate Indian intelligence so often as formerly. You have, however, been informed of everything of consequence (if anything there was) until our arrival here. It was high time some measures were taken to calm the minds of the nations in this country, and to turn the tide that was carrying them away from the interest of Government and consequently their own. They have not, however, shown the spirit or inclination to act that might have been wished; neither is there anything to be expected from them, but what the influence of other nations may prompt them to do . . . but, as there is now a communication opened between the Lake Indians and those of the Creeks and Alabamas, probably before the summer is over they will all act. The difficulties of transportation of provisions and other articles from Detroit hither is a great obstacle to the assembling the numbers that we might easily collect. A

* Hamilton to Haldimand, January 24-30, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. “The several nations of Indians inhabiting the banks of the Ouabache [Wabash], came in at different times, made great professions, and declared their distrust of the Virginians; but there was but one chief with his party who really acted with zeal and spirit, although the Lake Indians showed them a very good example.” — Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

party of Shawanese, Delawares and Piankeshaws set out this day for the Falls of the Ohio, by which you see some of those of this place join the last."

"If the inhabitants of this place," continued Hay, "were as much to be depended on as are the Indians, something might be attempted at present from here; but there are a set that requires force to make them obedient and are consequently a dangerous set to be left in the least [to themselves] . . . The rebel commandant, Captain Helm, told me that, for these two summers past, the parties that went from Detroit and the Lakes prevented upwards of ten thousand men joining the rebel army. We have not heard from Detroit since the fourth of November; but I am in hopes of hearing not only from there, but from Niagara."*

Writing on the same day as Hay, the Lieutenant-Governor informed General Haldimand that he had first raised one of the blockhouses of the fort, and that a party (the same mentioned by the Deputy Indian Agent) had set off on a scout to the Falls of the Ohio—another of Pottawattamies and Chippewas to follow them shortly. "Lieutenant Duvermet tells me," are the words of Hamilton, in addition, "he shall have the draft of this river ready to send off to your Excellency in a week after his arrival at Detroit." It is to be presumed the Lieutenant soon left Vincennes.

* Hay to Butler, January 28, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. It is doubtful if any single remark made by any one could have been more unfortunate than this of Helm, so far as the cause of America was concerned in the West. To prevent men from joining the "rebel" army in the East was exactly what Germain was desirous of accomplishing by his barbarous policy, as Hay well knew.

The commandant informed the Commander-in-Chief on the thirtieth of January, that the next day, Adhemar St. Martin, the Commissary, would set out, with ten pirogues and thirty of the inhabitants of Vincennes as crews, for "the Miamis" (Fort Miami — head of the Maumee), to get the provisions and goods sent in November from Detroit.* And he added that a party of Piankeshaws on the day on which he writes "set off for war to the Falls of the Ohio. This day, also, a Peoria chief came to give me his hand. I gave him an English medal in exchange for his French one."

"I may venture to affirm," continued Hamilton, "that the Indians of this country are as much united as can be expected, considering the differences which have existed for several years among some of them and which are not easily accommodated."

"By the returns I have the honor to send to your Excellency of this garrison," added the Lieutenant-Governor, "it will appear that regulars are very few in numbers; and I need not observe how much I stand in need of the assistance of regular officers. I have such frequent interruptions from the savages, who have no

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-30, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. The provisions were those sent by Lernoult; the goods, those forwarded by Macomb. In his letter of July 6, 1781, the Lieutenant Governor simply says "thirty men" went with the Commissary.

In "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS., December (1778) is given as the month in which the boats were ordered to "Omi" (Fort Miami — head of the Maumee) by Hamilton, which, of course, is error. In the same, in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois* (p. 108), the month is stated to have been October (1778) — placing it still farther from the true date.

other council chamber but my bedroom, that I am sensible my letters testify to a great want of order and method.”*

On the seventh of February, Captain McKee started on his return to the homes of the Shawanese in the Ohio wilderness.* It was well, perhaps, for this traitor to America that he left Vincennes. His active working connection with the expedition was the first of a series of efforts made by him against his own country. Undoubtedly it was his intention to come back in the Spring to aid in the movement of uniting the Northern and Southern Indian nations. But his intention was not carried out.†

Hamilton continued his labors upon Fort Sackville, and by the twenty-second of February it was “in a tolerable state of defence,” the work proposed being finished, except the lining of the stockade.‡

On the same day, Boatmaster Francis Maisonville returned by way of the Wabash from an expedition in pursuit of Williams (one of the two who were taken while attempting to carry Helm’s letter to Clark at the time of the surrender of Fort Sackville) and another, who had escaped a week previous. Maisonville had been unsuccessful in finding these men, but he brought in two Virginian prisoners — Captain William Shannon and another — whom he had taken on the Ohio.

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-30, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. (For the “Return” the Lieutenant Governor speaks of, see Appendix, Note LXXVIII.)

† Normand McLeod to McKee, April 6, 1779, and McKee to Haldimand, July 16, same year. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. The last sentence — “except the lining of the stockade” — is omitted in this letter as published in the *Michigan Pioneer Collections*, vol. IX, p. 408.

They were of a party of four from Fort Pitt going to Kaskaskia. A packet of letters in their possession was also captured.*

On going into the fort, Maisonville immediately took Hamilton aside and informed him that he had discovered some miles below the town a number of fires;† but he could not say whether they were of Virginians or Indians. The Lieutenant-Governor immediately questioned the two prisoners, demanding of them if they could give him any further intelligence than what they had already communicated on their examination by the commandant. They declared they could not. Hamilton at once concluded the fires were those of Americans — some men from Kaskaskia coming to join Captain Helm at the fort, they not knowing of the presence there of any of the King's troops.‡ However, he would, if possible, be assured that such

* *Account brought [into Detroit] from Vincennes, by Captain [Isidore] Chesne.* — Haldimand MSS.; *Journal of Colonel George Rogers Clark*, from Feb. 23, to Feb. 27, 1779, inclusive. — Haldimand MSS.; Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.. *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 70, 102; — "Bowman's Journal," Department of State MSS.

† "Nine miles below the town": Schieffelin's *Loose Notes*. "Four leagues below the fort:" Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS. "About six miles:" Chêsne's *Account*. Schieffelin, in his *Loose Notes*, says, "a number of fires was seen;" in his letter to Haldimand, just cited, Hamilton enumerates fourteen. Chêsne gives fifteen as the number.

‡ Chêsne's *Account*. Clark says Hamilton "supposed [the makers of the fires] to be spies from Kentucky." (Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 70.) This, however, is not probable; I have relied, rather, on the statement of Chêsne.

was the fact; so he immediately sent off Captain Lamothe, Lieutenant Schieffelin and twenty men to reconnoitre, hoping they would be able to bring him a more perfect account than the one he had obtained from Maisonville. As the water of the river was overflowing its banks the meadows were all submerged; and it was necessary for the party to make a considerable circuit. Maisonville, although much fatigued, took it upon himself to serve as guide.*

Hamilton now ordered the militia of Vincennes under arms. Major Legras and Captain Bosseron with several of the privates being reported absent, the commandant suspected treachery; the two officers, however, made their appearance at sunset. About five minutes after candles had been lighted, the garrison was alarmed by hearing a discharge of musketry; presently, there was another discharge. The Lieutenant-Governor concluded that some party of Indians was returned, or that there was a riotous frolic in the village. However, he thought best to go out on the parade ground to make inquiry, when he heard the whistling of balls. Immediately all inside the fort were ordered to the blockhouses, with a command not to fire until they should perceive the shots were directed against the fortification. But Hamilton and his men were soon out of suspense — one of the sergeants receiving a bullet in his breast.† The fort was as-

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. In his *Loose Notes*, Lieutenant Schieffelin does not give the number sent off, but says: "A detachment of the VIIIth [regiment] and Detroit Volunteers was immediately dispatched to reconnoiter." Chêne confirms the number — twenty — given by Hamilton to Haldimand.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

sailed by enemies — that was evident; but who were the assailants? Presently, we shall see.

It is pertinent now, before following farther the events of interest transpiring in the Illinois and upon the Wabash, that a brief mention be made of a few of the more important incidents which, about this period, occurred to the eastward, on the upper waters of the Ohio.

From the Alleghany mountains to the Ohio, and, from a point some distance up the Alleghany river to the mouth of the Great Kanawha, is a region, which, from what has already been narrated, it is evident had been more or less exposed to savage aggressions ever since the time Indians west of the Ohio had, to any extent, become hostile. Not only Virginia and Pennsylvania, but the General Government also, had actively engaged in endeavors to protect the settlers, but with varying success. The sending of Brigadier General Hand of the Continental army to take command of the Western Department with headquarters at Fort Pitt, at the commencement of the summer of 1777, gave much confidence to the oppressed people. Scarcely, however, had Clark departed upon his expedition before the General was, at his own request, recalled, and Brigadier General Lachlan McIntosh sent to take the command at Pittsburg, where he arrived early in August, 1778.

In November, of the year last mentioned, McIntosh with a considerable force — the largest collected by the Americans west of the Alleghanies during the Revolution — moved westward, ostensibly against Detroit; but he marched no farther than the Tuscarawas river, principally because of a lack of sup-

plies ; and thence, after commencing Fort Laurens and leaving a small number of men to continue the work, he returned, with the residue of his army to Fort McIntosh — a post he had erected on the right bank of the Ohio, some distance below Fort Pitt. In April, 1779, McIntosh retired from the command of the Western Department, being succeeded by Colonel Daniel Brodhead, who had direction of military affairs therein until the fall of 1781.

CHAPTER XVI.

ARUMOR of Clark's success in the Illinois in the early part of July reached Williamsburg before the arrival of Montgomery with letters and dispatches from the Colonel. The rejoicing was great, but many discredited the report; "it was too good to be true." Finally, there was a confirmation of the news when the Captain reached the capital, having Rocheblave in charge and bringing full accounts from the Colonel himself.* Nothing so cheering had before been received from the Western country since the war began. Those who had been foremost in encouraging the expedition were especially jubilant.

"By dispatches which I have just received from Colonel Clark," wrote Governor Henry, "it appears that his success has equalled the most sanguine expectations. He has not only reduced Fort Chartres and its dependences [the Governor meaning the Illinois towns] but he has struck such terror into the Indian tribes, between that settlement and the lakes that no less than five of them . . . who had received the hatchet from the English emissaries, have submitted to our arms, given up all their English presents, and bound themselves by treating and promising to be peaceable in future."

* "Major [George] Rogers Clark, the conqueror of the Illinois, has sent in the late Governor of the British settlement there, a Frenchman by birth, who is now in this city upon his parole." — From Williamsburg, Virginia, November 20, 1778, in *Continental Journal* (No. 138).

“In order to improve and secure the advantages gained by Colonel Clark,” added the Governor, “I propose to support him with a reinforcement of militia. But this will depend upon the pleasure of the Assembly, to whose consideration the measure is submitted. The French inhabitants have manifested great zeal and attachment to our cause, and insist on the garrison remaining with them under Colonel Clark. This I am induced to agree to because the safety of our frontiers as well as that of these people, demands a compliance with the request.”*

The request by Governor Henry that the Virginia Assembly authorize him to support Clark in the Illinois by a reinforcement “to improve and secure the advantages” the Colonel had gained, followed as it was by their empowering him with the advice of the Council, forthwith to raise either by voluntary enlistment or detachments from the militia, five hundred men for that purpose, induced the Executive of the State at once to take steps to enlist for the service five companies of one hundred men each—as this plan was preferred to the calling out of militia.

The cheerful news of Clark’s success had its immediate effect upon the Virginia legislators. They would not let the opportunity slip, of expressing their gratification to the Colonel and his officers and men at the bravery displayed by them. Thus it was that, by an unanimous vote, the House of Delegates put upon record their thanks on the twenty-third of November:

* Governor Henry to the Virginia Delegates in Congress, Nov. 14, 1778. The letter is printed in full in Tyler’s *Patrick Henry*, pp. 230, 231; also in Butler’s *Kentucky* (Id. ed.), p. 532; and in Henry’s *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, pp. 200, 201.

"Whereas, authentic information has been received that Lieutenant Colonel George Rogers Clark, with a body of Virginia militia, has reduced the British posts in the western part of this Commonwealth, on the river Mississippi and its branches, whereby great advantage may accrue to the common cause of America, as well as to this Commonwealth in particular;

"*Resolved*, That the thanks of this House are justly due to the said Colonel Clark and the brave officers and men under his command, for their extraordinary resolution and perseverance in so hazardous an enterprise, and for the important services thereby rendered their country."*

But there was another action taken by the legislators of Virginia. The inhabitants of the Illinois and upon the Wabash had shown a proper regard for this State, and had taken the necessary oath, thereby becoming citizens of the Commonwealth; and why, considering their isolated condition, should they not at once be accorded to a county government, in all respects consonant with Virginia laws, as had before been granted to Virginians, south of the Ohio?

So the Virginia General Assembly passed an act that all the citizens of that commonwealth "who are already settled, or shall hereafter settle on the western side of the Ohio, shall be included in a distinct county, which shall be called Illinois county."† The forming of this county was followed by the appointment on the twelfth of December, of John Todd, Jr., a resident of Kentucky county, as county lieutenant.

* Butler's *Kentucky*, ed. of 1834, p. 396; — ed. of 1836, p. 490.

† Appendix, Note LXXIX.

Clark was now promoted to a full colonelcy.* Captain John Montgomery was made lieutenant colonel; and Captain Joseph Bowman was commissioned major: the first mentioned was given the title of "Commander-in-chief of the Virginia Troops in the County of Illinois." Montgomery was to recruit the five companies.

Instructions were now drawn up for Todd, Montgomery and Clark. The first mentioned was directed by Governor Henry "to give particular attention to Colonel Clark and his corps, to whom the State has great obligations. You are to coöperate with him on any military undertaking when necessary, and to give the military every aid which the circumstances of the people will admit of. The inhabitants of the Illinois must not expect settled peace and safety while their and our enemies have footing at Detroit and can intercept or stop the trade of the Mississippi. If the English have not the strength or courage to come to war against us themselves, their practice has been and will be to hire the savages to commit murders and depredations. Illinois must expect to pay in these a large price for her freedom unless the English can be expelled from Detroit. The means for effecting this will not perhaps be found in your or Colonel Clark's power, but the French inhabiting the neighborhood of that place, it is presumed, may be brought to see it done with indifference or perhaps join in the enter-

* Clark's commission I have not found. There can be no doubt of its having been issued as Montgomery was made lieutenant colonel under him, and Governor Henry addressed him, in his official instructions and letter (as will now be seen), by his new title; whereas, previously, he was officially designated as lieutenant colonel.

prise with pleasure. This is but conjective. When you are on the spot, you and Colonel Clark may discover its fallacy, or reality if the former appears. Defense only is to be the object. If the latter, or a good prospect of it, I hope the Frenchmen and Indians at your disposal will show a zeal for the affair equal to the benefits to be derived from establishing liberty and permanent peace.

“One great good expected from holding the Illinois is to overawe the Indians from warring on our settlers on this side of the Ohio. A close attention to the disposition, character, and movements of the hostile tribes is therefore necessary for you. The forces [of Clark] and militia at Illinois, by being placed on the back of them may inflict timely chastisement on these enemies, whose towns are an easy prey in absence of their warriors.

“You perceive by these words that something in the military line may be expected from you. So far as the occasion calls for the assistance of the people composing the militia, it will be necessary to coöperate with the troops sent from here; and I know of no better general direction to give than this, that you consider yourself at the head of the civil department and as such having the command of the militia, who are not to be under the command of the military until ordered out by the civil authority, and to act in conjunction with them.”

Colonel Todd was also given additional instructions, — such as seemed necessary, by the Executive, to fully organize the new county.

Upon one subject of private concern, the Governor said: “Mr. Rocheblave’s wife and family must not

suffer for want of that property of which they were bereft by our troops. It is to be restored to them if possible. If this cannot be done the public must support them.”*

The instructions issued to Colonel Montgomery by the Virginia Governor were in effect that he was “forthwith to put on foot the recruiting of men to reinforce Colonel Clark at the Illinois and to push it on with all possible expedition.” As soon as the number of one hundred could be collected, they were to be sent on under proper officers. If the number should be thought too small to go in safety, more were to be added until Montgomery should judge the number large enough to resist any attacks that might be expected from the Indians. “You will,” said Governor Henry, “cause the proper vessels for transporting the troops down the Chewkee [Tennessee] river to be built and ready before they are wanted. Let no time be lost in doing that. Mr: James Buchanan you must direct to lay in the provisions necessary. You will get powder and flints from Colonel Fleming’s, and lead from the mines, sufficient for the use of the parties on their march.”

Blank commissions for the officers of five companies were delivered to Montgomery, to be filled up as the numbers of men they should recruit would entitle them as to date and rank. If any officer who should be entrusted to recruit should fail to enlist and produce his quota in a reasonable time, such as the exigence and pressing necessity to relieve and secure the Illinois country required,—in that case the offi-

* The instructions given to Todd by Governor Henry, are printed in full from the original, in Mason’s *Early Chicago and Illinois*, pp. 289-294.

cer so failing was to give up the men he had enlisted together with his recruiting instructions to the Colonel or such other person as Montgomery might appoint to succeed him; and if the person to succeed the first one should also fail, another was to be named, and so on until every quota was filled, or so nearly filled as to be fit to march. "You are," said Governor Henry to the Colonel, "to take especial care to appoint men proper to be officers; and as this matter, from necessity of the case, is entrusted to you, an improper appointment will reflect great dishonor upon you."

As soon as Colonel Montgomery succeeded sufficiently in the recruiting business to justify it, he was instructed that he was to go to the Illinois and join Colonel Clark. The Virginia Governor urged the utmost dispatch. "Our party," said he, "at Illinois may be lost, together with the present favorable disposition of the French and Indians there, unless every moment is improved for their preservation; and no future opportunity, if the present is lost, can ever be expected so favorable to the interest of the Commonwealth. I therefore urge it on you to exert yourself to the utmost to lose not a moment to forward the great work you have in hand and to conquer every difficulty in your way arising from an inclement season, great distances, wants of many necessaries, opposition from enemies, and others I cannot enumerate but must confide in your virtue to guard against and surmount."

Captain Isaac Shelby was desired by Governor Henry to prepare the boats; but if he could not do it, other persons were to be engaged. Montgomery was to receive ten thousand pounds cash for Colonel Clark's

corps; which were to be delivered to him, except two hundred pounds for Captain Shelby with which to build the boats and for what other incidental expenses might happen necessarily on the way out.*

On the same day of the issuing of the instructions to Colonel Montgomery, others were signed to be sent to Colonel Clark:

“You are to retain,” said the Governor, “the command of the troops now at the several posts in the county of Illinois and [which posts, with those] on the Wabash . . . fall within the limits of the county now erected and called ‘Illinois County,’—which troops marched out with and have been embodied by you. You are also to take the command of five other companies raised under the act of Assembly which I send herewith, and which if completed, as I hope they will be speedily, will have orders to join you without loss of time, and are likewise to be under your command. With your whole force, you are to protect the inhabitants of the county [of Illinois], and, as occasion may serve, annoy the enemy.”

It was thought by the Virginia Executive that by the adoption of proper measures on part of Clark, the Indian nations might be overawed and inclined to peace with the Americans; or, if that could not be effected, that such of them as send out parties towards the Virginia frontiers on the east and south of the Ohio, might be chastised by detachments sent from the Illinois. For this purpose, he thought it would behoove the Colonel to watch their motions, and to consider that one great advantage expected from the

* Gov. Henry to Lieut. Col. John Montgomery, Dec. 12, 1778. — Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, pp. 216–218.

American commander at Kaskaskia was to prevent the Indians from attacking the exposed settlements of the Virginias. In order the more effectually to prevent this, Clark was authorized to establish such forts in different parts of the country as he might judge best for his troops to occupy.

"I consider your further success," continued Henry, in further instructing Clark, "as depending upon the good will and friendship of the Frenchmen and Indians who inhabit your part of the Commonwealth [of Virginia]. With their concurrence, great things may be accomplished. But their animosity will spoil the fair prospects which your past success have opened. You will therefore spare no pains to conciliate the affections of the French and Indians. Let them see and feel the advantages of being fellow citizens and freemen. Guard most carefully against every infringement of their property, particularly with respect to land, as our enemies have alarmed them as to that. Strict and even severe discipline with your soldiers may be essential to preserve from injury those whom they were sent to protect and conciliate. This is a great and capital matter, and I confide [in you] that you will never lose sight of it, or suffer your troops to injure any person without feeling the punishment due to the offence. The honor and interest of the State are deeply concerned in this, and the attachment of the French and Indians depends upon a due observance of it."

Governor Henry would send Clark copies of the act of Government and Bill of Rights, together with the French Alliance. These would serve to show as the Virginia Executive thought, the new friends in

the Illinois the ground upon which they were to stand, and the support to be expected from France. Equal liberty and happiness were the objects, to a participation of which, the Americans invited them. "Upon a fair presumption," said the Governor, "that the people about Detroit have similar inclinations with those at the Illinois and [upon the] Wabash, I think it possible that they may be brought to expel their British masters and become fellow citizens of a free state. I recommend this to your serious consideration, and to consult with some confidential persons on the subject. Perhaps Mr. Gibault, the priest (to whom this country owes many thanks for his zeal and services), may promote this affair. But I refer it to you to select the proper persons to advise with, and to act as occasion offers. But you are to push at any favorable occurrences which fortune may present to you; for our peace and safety are not secure while the enemy are so near as Detroit."

It was the desire of Governor Henry that Clark should testify to all the subjects of Spain upon every occasion, the high regard and sincere friendship of Virginia towards them. He hoped it would soon be manifest that mutual advantages would be derived from the neighborhood of the Virginias and the subjects of his Catholic Majesty.

Henry did not fail to impress upon Clark the fact his situation was critical: "Far detached from the body of your country, placed among French, Spaniards, and Indian nations, strangers to our people, anxiously watching your actions and behavior, and ready to receive impressions favorable or not so, of our Commonwealth and its government, which im-

pressions will be hard to remove and will produce lasting good or ill effects to your country. These considerations will make you cautious and circumspect. I feel the delicacy and difficulty of your situation, but I doubt not your virtue will accomplish the arduous work with honor to yourself and advantage to the Commonwealth. The advice and assistance of discreet good men will be highly necessary; for, at the distance of your county, I cannot be consulted. General discretionary powers, therefore, are given you to act for the best in all cases where these instructions are silent and the law has made no provision."

The Virginia Executive called the particular attention of the Colonel to Mrs. Rocheblave and her children, that he should not suffer them to want for anything. He desired that Mr. Rocheblave's property, which was taken, be restored to his lady, so far as it could be done. "You have," he said, "the sum of sixty pounds sent for her use, in case you cannot find her husband's effects to restore;" none, however, could afterward be found; and the help she received from the State seems to have proved of little consequence to her, for in less than a year and a half thereafter, she wrote that she had not "even" the necessities of life."*

Prudence, the Governor declared, required that provisions should be laid in to subsist the troops under Clark's command and those expected to arrive to reinforce him. Colonel John Bowman, County Lieutenant of Kentucky County, had contracted to deliver thirty-five thousand pounds bear bacon at his county;

* Letter of "Marie Michel de Rocheblave," written at Kaskaskia March 27, 1780: from the Haldimand MSS.

but bread must be obtained in Illinois. Clark was to provide it, if possible, before the arrival of the troops or the necessity to purchase it became generally known, as perhaps advantages might be taken to raise the price. The Colonel was enjoined also to lay up a good stock of powder and lead.

The American commander was informed by the Governor that there was a cargo of goods at a Spanish post near him belonging either to the United States or Virginia. Rather than let his troops be naked, he could take a supply for them out of this cargo; but this was not to be done but in case of absolute necessity. An exact account must be kept of what might be used, which account should be sent to Governor Henry. Clark was likewise told that in his negotiations or treating with the Indians he would be assisted by Todd. He was enjoined to let the treaties be confined to the subject of amity and peace with Americans; he should not touch the subject of lands. He might accept of any services the savages might offer for expelling the English from Detroit or elsewhere. In the event presents were found necessary to give the Indians, he should make them as sparingly as possible, letting them know the Virginia stock of goods was then small, but by means of the trade with the French and other nations, it was expected there would be plenty of goods before long.

“Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery” were the concluding words of Governor Henry’s instructions, “will convey to you ten thousand pounds for payment of the troops, and for other matters requiring money. In the distribution of the money, you will be careful

to keep exact accounts from time to time, and take security where it is proper.”*

By a letter written by the Governor of Virginia on the first day of the year 1779, Colonel Clark was informed that the Virginia Assembly had directed his battalion to be completed, one hundred men to be stationed at the Falls of the Ohio, under Major Slaughter; and that one only of the additional battalions was to be filled. “Major Slaughter’s men,” said Henry, “are raised and will march in a few days.” The returns which had been made to the Governor were not sufficient for him to state confidently whether men enough had been raised to make up the additional battalion, but he supposed there were nearly enough. This battalion would march early in the spring as the weather would admit.

The Governor said to Clark that he knew of but two principal objects to engage his attention for his next summer’s operations: (1) an expedition against Detroit; or, (2) against those tribes of Indians between the Ohio and Illinois rivers, who had harrassed the Virginians constantly and whom experience had shown to be incapable of reconciliation.

“Removed at such a distance as we are,” are the concluding words of Henry, “and so imperfectly informed, it is impossible for us to prescribe to you. The defences at Detroit seem too great for small arms alone; and if that nest was destroyed, the English still have a tolerable channel of communication with the Northern Indians, by going from Montreal up the Ottawa river; on the other hand, the Shawanese,

* Gov. Henry to Col. G. R. Clark (Instructions), Dec. 12, 1778 — Henry’s *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, pp. 209-212.

Mingoes, Munsies, and the nearer Wyandots are troublesome thorns in our sides. However, we must leave it to yourself to decide on the object of the campaign; if against the Indians, the end proposed should be their extermination, or their removal beyond the lakes or Illinois river. The same world will scarcely do for them and us. I suppose it will be best for the new battalion to act with you all the summer, aided by a considerable part of Slaughter's men; and, in the fall, to fortify the ports we propose to take [to establish?] on the Ohio, and remain in them during the succeeding winter. The posts which have been thought of are, the mouth of Fishing or Little Kenawha, Great Kenawha, Scioto, Great Salt Lick, and Kentucky [river]. There being posts already at Pittsburgh, the mouth of Wheeling and the Falls of Ohio, these intermediate ones will form a chain from Pittsburgh to the Falls. I have then only to wish that your post [at Kaskaskia] was at the mouth of Ohio, which would complete the line."*

At the close of summer, Colonel Clark's conduct of public affairs had been so judicious that, so far as appearances were concerned, American rule seemed to be pretty firmly established not only in the Illinois

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, pp. 218, 219. That the Governor should have overlooked the fact of there being a post already established at the mouth of the Great Kanawha is strange indeed. To establish a post at the mouth of the Ohio, had been, for a considerable time, earnestly considered by Henry; and he had gone so far as to make certain propositions to the Spaniards suggesting if they would bring goods there in their own vessels one would be located at that point. (See Henry to Richard Henry Lee, Nov. 10, 1777. — Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 115.)

but upon the Wabash. He had let slip no opportunity in cultivating, in every quarter where there was the least appearance of future advantage, the growing interest of his country. His success had been as great as he had any good reason to expect. There was tranquility in the village of the white people, and among the savage tribes for many miles northward and eastward. It was this calm that gave him leisure to reflect seriously upon the conquest he had made — as perfect, it would seem, as it had been bloodless; but it was the calm before the storm. Patrick Henry's words to the Colonel — "I must observe to you that your situation is critical" — were almost prophetic.

The Colonel, after due consideration, became apprehensive that the British at Detroit, finding it hard to regain their lost interest among the savages, would make a descent on the Illinois. And the more readily would they undertake this should they learn with what a small force possession of the country was retained. Every precaution, then, was taken to keep the inhabitants in ignorance of the commander's real strength. Naturally, under such circumstances, there would be an exaggeration; and, as a matter of fact, the army was estimated, generally, at double its actual number. As it was of the utmost importance early to get particulars, should an undertaking be resolved upon by the enemy, spies were sent forward to watch any movement of an aggressive nature. They soon reported that Lieutenant Governor Hamilton was exerting himself to engage the savages to assist him in retaking the places which had fallen into the hands of Clark; and the latter wrote the Governor of Virginia concerning it: "General Hamilton of Detroit," said the

Colonel, "has of late been at great pains and expense to get a body of Indians to retake the Illinois; but above half the Indians that he had at his command has treated with me, and I believe the rest very willing to be quiet, except those towards Fort Pitt. In short, his officers among them have had success, as I often hear from them, having spies in the same towns. I think I shall keep his Excellency out of it [the Illinois] this year; as for the next, you are the best judge."*

Clark, it will be seen, felt too much at his ease. He was sure the favorable impression made on the Indians of the country of the lakes by the councils which had been held in the Illinois, and his sending messages of good will to many of those he had not seen, added to the influence of the French over all the nations, would make it difficult for the Lieutenant Governor to induce many to march under his command; besides expectations of reinforcements undoubtedly flattered the Colonel that, in any event, no great danger need be apprehended.†

Additional news was now brought to Clark. Hamilton was, in truth, on the march with a consider-

* Clark to Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia, Sept. 16, 1778. This letter is published in full in Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 194.

† Patrick Henry to Congressional Delegates of Virginia, Nov. 14, 1778. The following are the words of Governor Henry in relating what Clark had written him:

"The governor of that place [Detroit], M. Hamilton, was exerting himself to engage the savages to assist him in retaking the places that had fallen into our hands; but the favorable impression made on the Indians in general in that quarter, the influence of the French on them, and the reinforcement of militia Colonel Clark expected, flattered him that there was little danger to be apprehended."

able party, taking his route up the Maumee river. Surely, therefore, the Illinois must be his aim. But, in a few days the Colonel received certain intelligence that General McIntosh, who, as we have seen, was the successor of Brigadier General Hand in command of the Western Department, had left Fort Pitt for Detroit with a strong force.

This news was sent the Colonel by way of the Ohio river and the Mississippi; and it reached him in terms implying that it was his (McIntosh's) intention not to stop short of Detroit. The whole matter was, therefore, as the American commander thought, easily to be understood — Hamilton was marching against McIntosh.

It was the decided opinion entertained by Clark that Detroit could easily be taken: "knowing the weakness of the fortification of that post at that time, their numbers, etc., I made no doubt of it being shortly in our possession and that Governor Hamilton, sensible that there was no probability of his being able successfully to defend the fort, had marched with his whole force to encourage the Indians to harrass the General [McIntosh] on his way as the only probable plan to stop him; little thinking that he had returned, and that Mr. Hamilton had the same design on me that I supposed he had on General McIntosh."

"It being near Christmas," are the further words of Clark, "we feasted ourselves with the hopes of immediately hearing from Detroit, and began to think that we had been neglected in an express not being sent with the important news of its being ours."*

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 51.

But the American commander finally got some light. A young man at Cahokia was detected in holding a correspondence with "Governor Hamilton's party" and in sending intelligence to the enemy, and was "punished accordingly."* In the investigation, it was learned that General McIntosh had returned from the Tuscarawas and that Hamilton was marching really against the Illinois, although as to the latter, there was not sufficient evidence "to reduce it to a certainty;" but, if true, it was clear to the mind of Clark that the Lieutenant Governor would make his first strike at Kaskaskia — the Colonel's headquarters and where the strongest garrison was.

Spies were kept on all the roads but to no purpose: † some were captured; others returned with no news. Cold weather setting in, Clark was at a loss what to do. It was the opinion of many of his men that Hamilton had quit his design, going no farther than the head of the Maumee. As the Colonel could get no intelligence whatever from Vincennes, he gave himself the benefit of all doubts as to the Lieutenant Governor being there, — imagining that, perhaps, Captain Helm had not been able to send him an express on account of high waters. In this situation of uncertainty, he remained for a considerable time.

It was the intention of the American commander in the event of the appearance of the enemy to withdraw the garrison from Cahokia. But, as he was anxious to have a conference with the principal inhabitants of that place, whom he knew to be zealous in his coun-

* *Id.* p. 52. What punishment was meted out to the young man, Clark does not say. He was probably hung.

† Clark to Mason just cited.

try's cause, to fix on certain plans for the conduct of the people there in the event of possession being taken by the English, he set out for that village with the intention however of staying but a few days.

With a guard of not more than seven men, accompanied by "a few gentlemen in chairs" — that is, in wooden carts, one of which "swamped" on the way — Clark — after nearly an hour's detention — proceeded on his journey, reaching Prairie du Rocher, "about twelve miles above Kaskaskia," with safety, where, in the evening, the party were entertained by the good people of the place with a dance, gotten up in honor of their arrival. "We spent," says the Colonel, "the fore part of the night very agreeably, but about 12 o'clock there was a very sudden change."*

The cause for the interruption was this: An express arrived from Kaskaskia, with the information that Hamilton from Detroit was within three miles of the place first mentioned with eight hundred men and was determined to attack the fort there that night — indeed, before the news could possibly reach the American commander. There was at once among that small assembly the greatest confusion — "every person," says the Colonel, "having their eyes on me, as if my word was to determine their good or evil fate."† It required but a moment for the commander

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 53, 54.

Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, pp. 67, 68) speaks of the dance in such a manner as to convey the idea that the people "of the little village of La Prairie du Rocher" had gotten it up for their own entertainment; but this is error.

† Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 54. It is doubtful whether the report actually put the number

to form his resolution to attempt at once to regain the fort if possible before it should be attacked by the enemy; or, failing in that, to endeavor to get through the lines of the besiegers by stratagem. He communicated his resolution to two of his officers who had accompanied him; it met their approval; and their horses were ordered saddled.

“Those of the company,” says Clark “that had recovered from their surprise so far as to enable them to speak, begged of me not to attempt to return; that the town was certainly in possession of the enemy and the fort warmly attacked. Some proposed conveying me to the Spanish shore;—some one thing and some another.”* But the Colonel refused to listen to their various propositions for his safety; insisting at the same time that the dance should be continued until the horses were ready; and, to inspire them with as much courage as possible he tried to appear as unconcerned as if nothing had happened. After dropping a line to Captain Bowman at Cahokia, ordering him to return with his force at once to Kaskaskia,† Clark

at eight hundred as Clark declares. It is not improbable, when he wrote his letter to Mason, having that number in his mind as the force under Hamilton when the latter entered Vincennes, he gave it as the number reported.

* Clark to Mason—in the work last cited, p. 55.

† In his letter to Mason of Nov. 19, 1779, Clark does not mention what word he sent to Bowman; but in a letter to the Governor of Virginia written on the 29th of April previous, he explains that it was an order to evacuate the fort at Cahokia. (See *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n, where the entire letter is printed. The original is the property of the United States and is in the archives of the Department of State.) This letter is frequently cited hereafter; for, although not written for some months after the events took

set out on his return to his headquarters, making the journey, it may be presumed, in much less time than on his way out. On his arrival, he found, instead of an enemy in possession of the fort or besieging it, everything to all appearances as calm as when he left.

Clark and his men before starting on their return from Prairie du Rocher had provided themselves with blankets, in which, in case the fort, on their arrival, was surrounded by the enemy, each one was to wrap himself, fall in with the besiegers until an opportunity offered of getting near enough to the fortification to give the proper signals, when he would be promptly admitted inside.*

It was the general impression in the fort that, as the weather was inclement, the attack would not take place until it cleared up, none doubting the presence of the enemy in the immediate vicinity. But Clark, from several circumstances, was led to believe that the reason for the postponement of hostilities was due to their desire to give the garrison time to escape; however, he determined if that was their wish, they should be disappointed; so he lost no time in putting everything in as good order as possible.

Now, the good Father Gibault was inside the fort at the time and it would seem was "in the greatest consternation," but he was determined to act agreeable to the commander's instructions. He was, of all those in Kaskaskia, "the most afraid of Mr. Hamilton,"

place, it refers back to them, for certain reasons hereafter explained. Its statements are generally to be relied upon.

* This, certainly, was a novel and, doubtless, an original plan for cutting through a besieging force. Had there been an occasion for testing its efficacy, failure probably would have been the result.

and for good reason. The interest manifested by him in temporal affairs both at Kaskaskia and Vincennes, he well knew "Mr. Hamilton" would soon be informed of, if he had not already obtained information concerning it; and he had good reason to fear the worst should he fall into the Lieutenant Governor's power.*

Hamilton seems to have treasured up an implacable hatred of the priest. More than two years after learning how much the American commander had been indebted to him for the change of affairs at Vincennes, he gave vent in unmeasured terms to his ill-feeling against him: "He [Gibault] had been," he said, "an active agent for the rebels, and whose vicious and immoral conduct was sufficient to do infinite mischief in a country where ignorance and bigotry give full scope to the depravity of a licentious ecclesiastic. This wretch it was who absolved the French inhabitants from their allegiance to the King of Great Britain. To enumerate the vices of the inhabitants would be to give a long catalogue; but to assert that they are not in possession of a single virtue is no more than truth and justice require; still, the most eminently vicious and scandalous was the Rev. Mons'r Gibault."†

In conferring with Clark, the worthy priest felt sure the fort would be taken unless reinforced by the garrison from Cahokia, not knowing that Clark had previously written Captain Bowman to join him at once from that place. The Colonel thought best to relieve the priest of his anxiety by pretending he wanted him to go to the Spanish side of the Mississippi

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 55, 56.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

with public papers and money. "The proposition," says Clark, "pleased him well; he immediately started and getting into an island, he was obliged to encamp there three days, in the most obscure part with only a servant to attend him, the ice passing so thick down the Mississippi."

During the hours which passed after the return of the commander, but before the morning of the next day, he had sufficient time to carefully reflect upon what he deemed the serious condition of affairs. The inhabitants had always appeared to be attached to the Americans; at the same time he fully realized that he would soon have an unmistakable demonstration from them as to their feeling toward him, which at first seemed to be one of friendship; as several of the young men of the place, soon after the alarm had been given, turned into the fort to help defend it. But he was sensible, at the same time, that, in the event they took up arms to defend the town, the whole would probably be lost, as he would be obliged to give the enemy battle in the commons; he thought, therefore, it would be best, could it be brought about, that such as had no families should reinforce the garrison, while those with families should remain neutral.

The Colonel concluded to burn all the houses near the fort, and when the attack was made, "to sell it as dearly as possible," as there was no probability of escaping the enemy who, he had no doubt, were about ready to commence the siege, although not a single white man or Indian had, as yet, made his appearance in a threatening manner near the village. The only probable chance of safety for the garrison depended,

as it seemed to Clark, on the prompt arrival of Captain Bowman from Cahokia, with his company, for no reinforcements were expected from the eastward, and, with this force added to those of his garrison he might possibly defend himself until "Mr. Hamilton's Indians" and white men got tired and returned; which, he judged, would be in four or five weeks, for the greatest part of them, should they not meet with the success they had expected.

In the morning, the first thing the American commander did was, to assemble all the inhabitants in the fort in order to know what their resolution was; for he had learned of their counselling together during the night as to what course ought, under the circumstances, to be pursued by them. He then promptly asked them whether they would endeavor to defend their village or not. If they would act on the defensive, he would, he told them, quit the fort, leaving inside only a small guard, and "head" them with his troops. He told them also that if the enemy lay concealed until the weather broke, he might probably discover their camps and get some advantage of them. But the citizens declined to act on one side or the other, which was really not displeasing to Clark; at the same time they protested they were really in the American interest. Now, all would have been well had they said no more; yet they not only suggested that the Colonel's whole force joined with them would make a poor showing against so considerable a party as the one which (as supposed) was about to attack them, but they hinted that it was their wish that the Americans should abandon the place and take protection of the Spanish on the other side of the Mississippi; for they could not

conceive that Clark could keep possession of the fort a single day, as the enemy would immediately set the adjoining houses on fire, which would fire the fortification (they not knowing that the commander had already resolved to burn them as soon as the wind shifted).*

The suggestion made by the Kaskaskians that Clark should avail himself of Spanish protection, and the fact that they had already discussed the matter of the enemy firing the adjacent houses to get possession of the fort, "with some other circumstances," put the Colonel "in a most violent rage." As soon as he could curb his passion he gave them a lecture such as would suit "a set of traitors," although he did not conceive them all to be such. He then ordered out the Kaskaskians that were in the fort, at the same time telling them he no longer thought them deserving any favor from him; that he, consequently, must conceive them to be his secret enemies and should treat them as such. But he had no idea of carrying out his threat; it was made only that the inhabitants might be convinced of his firm determination never to yield to the foe so long as there was the least chance left for him and his men.

The inhabitants who had assembled in the fort now asked Clark to issue an order for all the provision in the town to be brought him immediately as an earnest of their good intentions toward him and which in reality convinced him that as they saw he was determined

* This, it will be seen, is additional evidence that Fort Gage was in Kaskaskia; although, already enough has been adduced, it is confidently believed, to convince the most skeptical.

to stand his ground it was their desire he should be able to withstand the siege as long as possible; besides, if such an order were issued, it would be an excuse for them to their new master, (whom they expected every moment). for furnishing the supplies to the Americans. The Colonel told them he would have all their provisions, and that he would then burn their town "to the enemy's hand." He added that they might send in what they had if they chose to do so. He then again ordered them all out of the fort; and no sooner had they departed than he had set fire to some out houses, a proceeding which convinced them of his firm determination to fight to the last. "Never," says Clark, "was a set of people in more distress; their town set on fire by those they wished to be in friendship with, at the same time surrounded by the savages, as they believed, from whom they had little else but destruction to expect."

Owing to the circumstance that there was considerable snow on the roofs of the houses, the fire kindled by Clark's orders did not spread to any extent. Meanwhile, the inhabitants looked on without daring to say a word. The Colonel told them he intended to set fire to all the houses that contained much provision, for fear, unless destroyed, the enemy would get it; however, they did not wait to see the commander put his threat into execution, but at once commenced bringing their hoarded supplies to the fort; and, before night, six months' provisions had been deposited there.

"Not having received a scrape of a pen from you for nearly twelve months," wrote the Colonel afterward to the Governor, "I could see but little probability of keeping possession of the country, as my number of

men was too small to stand a siege, and my situation too remote to call for assistance. I made all the preparations I possibly could for the attack, and was necessitated to set fire to some of the houses in town, to clear them out of the way.”*

During the first day after Clark's return, an incident occurred which came very near having a tragical ending. A citizen riding out of town got information that a party of the enemy were going to the island to capture the priest, who was detained there by the floating ice. The man, while desiring to befriend Father Gibault, was at the same time disposed to keep the presence of the enemy a secret from Clark; so, on his return to the village and meeting the priest's brother-in-law, he related the news to the latter, begging him not to tell the American commander; but he made all haste to inform the Colonel. Thereupon, the citizen who told the story to the relative of Gibault was arrested and ordered to be immediately hanged. Nothing, apparently, would have saved him had not his wife and seven small children been brought before Clark. “This,” says the latter, “was a sight too moving not to have granted them the life of their parent,” but “on terms that put it out of his power to do any damage to me.”†

The following day Captain Bowman with his own company and one of volunteers reached Kaskaskia

* Clark to Governor of Virginia, April 29th, 1779. — *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n.

† Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 60, 61. It would be a matter of no little interest could it be ascertained what the “terms” were; but they will doubtless never be known.

from Cahokia.* The weather had cleared away and the reinforcement gave Clark strong hopes of being able to defy the enemy; he having still the firm belief that a large force was in the vicinity ready to begin an attack upon him. Spies were sent out in every direction to make discoveries; the commander hoping to get such an advantage as would enable him, notwithstanding the odds were as he supposed against him, to attack them in the environs of the town. By this time, the inhabitants seemed to change their minds and to manifest a desire to aid in defense of the place. And the Colonel was not slow to show them he appreciated their readiness to assist him. Soon the spies returned and, to the great relief of all, reported that, instead of an army of huge dimensions there were only about forty whites and Indians in the vicinity, and that they were making their retreat as fast as possible to Vincennes.

* Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 313] confounds Captain Joseph Bowman, then in command of a company under Clark with Colonel John Bowman, of Kentucky. He says: "By his [Clark's] orders, Bowman of Kentucky joined him, after evacuating the fort at Kahokia, and preparations were made for the defense of Kaskaskia."

CHAPTER XVII.

THE particulars of the movement of the enemy's small force of Indians from the mouth of the Wabash to the vicinity of Kaskaskia show not a little daring on part of the one in command. Hamilton had not contemplated sending any of his men, either Indians or whites, as a war party into the very heart of the Illinois settlements, either for information or to capture stragglers belonging to the army of Clark. He was content with the knowledge he had already of affairs there, willing to abide the time when the season would admit of his marching onward to the Mississippi. But a plan of an Ottawa Indian chief who had, along with other savages and a party of whites, been sent down the Wabash by the Lieutenant Governor to go to the Tennessee river to confer with the Cherokees, as mentioned in a previous chapter, was laid, as before stated, at the mouth of the first mentioned stream, to go on an expedition to the Illinois to take some prisoners.* There went with the party, as already noticed, two French Canadians. The whole marched by land, their objective point being the immediate vicinity of Kaskaskia. After a very fatiguing march they reached

* Ante, Chap. XV. Hamilton, in his letter to Haldimand of Jan. 24-28, 1779, simply says that "the chief . . . (an Ottawa) determined to go on a *decouverte* to Kaskaskia." But in his letter to the same, of July 6, 1781, he explains, as has been shown, that the chief, having remained sometime at the mouth of the Wabash with his party without taking any prisoners, "declared he would not return without attempting to be of further service;" so he started for the Illinois towns.

the Kaskaskia river and crossed over at a point apparently above the town, where they secreted themselves.

A few of the savages lay concealed near a small branch about three miles from Kaskaskia, and only a hundred yards from the place where the "chair" belonging to one of Clark's companions was mired when the Colonel, with some others, was on his way to Cahokia as before described, and where the whole had been detained about an hour. "I believe nothing here saved me," says the Colonel, "but the instructions they had not to kill me, or the fear of being overpowered, not having an opportunity to alarm the main body . . . without being discovered themselves." The residue of the party was at this time, about half a mile away—so Clark afterward learned; and he subsequently became fully persuaded that the enemy's coming was only that he alone should be captured: "Mr. Hamilton . . . had sent a party of forty savages, headed by white men from Vincennes in order if possible to take me prisoner; and he gave such instructions for my treatment as did him no dishonor." And again he speaks of the force of the enemy as having been "sent for no other purpose, as we found after, than to take me."* In all this, the Colonel was mistaken. It is clear that the Lieutenant Governor did not send the Ottawa chief and his Indians to the Illinois at all; and it is certain that the object of their going was not directed against Clark alone, but to take "rebel" prisoners generally. On their way the Indian war-party came upon some "French hunters of the Illinois," first taking away

* Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 53, 61.

their horses but afterward returning them. They were not otherwise molested.* French residents of the Illinois were not the kind of prisoners wanted by the savages in this expedition.

It was now clear to the mind of Clark that the British were in possession of Vincennes and that, consequently, an attack by the enemy in force would not be long delayed, though there could be no present danger. The outlook, on the whole, was discouraging to the American commander, notwithstanding he had reason to expect a reinforcement to be sent him by the Virginia government. It seemed to the Colonel, after a careful survey of the situation, that all of the Illinois, except the fortification in Kaskaskia guarded by his men, would, in a few months, be again in possession of the English;—his garrison, he believed, would not surrender unless driven to it by the greatest distress. He sent horsemen in the direction of Vincennes to take a prisoner if possible,

* Hamilton says, that Charles Beaubien, one of the party, took their horses and would have kept them but for the Ottawa chief who reproached him for acting contrary to his (Hamilton's) orders. Beaubien also assured the hunters that the British and their Indian allies intended to recapture their towns and put all the inhabitants to death (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.) This "treachery" of Beaubien, Hamilton declares, was the reason why Clark escaped; and this may have been true, as the hunters, now thoroughly frightened, made all haste to the settlement giving the alarm first to some negroes, who quickly notified the Kaskaskians of the approach of the war party, at the same time greatly exaggerating the number of the approaching enemy. It is probable that "Hamilton's orders" as given to Beaubien were to treat the French and creole residents of the Illinois as friends; hence the Lieutenant Governor speaks of the words of Beaubien as being treacherous.

from whom he hoped to gain intelligence; but their progress was impeded by high water and they returned empty-handed.

Now, in the very height of Clark's anxiety, there arrived at Kaskaskia, on the evening of the twenty-ninth of January, Francis Vigo, of the firm of Vigo and Gosti, merchants of St. Louis, connected in business with the Governor of Upper Louisiana. Vigo was just from Vincennes, whither he had gone early in December* on his own private business.† He was there when the place was taken by Hamilton,‡ but was detained by the Lieutenant Governor. However, he soon found means of escaping,§ and while on his way back to St. Louis, stopped at Kaskaskia.||

The Colonel lost no time in writing to the Virginia governor, giving the particulars he had just

* Vigo must have started for Vincennes after the fourth of December, as he cashed a draft on that day either at Kaskaskia or St. Louis, drawn by Clark on Oliver Pollock, the Virginia agent at New Orleans. (See *A Centennial Lawsuit*. By C. C. Baldwin. *Western Reserve and Northern Ohio Historical Society's Tract*, No. 35, Dec. 1876.)

† "On his lawful business": "Bowman's Journal" in Department of State MSS. It is the same when printed in Clark's *Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 99.

‡ Clark to Mason. — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 63.

§ Clark to the Governor of Virginia, Feb. 3d [Jan. 30th], 1779. (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316). The imprisonment of Vigo by Hamilton was only to detain him in Vincennes. Being a Spanish subject, he was well treated, — only required to report himself once a day at headquarters, but his merchandise was confiscated.

|| Vigo did not go to St. Louis first as has been very generally asserted. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXX.)

received from Vigo: "No attack is to be made on the garrison at Kaskaskia until the Spring. The passage is too difficult at present. His Indians are sent to war against different parts of the country, especially Kentucky. Belts, presents, and speeches are sent to all the nations south of the Ohio, requesting them immediately to meet at a general council at the mouth of the Tennessee river, to lay the best plans for cutting off the rebels in the Illinois and in Kentucky."

"The Grande Couette and his nation," continued the Colonel, "living at Port St. Vincent [Vincennes] told Hamilton that he and his people were Big Knives and would not give their hands any more to the English; for he would shortly see his father who was at Kaskaskia. There are ninety regulars in the garrison at Vincennes; also a few volunteers, and about fifty Shawanese Indians, that are shortly to go to war. They are very busy in repairing the fort, which will shortly be very strong. One brass six-pounder, two iron four-pounders, and two swivels, are mounted in the bastions. They have plenty of ammunition and provisions, and all kinds of warlike stores, and are making preparations for the reduction of the Illinois and other places held by the rebels. They have no suspicions of a visit from the Americans. This was Mr. Hamilton's circumstances when Mr. Vigo left him."* But he also informed Clark that Hamilton's force when the Governor reached Vincennes consisted of thirty regulars, with fifty French volunteers and

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316. The Piankeshaw chief, Grande Couette (or Coite), is mentioned by Clark as the "Grand Kite." The Colonel's knowledge of the French language was limited.

about four hundred Indians,* and further that he not only took the fort with Capt. Helm and several other Americans who were there, but secured a number of horses designed for Kentucky.†

Hamilton was fully in the belief, when he heard of the desertion of the corporal and six men of Lamothe's company at the mouth of the Wabash, that they went directly to Kaskaskia, where some of the men had relatives living;‡ and he subsequently declared they were the first to give Clark intelligence of his being at Vincennes.§ It is doubtful if he ever learned the real offender was Vigo.

If the situation had before appeared desperate to the American commander, it seemed no less critical on his getting the intelligence communicated by Vigo. "At this moment," he subsequently wrote, "I would have bound myself seven years a slave to have had five hundred troops." The only probable way to maintain the country was, in his judgment, to take advantage at once of Hamilton's weakness; perhaps he might be fortunate. He considered the inclemency of the season and the badness of the roads, or trails, an advantage; as the enemy would be more off their guard in all quarters. So the next day after Vigo's appearance, he collected his officers about him and told

* "Bowman's Journal" in Department of State MSS. (See also *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 99.)

† "Bowman's Journal," Department of State MSS. (See as to Clark's published errors concerning the information brought him by Vigo, Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXXI.)

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-30, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

§ Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

them what he believed the chances were for success. They agreed with their commander; and all were eager for the trial.*

As a number of days must have passed after Vigo left Vincennes before his arrival at Kaskaskia — that fact accounts for his not knowing of the return home of most of the savages from the place first mentioned. Had Clark known of the departure of the Indians, his determination to march against Hamilton would not have seemed so desperate.

“30th [Jan.] — On which Col. Clark called a council with his officers and it was concluded to go and attack Gov. Hamilton at all events; for fear, if it was let alone 'till the spring, that he with his Indians would undoubtedly cut us all off. — “Bowman’s Journal” in the department of State MSS. (See appendix to our narrative, Note LXXXII, concerning some published errors as to the reasons inducing Clark to undertake the capture of Hamilton in Vincennes.”

It was immediately after taking his resolution that Clark wrote the Governor of Virginia:

“As it is now near twelve months since I have had the least intelligence from you, I almost despair of any relief being sent to me. I have, for many months past, had reports of an [American] army marching against Detroit, but no certainty. A late maneuver of the famous Hair-Buyer General, Henry Hamilton, Esquire, Lieutenant Governor of Detroit, has alarmed us much. On the sixteenth [17th] of December, last, he, with a body of six hundred men,

* Clark to Mason — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 63, 64.

composed of regulars, French volunteers, and Indians, took possession of St. Vincent [Vincennes] on the Wabash and what few men composed the garrison, they not being able to make the least defense. Hamilton is influencing all the Indians he possibly can to join him. I learn that those who have treated with me, have as yet refused his offers. I have for some time expected an attack from him. He has blocked up the Ohio river with a party of French and Indians."

"Being sensible," Clark continued, "that, without a reinforcement, which, at present I have hardly a right to expect, I shall be obliged to give up the country to Mr. Hamilton, unless there is a turn of fortune in my favor, I am resolved to take advantage of his present situation and risk the whole in a single battle. I shall set out in a few days with all the force I can raise of my own troops and a few militia that I can depend on," "I know," he added, "the case is desperate; but, sir, we must either quit the country or attack Mr. Hamilton. No time is to be lost. Were I sure of a reinforcement, I should not attempt it. Who knows what fortune will do for us? Great things have been effected by a few men well conducted. Perhaps we may be fortunate. We have this consolation, that our cause is just, and that our country will be grateful and not condemn our conduct in case we fall through. If we fail, the Illinois as well as Kentucky, I believe, is lost."*

* Clark to the Governor of Virginia, Feb. 3 [Jan. 30], 1779. (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316.) It will be noticed that even in writing so soon after his conversation with Vigo, the Colonel exaggerated somewhat—placing the whole body of men under Hamilton who took possession of Vincennes at six hundred.

So it was the American commander saw there was no alternative; he must attack the enemy in Vincennes. He must take Hamilton or Hamilton would take him.

So soon as Clark had matured his plans, he aroused himself to the utmost exertion. On the last day of January, he sent an express to Captain Richard McCarty, who had gone back to Cahokia with the volunteer company that came away when Captain Bowman left there, ordering him to return to Kaskaskia. The determination of the American commander to march against Vincennes was quickly known throughout all the Illinois towns. "The whole country," he wrote, "took fire at the alarm; and every order was executed with cheerfulness by every description of the inhabitants." Provisions were prepared; volunteering was encouraged; "and, as we had plenty of stores," adds the Commander, "every man was completely rigged with what he could desire to withstand the coldest weather."*

The Colonel conducted himself as though he was sure of taking Hamilton; and he instructed his officers "to observe the same rule." In a day or two, the inhabitants all seemed to believe it. Many persons, anxious to retrieve their character for loyalty to the American cause, enlisted for the expedition. The ladies, also, began to be spirited and to interest themselves in the undertaking, "which had great effect on the young men."†

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 138.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 64.

On the first day of February, in accordance with Clark's determination of two day's previous, orders were given for "a large bateau" — which, in reality, was a small galley, fitted out some time previous — to be got ready for the expedition. It was finished on the third, "completely fitted up," and her loading, consisting of provisions "and great stores of ammunition," put on board, together with two four-pounders and four large swivels. This gun-boat, the first one prepared by the Americans west of Pittsburg, was named the *Willing*, in honor of Captain James Willing. She was manned by forty-six men and a lieutenant — "a fine company" — all under command of Lieutenant John Rogers. "This vessel when complete," afterwards wrote Clark, "was much admired by the inhabitants, as no such thing had been seen in the country before. I had great expectations from her."

Lieutenant Rogers was directed to force his way up the Wabash to within ten leagues of Vincennes (as high as the mouth of the White river), and to secrete himself until further orders; but if he found himself discovered, he was to do the enemy all the damage he could without running too great a risk of losing his vessel, and not to leave the river until he had no longer hope of Clark's arrival by land; but, by all means, he was to conduct himself so as to give no suspicion of the approach of the American commander. If Clark should suffer defeat, the boat was to join Col. David Rogers on the Mississippi. This officer, who was a member of the Virginia senate, on the fourteenth of January, 1778, had been selected by Governor Henry to proceed to New Orleans to bring

up the Mississippi and Ohio rivers some goods sent there by Spain for that State — “which you will take,” said the Governor in his instructions, “under your care and safely convey home.” “You are to take my instructions to Colonel Clark,” continued Henry, “by which he is directed to escort you homeward.” Rogers raised a small party of men in the Redstone (now Brownsville) region of Pennsylvania and in keel-boats floated down, after considerable trouble and delay, to New Orleans. When he arrived, he found he would have to return to St. Louis to obtain the goods; he started up the Mississippi for that purpose. However, early in October, 1779, after reaching a point just above the mouth of the Licking river on the Ohio, his force was attacked by Indians, a large portion killed or taken prisoners, and much of his cargo captured. Rogers was killed. The *Willing* left Kaskaskia about two o'clock in the afternoon of the fourth of February.*

About ten o'clock of the same day of the departure of the gun-boat, Captain McCarty arrived with a company of volunteers from Cahokia; and, on the fifth, a company was raised in Kaskaskia under the

* Clark to Gov. Henry of Virginia, Feb. 3 [Jan. 30], 1779: *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 316. *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n. “Bowman's Journal,” of Feb. 1, 1779, Department of State MSS., — and as printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 99. See, also, p. 64 — Clark to Mason — printed in the work last cited; and Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 138. For the fact that there was a lieutenant of the crew — not the commander of the boat — I am indebted to another and trustworthy account. (See, also, as to the *Willing*, Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXXIII.)

command of Captain Charleville. A pack-horse master had previously been appointed and ordered to prepare pack-saddles and other necessary equipments for the horses which were to be taken along. Provisions, also, sufficient in quantity, as was supposed, to supply the men on the march, were provided.*

"The principal persons which follow me on this forlorn hope," wrote the American commander before starting, "are Captains Joseph Bowman, John Williams, Edward Worthington, Richard McCarty and Francis Charleville; Lieutenants Richard Brashear, William Keller, Abraham Chapline, John Gerault, and John Bayley; also several other brave subalterns. You must be sensible of the feeling I have for these brave officers and soldiers that are determined to share my fate, let it be what it will."†

* See Appendix, Note LXXXIV, as to error concerning the supplies taken along by Clark.

† Clark to the Governor of Virginia, February 3 [Jan. 30], 1779. (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316), before cited. I have corrected Clark's spelling of several names. In his letter to Mason, the Colonel says he was "joined by two volunteer companies of the principal young men of the Illinois, commanded by Captains McCarty and Charleville; those of the troops were commanded by Captains Bowman, Williams and Worthington, of the light horse." (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 65.)

CHAPTER XVIII.

ON the fifth day of February, 1779, all preparations for the march from Kaskaskia to Vincennes having been completed, Colonel Clark and his little band (himself at its head) moved out of the place under escort of the inhabitants of the village.* Father Gibault "after a very suitable discourse," gave them — one hundred and seventy in number — absolution; "and we set out," wrote the Commander subsequently, "on a forlorn hope indeed; for our whole party, with the boat's crew, consisted of only a little upwards of two hundred. I cannot account for it, but I still had inward assurance of success, and never could, when weighing every circumstance, doubt it. But I had some secret check."†

The Colonel left the fort in Kaskaskia governed by the militia — about every other one of the able-bodied men enrolling themselves to guard the several

* "On the 5th I marched": Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 65. The same date is given in Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 139, and in "Bowman's Journal," in the Department of State MSS. There can be no doubt about that being the day of starting; and yet, in his letter to the Governor of Virginia of the 29th of April (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n), the Colonel says: "I marched on the 7th of February." It was a slip of his memory; or, he may not, for certain reasons hereafter mentioned, have considered the 5th and 6th as really marching days.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. —. (See as to the entire force which went against Vincennes, Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXXV.)

villages. The distance to be traveled was about two hundred miles,* "through, I suppose," afterwards wrote Clark, "one of the most beautiful countries in the world, but, at this time, in many parts flowing with water, and the marching exceedingly bad."

After crossing the Kaskaskia river, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, the march began. Clark rode a horse which had been brought from New Mexico, — "The finest stallion by far that is in the country," wrote the Colonel subsequently.† Only about three miles were made the first day, when they encamped, the weather being rainy and drizzly. Here they lay the next day, — starting early, however, on the seventh and making a good day's progress — nine leagues, notwithstanding the roads were heavy, owing to mud and water. Their camp that night was pitched in a square — baggage in the center; each company was to guard its own. Fortunately, though the weather was wet, it was not cold for the season.‡

The route the army was following was one known as the "Vincennes trace," from Kaskaskia to Vincennes. It was a portion of the same trail, leading on to Wea — thence to Detroit — traveled at an early day by the French and Indians, from the Mississippi to the lakes — from Louisiana to Canada. It bore off to the northeastward, but inclining northward to avoid

* Appendix, Note LXXXVI.

† Clark to Gov. Henry, March 9, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ "Bowman's Journal," Feb. 7, 1779. — Department of State MSS. In this Journal as printed — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois* (p. 100) — the "leagues" marched are mentioned as "hours." Compare, in connection with this day's march, Clark to Mason, in the work last cited (p. 65); also Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 139.

the deep water in some of the rivers necessary to be crossed.

On the eighth "[we] marched," says one of the men, in his record of that day, "early through the water, which we now began to meet in those large and level plains, where, from the flatness of the country, [it] rests a considerable time before it drains off. Notwithstanding [which] our men were in great spirits though much fatigued."*

The next day — the ninth — the march was resumed. Only a moderate day's progress was made, as it rained most of the time† The Petit Fork‡ was reached on the tenth, but its waters were so high, "there was no fording it;" so it had to be crossed on trees that were cut down for that purpose. It was still raining; and, as there were no tents brought along, the stormy weather made it disagreeable for all during their encampment that night, which was near the river. The next day, the Saline river was crossed. On the twelfth, "numbers of buffaloes" were seen and killed. The road was very bad from the immense quantity of rain that had fallen, and, as a consequence, the men were very tired. The encampment was made that night on the edge of the woods; the prairie — "Cat Plain," as it was then called — which

* "Bowman's Journal."

† "9th. Made a moderate day's march, rain'd most of the day" — "Bowman's Journal" in Department of State MSS. But, when printed, the entry reads: "9th. Made another day's march. Fair the part of the day." See *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 100.

‡ "Bowman's Journal" — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 100, correcting the entry in the MS. Journal, where it is given "Petit Ford."

had just been traversed, being fifteen miles or more across, it was late in the night before the baggage and troops got together. From this point Vincennes was twenty-one French leagues — about fifty miles — distant, in a direction a little north of east.*

Thus far on the march, the spirits of the men were excellent. They had been permitted "to shoot game on all occasions," says Clark, "and feast on it like Indian war-dancers — each company by turns inviting the other to their feasts, which was the case every night, as the company that was to give the feast was always supplied with horses to lay up a sufficient store of wild meat in the course of the day — myself and principal officers putting on the woodsmen, shouting now and then, and running as much through the mud and water as any of them.†

It was early on the thirteenth that the drowned lands of the Little Wabash were reached. The first obstruction of any consequence was now encountered. The two Wabashes — that is, the Little Wabash and a tributary flowing into it from the north — were before them, and although three miles apart they made but one stream, the overflowed water between them being at least three feet deep and in many places four. It was nearly five miles to the opposite hills, and, in that distance, the shallowest place, except about a hundred yards, was three feet. "This," said the Colonel afterwards, "would have been enough

* Bowman's Journal" — Department of State MSS. The printed Journal erroneously gives twenty-one miles. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXXVII.)

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 139. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note LXXXVIII.)

to have stopped any set of men not in the same temper we were."

"We reached on the 13th [the banks of the Little Wabash], through incredible difficulties," is the subsequent relation of Clark, "far surpassing anything that any of us had ever experienced. Frequently the diversions of the night wore off the thoughts of the preceding day. We formed a camp on a height which we found on the bank of the river, and suffered our troops to amuse themselves. I viewed this sheet of water for some time with distrust; but, accusing myself of doubting, I immediately set to work, without holding any consultation about it, or suffering any body else to do so in my presence; ordered a pirogue to be built immediately, and acted as though crossing the water would be only a piece of diversion. As but few could work at the pirogue at a time, pains were taken to find diversion for the rest, to keep them in high spirits."*

The pirogue was finished the next day, and was put into the river about four o'clock in the afternoon. It was manned and sent to explore the drowned lands on the opposite side of the united streams. The crew had private instructions from the Colonel what to report on their return; and, if possible, they were to find some spot of dry land. They found about half an acre, and marked the trees thence back to the camp; they brought back, of course, a very

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 139, 140. "Bowman's Journal" of the 13th of Feb., in Department of State MSS. and as printed — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 101. Clark, in his letter to Mason (p. 66 of the work last cited), calls the pirogue "a large canoe," which it really was.

favorable account. No attempt was made to utilize the pirogue again until the fifteenth, when the first channel was ferried across, the men going no farther than to shallow water on the opposite side. There they erected a scaffold on which was placed the baggage, which had been brought along, where it remained until they swam the horses over, when it was placed upon their backs and thus taken to the edge of the second channel, the canoe again ferrying the men over, as had been done in the first instance, when another scaffold was built and the baggage placed upon it. The horses were then made to swim a second time; and when this scaffold was reached, they were again loaded: and men and animals waded in safety to the high ground, where a camp was made. This transit was accomplished in one day, and much of the time it was raining.* Orders were then issued not to fire any guns for the future, except in case of necessity.† Caution was necessary because of the near approach to the enemy.

The march on the sixteenth was continued, but under difficulties, as it rained the whole time and the men were continually compelled to wade through

* Appendix, Note LXXXIX.

† The wording of "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS., for the fifteenth is as follows:

"15. Ferried across the two Wabashes with it [the canoe; — it] being then five miles in water to the opposite hills, where we encamped. Still raining. Orders given to fire no guns in future, except in cases of necessity." As printed (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 101), the words are these, for the same date: "15th. Ferried across the two Wabashes, it being then five miles in water to the opposite hills, where we encamped. Still raining. Orders not to fire any guns for the future but in case of necessity."

water. Another small river was forded, when, unfortunately, provisions for the force began to grow short.*

Early on the seventeenth, the march was resumed; several very deep runs were crossed. Patrick Kennedy, commissary of the little army, was then sent with three men to endeavor to cross the river Embarrass, and proceed to a point on the west side of the Wabash opposite Vincennes, where there was a plantation,—there to steal, if possible, boats or canoes to ferry the troops over the stream last mentioned, which the force was now approaching. The low lands of the Embarrass were soon reached by Clark,—only nine miles from Fort Sackville, but the post was on the east side of the Wabash; and it was not much of an exaggeration of the Colonel when he declared,—“and every foot of the way covered with deep water.”

The Colonel and his men got near the Embarrass about an hour before sunset.† This river enters the Wabash on the west not a great distance below Vincennes, its general course being southeast. The Colonel now strove to find the parent stream. After traveling till eight o'clock in mud and water still the Wabash was not reached, nor was there any place on which to encamp. Presently Mr. Kennedy and his party returned, having found it impossible to cross the Em-

* The stream crossed on the sixteenth is given in “Bowman's Journal,” (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 101), as “Fox river;” in Clark's *Memoir* [*Dillon's Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 141], as “Fur river;” in “Bowman's Journal” in the Department of State MSS., the name is not mentioned. The probability is that “Fox river” is the true reading.

† Appendix, Note XC.

barrass. At length a small spot of ground was discovered from which the water had fallen and upon it the army staid the remainder of the night. The weather was dark and drizzly.*

At break of day, on the eighteenth, Hamilton's morning gun in Fort Sackville was heard. Clark set off and marched down the Embarrass. Some fine land was seen. At about two o'clock, the bank of the Wabash was reached. Rafts for four men to cross the river were made, to enable them to go up to Vincennes to steal boats; but the attempt proved abortive. They spent the day and the night on some old logs in the water to no purpose, for there was not one foot of dry land to be found; they got back to their comrades the next day at three o'clock. The camp of the army for the night was about ten miles from Vincennes. The army had marched nine miles down the Embarrass and the distance was greater to Fort Sackville than at the point where the stream was first reached. There was not, the Colonel subsequently declared, more than one-quarter of the ten miles yet to be traveled "that was not three feet and upwards under water, and there was not a mouthful of provisions left.†

On the nineteenth Captain McCarty's company was set at work making a canoe. When it was finished three men embarked in it along with the

* "Bowman's Journal" of the seventeenth. See also Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 66. In Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 141 — "Bowman's Journal" for the day is copied, but Mr. Kennedy's name is given incorrectly as "Kernedy."

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 66.

Captain, to make still another (the third) attempt to steal boats. The party, however, soon returned, having discovered four large fires about a league up the river which seemed to be those of whites and Indians.

As yet nothing had been heard of the *Willing*. Clark ordered two men into the canoe with directions to drop down the Wabash until they met Lieutenant Rogers and his galley. Word was sent the commander of the boat to come on day and night, as that seemed now about the last hope of the little army. Many of the men were much cast down, particularly the volunteers. They had had no provisions of any sort for two days. It is not too much to say starvation stared them in the face. It seemed indeed a "hard fortune."*

Here is the suggestive entry of one of the force in his journal for the next day—the twentieth: "Camp very quiet, but hungry. Some almost in despair. Many of the Creole volunteers talk of returning." But the subsequent narration of Clark adds somewhat of a silver lining to this dark cloud: "Many of our volunteers began, for the first time, to despair. Some talked of returning; but my situation was now such that I was past all uneasiness. I laughed at them without persuading or ordering them to desist from any such attempt; but told them I should be glad if they would go out and kill some deer. They went, confused with such conduct. My own troops I knew had no idea of abandoning an enterprise for the want of provisions while there were plenty of good horses in their possession; and I

* "Bowman's Journal" for the nineteenth.

knew that, without any violence, the volunteers could be detained for a few days, in the course of which time our fate would be known. I conducted myself in a manner that caused the whole to believe that I had no doubt of success, which kept their spirits up.”*

Orders were now given for the making of more canoes. At noon, a boat on the river was brought to having on board five Frenchmen from Vincennes. Clark was informed by them that he was not as yet discovered, and that the inhabitants were well-disposed toward the Americans. They also gave information that Captain Williams' brother, who had been captured just after leaving Fort Sackville with the letter of Captain Helm to Clark in his care, had made his escape; and that Francis Maisonville, with a party of Indians, were then seven days in pursuit of him.† The Colonel likewise obtained from the Frenchmen a full report of the repairs made to the fort, of its strength, and of the number of men constituting the garrison. He was told by them of two canoes being adrift some distance up the Wabash; whereupon Captain Worthington was ordered, with a party, to go in search of them. He returned late, one only having been secured. One of Clark's men, before dark, killed a deer, which was brought into camp; “this was very acceptable.”

At daybreak, on the twenty-first of February, the ferrying over the Wabash in two canoes — the one captured, also one just completed — to a small hill

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 141 n.

† Appendix, Note XCI.

called the "Lower Mamelle," began.* Clark would have crossed at a greater distance from Vincennes, but the White river coming in just below made him fearful of getting too near it. All reached the opposite (left) bank of the Wabash in safety, the horses being left behind in care of a guard detailed for that purpose.† Captain Williams was sent ahead to look for a passage on the east side of the stream to the town, he having crossed the river with the first who reached the eastern shore for that purpose, taking with him two men. The three were discovered by two men in a canoe, and as they could not be "brought to," Captain Williams thought it advisable to return. The whole force being across the river, Clark thought he might reach the town that night; so the men plunged into the water, sometimes up to the neck, and continued wading for more than three miles, when a halt was called on a second hill called also "Mamelle." It rained all day and there were no provisions. Here they encamped. It was the opinion of the pilots that no further progress could be made.

The record of one of the men for the twenty-second of the month though exceedingly brief, is suggestive: "Colonel Clark encouraged his men which gave them great spirits. Marched on in the water. Those that were weak and faintish from so much

* "21st. [Feb.]. At break of day began to ferry our men over in our two canoes to a small little hill called the Lower Mamelle (or Bubbie)." — "Bowman's Journal" in Department of State MSS.

† "21st [Feb.]. At break of day began to ferry our men over in our two canoes to a small hill." Same in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 102.

† This fact sufficiently appears hereafter.

fatigue went in the canoes. We came one league farther to some sugar camps, where we staid all night. Heard the evening and morning guns from the fort [in Vincennes]. No provisions yet. Lord help us!"*

The five Frenchmen who were from Vincennes and were taken on the river below, on the twentieth, gave information at this time concerning the route that was of value of Clark. It was from them the Colonel got knowledge of the sugar camps on the bank of the river, where he was now encamped. Years after, Clark wrote that he had, on learning from their conversation, the position of the high ground, sent a canoe to examine the route, which returned without finding the passage there feasible. He adds that he then went himself and sounded the water and found it as deep as to his neck. "I returned," are his words in addition, "with a design to have the men transported on board the canoes to the sugar camp, which I knew would take the whole day and ensuing night as the vessels would pass slowly through the bushes. The loss of so much time to men half starved was a matter of consequence. I would have given a great deal for a day's provision." . . .

Clark continues: "I returned but slowly to the troops, giving myself time to think. On our arrival, all ran to hear what was the report. Every eye was fixed on me. I unfortunately spoke in a serious manner to one of the officers; the whole were alarmed without knowing what I said. I viewed their con-

* "Bowman's Journal" for this day as printed — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 103 — agrees with the one in the Department of State MSS., except as to the single word "faintish," which is given as "famished," which does not express the true idea.

fusion for about one minute — whispered to those near to me to do as I did; immediately I put some water in my hand, poured on powder, blackened my face, gave the wharwhoop, and marched into the water without saying a word. The party gazed and fell in silently, one after another, like a flock of sheep. I ordered those near me to begin a favorite song of theirs; it soon passed through the line, and the whole went on cheerfully.”*

Clark also says: “I now intended to have them transported across the deepest part of the water; but when about waist deep, one of the men informed me that he thought he felt a path. We examined and found it so, and concluded that it kept on the highest ground, which it did, and by taking pains to follow it, we got to the sugar camp without the least difficulty, where was about half an acre of dry ground, — at least not under water, where we took up our lodging.”†

At this time, the five Frenchmen from Vincennes appeared to be uneasy at the situation. They begged of the Colonel that they might go in the two canoes to town that night. They said they would bring from their own houses provisions without a possibility of any one knowing it; that some of his men should go with them as a surety for their good conduct; and that it was impossible for the army to march any farther until the water fell, as the plain was too deep to be traversed. Some of the officers thought the plan might be adopted, but Clark would not suffer it to be done. “I never could,” are his words

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 142, 143. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XCII.)

† Clark's *Memoir*, loc. cit.

subsequently, "well account for this piece of obstinacy and give satisfactory reasons to myself or anybody else why I denied a proposition apparently so easy to execute and of so much advantage, but something seemed to tell me that it should not be done, and it was not done."*

It was very early in the morning of the twenty-third that the little army, "prodigiously hungry," began its march.† At the very commencement, there was a stretch of land called the "Horseshoe Plain," more than three miles across, "all covered with water breast high." Here it was thought some of the men would surely perish, — it having frozen in the night; and all had been so long fasting. Having no other resource but wading this plain (or rather lake) of waters, they plunged into it with courage, Colonel Clark being first, taking care to have the boats close by to take those that were weak and numbed with cold, into them.‡" Never were men so animated with

* Clark's *Memoir*, loc. cit. But before giving these incidents, Clark confounds the day in which they took place with the previous one. He also says in connection with his remarks concerning the scarcity of provisions that he would have given a great deal for one of his horses, — his meaning doubtless was — that it might have been killed and served out as food to his men.

† Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 23, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. This *Journal* is not to be confounded with "Bowman's *Journal*" or Clark's *Memoir*. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXVII.)

‡ "Bowman's *Journal*" as printed, is evidently at fault in saying Clark took "care to have the boats *try* to take those that were weak and numbed with the cold into them" (the italicising is mine). I have followed the one in the Department of State MSS.

the thought of avenging the wrongs done to their back settlements as this small army was.”*

Pressing onward against such almost insurmountable obstacles, keeping up good hearts in hopes of a speedy sight of the town, at last, at not later than two o'clock in the afternoon, the long-sought village came in sight. “The spirit of my men,” wrote Clark, “seemed to revive.” “We marched up under cover of a wood,” adds the Colonel, “called the ‘Warriors’ island,’ where we lay concealed until sunset.”†

“To our inexpressible joy in the evening of the twenty-third,” wrote the commander subsequently, “we got safe on terra firma within half a league of the fort, covered by a small grove of trees, where we had a full view of the wished-for spot.”‡

In after years Clark recorded a number of incidents of this day not mentioned in any contemporaneous accounts: “The most of the weather we had on this march [from Kaskaskia] was moist and warm for the season. This [the one of the twenty-third of February] was the coldest night we had. The ice in the morning was from one-half to three-quarters of an inch thick near the shores and in still water.

* “Bowman’s Journal,” entry of Feb. 23, 1779. As to the spirits of the men, notwithstanding their famishing condition, Clark, in his Journal, says: “Set off very early [on the morning of the 23d]; waded better than three miles on a stretch; our people prodigious[ly hungry], yet they keep up a good heart in hopes of a speedy sight of our enemy.”

† Clark’s *Journal*. — Haldimand MSS. In “Bowman’s Journal” as printed “Warriors’ island” is incorrectly given as “Warren’s Island” — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 104.

‡ Clark to Mason — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 67.

The morning [of the twenty-third] was the finest we had on our march. A little after sunrise I lectured the whole. What I said to them I forgot; but it may be easily imagined by a person that could possess my affections for them at that time:—I concluded by informing them that passing the plain that was in full view and reaching the opposite woods [Warriors' island"] would put an end to their fatigue; that in a few hours they would have a sight of their long-wished for object; and [I] immediately stepped into the water without waiting for a reply. A huzza took place."

"As we generally marched through the water in a line," continues Clark, "before the third [man] entered, I halted and called to Major [Captain] Bowman, ordering him to fall in the rear with twenty-five men and put to death any man who refused to march, as we wished to have no such person among us. The whole gave a cry of approbation, and on we went. This was the most trying of all the difficulties we had experienced. I generally kept fifteen or twenty of the strongest men near myself, and judged from my own feelings what must be that of others. Getting about the middle of the plain, the water about mid-deep, I found myself sensibly failing, and as there were no trees nor bushes for the men to support themselves by, I feared that many of the most weak would be drowned. I ordered the canoes to make the land, discharge their loading, and play backward and forward with all diligence and pick up the men; and, to encourage the party, sent some of the strongest men forward with orders when they got to a certain place, to pass the word back that

the water was getting shallow, and when getting near the woods to cry out 'Land!' This stratagem had the desired effect. The men encouraged by it exerted themselves almost beyond their abilities,—the weak holding by the stronger. . . . The water never got shallower, but continued deepening. Getting to the woods where the men expected [dry] land, the water was up to my shoulders, but gaining the woods was of great consequence; all the low men and weakly hung to the trees and floated on the old logs, until they were taken off by the canoes. The strong and tall got ashore and built fires. Many would reach the shore and fall, with their bodies half in the water, not being able to support themselves without it."

"This," adds Clark, "was a delightful dry spot of ground of about ten acres. We soon found that the fires answered no purpose, but that two strong men taking a weaker one by the arms was the only way to recover him; and, it being a delightful day, it soon did. But fortunately, as if designed by Providence, a canoe of Indian squaws and children was coming up to town, and took through part of this plain as a high way. It was discovered by our canoes as they were out after the men. They gave chase and took the Indian canoe, on board of which were near half a quarter of a buffalo, some corn, tallow, kettles, etc. This was a grand prize and was invaluable. Broth was immediately made and served out to the most weakly with great care: most of the whole got a little; but a great many gave their part to the weakly, jocosely saying something cheering to their comrades. This little refreshment and fine weather, by the afternoon, gave new life to the whole,"

“Crossing a narrow deep lake in the canoes, and marching some distance,” are Clark’s further remarks, “we came to a copse of timber called the Warrior’s island. We were now in full view of the fort and town (not a shrub between us) at about two miles’ distance. Every man now feasted his eyes and forgot that he had suffered anything, — saying that all that had passed was owing to good policy and nothing but what a man could bear; and that a soldier had no right to think, etc., — passing from one extreme to another, which is common in such cases.”*

The Colonel in writing to a friend a few months after the transpiring of these events, says: “If I were sensible that you would let no person see this relation, I would give you a detail of our suffering for four days in crossing those waters [meaning from the twentieth to the twenty-third day of February, inclusive], and the manner it was done, as I am sure you would credit it, but it is too incredible for any person to believe except those that are well acquainted with me as you are, or had experience something similar to it.”†

While the army was lying on “Warriors’ island” to dry their clothes by the sun, another prisoner, known to be a friend, was taken, by whom the Colonel got all the intelligence he wished for, being informed by him that no one suspected his coming at that season of the year, and further, it seems, that the walls of Fort Sackville had just been completed and that there

* Clark’s *Memoir* — Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 143-145.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 66, 67. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XCIII.)

were a good many Indians in Vincennes; but the man captured was only allowed to see but few of the soldiers. "A thousand ideas," says Clark, "flashed in my head at this moment. I found that Governor Hamilton was able to defend himself for a considerable time, but knew he was not able to turn out of the fort; that if the siege continued long, a superior number might come against us, as I knew there was a party of English not far above in the river; and that, if they found out our numbers, they might raise the disaffected savages and harass us. I resolved to appear as daring as possible, that the enemy might conceive by our behavior that we were very numerous and thereby probably discourage them. I immediately wrote to the inhabitants in general, informing them where I was and what I determined to do, desiring the friends to the States to keep close to their houses, and those in the British interests to repair to the fort and fight for their King; otherwise there would be no mercy shown them, — at the same time sending the compliments of several officers to some gentlemen of the town who were known to them, and who, it was expected, would reinforce me on my arrival."* The letter was then sent by the friendly prisoner — the one last taken — to the village, Clark reasoning that it would cause the lukewarm to be decided; encourage his friends; and astonish the enemy; it was in these words:

"To the Inhabitants of Vincennes:

'GENTLEMEN: — Being now within two miles of your village with my army, determined to take your fort this night,

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 66–688. As to there being a party of English not far above Vincennes, Clark had been wrongly informed.

and not being willing to surprise you, I take this step to request of such of you as are true citizens, and willing to enjoy the liberty I bring you to remain still in your houses. And those, if any there be, that are friends to the King, will instantly repair to the fort and joint the Hair-buyer General and fight like men. And if any such, as do not go to the fort shall be discovered afterwards, they may depend on severe punishment. On the contrary, those that are true friends to liberty, may depend on being well treated. And I once more request they shall keep out of the streets; for every person I find in arms on my arrival, I shall treat as an enemy.

“(Signed)

“G. R. CLARK.”*

The comments of Clark upon what took place while he remained on “Warrior’s island,” as written in after years, were as follows: “Our situation was now truly critical — no possibility of retreating in case of defeat — and in full view of a town that had, at this time, upwards of six hundred men in it — troops, inhabitants and Indians. The crew of the galley [the *Willing*] though not fifty men, would have been now a reinforcement of immense magnitude to our little army (if I may so call it), but we would not think of them. We were now in the situation that I had labored to get ourselves in. The idea of being made prisoner was foreign to almost every man, as they expected nothing but torture from the sav-

* This letter is given in “Bowman’s Journal,” in the Department of State MSS., as well as in the same printed in *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois* (p. 104). They differ somewhat in the wording, but not in sense. The one to be found in Clark’s *Memoir* — Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 146 — is identical with the last mentioned. I have followed the one in the Department of State MSS. In Clark’s Journal (entry of the 23d of Feb.) only the two principal points of the letter are mentioned, and these briefly.

ages if they fell into their hands. Our fate was now to be determined, probably in a few hours. We knew that nothing but the most daring conduct would insure success. I knew that a number of the inhabitants wished us well—that many were lukewarm to the interest of either [the Americans or British]; and I also learned that the grand chief [of the Piankeshams], the Tobacco's son, had, but a few days before, openly declared in council with the British that he was a brother and friend to the Big Knives. These were favorable circumstances; and as there was but little probability of our remaining until dark undiscovered I determined to begin the career immediately.”*

Clark now arranged his men in two divisions. In the first one were Captain Williams and his company, Captain Worthington and his company, and Captain Charleville with his Kaskaskia volunteer company. In the second division, commanded by Captain Bowman, were his own company and Captain McCarty with the Cahokia volunteers. They were ordered by the Colonel to march with the greatest regularity; and the men were enjoined to observe the commands of their officers; above all things, they were to keep silence. The five men captured in the canoes were to act as guides.†

The little army lay still until about sunset, in order to give time for the reception and reading of

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 145, 146. But he had been wrongly informed as to the open declaration of the Tobacco's son.

† Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 23, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

the letter, by the Vincennes people, when, "with colors flying and drums braced" the march began.*

Clark's letter had been carried into the town and delivered to prominent and friendly citizens.† Those of the inhabitants who caught sight of the Colonel's flags in the twilight, judged he had with him five hundred men.‡ The houses obstructed the view from the fort, so that the British did not observe the approach of the Americans, and they were not notified of it by any one.§ As the army neared Vincennes, Lieutenant Bayley, with fifteen riflemen, was detached to attack the fort, — keep up their firing, and harass the enemy until the village was gained and he should be relieved.||

According to Clark's subsequent statement, the messenger who carried his letter to the people of Vincennes was anxiously watched by the Americans until

* "Bowman's Journal." Clark, in his letter to Mason says: "I dispatched the prisoner off with this letter, waiting until near sunset giving [to give] him time to get near the town before sunset, before we marched" (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 68. The italicising is mine). But the statement in "Bowman's Journal" is the correct one: "In order [to give the bearer time] to publish this letter, we lay still to about sundown." The words "to give time" which are found in the Journal as printed are not given in the same in the Department of State MSS.

† This fact is given upon the authority of a tradition, which, seemingly, is worthy of entire credit.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. Clark had so manœuvred his men that only his colors could be seen from the town; and as these were numerous, his force was judged to be much larger than it really was. (Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 68).

§ *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, loc. cit.

|| Appendix, Note XCIV.

he entered the town; and in a few minutes they could see with their glasses some stir in the streets, great numbers running or riding out into the commons to see the approaching army, as was supposed by the Colonel and his men. But what was surprising was, that nothing happened having the appearance of the garrison being alarmed;—no drum nor gun was heard. “We began to suppose,” are Clark’s words, “that the information we got from our prisoners was false, and that the enemy already knew of us and were prepared.”

“A little before sunset,” continues Clark, “we moved and displayed ourselves in full view of the town—crowds gazing at us. We were plunging ourselves into certain destruction, or success. There was no midway thought of. We had but little to say to our men, except inculcating an idea of the necessity of obedience. We knew they did not want encouraging, and that anything might be attempted with them that was possible for such a number,—perfectly cool, under proper subordination, pleased with the prospect before them, and much attached to their officers. They all declared that they were convinced that an implicit obedience to orders was the only thing that would insure success and hoped that no mercy would be shown the person that should violate them. Such language as this from soldiers to persons in our stations must have been [was] exceedingly agreeable.”

“We moved on slowly,” adds Clark, “in full view of the town; but, as it was a point of some consequence to us to make ourselves appear as formidable [as possible], we, in leaving the covert that we were

in, marched and counter-marched in such a manner that we appeared numerous. In raising volunteers in the Illinois, every person that set about the business had a set of colors given him, which they brought with them, to the amount of ten or twelve pairs. These were displayed to the best advantage; and as the low plain we marched through was not a perfect level, but had frequent raisings in it seven or eight feet higher than the common level (which was covered with water), and as these raisings general run in an oblique direction to the town, we took advantage of one of them, marching through the water under it, which completely prevented our being numbered. But our colors showed considerably above the heights, as they were fixed on long poles procured for the purpose, and at a distance made no despicable appearance; and as our young Frenchmen had, while we lay on the Warriors' islands, decoyed and taken several fowlers with their horses, officers were mounted on these horses, and rode about more completely to deceive the enemy. In this manner all moved, and directed our march in such a way as to suffer it to be dark before we had advanced more than half way to the town. We then suddenly altered our direction and crossed ponds where they could not have suspected us."*

At eight o'clock, the Colonel reached the lower end of the town, going at once to the houses of Major Legras and Captain Bossoron.† He then took possession of the main street, putting out his guards

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 146-148.

† Chêsne's *Account* — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note XCV.)

without the least molestation,* and his long and toilsome march was ended.

“The difficulties and dangers of Colonel Clark’s march from the Illinois,” afterward wrote Hamilton, “were such as required great courage to encounter and great perseverance to overcome.”† True; but, in this admission, was there not more of an attempt on the part of the Lieutenant Governor to justify himself in not leaving Vincennes immediately after the surrender by Helm of Fort Sackville, than to praise the American commander? Be this as it may, it is certain the march was a remarkable achievement. Could the Colonel have foreseen the obstacles to be overcome, the undertaking, doubtless, would never have been resolved upon. There were perils on every side. There were raging floods encountered, to combat which seemed more like acts of reckless desperation than the determinations (which they were) of a cool and undaunted courage. Such resolution, in the face of almost interminable obstructions, the world has seldom witnessed.‡

* Clark’s *Journal* — Haldimand MSS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

‡ See Appendix, Note XCV, as to B. J. Lossing’s opinion of the difficulties encountered.

CHAPTER XIX.

IT was one of the strange incidents connected with the sudden and unexpected appearance of Clark's little army around Fort Sackville on the evening of the twenty-third of February, that the pioneers inside the fortification had already obtained knowledge of the approach of their friends. Some of those deprived of their liberty were residents of Vincennes who seemed to Hamilton not only indifferent and lukewarm in their feelings toward him, but as absolutely dangerous to the cause of Britain. They had been taken inside the fort and were still held in custody. One of these was Moses Henry, whose wife had subsequently been granted permission to supply her husband with provisions whenever she desired, from their home in the village. Soon after the arrival in Vincennes of the bearer of the Colonel's note to the inhabitants, Mrs. Henry visited her husband ostensibly to take him some supplies, but really to whisper to him the news of the approach of Clark, — the information having been conveyed by the messenger at once to persons whom he met upon his reaching town, from one of whom, she had obtained it. Henry was not long in conveying the intelligence to his fellow-prisoners, "which gave them much pleasure, particularly Captain Helm."* But all this was unknown as yet to the Lieutenant Governor.

No sooner had Lieutenant Bayley reached a position within gunshot of the fort, than he opened fire

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 149. Some additional particulars not mentioned by Clark, I am indebted for to a well-authenticated tradition.

upon it. "The garrison," wrote Clark to Mason, "had so little suspicion of what was to happen that they did not believe the firing was from an enemy until a man was wounded through the ports (which happened the third or fourth shot); they supposing it to be some drunken Indians. It was now clear to Hamilton that an enemy was assailing his post.* In a few moments, Dr. McBeath, who happened to be in the house of one of the citizens of the town at the time and who was told that Clark had arrived with five hundred men, "pushed to get to the gate" of the fort, rushed in (although narrowly escaping with his life), and reported to the Lieutenant Governor the particulars as given to him by the woman where he had been visiting.* The astonishment of the commandant may be imagined.†

"We now found," subsequently wrote Clark, "that the garrison had known nothing of us; that, having finished the fort that evening, they had amused themselves at different games, and had just retired before my letter arrived, as it was near roll call. The placard being made public, many of the inhabitants were afraid to show themselves out of the houses for fear of giving offense, and not one dare give information. Our friends flew to the commons and other convenient places to view the pleasing sight. This was observed from the garrison and the reason asked, but a satisfactory excuse was given; and as a part of the town

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. (See as to a fiction concerning Clark's appearance in Vincennes, Appendix to our narrative, Note XCVI.)

† See, for a ridiculous tradition concerning the first firing at the fort, Appendix to our narrative XCVII.

lay between our line of march and the garrison, we could not be seen by the sentinels on the walls."*

It was not long after Clark arrived in the village before he "reconnoitered about to find a place to throw up an entrenchment." One was soon found, and Captain Bowman's company set at work, — the trench to be thrown up across the main street, about two hundred yards from the fort gate†

When Hamilton became fully assured of the presence of an enemy and that the attack was by hostile riflemen, he gave orders to have the fire returned by his garrison. "But the enemy," he declares, "had a great advantage from their rifles and the cover of the church, houses and barns."‡

So soon as the firing had commenced on both sides, Clark's two divisions united — the second joining the first. The Colonel found that what had been told him by his friendly prisoner before reaching the town concerning the presence in the village of a considerable number of Indians was true; but Hamilton's dusky allies had not at any time been permitted (if, indeed, they had desired it) to take up their quarters inside the fort, but had been freely admitted within the pickets when councils were holden; so, on hearing the firing, those who remained firm to the British cause easily made their escape out of town. Of these savages were two Ottawa chiefs and "the King of the Hurons" — that is, the head chief of the Wyandots (not only of those living near Detroit but of those whose homes were upon the Sandusky) — the same

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 148.

† Not "first gate" as printed in "Bowman's Journal" — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 105.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

chief whose Indian name was Dunqua, but who was known to the English as the Half King. Captain Chêne, the interpreter, who, ever since his arrival with Hamilton had lived in the village so as always to be near the Indians, not being able after Lieutenant Bailey had reached the fort and opened fire, to get inside of it, fled also with the before mentioned savages. None of the inhabitants of Vincennes left until the next day, and then so far as is known, but two families.

As might be supposed, ammunition was, at this juncture, scarce with the Americans, as most of the stores were on board the *Willing*. Fortunately, however, when Hamilton undertook to have all the powder and ball in the town brought into the fort for the king's use (giving the owners bills for the same), Legras, Bosseron and others buried most of theirs, which they now produced, and the Colonel found himself well supplied.*

It was soon discovered by Clark that about one hundred Kickapoos and Piankeshaws had not fled the town — that, in reality, they were friends. They immediately armed themselves and offered their services in assailing the fort. The Colonel requested them to remain quiet until morning, when he would gladly accept them as his allies. "I thanked the chief for his intended service," says Clark; "told him the ill consequence of our people being mingled in the dark; and that they might lay in their quarters until daylight. He approved of it, and sent off his troops, and appeared to be much elevated himself, staying with me and giving me all the information he could."†

* Appendix, Note XCVIII.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 69.

So, also, in after years, Clark wrote: "The Tobacco's son being in town with a number of warriors, immediately mustered them and let us know he wished to join us, saying that by the morning he would have a hundred men. He received for answer that we thanked him for his friendly disposition; and as we were sufficiently strong ourselves, we wished him to desist, and that we would counsel on the subject in the morning; and as we knew there were a number of Indians in and near the town that were our enemies, some confusion might happen if our men should mix in the dark; but hoped we might be favored with his counsel and company during the night, — which was agreeable to him."*

It was not very long after the two divisions of Clark's force had united before the Virginia riflemen effectively annoyed the enemy, parties being sent by Clark for that purpose, who were posted within from eighty to one hundred yards of the fort behind houses, barns, palings and ditches, — only being dislodged by the artillery (as Hamilton, afterward, rightfully declared) from the church and some of the nearest houses † was "fine sport" — this firing on the fort — "for the 'Sons of Liberty.'" ‡

It was now that the American commandant heard of the sending out, by Hamilton, of Captain Lamothe and party, about three hours before, on their reconnoitering expedition. The Captain had got some miles from the fort when the high waters prevented him pursuing his route farther. Upon his return, on reaching "the commons behind the town," he and his party

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 149.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

‡ Bowman's *Journal* of Feb. 23, 1779.

“heard, to their great surprise, a discharge of musketry; they did not know what could be the occasion” of it. Meeting some men from the village, they were assured the “rebels” had laid close seige to the fort. Thereupon, they took refuge in a barn and awaited further news.* Meanwhile, Clark had sent out a detachment to intercept the party, — and Maisonville and another were captured and brought into town.† They were questioned as to the place of concealment of Lamothe and his party. Both declared their ignorance as to where they might be found. Maisonville was threatened to be hanged if he did not at once reveal where they were; but he still protested he did not know. He was then pinioned, a halter put around his neck, when he was led to an improvised gallows; but he was saved by the town’s people from death. He was then placed in a chair, and at Clark’s order, says Hamilton, was partially scalped, when he was again saved, this time by “rebel” intercession. It is altogether prob-

* Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*. In Hamilton’s letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781 (Germain MSS.), is the following: “They [Lamothe and his men] lost their way — night coming on — and were only apprised by the firing of cannon at the fort, that it was invested.” It is also recorded in “Bowman’s Journal” in the Department of State MSS. and in the one in print (*Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 105), upon hearsay, that hearing the firing was the cause of Lamothe’s return. But Schieffelin (in this case the better authority) clearly disproves this.

† Clark, on the twenty-third, records in his Journal that Maisonville and one man were taken, and “Bowman’s Journal” corroborates this. Hamilton only speaks of Maisonville being captured, — “having been betrayed and delivered to the rebels by his own cousin.” (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.)

able that Maisonville and the other prisoner had, in the darkness, as they were returning, become separated from the balance of the party, and could not, therefore, give any information as to where their companions were.*

The American commander, in a general description given not long after, of affairs during the night, says he made the attack on the fort at seven o'clock, before they knew of his coming; and that he had no expectation of gaining it until the arrival of his artillery. The moon set at about one o'clock, and he then, in the darkness, had an entrenchment thrown up within rifle-shot of the strongest battery of the enemy, and, as he declares, "poured such a shower of well-directed balls into their ports, that we silenced two pieces of cannon in fifteen minutes, without getting a man hurt."†

"In a few hours," adds the Colonel concerning the seige, in another account, "I found my prize sure,—I was certain of taking every man that I could have wished for, being the whole of those that incited the Indians to war. All my past sufferings vanished. Never was a man more happy. There was wanted no encouragement from any officer to inflame our troops with a martial spirit. The knowledge of the person they attacked and the thoughts of their massacred

* Appendix, Note XCIX.

† Clark to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779—*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n. The Colonel says that "the town immediately surrendered with joy"—that is, they welcomed the Americans to the place; "and," he adds "assisted in the siege." But there was no assistance, to speak of, until the next morning. There was a continued fire on both sides," is the Colonel's farther declaration, "for eighteen hours." This is error, as will be presently seen.

friends were sufficient. I knew that I could not afford to lose men; and I took the greatest care of them I possibly could; at the same time, I encouraged them to be daring but prudent. Every place near the fort that could cover them was crowded, and a very heavy firing during the night was kept up. I had flung up a considerable entrenchment before the gate [of the fort] where I intended to plant my artillery when it arrived [on the *Willing*].”*

But more circumstantial is the portrayal by Clark of the beginning of the siege, as made by him years after. “The garrison,” he wrote, “was soon completely surrounded, and the firing continued without intermission (except about fifteen minutes a little before day), until about nine o’clock the following morning. It was kept up by the whole of the troops — joined by a few of the young men of the town who got permission — except fifty men kept as a reserve. . . . I had made myself fully acquainted with the situation of the fort and town, and the ports relative to each. The cannon of the garrison were on the upper floors of strong blockhouses at each angle of the fort eleven feet above the surface; and the ports so badly cut that many of our troops lay under the fire of them within twenty or thirty yards of the walls. They [the garrison] did no damage except to the buildings of the town, some of which they much shattered; and their musketry in the dark employed against woodsmen covered by houses, palings, ditches and the banks of the river, was but of little avail against us and did us no injury except wounding a man or two.”

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 70.

“As we could not afford to lose men,” continues Clark, “great care was taken to preserve them sufficiently covered, and keep up a hot fire in order to intimidate the enemy as well as to destroy them. The embrasures of their cannon were frequently shut, for our riflemen finding the true direction of them would pour in such vollies when they were opened that the men could not stand to their guns — seven or eight of them in a short time got cut down. Our troops would frequently abuse the enemy in order to aggravate them to open their ports and fire their cannon that they might have the pleasure of shooting them with their rifles — fifty of which, perhaps, would be leveled the moment a port flew open; and I believe that if they had stood at their artillery, the greater part of them would have been destroyed in the course of the night, as the larger portion of our men lay within thirty yards of the walls, and in a few hours were covered equally to those within the fort, and much more experienced in that mode of fighting.

“Sometimes an irregular fire as hot as possible,” is the further language of Clark, “was kept up from different directions for a few minutes, and then only a continual scattering one at the ports as usual; and a great noise and laughter immediately commenced in different parts of the town, by the reserved parties, as if they had only fired on the fort a few minutes for amusement, and as if those firing at the walls were only regularly relieved. Conduct similar to this kept the garrison constantly alarmed. They did not know what moment they might be stormed or [blown up] as they could plainly discover that we had flung up some entrenchments across the streets and appeared to be very

busy under the bank of the river, which was within thirty feet of the fort. The situation of the magazine we knew well. Captain Bowman began some works in order to blow it up in case our artillery should arrive; but as we knew that we were daily liable to be overpowered by the numerous bands of Indians on the river in case they had again joined the enemy (the certainty of which we were acquainted with), we resolved to lose no time, but to get the fort in our possession as soon as possible. If the vessel [the *Willing*] did not arrive before the ensuing night we resolved to undermine the fort, and fixed on the spot and plan of executing this work, which we intended to commence the next day.”*

Hamilton's officers inside the fort were exposed to the fire of Clark's riflemen as they occupied tents and had ever since getting possession of the place — the picketing of the fortification being so poorly set up that one might pass the hand clinched between the uprights. “Though the night was dark,” says Hamilton, “we had a sergeant matross and five men wounded. The weather was still so cold, we were obliged to bring the wounded into our own quarters.”†

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 149–151. But, in this relation, there is exaggeration, and some errors both by inference and direct statement, which are manifest from what has already been shown and what will be presently given. Clark's language I have not followed in all instances literally, but have preserved his meaning strictly.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. The “sergeant matross” spoken of by Hamilton, is mentioned in Chêsne's Account as the “master gunner.” Chêsne was told that this soldier and five others had been killed; but they were, as stated by Hamilton, only wounded.

Throughout the night the inhabitants of Vincennes remained, most of them, in their houses, giving the Americans no trouble. Colonel Clark had little or no fear of hostility on their part.

Lamothe and his men remained concealed in the barn where they had taken refuge, until daylight, when they made a rush for the fort and got inside without the loss of a man.* Clark says, in writing a few months afterward of their successful exploit, that he was convinced they would make off at daybreak if they could not rejoin their friends; so, finding all endeavors fruitless to take them (ending, as these efforts had, in the capture only of Maisonville and one other), he withdrew his troops a little farther from the pickets in order to give them an opportunity to get in. This Lamothe accomplished "much to his credit," the Colonel declares, "and my satisfaction, as I preferred the garrison should receive that reinforcement rather than he and his men should be at large among the savages."†

The account given by Hamilton of Lamothe's reaching the inside of the fort shows he had no suspicion of Clark's design: "We despaired of Captain Lamothe's party regaining the fort; but, to our great surprise and joy, about half an hour before sunrise, they appeared and got into the fort over the stockades (which were upright and eleven feet out of the ground) with their arms in their hands. Two Canadians of his company had deserted the preceding night."‡

* Schieffelin's *Loose Notes* — *Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 187.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 71. Compare "Bowman's Journal" under date of Feb. 23d.

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. Hamilton, in the same letter, speaks of Lamothe and his men

In after years, in recording his recollections of the events connected with the successful endeavor of Lamothe to get inside the fort, Clark says: "As almost the whole of the persons who were most active in the Department of the Detroit were either in the fort or with Captain Lamothe, I got extremely uneasy for fear that he would not fall into our power, — knowing that he would go off, if he could not get into the fort in the course of the night. Finding that, without some unforeseen accident, the fort must inevitably be ours, and that a reinforcement of twenty men, although considerable to them, would not be of great moment to us in the present situation of affairs, and knowing we had weakened them by killing or wounding many of their gunners, after some deliberation we concluded to risk the reinforcement in preference of his going again among the Indians; the garrison had at least a month's provisioning, and if they could hold out, in the course of that time he might do us much damage [outside the fortification]."

"A little before day," adds Clark, "the troops were withdrawn from their positions about the fort, except a few parties of observation, and the firing totally ceased. Orders were given in case of Lamothe's approach, not to alarm or fire on him, without a certainty of killing or taking the whole. In less than a

"returning to the village, and finding it impossible to make their way good [into the fort], they concealed themselves in a barn, sending from time to time, one of their number to explore and make report. but as they employed Canadians, none of them returned." Now, it is evident, that none were sent "to explore and make report;" and that Maisonville and his companion were the "two Canadians," that he speaks of (though erroneously) as having deserted.

quarter of an hour he passed within ten feet of an officer and a party that lay concealed. Ladders were flung over to them [by the garrison], and as they mounted them our party shouted. Many of them fell from the top of the walls — some within and others back; but, as they were not fired on, they all got over, much to the joy of their friends. But, on considering the matter, they must have been convinced that it was a scheme of ours to let them in, and that we were so strong as to care little about them or of the manner of their getting into the garrison.”*

Captain Chêne and the three chiefs who had so unceremoniously fled on Clark's arrival secreted themselves in a wood about a mile and a half out of the town, where they heard “a smart firing all night, and now and then, a great gun from the fort.” About eleven o'clock, they attempted to enter the village, “but not finding it practicable, they returned again to the wood; and, in the morning, they were joined by Petit Gres, chief of the Miamis, and three of his people.”† Chêne, so soon as he had fully satisfied himself of the true state of affairs started for Detroit to bear the news to Captain Lermoult. That he made quick time on his return is not to be doubted.†

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 151, 152. But, when he says the Americans knew that their firing “had weakened them [the enemy] by killing or wounding many of their gunners,” Clark was drawing, certainly, on his imagination. And, as to the garrison “having, on considering the matter,” “been convinced that it was a scheme” of the Americans “to let them in,” it is only necessary to refer to Hamilton's letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781 (Germain MSS.), to refute the idea.

† Chêne's *Account* having been verbally given to Captain Lermoult of course is not dated; but from a letter the latter

Immediately after the return of Lamothe and his party, Hamilton perceiving the works thrown up by Clark, began to play his small arms very briskly but could not bring his cannon to bear on them; so the firing from the fort was but slack after sunrise.*

About sixty of the inhabitants of Vincennes now joined the Colonel's force,† behaving, in general, exceedingly well. The Wabash Indians were also permitted, at this juncture, to assist the Americans.‡

After Lamothe's return, "the firing," says Clark, "immediately commenced on both sides with double vigor; and I believe that more noise could not have been made by the same number of men — their shouts could not be heard for the firearms; but a continual blaze was kept around the garrison, without much being done, until about daybreak [sunrise], when our troops were drawn off to posts prepared for them, about sixty or seventy yards from the fort. . . . To have stood to their cannon would have destroyed their men without a probability of doing much service. Our situation was nearly similar. It would have been imprudent in either party to have wasted their men, without some decisive stroke required it. Thus the attack

wrote to Col. Bolton we can readily see that the escaped Frenchman did not tarry on his way back.

* Clark's *Journal* — Haldimand MSS. Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*. Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Haldimand MSS. Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 71.

‡ This is to be inferred from what subsequently took place, as given in detail by Clark to Mason. All contemporary accounts are silent as to the aid given Clark by these Indians.

continued until about nine o'clock on the morning of the twenty-fourth.*"

Clark some time before eight o'clock in the forenoon had received from the inhabitants of Vincennes such a description of the prisoners lately brought into the fort from the Ohio river by Maisonville as induced him to believe they were an express from Williamsburg on their way to Kaskaskia with papers and letters to him from Governor Henry, of Virginia, (but in this he was mistaken as he afterward discovered); so, at the hour just named, he ordered the firing to cease, intending to send a flag to Hamilton demanding a surrender, at the same time to give him to understand that, if he destroyed any papers or letters taken from prisoners, or injured the houses of the inhabitants with his artillery, punishment of the severest kind might be expected in the event the Lieutenant Governor should be captured.†

The determination of the American commander was now carried out. He at once wrote to Hamilton:

"SIR:—In order to save yourself from the impending storm that now threatens you, I order you immediately to surrender yourself up, with all your garrison, stores, etc., etc.; for, if I am obliged to storm, you may depend on such treatment [as is] justly due to a murderer. Beware of destroying stores of any kind, or any papers or letters that are

* Clark's *Memoir*—Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 152.

† Both Clark and Hamilton declare the firing ceased at eight o'clock (Clark's *Journal*, Feb. 24, 1779—Haldimand MSS.; also, his letter to Mason—*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 71; and Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781—Germain MSS.): now, as it began about seven o'clock the previous evening, it could not have been continuous for eighteen hours, as stated by the Colonel in his letter of April 29, 1779. to the Governor of Virginia. "Bowman's Journal" says, by inference, that the firing ceased about nine o'clock.

in your possession, or hurting one house in the town; for, by Heavens, if you do, there shall be no mercy shown you.

“(Signed)

“G. R. CLARK.”*

This letter was then sent to the Lieutenant Governor.

Clark's subsequent recollection of the incident agrees with his statement made a short time after the event occurred: “Learning that the two prisoners they had brought in the day before had a considerable number of letters with them, I supposed it an express that we expected about this time, which I knew to be of the greatest moment to us as we had not received one since our arrival in the country; and not being fully acquainted with the character of our enemy, we were doubtful that those papers might be destroyed,—to prevent which I sent a flag [with the letter] demanding the garrison.”†

The troops of Clark's command took advantage of the occasion to provide themselves with breakfast,—“it being the only meal of victuals since the eighteenth.‡”

“About eight o'clock,” are the words of Hamilton, “a flag of truce from the rebels appeared, carried by Nicolas Cardinal, a captain of the militia of Vincennes, who delivered me a letter from Colonel Clark requiring me to surrender at discretion, adding, with

* “Bowman's Journal” in the Department of State MSS. As printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois* (pp. 105, 106), the words “or hurting one house in the town,” are omitted. But in printing the letter, Dillon, in his *History of Indiana*, pp. 152, 153, gives them. They are likewise retained in *Clark's Journal*, in the Haldimand MSS., where he speaks of the letter.

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 152.

‡ “Bowman's Journal” of the 24th of Feb.

an oath, that if I destroyed any stores or papers, I should be treated as a murderer. Having assembled the officers, and read them this letter, I told them my intention was to undergo any extremity rather than trust to the direction of such sort of people as we had to deal with. They all approved of the resolution, on which I assembled the men and informed them of our determination. The English assured me they would defend the King's colors to the last, adding an homely but hearty phrase that they would stick to me as the shirt to my back. They then gave three cheers. The French, on the contrary, hung their heads."*

Thereupon the Lieutenant Governor answered the Colonel's letter, sending (on a card) a most manly and soldierly reply in these words: "Governor Hamilton begs leave to acquaint Col. Clark that he and his garrison are not disposed to be awed into an action unworthy a British subject."†

"I then ordered out parties to attack the fort," says the American commander, "and the firing began very smartly on both sides."‡ "One of my men," are the Colonel's words in his record of the day, "through a bravery only known but to Americans, walking carelessly up the main street, was slightly wounded over

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† "Bowman's Journal." See, also, Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 71; Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.; Clark's *Journal*, under date of Feb. 24, 1779, in Haldimand MSS.; also, Schieffelin's *Loose Notes*.

‡ Clark's *Journal*, Feb. 24, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. "Bowman's Journal" same date. Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 71. Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.

the left eye, but in no wise dangerous."* Subsequent to this Clark wrote:

"The firing then commenced warmly [and continued so] for a considerable time; and we were obliged to be careful in preventing our men from exposing themselves too much, as they were now much animated, having been refreshed during the flag. They frequently mentioned their wishes to storm the place and put an end to the business at once. . . The firing was heavy through every crack that could be discovered in any part of the fort."†

"Lamothe's volunteers," says the Lieutenant Governor, ruefully, "now began to murmur, saying it was very hard to be obliged to fight against their countrymen and relatives, who they now perceived had joined the Americans. They made half our number, and after such a declaration were not to be trusted. The Englishmen wounded (six in number) were a sixth of those we could depend on, and duty would every hour fall heavier on the remaining few. Considering we were at the distance of six hundred miles from succor, that if we did not burn the village we left the enemy a most advantageous cover against us; and that if we did, we had nothing to expect after rejecting the first terms but the extremity of revenge, I took up the determination of accepting honorable terms if they could be procured; else, to abide the worst."

* Clark's *Journal*, Feb. 24, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. "Bowman's Journal" speaks of the man being wounded; but the words there given carry the idea that it happened soon after daylight and of course before the Colonel sent his flag to Hamilton. I have followed Clark's account, however, because his explanation makes it the more probable.

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 153.

"I stated," adds the Lieutenant Governor, "these considerations to the officers first, who allowed them to be reasonable, then to the men, who very reluctantly admitted them. And here I must declare that if the defense of the fort had depended on the spirit and courage of the English only, the rebels would have lost their labor."*

It was now nearly mid-day, and of a sudden the firing from the fort was suspended. It had continued for about two hours. The Colonel was determined to listen to no terms whatever until he was in possession of the fort—keeping only a part of his troops in action while the residue were making necessary preparations for an assault, in which the inhabitants of the town were willing to assist, but they were not called upon by Clark.† Immediately following the suspension of firing by Hamilton was the appearance of a flag of truce sent by him.‡

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. Besides the six Englishmen wounded there, was one other ("Bowman's Journal," Department of State MSS.) — probably one of the volunteers (French). "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS., has this record after mentioning the capture of Maisonville: "Smart firing all night on both sides. The cannon played smartly. Not one of our men wounded. Seven men in the fort badly wounded." But the account as printed — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 105 — leaves out much of this. It says: "The cannon played smartly. Not one of our men wounded. Men in the fort badly wounded."

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 71.

‡ The declaration in "Bowman's Journal" (see Department of State MSS., also *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 106) that "several of the men in the fort [being] wounded through the port-holes . . . caused [Lieutenant] Governor Hamil-

"About twelve o'clock the firing from the fort suspended," says Clark, "and I perceived a flag coming out. I ordered my people to stop firing. . . I soon saw it was Captain Helm."*

"After salutations," continued Clark, "[Captain Helm] informed me that the purport of his commission was, that Lieutenant Governor Hamilton was willing to surrender up the fort and garrison, provided Colonel Clark would grant him honorable terms; and that he begged the American Commander to come into the fort and confer with him." "First, I desired," continues Clark, "Captain Helm not to give any intelligence of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton's strength, he (Helm) being on his parole; second, my answer to Hamilton was that I should not agree to any terms but that he should immediately surrender at discretion. I allowed him half an hour to consider of this. As to my entering the fort, my officers and men would not allow it, for it was with difficulty I restrained them from storming the garrison. I dismissed Captain Helm with my answer."†

When the time allowed by Clark was up, Captain Helm came back with Hamilton's second proposals, which were as follows:

"Lieutenant Governor Hamilton proposes to Colonel Clark a truce for three days, during which time

ton to send out a flag," does not seem warranted by the facts; — certainly it is not correct according to Hamilton's statement.

* Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 24th, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. The Colonel nowhere else mentions the *first* appearance of Captain Helm except incidentally. Hamilton does not refer to it directly or indirectly in his letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781.

† Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 24, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

he promises there shall be no defensive works carried on in the garrison, on condition Colonel Clark shall observe on his part a like cessation of any offensive work; that he wishes to confer with Colonel Clark as soon as can be; and further proposes that whatever may pass between them two and any other person mutually agreed upon to be present, shall remain a secret till matters be finally concluded, as he wishes whatever the result of their conference may be [it may tend] to the honor and credit of each party. If Colonel Clark makes a difficulty of coming into the fort Lieutenant Governor Hamilton will speak to him before the gate."†

"I was," are the subsequent words of Clark, "at a great loss to conceive what reason Lieutenant Governor Hamilton could have for wishing a truce of three days on such terms as he proposed. Numbers said it was a scheme to get me into their possession. I had a different opinion and no idea of his possessing such sentiments, as an act of that kind would infallibly ruin him. Although we had the greatest reason to expect a reinforcement [from the *Willing*] in less than three days that would at once put an end to the siege, I yet did not think it prudent to agree to the proposals."‡

† "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note C.)

‡ Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 153, 154.

CHAPTER XX.

BEFORE a reply to Hamilton's second message was prepared, to be taken back by Captain Helm, an incident occurred tragic in its results. "This moment," wrote Clark at the time, "I received intelligence that a party of Indians was coming up from the Falls [of the Ohio] with prisoners or scalps. They had been sent out by Lieutenant Governor Hamilton for that purpose." "My people," he adds, "were so enraged that they immediately intercepted them."* They consisted of eight Indians under the lead of two Frenchmen of the fort garrison. Three Indians were killed on the spot and four brought in — one only making his escape. The two white men were also captured. The savages who were made prisoners were tomahawked in the street opposite the fort gate and then thrown into the river. The two Frenchmen were dressed in Indian style, but were seen to be white men; and Clark ordered them also to be put to death. One had a father present whose name was St. Croix, who was a lieutenant in Captain McCarty's company. He recognized his son's voice; and the parent's earnest solicitations saved him. The other was rescued by his sister, "whose husband was a merchant" in Vincennes. There were but two prisoners brought in by the war party on its return and these fortunately escaped death. They were Frenchmen and had been hunting on the Ohio. They were, of course, quickly released.†

* Clark's *Journal* — Haldimand MSS. The Colonel, in speaking of the "Falls," refers to the Falls of the Ohio. "My people" means, of course, his soldiers.

† Appendix, Note CI.

Colonel Clark now sent in his reply by Captain Helm to the commander of Fort Sackville:

"Colonel Clark's compliments to Mr. Hamilton, and begs leave to inform him that Col. Clark will not agree to any other terms than that of Mr. Hamilton's surrendering himself and garrison prisoners at discretion.

"If Mr. Hamilton is desirous of a conference with Col. Clark, he will meet him at the church with Captain Helm.

"Feb'y. 24th, 1779.

"G. R. CLARK.

"L't. Gov'r. Henry Hamilton."*

Clark immediately repaired to the church to confer with Hamilton, where he met him and Captain Helm.† "Governor Hamilton then begged that I would consider the situation of both parties," says the American commander; "that he was willing to surrender the garrison, but was in hopes that Colonel Clark would let him do it with honor." "I answered him that I had been informed that he had eight hundred men;—'I have not that number, but I came to fight as many.' Governor Hamilton then replied: 'Who could have given you this false information?' 'I am, sir,' replied I, 'well acquainted with your strength and force and am able to take your fort; therefore I will give you

* "Bowman's Journal"—Department of State MSS. The same Journal, printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 107, leaves out the word "leave" after "begs," substitutes "he" for "Col. Clark," and has only the initials "G. R. C." signed at the bottom. Clark in his Journal (Haldimand MSS.) and in his letter to Mason (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 72) gives the substance of his reply only.

† Clark's *Journal*—entry of Feb. 24, 1779—Haldimand MSS. Consult, also, Clark's *Memoir*—Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 154. Except in the two places just cited Captain Helm's name is nowhere mentioned as accompanying Hamilton on this his first interview with the American commander.

no other terms but to submit yourself and garrison to my discretion and mercy."

The rejoinder of Hamilton was that his men were brave and willing to stand by him to the last; "and if," he declared, "I cannot surrender on honorable terms, I will fight it out to the last." The answer to this, by Clark was, that it would give his men infinite satisfaction and pleasure to fight; it was their desire. The Lieutenant Governor then left the Colonel "and went a few paces aloof."

Clark thus continues his account of the interview: "I told Captain Helm — 'Sir, you are a prisoner on your parole; I desire you to re-conduct Lieutenant Hamilton into the fort and there remain until I retake you.' Hamilton then returned, saying — 'Colonel Clark, why will you force me to dishonor myself, when you cannot acquire more honor by it?' I told him — 'Could I look on you as a gentleman, I would do to the utmost of my power [to favor you]; but, on you, sir, who has embued your hands in the blood of our women and children, — honor, my country, everything, calls on me aloud for vengeance. GOVERNOR HAMILTON: 'I know, sir, my character has been stained, but not deservedly; for I have always endeavored to instill humanity, as much as in my power, [into the minds of] the Indians whom the orders of my superiors obliged me to employ.' COLONEL CLARK: 'Sir, speak no more on this subject; my blood glows within my veins to think of the cruelties your Indian parties have committed; therefore, repair to your fort and prepare for battle'; on which I turned away; and the Lieutenant Governor and Captain Helm went towards the fort. The latter then said — 'Gentlemen, pray do

not be warm; strive to save many lives which may be useful to their country, which must unavoidably be sacrificed in case you do not agree': on which, we again conferred."*

It is the declaration of the Colonel subsequently made that the British commander "received such treatment, at this conference, as a man of his known barbarity deserved." "I would not come upon terms with him; and I recommended to him to defend himself with spirit and bravery; that it was the only thing that would induce me to treat him and his garrison with lenity, in case I stormed the fort, which he might expect. He asked me what more I could require than the offers he had already made. I told him (which was really the truth) that I wanted a sufficient excuse to put all the Indians and partisans to death, as the greatest part of these villians was then with him. All his propositions were refused. He asked me if nothing would do but fighting. I knew of nothing else."†

Hamilton's account of the conference is a studied attempt to excuse himself to his Commander-in-chief for the misfortune which, it may be premised, soon overtook him: "He [Clark] told me that it was in vain to think of persisting in the defense of the fort; that his cannon would be up in a few hours; that he

* Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 24. This is the only account *written at the time*, so far as known, detailing the conversation between Clark and Hamilton. There were other "talks," as will be presently shown. The one just given is so connected in the Colonel's *Journal* with other matters that it there seems (though erroneously) to have been not only the *first* but the *only* conversation held by them.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 72.

knew to a man who might be depended upon with every other circumstance of my situation; that if, from a spirit of obstinacy I persisted when there was no probability of relief and should stand an assault, not a single soul should be spared. I replied that, though my numbers were small, I could depend on them. He said he knew I had but thirty-five or thirty-six staunch men; that it was but folly to think of defense with so small numbers so overmatched; that if I would surrender at discretion and trust to his generosity, I should receive better treatment than if I articted for terms. My answer was, that I would then abide by the consequences and never take so disgraceful a step, while I had ammunition and provisions.

“You will be answerable,” he said, “for the lives lost by your obstinacy.” I said my men had declared they would die with arms in their hands rather than surrender at discretion; that still I would accept such terms as might consort with my honor and duty.”

The suggestion of Hamilton that Clark might present articles of capitulation for his consideration was met, says the Lieutenant Governor, by his remarking that “he would think upon it and return in half an hour.”* Thereupon they separated, — the British commander returning to the fort and the American going to his head quarters. This ended the first conference.

At the appointed time Clark returned with Captain Bowman, and Hamilton, with Major Hay, went to meet them. “The soldiers,” says the Lieutenant Governor, “in the mean time, apprehensive of some ill design, manned the east blockhouse ready to fire at an

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

instant. The conversation was resumed, and Colonel Clark appeared as determined as before. "I then said further discourse was vain; that I would return to the fort, and, to prevent mistakes, the firing should not take place for an hour after our parting. [I] took my leave, and was proceeding to the fort, when Major Hay and Captain Bowman called me back. The subject was renewed."*

Hamilton then begged Clark to stay until he could return to the garrison and consult his officers. "Being indifferent about him," says the Colonel, "and wanting a few moments for my troops to refresh themselves, I told him that the firing should not commence until such an hour; that during that time he was at liberty to pass with safety."†

Hamilton and Clark again met.‡ The former then produced a series of articles of capitulation for the consideration of the American commander:

"ARTICLE 1ST. Lieutenant Governor Hamilton engages to deliver up to Col. Clark, Fort Sackville as it is at present with all the stores, ammunition and provision, reserving only thirty-six rounds of powder and ball per man, and as many weeks' provisions as shall be sufficient to conduct those of the garrison, who shall go by land or water to their destination.

"2D. The garrison are to deliver themselves as prisoners of war and to march out with their arms, accoutrements and

* Id. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CII.)

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 72, 73.

‡ Id., p. 74. That this was the *third* meeting and at the church, is evident. "Governor Hamilton," says Clark in his letter to Gov. Henry of April 29, 1779, (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222n), "and myself had on the following day (Feb. 24), *several conferences.*" [The italicising is mine].

knapsacks, — a guide or guides to be given with a safe-guard to escort the garrison to their destination, as also horses for the transport of provisions, provided the garrison marches by land.

“3D. The garrison [is] not to be delivered up until the person employed by Col. Clark shall receive an account of the stores, etc.

“4TH. Three days' time from the signing of the articles [is] to be allowed the garrison to provide shoes, etc., necessary for the journey (if by land) and for baking bread, as also for settling the accounts with the traders of this post.

“5TH. Officers or others of the garrison who have families [are] to be allowed to return to their homes on promise of not acting during the present contest between Great Britain and America.

“6TH. The sick and wounded are recommended to the humanity and generosity of Col. Clark; any charge incurred by them to be discharged by Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, who will leave a draft for 50£ New York currency, for their use.

“7TH. Officers [are] to take their private baggage.”

“Signed at Fort Sackville, Feb'y. 24, 1779.

“H. HAMILTON.”*

These articles were promptly refused by Clark.†

* These articles, although printed in several of the Eastern papers in 1779, are not heretofore to be found in any work on Western history. The substance of them (except the first, which is not mentioned) is given in Hamilton's letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781. But he then erroneously gives them as his *first* propositions sent out to Colonel Clark.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 74. In “Bowman's Journal” of Feb. 24, 1779, the words are: “Governor Hamilton produced certain articles of capitulation, which were refused,” — showing they were not sent by Hamilton but presented in person. Upon this point, the Lieutenant Governor, in his letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781, gets confused — evidently his recollection is at fault; for he says that then the Colonel agreed to his *sending* terms

The American commander records that "Hamilton then said — 'Is there nothing to be done but fighting?' 'Yes, sir,' I replied, 'I will send you such articles as I think proper to allow; if you accept them, well. I will give you half an hour to consider them': on which, Captain Helm came with me to take them when drawn up, to the Lieutenant Governor."* And Hamilton returned to the fort.

Having assembled his officers, Colonel Clark conferred with them and it was finally determined to send to Hamilton ("it was about the close of the evening") articles, by which the latter engaged to surrender to the former, Fort Sackville, as it then was, with all its stores, ammunition, provisions, etc., etc.; the garrison to deliver themselves up as prisoners of war, and march out with their arms, accoutrements, knapsacks, etc., at ten o'clock next day; three days to be allowed them to settle their accounts with the inhabitants and traders of Vincennes; and the officers to be allowed their necessary baggage, etc.

These articles were taken inside the fort by Captain Helm for Hamilton's consideration. "I agreed to them," says the Lieutenant Governor, "having first called the officers together and explained to them the

for his (Clark's) consideration, and that they were *sent* the same evening.

* Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 24, 1779 — Haldimand MSS. But the Colonel, in his record of that day, connects these words immediately with the first conversation, thereby leaving it to be inferred that there was but *one* conference. This is error as already shown. "Bowman's Journal" has the following, after mentioning the fact that Hamilton's articles of capitulation were refused: "The Colonel told him he would consult with his officers and let him know the terms he would capitulate on [meaning, the terms he would grant him]."

necessity of the step. The men were then assembled, and were convinced that no advantage to his Majesty's service could result from our holding out in our present circumstances."

Within the time limited, Captain Helm returned with the articles signed by the Lieutenant Governor, with these words written above his signature: "Agreed to, for the following reasons: the remoteness from succors; the state and quantity of provisions; unanimity of officers and men on its expediency; the honorable terms allowed and, lastly, the confidence in a generous enemy."*

Among the reasons not mentioned by the British commander in giving his assent to these articles (if we are to believe what he afterward asserted) were the treachery of one half the little garrison, the certainty of the inhabitants of the village having joined the rebels, the northeast angle of the fort projecting over a sand bank already considerably undermined, the miserable state of the wounded men, and the impossibility of effecting our escape by water.† Hamilton, at the same time, attempts to apologize for the use of the words — "the confidence in a generous

* Clark's *Journal* — entry of Feb. 24. "Bowman's Journal" — entry of the same date; but there is a difference in the wording of the articles (though the meaning is essentially the same) in the printed *Journal* from the MSS. copy. Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 75. Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS. No two of these are the same, word for word. I have followed Clark's *Journal*, as near as may be, in the text; but, for an exact copy of the Articles, see Appendix to our narrative, Note CIII.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CIV.)

enemy": "If it be considered that we were to leave our wounded men at the mercy of a man who had shown such instances of ferocity as Colonel Clark had lately, a compliment bespeaking his generosity and humanity may possibly find excuse with some as I know it has censure from others."

After having given the necessary orders for the surrender of the fort on the morrow according to the terms of the capitulation agreed upon, the Lieutenant Governor "passed the night in sorting papers and in preparing for the disagreeable ceremony of the next day. Mortification, disappointment and indignation had their turns."

"The business being now nearly at an end," says Clark in an after-recollection of the matter, "troops were posted in several strong houses around the garrison and patrolled during the night to prevent any deception that might be attempted. The remainder on duty lay on their arms and for the first time for many days past got some rest."*

About ten o'clock of the following morning (the twenty-fifth), Captain Bowman and Captain McCarty's companies paraded on each side of the gate of the fort.† Hamilton and his men then marched out, "with fixed bayonets," as he declares, "and the soldiers with their knapsacks,—the colors had not been hoisted

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 156, 157.

† "Bowman's Journal" says the two companies were "paraded on *one* side of the fort gate [the italicising is mine];" but this is error as shown by Chêne, who says (in his *Account*) they were "drawn up on *each* side of the fort gate" (the word "each" being italicised by myself).

. . . that we might be spared the mortification of hauling them down;”* and the whole force of the garrison, seventy-nine in number, was surrendered to the two Captains just mentioned as prisoners of war.† Considerable stores also fell into the hands of the victors. “Besides the provisions, clothing and stores belonging to the king,” says the Lieutenant Governor, “all the private baggage of the officers fell into the possession of Colonel Clark.”‡

“It had been told Colonel Clark,” is the declaration of Hamilton, “that we had labored all night to lay powder-chests under the gateway, and had planted the six-pounder loaded with grape, which, by a train, was to destroy the rebels as they entered to take possession. This report may reasonably be imputed to the invention of the French inhabitants, since they had the effrontery to give Colonel Clark a written account of cruelties exercised by us . . . which our own American prisoners confuted in their accounts to the Colonel.”§

Colonel Clark, with Captain Williams and Captain Worthington's companies, now marched inside the fortification, relieved the sentries, hoisted the American colors, and secured all the arms. The Lieutenant Governor then marched back to the fort and shut the

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Clark to Gov. Henry, April 29, 1779. — *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n. “Bowman's Journal.” Butler's *Kentucky*, pp. 86, 87. Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 157. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXVI.)

‡ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. The value of the stores “belonging to the King” is nowhere estimated by Hamilton or Clark in any of their statements.

§ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

gate. Thirteen guns were attempted to be fired, one for each of the thirteen states, "during which time there happened a very unlucky accident through mismanagement" after the ninth discharge. There blew up twenty-six six-pound cartridges in one of the batteries, which much hurt Captain Bowman, Captain Worthington, and four privates.*

And now Fort Sackville was again in possession of Americans, and its name changed to "Fort Patrick Henry." Hamilton attributed his failure, "chiefly, if not entirely" to the treachery of the persons whom, he declares afterward to his Commander-in-chief, he "had reason to expect lenity and moderation would have gained and whose interest it was to be faithful." He refers, of course, to the inhabitants of Vincennes. While giving Clark credit for a due amount of courage and perseverance in marching against Fort Sackville, he declares it is not for him to determine whether the Colonel was entitled to success or not in its capture. "In trusting to traitors," says the Lieutenant Governor, "he was more fortunate than myself." As to the Canadians who went from Detroit upon the expedition, he declares there was but little choice among them. The arts of some rebel emissaries and the intrigues of persons still attached to the interests of France, got the better of the good intentions they might have set out with. "If my conduct," he says, in writing the Commander-in-chief, "appears to your Excellency in a justified light, I may hope to be more pitied than blamed ;

* "Bowman's Journal" — Department of State MSS. Compare same in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 108. Chêne says (in his Account) he was told there were but nine guns heard. (See further as to this mishap, Appendix to our narrative, Note CV.)

at least, your approbation will enable me to support the weight of that censure which seldom fails to accompany an unsuccessful enterprise."*

In one thing, at least, Hamilton got the better of Clark;—he conducted the conferences had with the Colonel with consummate skill, making use of Captain Helm (who, naturally, could not relish the idea of being inside the fort, even though an American and well known to the assailants, when assaulted by Virginia riflemen) very effectively as a go-between. By yielding as it were, point by point only after strong efforts to maintain each, and by a firm declaration often repeated to die rather than surrender at discretion, he finally succeeded in almost forcing from the American commander honorable terms of capitulation. This was strategy of a high order. It was, almost from the firing of the first gun, evidently the only hope of the Lieutenant Governor to obtain from his assailant *some* terms which should prevent an indiscriminate slaughter of his men when the fort should be taken; and in this he was successful.

The spirit and assurance manifested by Clark in marching openly into Vincennes was, of course, the result of his having learned that the inhabitants were friendly. He believed he could not be deceived, and he was not. His bravery in assailing the fort was due, at first, largely to the circumstance that his artillery was hourly expected and he would secure meanwhile advantageous situations for planting his guns.†

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Appendix, Note CVI.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE sending by Hamilton, on the last day of January, of Commissary Adhemar St. Martin, with ten boats and thirty of the inhabitants of Vincennes, to Fort Miami — head of the Maumee — for provisions and stores which had been forwarded from Detroit, had already been made known to Clark; and he lost no time in fitting out an expedition to capture the whole, before news could reach Adhemar of the surrender of Hamilton.

On the day after the occupation of the fort by the Americans, the Colonel ordered Captain Helm, Moses Henry, Major Legras and Captain Bosseron with fifty men of the Vincennes militia (Legras and Bosseron having assumed the command of which they had been deprived by Hamilton) to proceed up the Wabash with three boats, each armed with a swivel, to intercept the convoy.* “Knowing,” says Clark, “that Governor Hamilton had sent a party of men up the Wabash to Orne [Fort Miami] for stores that he had left there, which must be on their return, I waited about twelve hours for the arrival of the galley [the Willing] to intercept them; but fearing their getting intelligence, I dispatched Captain Helm with a party in armed boats [to capture them].”† This was on the twenty-sixth of February.

* “Bowman’s Journal” — Department of State MSS.; but in the same when printed (*Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 108), Capt. Bosseron’s name is omitted.

† Clark to Mason — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 75. But the Colonel was in error in stating the stores had

Meanwhile, St. Martin, with thirty-eight men, (eight having taken passage for their homes), had left Fort Miami, crossed the carrying-place, and was floating down the Wabash, not only with his provisions and stores, but with Depean, who, upon his arrival at Miami, had obtained leave of the commandant to proceed on his journey, taking with him a number of letters from Detroit which had been entrusted to him. Little did the party imagine, as the seven boats were urged down the river, the reception which awaited them.

Captain Helm returned to Vincennes on the fifth of March. He had been successful. At Wea, he met the British convoy and made a prize of the whole, taking forty prisoners and about ten thousand pounds sterling worth of goods and provisions without firing a gun; also the mail from Canada to Governor Hamilton, containing, however, no news of importance. Hamilton subsequently declared that Dejean had not sufficient presence of mind to destroy the papers, which, with everything else, were seized by the rebels.

The return of the Captain caused much rejoicing, not only because of the large amount of stores secured, but because of the capture of "Grand Judge" Dejean and Commissary St. Martin. Such of the prisoners as were inhabitants of Vincennes were at once set at liberty.

Of the "spoils" secured, Clark divided as gifts among his men a considerable amount of such things as were thought suitable for them, only retaining for himself and his officers a small quantity of needed

been left at Fort Miami by Hamilton. His words to Gov. Henry of April 29, 1779, are nearer the truth: "Hearing of a convoy of goods from Detroit," etc.

clothing. There was set aside for a specific purpose what was judged to be of the value of eight hundred pounds sterling, in addition to the foregoing.*

On the same day that Helm reported his success to Colonel Clark, the latter discharged a number of the Illinois volunteers, consisting of the whole of Captain Charleville's company and a part of Captain McCarty's. Cheerfully, of course, they started for their homes. Meanwhile, it seems, Clark had sent men down the Wabash to bring up to Vincennes, the horses which had been left below the mouth of the Embarrass on the march out.†

Hamilton, not many hours after he became a prisoner, if we may credit his account, feared he had placed himself in the power of a tyrant. "The evening of the day we capitulated," he subsequently assured General Haldimand; "Colonel Clark ordered neck-irons, fetters and hand-cuffs to be made, which, in our hearing, he declared were designed for those officers who had been employed as partisans with the Indians. I took him aside and reminded him that these prisoners were prisoners of war included in the capitulation which he had so lately set his hand to. He said his resolution was formed; that he had made a

* "Bowman's Journal." Clark to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779 — *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n. Jefferson to Captain Lernoult, July 22, 1779 — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 321. Clark to Mason, Nov. 19, 1779 — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 75. Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Haldimand MSS. Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 87. Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 157, 158. Appendix to our narrative, Note CVII.

† Such is the inference from a letter written by Clark to Gov. Henry, March 9, 1779, to be found in the Haldimand MSS. [See Appendix, Note CXXV(1)].

vow never to spare man, woman or child of the Indians or those who were employed with them."

"I observed to him," continued the Lieutenant-Governor, "that these persons having obeyed my orders were not to be blamed for the execution of them; that I had never known that they had acted contrary to those orders, by encouraging the cruelty of the savages; and that, if he was determined to pass by the consideration of his faith and that of the public, pledged for the performance of the articles of capitulation, I desired he might throw me into prison, or lay me in irons, rather than the others. He smiled contemptuously, turned away, and ordered three of these persons to the guard till the irons should be made."*

But the British commander had other causes of complaint. "The scalps of the slaughtered Indians were hung up by our tents," he indignantly declared to his Commander-in-Chief; "and a young man of the name of Ramboult was brought into the fort with a halter about his neck; and only for the interposition of the volunteers from the Illinois (some of whom were his relations) he would infallibly have been hanged without any crime laid to his charge but his having been with a scouting party. He was half strangled before he was taken from the tree."*

Hamilton fails to explain what was implied by the culprit being out "with a scouting party;" fails to make known that it meant the killing of men, women

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CVIII.)

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

and children indiscriminately at their homes in the Kentucky settlements.

“Besides the provision, clothing and stores belonging to the King, all the private baggage of the officers fell into the possession of Colonel Clark,” is the lugubrious assertion of Hamilton, . . . “Colonel Clark being arbiter of that article of the capitulation by which the officers were to take their necessary baggage.”* But private baggage was one thing; necessary baggage, quite another.

However much the Lieutenant-Governor may have deprecated the conduct of Clark toward his (Hamilton's) savage allies, he had really no cause of complaint after his surrender, because of bad treatment of himself or his officers from the Colonel, who, it is evident, did not carry out his scheme of ironing such as were partisans. On the first day of March, all were given the freedom of the town on their signing a parole not to go beyond its limits.† The one signed by Hamilton (and those by the other officers were of like tenor) was in these words:

* Id. What Lieut. Schieffelin also wrote concerning the failure of Clark to carry out the stipulation of the surrender relative to the “necessary baggage” of the officers, was this: “The rebel officers plundered the British of their baggage, etc., contrary to the faith pledged by them, by virtue of which they yielded their arms.” (*Loose Notes—Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 187. But, it is clear, that the right to determine what was “necessary baggage” was one of the prerogatives of Clark.

† Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*. “Bowman's Journal” under date of March 1. A copy of Hay's parole is in the Haldimand MSS.; that of Schieffelin is printed in his *Loose Notes*. But the letter gives the impression that they were paroled the next morning after the surrender, which is error.

"VINCENNES, March 1, 1779.

"This certifies that I have given my parole of honor to Col. George Rogers Clark, commanding the American forces here, that I will not attempt to make my escape from this place, nor will I by word or action, behave unbecoming a prisoner at large; neither will I in any manner convey intelligence to the subjects of his Britannic Majesty in arms against the States of America.

"In witness wherof, I hereunto sign my name without compulsion.

"HENRY HAMILTON,
"Lieu. Gov. and Superintendent."

But Hamilton, as a prisoner, was ill at ease. "Our soldiers" are his subsequent words, "told us that some of the rebels had solemnly sworn to destroy Major Hay and myself the first opportunity. As we could not guard against any attempt in the situation we then found ourselves, we thought it best to appear unacquainted with any such resolution, but we were twice in the night obliged to fly for security to Colonel Clark's quarters in the fort, — two men that were intoxicated and whose names had been given us attempting to shoot us in our tent. The attempt was proven, but no punishment ensued.†

Soon after his surrender, the British commander had been informed by Clark that he and his officers and perhaps others of the prisoners were to be sent east over the mountains to Williamsburg. When this would happen the Colonel wisely declined to give any one a hint. "We were kept in the dark," says the Lieutenant-Governor, "as to the day of our departure, although I had repeatedly asked it that we might have bread baked and other necessary preparations made."*

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Grmain MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CIX.)

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

On the seventh, Captain Williams and Lieutenant Rogers, with twenty-five men, set off for the Falls of the Ohio, with Hamilton, Dejean, Lieutenant Schieffelin, Dr. McBeath, Francis Maisonville, Mr. Bellefeuille, Major Hay, Captain Lamothe, Adhemar St. Martin, and eighteen other prisoners (who had made themselves especially obnoxious by going out with Indian war parties) to be sent to Williamsburg, — to which place Lieutenant Rogers had orders to guard them from the Falls.†

The prisoners were “under guard of two armed boats” and furnished with ten days’ rations of pork and flour to last them until their arrival “at the Falls fort, on the Ohio (400 miles) to row against a strong current.”‡ Fourteen gallons of spirits were sent along for the prisoners and their guard.§

Before starting, the Lieutenant-Governor and Major Hay, by consent of Colonel Clark, wrote each to Captain Lernoult at Detroit, asking him to allow a Mr. Cournailler, who proposed to go to that place on his private affairs, to return to Vincennes.||

The tenth, in the afternoon,” says the Lieutenant-Governor, “we reached the Ohio, whose waters were out in an uncommon and astonishing degree. The

† “Bowman’s Journal” in the Department of State MSS., where several of their names are misspelled and Adhemar St. Martin’s is omitted. The spelling in the same in *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 109, is yet wider of the mark; and there also St. Martin’s name is not mentioned. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CX.)

‡ Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*.

§ Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

|| Hamilton to Lernoult and Major Hay to same. — Haldimand MSS. Hamilton’s letter, although written on the 7th of March, is dated the 8th.

depth above the banks [was] eighteen feet, with such a swift current as made it very fatiguing to row, which we all did in turn, while our guard was distributed in four light boats. At night, we were obliged to lie in our boat, making it fast to a tree; for the flood extended as far in the woods as the eye could reach. We made a miserable shift with our mast and oars to throw a cover overhead to keep out the rain, and lay like swine, closely jammed together, having not room to extend ourselves."

"We presently found the discipline of our guards such," continues the Lieutenant-Governor, "as would have enabled us to seize their arms and escape to the Natches; this was agitated among us, but the idea was given up on the persuasion that our companions left in the hands of the rebels at Vincennes would be sufferers for it. We fell in with four Delaware Indians who were hunting, having only their bows and arrows. Our escort obliged them to accompany us part of the way, but they disappeared one day; and we were given to understand they were quietly knocked on the head."*

The Falls of the Ohio was reached on the thirtieth when the prisoners were "marched to the Falls fort, commanded by Captain [William] Harrod. Little or no refreshments were to be had."† This is not surprising. The emigrants, as well as the original settlers upon the island, who had moved to the mainland, and had located around the fort found it difficult to supply themselves with necessaries. Their

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*. The Lieutenant gives the day of arrival at the Falls fort as the 31st; but Hamilton says it was the 30th. I have followed the Lieutenant Governor.

new settlement which had taken the name of "White Home," clustered around the fortification.*

Hamilton found at the Falls, as he remarks, with much truthfulness, "a number of settlers who live in log houses, in eternal apprehensions from the Indians;"† — "the cause of all which anxiety," he could, with truth, have added, "was, because I chose to obey the behests of my superiors, however barbarous, rather than resign my office; and because I had shut my eyes to the awful scenes of destruction and death which I knew were constantly occurring in the Kentucky settlements from these savage visitations."

The news that Fort Sackville had fallen into the hands of the British on the seventeenth of December, had only reached the Falls the day before the arrival there of the prisoners,‡ so vigilant had been the parties sent out from Vincennes by Hamilton; and great, of course, was the astonishment of the borderers to find by ocular demonstration, that the Fort had already been re-taken, and that before them was a number of the enemy who had surrendered to the heroic Clark and his gallant Americans.

From the "Falls fort," the Lieutenant-Governor and his fellow prisoners were marched through the woods on foot, under a heavy guard, with their necessaries and provisions about one hundred miles, to Harrodstown, which they reached on the eighth of April. The post there they found commanded by Colonel John Bowman, county-lieutenant of Kentucky

* R. T. Durrett, in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, August 2, 1883.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

‡ Id.

county, "who treated them as well as his abilities would admit." There they remained ten days when they again started, "depending," says one of the prisoners, "on Providence for provisions" and "insulted by every dirty fellow as they passed through the country;* "In our long march," afterward declared the Lieutenant-Governor, "we had frequently hunger and thirst to encounter as well as fatigue."†

According to Hamilton, Colonel Clark had promised to send fifteen horses to the Falls for his (Hamilton's) use and those of the other officers, on their march thence; but that promise, he declares, "never was performed." "He had apprized us," are the Lieutenant-Governor's words, "that there was but little chance of escaping with our lives, the people on the frontiers were so exasperated by the inroads of the Indians; and, in this, we found he had told us the truth, being often threatened upon the march and waylaid at different places. Our guard, however, behaved very well, protected us and hunted for us, else we must have starved, for our rations were long since expended, and our allowance of bear's flesh and Indian meal was frequently very scanty."

"The people at the forts," Hamilton added, "were in a wretched state, obliged to enclose their cattle every night within the pickets, and carry their rifles to the field when they went to plow or cut wood."‡ Why these particulars should have been related by the Lieutenant-Governor afterward, to his superior officer can only be accounted for on the presumption that he

* Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

‡ Id.

delighted in recounting them and in the remembrance that he, of all others, had most promoted such wretchedness and distress to the "rebels" — men, women and children.

As the prisoners and their guard passed out of Kentucky, the Lieutenant-Governor, who, for over three years had governed Detroit and its dependencies always in a turbulent manner (and sometimes despotically), was forced from the West, in a bad plight. His capture, wherever it had become known in the American frontier settlement, was hailed with delight; for the backwoodsmen all knew who it was that fitted out many war-parties of savages carrying destruction and death to the distracted border.

Without any suspicions of the stirring events which had in the previous month transpired at Vincennes, — without any knowledge of Clark's march and the capture of Hamilton — without any information of the latter being then on his way to the Virginia capital a prisoner of war, — Governor Henry, on the sixteenth of March, wrote Washington, that Virginia militia had full possession of the Illinois and the post (Vincennes) on the Wabash; that he was not without hopes the same militia might overawe the Indians as far as Detroit; that these troops were independent of General McIntosh whose numbers although upward of two thousand, he thought could not make any great progress on account, as he had heard, of the route they took and the lateness of the season; that the conquest of the Illinois and Wabash towns was effected with less than two hundred men, who would soon be reinforced; and that then these mili-

tiamen, he hoped, by holding posts on the back of the Indians, might intimidate them.*

On the eighteenth of May, the Governor of Virginia, having received information of the capture of Hamilton, announced it to the House:

"I have enclosed a letter for the perusal of the Assembly, from Colonel Clark, at the Illinois. This letter, among other things, informs me of an expedition which he had planned and was determined to execute, in order to recover Fort Vincennes, which had been formerly taken from the British troops and garrisoned by those under the Colonel's command. This enterprise has succeeded to our utmost wishes; for the garrison commanded by Henry Hamilton, Lieutenant-Governor of Detroit, and consisting of British regulars and a number of volunteers, were made prisoners of war. Colonel Clark has sent the Governor, with several officers and privates under guard, who have by this time arrived at New London, in the county of Bedford. Proper measures will be adopted by the Executive, for their confinement and security."†

"At length," says Hamilton, "we gained the settled country, and at Lynch's ferry, on James river, were put into canoes and continued our progress by water." On the twentieth of May, being on shore to

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 230.

† *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316; Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, pp. 240, 241. The letter mentioned by Gov. Henry as having been received from Clark was the one dated at Kaskaskia Feb. 3, 1779. He of course only got from that letter the Colonel's determination to go against Vincennes. The residue of the information he obtained, doubtless, from some person or persons who had come on with the prisoners.

get refreshments, the Lieutenant-Governor was agreeably surprised to find himself at Brigadier Hamilton's quarters, "who endeavored," the Lieutenant-Governor affirms, "by his kindness and hospitality to make us forget our hardships." "The same evening," he states further, "halting at the house of a rebel, Colonel Lewis, we had the good fortune to see two officers of the Convention army. Captain Freeman, aid-de-camp to General Reidezel was so obliging as to be the bearer of a letter from me to General [William] Phillips." He also sent one to General Haldimand, containing the capitulation and some returns. On the twenty-sixth, the prisoners were marched by a "rebel" captain with a small force, from Beaver Dam to Richmond; thence, they were taken to Chesterfield Court House, being "kept to its limits under a strong guard."*

By the middle of June, the Virginia Council had determined to put Hamilton, Dejean and Lamothe in irons, and confine them in the dungeons of the public jail, — to be "debarred the use of pen, ink and paper, and excluded all converse, except with their keeper."

"The Board proceeded to the consideration of the letters of Colonel Clark, and other papers relative to Henry Hamilton, Esq., who has acted for some years past as Lieutenant-Governor of the settlement at and about Detroit, and commandant of the British garrison there, under Sir Guy Carleton, as Governor-in-chief; Philip Dejean, justice of the peace for Detroit, and William Lamothe, captain of volunteers, — prisoners of war taken in the county of Illinois."

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS. Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 188. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXI.)

“They find,” says the Board, “that Governor Hamilton has executed the task of inciting Indians to perpetrate their accustomed cruelties on the citizens of the United States without distinction of age, sex or condition, with an eagerness and avidity which evince, that the general nature of his charge harmonized with his particular disposition. They should have been satisfied from the other testimony adduced, that these enormities were committed by savages acting under his commission; but the number of the proclamations which, at different times, were left in houses, the inhabitants of which were killed or carried away by the Indians, one of which proclamations is in possession of the Board, under the hand and seal of Governor Hamilton, puts this fact beyond a doubt.”

“At the time of his captivity,” continues the Council, “it appears he had sent considerable bodies of Indians against the frontier settlements of these states, and had actually appointed a great council of Indians to meet him at [the mouth of the] Tennessee, to concert the operations of this present campaign. They find that his treatment of our citizens and soldiers, taken and carried within the limits of his command has been cruel and inhuman; that in the case of John Dodge, a citizen of these States, which has been particularly stated to this Board, he loaded him with irons threw him into a dungeon, without bedding, without straw, without fire, in the dead of winter and severe climate of Detroit; that, in the state, he wasted him with incessant expectations of death; that when the rigors of his situation had brought him so low that death seemed likely to withdraw him from their power, he was taken out and somewhat attended to, until a

little mended; and before he had recovered ability to walk, was again returned to his dungeon, in which a hole was cut seven inches square only, for the admission of air, and the same load of irons again put on him; that appearing, a second time in imminent danger of being lost to them, he was again taken from his dungeon in which he had lain from January till June, with the intermission of a few weeks only, before mentioned; that Governor Hamilton gave standing rewards for scalps, but offered none for prisoners, which induced the Indians, after making their captives carry their baggage into the neighborhood of the fort [Detroit], there to put them to death, and carry in their scalps to the Governor, who welcomed their return and success by a discharge of cannon; that when a prisoner, brought alive, and destined to death by the Indians, the fire already kindled, and himself bound to the stake, was dexterously withdrawn, and secreted from them by the humanity of a fellow prisoner, a large reward was offered for the discovery of the victim, which having tempted a servant to betray his concealment, the present prisoner, Dejean, being sent with a party of soldiers, surrounded the house, took and threw into jail the unhappy victim and his deliverer, where the former soon expired under the perpetual assurances of Dejean, that he was to be again restored into the hands of the savages, and the latter, when enlarged, was bitterly reprimanded by Governor Hamilton."

"It appears to them," the Council adds, "that the prisoner, Dejean, was on all occasions, the willing and cordial instrument of Governor Hamilton, — acting both as judge and keeper of the jails, and instigating

and urging him, by malicious insinuations and untruths, to increase, rather than relax his severities, heightening the cruelty of his orders by the manner of executing them; offering, at one time, a reward to one man [a prisoner] to be the hangman of another, threatening his life on refusal; and taking from his prisoners the little property their opportunities enabled them to acquire."

"It appears that the prisoner, Lamothe," says the Council further, "was a captain of the volunteer scalping parties of Indians and whites, who went, from time to time, under general orders to spare neither men, women, nor children." Then, to begin their summing up, the Council say:

"From this detail of circumstances which arose in a few cases only, coming accidentally to the knowledge of the Board, they think themselves authorized by fair deduction to presume what would be the horrid history of the sufferings of the many who have expired under their miseries (which, therefore, will remain forever untold), or who have escaped from them and are yet too remote and too much dispersed to bring together their well-founded accusations against these prisoners."

"They [the Council] have seen that the conduct of the British officers, civil and military, has in the whole course of this war been savage, and unprecedented among civilized nations; that our officers taken by them, have been confined in crowded jails, loathsome dungeons and prison ships, loaded with irons, supplied often with no food, generally with too little for the sustenance of nature and that little sometimes unsound and unwholesome, whereby such numbers

have perished, that captivity and death have with them been almost synonymous; that they have been transported beyond seas, where their fate is out of the reach of our inquiry, have been compelled to take arms against their country, and by a refinement in cruelty, to become murderers of their own brethren.

“Their prisoners with us have, on the other hand, been treated with humanity and moderation; they have been fed on all occasions, with wholesome and plentiful food, suffered to go at large within extensive tracts of country, treated with liberal hospitality, permitted to live in the families of our citizens, to labor for themselves, to acquire and enjoy profits, and finally to participate of the principal benefits of society, privileged from all burdens.

“Reviewing this contrast, which cannot be denied by our enemies themselves, in a single point, and which has now been kept up during four years of unremitting war, a term long enough to produce well-founded despair that our moderation may ever lead them to the practice of humanity; called on by that justice we owe to those who are fighting the battles of our country, to deal out, at length, miseries to their enemies, measure for measure, and to distress the feelings of mankind by exhibiting to them spectacles of severe retaliation, where we had long and vainly endeavored to introduce an emulation in kindness; happily possessed, by the fortune of war, of some of those very individuals who, having distinguished themselves personally in this line of cruel conduct, are fit subjects to begin on, with the work of retaliation; this Board has resolved to advise the Governor that the said Henry Hamilton, Philip Dejean and William La-

mothe, prisoners of war, be put in irons, confined in the dungeon of the public jail, debarred the use of pen, ink and paper, and excluded all converse except with their keeper."*

It is evident that a considerable part of the finding by the Council against Hamilton and Dejean was predicated upon what had been "particularly stated" to the Board by Dodge.† The latter, after a great deal of ill treatment in Detroit by Hamilton as he claimed, had been taken a prisoner to Quebec. He subsequently escaped, reaching Boston in safety. From that place, he made his way finally to Pittsburgh.‡

The prisoners remained in Chesterfield until the fifteenth of June. On that day, an officer having a written order under the hand of the Governor of the State — Thomas Jefferson — for taking the Lieutenant-Governor in irons to Williamsburg, reached the former place. "I was accordingly handcuffed," says Hamilton, "put upon a horse, and my servant not being suffered to go with me, my valise was fastened behind me. Captain Lamothe was ordered to accompany me, being in like manner handcuffed."

"The fatigues of the march," continues the Lieutenant-Governor, "having heated my blood to a violent degree, I had several large boils on my legs. My

* These proceedings of the Virginia Council were published the next day (June 16, 1779), in the *Virginia Gazette*. They are to be found, also, in *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 226 n, and in other publications.

† Compare in this connection Andrew McFarland Davis's article, "The Indians and the Border Warfare of the Revolution," in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 683.

‡ Appendix to our narrative, Notes IV and CXII.

handcuffs were too tight, but were eased at a smith's shop on the road. Thus sometimes riding and sometimes walking, we arrived the second evening at Williamsburgh, having come sixty miles. We were conducted to the palace, where we remained about half an hour in the street at the Governor's door, in wet clothes, weary, hungry and thirsty, but had not even a cup of water offered us. During this time, a considerable mob gathered about us, which accompanied us to jail. On our arrival there, we were put into a cell, not ten feet square, where we found five criminals and Mr. Dejean, who was also handcuffed. This poor man could not refrain from tears on seeing our equipment. We had the floor for a bed; the five felons were as happy as rum could make them; and so we were left to our repose for that night.”*

And thus Lieutenant Schieffelin :

“JUNE 15th. An American officer came to them [the prisoners] from Williamsburg with orders to lay Governor Hamilton in irons, with Capt. Lamothe, which piece of cruelty was performed before his officers, who shed tears of indignation that their worthy Chief should be so treated. They were marched on foot, handcuffed, through rain, their wrists much hurt from the chafing of the irons; they would not allow him his waiting-boy. They were marched, in great pomp, through Williamsburg city, and committed to the dungeon with felons, murderers, and condemned criminals; not so much as a blanket allowed them.”†

The Virginia Council having given Jefferson, who, since the first day of June had been Governor of

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† *Loose Notes*, already cited.

the State, their advice to lay the three prisoners in irons, an order was issued in accordance therewith. "The next day [after their arrival in Williamsburg, which was on the sixteenth] we three," says Hamilton, "were taken out about 11 o'clock, and, before a number of people, our handcuffs were taken off and fetters put on in exchange. I was honored with the largest, which weighed eighteen pounds eight ounces. As I thought opportunities might not offer frequently, and seeing some of the delegates [members of the Virginia Assembly] present, I took occasion, while my irons were riveting to speak a few words. I told them that the ignominious manner in which we were treated, without any proof of criminality, or any hearing, without even a crime being laid to our charge, was a reproach to those only who could act in that manner to prisoners of war, under the sanction of a capitulation; that after a proceeding so unjust, I was prepared for any extremity, but desired the persons present to observe that punishment was exercised on us before any inquiry had taken place or before any persons who might have accused us had been confronted with us;—some by their jestures appeared to feel for us, but no one uttered a word, and when our fetters were properly fixed, we were remanded to our dungeon, from which the five felons were removed."*

The indignant Schieffelin says: "Their [the prisoners'] handcuffs were knocked off; and heavy chains put on their legs before great numbers of people. Mr. Dejean, justice of peace for Detroit, was also put in irons for reasons of State retaliation."†

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781, — Germain MSS.

† *Loose Notes*, before cited.

A friend, on the fifth of July, dispatched to Dodge, at Pittsburgh (where the latter had remained since his arrival from the East after escaping from Quebec), a letter, inclosing the proceedings of the Virginia Council as to Hamilton, Lamothe and Dejean, — that, for some time, they had been loaded with irons. This friend was one Andrew Robinson. He wrote that he had previously been called on by the Virginia Council to give evidence as to Dodge's character, "which I gave," says the writer, "to your advantage." Robinson also wrote that he was "engaged to secrecy, as the Governor and Council were jealous that he [Hamilton] might, if acquainted with their intention of retaliation, endeavor to escape." He gave information that the Lieutenant-Governor was "loaded with heavy irons," but that he was very severe in his denunciations of Dodge, and that numbers were drawn to condole with him and cry out against his accuser. He adds: "I have gone some lengths to justify you and assure all of them [members of the Council] that you will appear and confront Mr. Hamilton, as he and Dejean both wish to be face to face." Robinson informed Dodge also that he (Dodge) had a letter of the Governor, for his going to Williamsburg, and he hoped he would go without delay. "I wish to see you and give you the letter; but I desire you not to wait for it."*

Dodge at once resolved to make a trip from Pittsburgh to the Virginia capital; — he would go immediately — still be delayed starting. He found an opportunity to send a letter to a friend of his — a trader — at Sandusky. "It is," said he, "with pleasure that

* Haldimand MSS.

I inform you that I have made my escape from Quebec. I have the honor of wearing a captain's commission, and have the managing of Indian affairs. You may depend on seeing me this fall with a good army." "I am going to Williamsburg in a few days," he added, "to prosecute Hamilton, and that rascal, Dejean; [also] Lamothe; likewise . . . [Major Hay]. They will be all hanged without redemption and the Lord have mercy on their souls. My compliments to all the good Whigs of Detroit—money plenty—fine times for the sons of liberty! I am just now drinking your health with a good glass of madeira. God bless you all. We will soon relieve you from those tyrants!"*

A printed copy of the order of the Virginia Council in regard to Hamilton, Dejean and Lamothe was transmitted to Washington on the 23d of June.

The British General, William Phillips, soon protested to Jefferson against the treatment administered to the Lieutenant-Governor of Detroit. He wrote him a lengthy and temperate letter, to the effect that the putting in irons and confinement of Hamilton could not be justified, upon military principles, even if the charges against him were true. Had he been captured, or had he surrendered at discretion, General Phillips acknowledged that he would have been at the mercy of his enemies; "but since he had capitulated upon honorable terms, which were signed in the usual form by both parties, he could not be made accountable for alleged previous misdemeanors, with-

* Dodge to Philip Boyle, July 13, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. It was not at Pittsburgh that Dodge was to have "the managing of Indian affairs," but in the Illinois.

out the violation of a compact which had always been considered sacred by civilized nations.”*

On the seventeenth of July, Jefferson wrote Washington concerning the subject of General Phillips' letter. "I some time ago inclosed to you," said the Governor, "a printed copy of an order of Council, by which Governor Hamilton was to be confined in irons and in close jail. This has occasioned a letter from General Phillips, of which the inclosed is a copy. The General seems to suppose that a prisoner on capitulation cannot be put into close confinement, though his capitulation shall not have provided against it. My idea was that all persons taken in war were to be deemed prisoners of war; that those who surrendered on capitulation (or Convention) are prisoners of war also, subject to the same treatment with those who surrender at discretion, except only so far as the terms of their capitulation or Convention shall have guarded them. In the capitulation of Governor Hamilton (a copy of which I inclose), no stipulation is made as to the treatment of himself or those taken with him. The Governor, indeed, when he signs adds a flourish of reasons inducing him to capitulate, one of which is the generosity of his enemy. Generosity, on a large and comprehensive scale, seems to dictate the making a signal example of this gentleman; but waiving that, these are only the private motives inducing him to surrender, and do not enter into the contract of Colonel Clark."

Jefferson added that he had "the highest idea of the sacredness of those contracts which take place be-

* Jared Sparks. See the *Writings of George Washington* (Worthington Chauncey Ford's edition, 1890), vol. VIII, p. 5, note.

tween nation and nation at war," and that he "would be among the last on earth who should do anything in violation of them." He could find nothing in those books usually recurred to as testimonials of the laws and usages of nature and nations which convicted the opinions he had expressed, of error; yet there might be such an usage as General Phillips seemed to suppose, though not taken notice of by these writers.

Jefferson's particular object in writing Washington was to get from him information upon the point made by General Phillips. He declared to the Commander-in-chief that there was no other person whose decision would so authoritatively decide the doubt in the public mind, and none with which he was disposed so to comply. "If you shall be of the opinion," said he, "that the bare existence of a capitulation in the case of Governor Hamilton, privileges him from confinement, though there be no article to that effect in the capitulation, justice shall most assuredly be done him."*

When the confinement in the Williamsburg jail, of Hamilton, Lamothe and Dejean became known to Captain Lernoult, at Detroit, he addressed a letter to the Executive of Virginia, asking the reasons for this treatment and remonstrating against it. This on the twenty-second of July, was answered by Governor Jefferson:

"I think you, sir, who have had as good opportunities as any British officer, of learning in what manner we treat those whom the fortune of war has put into our hands, can clear us from the charge of rigors, as far as your knowledge or information has extended.

* *Jefferson's Works.*

I can assert that Governor Hamilton's is the first instance which has occurred in my own country; and if there has been another in any of the United States it is unknown to me. These instances must have been extremely rare, if they have existed at all, as they could not have been altogether unheard of by me.

"When a uniform exercise of kindness to prisoners on our part has been returned by as uniform severity on the part of our enemies, you must excuse me for saying it is high time, by other lessons, to teach respect to the dictates of humanity. In such a case, retaliation becomes an act of benevolence."

"But suppose, sir," continues Jefferson, "we are willing still longer to decline the drudgery of general retaliation, yet Governor Hamilton's conduct has been such as to call for exemplary punishment on him personally. In saying this, I have not so much his particular cruelties to our citizens, prisoners with him (which, although they have been great, were of necessity confined to a small scale), as the general nature of the service he undertook at Detroit, and the extensive exercise of cruelties which that involved. Those who act together in war are answerable to each other.

"I will not say to what length the fair rules of war would extend the right of punishment against him; but I am sure that confinement under its strictest circumstances as a retaliation for Indian devastation and massacre, must be deemed lenity." . . .

"The proclamation alluded to [by the Council]," says the Virginia Governor, further, "contained nothing more than an invitation to our officers and soldiers to join the British arms against those whom he is pleased to call rebels and traitors. In order to intro-

duce these among our people, they were put into the hands of the Indians, and in every house where they murdered or carried away the family they left one of these proclamations. Some of them were found sticking in the breasts of the persons murdered, one under the hand and seal of Governor Hamilton came to our hands. The Indians being the bearer of proclamations under the hand and seal of Governor Hamilton (no matter what was the subject of them), there can be no doubt they were acting under his direction; and, as including this proof, the fact was cited on the advice of the Council.

“No distinction can be made between the principal and ally by those against whom the war is waged. He who employs another to do a deed, makes the deed his own. If he calls in the hand of the assassin or murderer, himself becomes the assassin or murderer. The known rule of warfare with the Indian savages is, an indiscriminate butchery of men, women and children. These savages under this well-known character, are employed by the British nation as allies in the war against Americans. Governor Hamilton undertakes to be the conductor of the war. In the execution of that undertaking, he associates small parties of whites under his immediate command with large parties of the savages, and sends them to act sometimes jointly, sometimes separately, — not against our forts or armies in the field, but against the farming settlements on our frontiers. Governor Hamilton, then, is himself the butcher of men, women and children.”

“A proclamation addressed to the Inhabitants of the Illinois, afterward printed in the public papers — which though it does not in express terms threaten vengeance, blood and massacre, yet it proves that Hamilton had made for us the

most ample provision for all these calamities. He then gives in detail the horrid catalogue of savage nations, extending from south to north, whom he had leagued with himself to wage combined war on our frontiers; and it is well known that that war would of course, be made up of blood and general massacre of men, women and children. Other papers of Governor Hamilton have come to our hands, containing instructions to officers going out with scalping-parties of Indians and whites and proving that that kind of war was waged under his express orders. Further proof in abundance might be added, but I suppose the fact too notorious to need them.”*

Jefferson, after discussing the question as to whether Hamilton, being a prisoner by capitulation was privileged or not from strict confinement — taking the ground that he was not — says: “However, we waive reasoning on this head, because no article in the capitulation of Governor Hamilton is violated by his confinement.

“Perhaps,” adds Jefferson, “not having seen the capitulation, you were led to suppose it a thing of course, that, being able to obtain terms of surrender, they [Hamilton and his party] would first provide for their own treatment. I inclose you a copy of the capitulation, by which you will see that the second article declares them prisoners of war, and nothing is said as to the treatment they were entitled to. When Governor Hamilton signs, indeed, he adds a flourish containing the motives inducing him to capitulate, one of which was, confidence in a generous enemy. He

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 321. The proclamation to the inhabitants of the Illinois was, as before shown, dated at Vincennes, Dec. 29, 1778, and published in the *Virginia Gazette*, June 26, 1779. It was the one handed to Beaubien, already mentioned.

should have reflected that generosity on a large scale would take side against him. However, these were only his private motives and did not enter into contract with Colonel Clark. Being prisoner of war then, with only such privileges as their capitulation has provided, and that having provided nothing on the subject of their treatment, they are liable to be treated as other prisoners. We have not extended our order as we might justifiably have done to the whole of this corps. Governor Hamilton and Captain Lamothe alone as leading offenders are in confinement. The other officers and men are treated as if they had been taken in justifiable war; the officers being at large on their parole, and the men also having their liberty to a certain extent. Dejean was not included in the capitulation, being taken eight days after, on the Wabash, one hundred and fifty miles from Vincennes."

"I hope, sir," concludes Jefferson, "that, being made more fully acquainted with the facts on which the advice of Council was grounded, and exercising your own good sense in cool and candid deliberation on these facts, and the consequences deduced from them according to the usage and sentiments of civilized nations, you will see the transaction in a very different light from that in which it appeared at the time of writing your letter; and [that you will] ascribe the advice of the Council not to want of attention to the sacred nature of public conventions, of which I hope we shall never in any circumstances lose sight, but to a desire of stopping the effusion of the unoffending blood of women and children and the unjustifiable se-

verities exercised on our captive officers and soldiers in general, by proper severities on our part.”*

It is to be noticed that, in his reply, Jefferson not once alludes to Dodge, or to the particulars furnished by him to the Virginia Council. Had the Governor come to doubt the truth of his narrative? It seems not; for as will presently be seen, he subsequently wrote that, as to particular acts of barbarity on Hamilton's part to citizens of the United States, he (Jefferson) had “as sacred assurances as human testimony was capable of giving.” Nevertheless, for fear he had, possibly, been imposed upon, he would not (such is the inference) rest the case in any wise upon that evidence, in his reply to Lernoult.

That the Governor desired to see Dodge in Williamsburg, to the end that the latter might meet his arch-adversary and, in hearing of the Executive, charge Hamilton with his crimes was what he expected of Jefferson in view of the emphatic denial on part of the prisoners of what had been alleged against them, and does not imply any doubt on part of the Virginia Governor of the statements previously made by Dodge. The resolution of the latter at once to leave Pittsburg for the Virginia capital was not, it seems, carried out. As the sequel shows, he was in no especial hurry to confront the three prisoners — Hamilton, Dejean and Lemothe — “face to face.”†

* Ibid. The reply of Jefferson, in some of its parts, is illegible and therefore not printed in the work just cited. This has caused an arrangement of some of the words, as given in the text above, different from that found in the *Virginia Calendar*.

† Appendix, Note CXII.

CHAPTER XXII.

HAMILTON gives a dolorous description of the condition of the jail in which the three prisoners — himself, Lamothe and Dejean — were confined: “The light we received was from a grate, which faced the court of twenty feet square, with walls thirty feet high. The prison having been built sixty years, it may be conceived we were subject to one very offensive convenience, in the heat of the summer almost suffocating. Our door was only opened to give us water. We were not allowed any candle; and, from the first to the last of our confinement, we never could find that the Governor or Council had ordered provision of any kind to be made for us except water, with which we were really very well supplied. The variety of vermin to which we were a prey, bad air, chagrin, and want of exercise, began to produce their effects on my companions.”*

Because of this, Hamilton thought to procure by writing a letter to the Lieutenant Governor of the State (the Governor being absent) a mitigation of their sufferings. So, having obtained from the jailor (who was left sole arbiter to deal out his indulgence or straighten their captivity) pen, ink, and paper, he wrote Mr. Pelham, who had procured him these necessary articles:

“Having understood from you yesterday,” said Hamilton, “that the Governor [Jefferson] was gone to the country to stay for a month, I request you to

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

wait on the Lieutenant Governor, present my respects to him, acquainting him that, by a written order signed by the Governor, I, with Mr. Dejean and Captain Lamothe, have been ironed and thrown into a dungeon where we have now lain upwards of forty days; that we have not been informed of the cause of this treatment: we do not hear of our being to be confronted with our accusers; we hear no mention of any public inquiry; we suffer without trial."

"We understand," continued the Lieutenant Governor, "that these proceedings are not agreeable to the laws of this province, or to any known rule of equity; that it is inconsistent with the tenor of the Governor's oath, and breathes the genuine spirit of *lettres de cachet* in the most arbitrary government. The Governor's departure without bestowing a thought on men in our situation shows that we may suffer in reputation, health and loss of time, with as little prospects of redress as if we were in the cells of the inquisition."

"Mr. Pellham, please to inform the Lieutenant Governor [of Virginia]," added Hamilton, "that I do not think common justice to be less the birthright of every man, than the enjoyment of life and liberty; but that since our arrival in this state, we have in lieu of common justice, experienced uncommon injustice. I do, therefore, for myself and the gentlemen confined with me, demand *justice* — justice as open to the public as our ill treatment has been notorious."

The next day after the writing of this letter it was returned to Hamilton "with the greatest insolence of contempt," as he puts it. He was informed by his jailor "that dignified characters in that country were

not treated with so little ceremony." Now, as the message had been "contemptuously refused," — "I was necessitated to lower my tone," the Lieutenant Governor declared, "or give up all thoughts of redress." So he again wrote, but this time directly to the Lieutenant Governor and Council of the State.

"Mr. Pelham," said he, "having very obligingly procured me the means of addressing you, I take this first opportunity of representing to you the circumstances and situation of the two gentlemen at present in confinement along with me. I am to suppose they have been put in prison for having acted under my orders; if there be any criminality in those orders, justice demands that I alone should be the sufferer. I, therefore, make it my request that I may suffer alone."

"The health of these gentlemen," continued Hamilton, "is daily impaired by the consequences of their restraint, as they are in want of even a change of linen, highly necessary at this sultry season. As to my own conduct, however misrepresented, I have confidence (which will, I hope, hereafter appear well grounded) that it will support itself against the attacks which have been made upon it in this country, and that it will abide the test of that inquiry which I am to expect it will undergo whenever I shall be called upon by those superiors whose orders I have endeavored to execute with humanity and moderation."

"Gentlemen, whatever may be the result of this application," added the prisoner, "I shall with patience wait for the day when I may more largely expose to the world the whole tenor of my conduct, which

I have all the reason imaginable to think has been discolored and misrepresented."

But Hamilton declared, what was true, that the Virginia Lieutenant Governor "never deigned an answer to his letter. But soon thereafter the prisoners got knowledge of the charges that had been preferred against them — by being secretly furnished with the "findings" of the Council. The way this was brought about is told by the Lieutenant Governor himself. "Having been," he says, "by order of the Governor (with the advice of his Council) prohibited the use of pen, ink and paper, or the converse of any one but our jailor, we had no employment but our reflections. At length, the prisoners in the next cell contrived to thrust the newspapers through a hole, and in them we found the formal charge drawn up against us, entirely unsupported by truth or evidence."*

On the twenty-sixth of August, Hamilton wrote Haldimand from the jail in Williamsburg, that he had drawn bills in favor of Samuel Beal for four hundred pounds sterling. He said he might have to draw again, as there were eight officers and eighteen men of his party. Dejean and Lamothe as well as himself had been in confinement seventy-five days. Major Hay, with the other prisoners were at Chesterfield, Virginia.† In explanation of this drawing of bills, by Hamilton, it may be stated that General Phillips had arranged for it by the consent of the Virginia authorities. "General Phillips," subsequently wrote the Lieutenant Governor, "knowing our situation, had

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Haldimand MSS.

sent us an unlimited credit; and his letter having passed to us through the hands of the Governor and Council [of Virginia], we, for a time, lived plentifully and had the means of helping out the miserable ration of the prisoners; but, after a while, the Executive power ordered our purveyor to limit our allowance.”*

“Major Hay, Lieutenant Schieffelin, and others, remained at Chesterfield, under a guard,” wrote one of the prisoners, subsequently, who was there confined, “until the twenty-eighth of August, when an officer, with a party, arrived with orders to march them immediately to Williamsburg; to keep them closely confined at nights; and, in every instance, to let them know they were prisoners: if they behaved unbecoming, to punish them.”

On the thirty-first of the month, they started for the capital. “We were marched on foot,” says the same chronicler, “passed through Williamsburg to the common jail, where they kept us at the door for three or four hours, when the jailor showed his orders to commit us in close confinement, searching us beforehand. He desired us to follow him to a cell, when the dungeon where the worthy Governor was in, was opened, and we were locked therein. We were now eight in number; hardly room to stretch ourselves; no one permitted to confer with us. Here we continued for the long space of eight or ten days, without ever having the door once opened. The criminals were let out to get the air of the court, but we were not. On the eighth day some of us fell ill at twelve at night and would have expired had not blood been immediately let. The jailor then represented the

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

dreadful situation we were in as also the privates, who were confined in another apartment, when, after some deliberation, the infamous Executive Council indulged us, by separating the officers, namely, Capt. Lamothe, Lieut. Schieffelin, Mr. Dejean and Surgeon McBearth, from the others, putting them in an upper apartment. The others were left in the dungeon, but the doors were left open until evening when they were shut at the same time that those of the criminals were.”*

“August thirty-first,” wrote Hamilton, afterwards, concerning the coming on of the residue of his captive friends at his jail, “Major Hay, with the other prisoners from Chesterfield, arrived at Williamsburg; the soldiers were confined in the debtors’ room. The officers, five in number, were put into the dungeon, with us, which made the heat intolerable. At eleven at night, we were obliged to alarm the prisoners in the next cell, who passed the word to the guard, for the jailor, — our surgeon being on the point of suffocating, an asthma, to which he was subject, having seized him, at this time, with such violence that he lost his pulse for ten minutes. We had tried, by wafting a blanket, to draw some air through the grate; but this was insufficient; and if we had not had presence enough of mind to open a vein, he probably would have expired; for the state of the air was such that a candle, with which we had lately been indulged, would barely live if held near the top of the cell.”

“The jailor,” continued the Lieutenant Governor, “took Mr. McBearth out and suffered him to sleep in

* Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 189.

his own room; and I must declare in justice to him, that, in several points, he showed more feeling by far than his employers. The door of our cell continuing shut for several days, the poor prisoners young and old, men and women, offered to be locked up and debarred the use of the court, if we might be allowed the liberty, which at length we had."

"The humanity and attention of these poor people," adds Hamilton, "is not to be forgotten. They offered themselves to do a hundred kind offices; cleaned and washed our cell; showed us how to manage our irons; wrapped them round with rags; offered to saw them off whenever means of escape were presented: but what struck me most was, that when we were indulged with the use of the court and sat down to eat, these people always withdrew. Gratitude calls on me to mention the difference of characters we experienced from the leaders in this country and those subject to their control."

"Being attacked with a fit of the gout," concludes the Lieutenant Governor, "a surgeon was sent for who treated me with the greatest tenderness. By this means, my fetters were taken off and hand-cuffs put on; but these were of little restraint; for, as I had fallen away considerably, I could slip my hands through them with ease."

When Washington first received the proceedings of the Virginia Council as to Hamilton and his companions he had no doubt of the propriety of the treatment decreed against them. He believed it was founded in principles of a just retaliation. But, after the letter of Jefferson, of the seventeenth of July came to hand,

and upon examining the matter more minutely, at the same time consulting with several intelligent general officers, it seemed to be the opinion of the Commander-in-chief — and on the sixth of August he wrote Jefferson — “that Mr. Hamilton could not, according to the usage of war, after his capitulation even in the manner it was made, be subjected to uncommon severity, under that idea, and that the capitulation placed him upon a different footing from that of a mere prisoner at discretion.”

“Whether it may be expedient,” said Washington, “to continue Hamilton in his present confinement from motives of policy and to satisfy our people, is a question I cannot determine; but if it should be, I would take the liberty to suggest that it may be proper to publish all the cruelties he has committed or abetted, in a particular manner, and the evidence in support of the charges, that the world, holding his conduct in abhorrence, may feel and approve the justice of his fate. Indeed, whatever may be the line of conduct towards him, this may be advisable. If, from the considerations I have mentioned, the rigor of his treatment is mitigated, yet he cannot claim of right, upon any ground, the extensive indulgence which General Phillips seems to expect for him; and I should not hesitate to withhold from him a thousand privileges I might allow to common prisoners. He certainly merits a discrimination; and, although the practice of war may not justify all the measures that have been taken against him, he may unquestionably without any breach of public faith or the least shadow of impu-

tation, be confined to a room. His safe custody will be an object of great importance.”*

The arrival of Dodge in Williamsburg as requested by his friend Robinson, was not productive of results as against Hamilton, Lamothe and Dejean, who were still closely confined in jail at that place. It is evident he did not confront these men in their dungeon, although he says he saw them there in irons;* and it is doubtful if either of the prisoners were aware of his presence. He soon learned that in no event were they to be hanged; but he was informed they would be imprisoned until the end of the war. He got his information doubtless before the arrival of Washington's letter at the Virginia capital. He returned to Pittsburgh declaring that the three had been ironed and thrown into the dungeon for the usage they had given him at Detroit,† which was undoubtedly true, in part, as to Hamilton and Dejean, but wholly erroneous as to Lamothe.‡

On the receipt of Washington's letter of the sixth of August by the Virginia Council in the absence of the Governor, that body on the twenty-ninth of September, officially promulgated the following:

“The Board having been, at no time, unmindful of the circumstances attending the confinement of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, Captain Lamothe and Philip Dejean, which the personal cruelties of those men, as well as the general conduct of the enemy had

* *Writings of Washington* (Ford's ed.), vol. VIII, pp. 4, 5.

† Dodge to Boyle, Sept. 18, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXII.

constrained them to advise: wishing and willing to expect that their sufferings may lead them to the practice of humanity, should any future turn of fortune, in their favor, submit to their discretion the fate of their fellow-creatures; that it may prove an admonition to others, meditating like cruelties, not to rely for impunity in any circumstances of distance or present security; and that it may induce the enemy to reflect, what must be the painful consequences, should on their part impel us again to severities, while such multiplied subjects of retaliation are within our power: sensible that no impression can be made on the event of the war by wreaking vengeance on miserable captives; that the great cause which has animated the two nations against each other is not to be decided by unmanly cruelties on wretches, who have bowed their necks to the power of the victor, but by the exercise of honorable valor in the field: earnestly hoping that the enemy, viewing the subject in the same light, will be content to abide the event of that mode of decision, and spare us the pains of a second departure from kindness to our captives: confident that commiseration to our prisoners is the only possible motive to which can be candidly ascribed, in the present actual circumstances of the war, the advice we are now about to give; the Board does advise the Governor to send Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, Captain Lamothe and Philip Dejean to Hanover Court House, there to remain at large within certain reasonable limits taking their parole in the usual manner.”*

* *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 230 n.

Thereupon the Board ordered the irons to be taken off the three prisoners.* Two days thereafter a parole was made out and tendered them also Major Hay, which, among other things, restrained them from saying anything to the prejudice of the United States. This they would not sign — they insisted on the “freedom of speech”; and, in consequence, they were continued in prison, though not ironed; “which confinement,” wrote Jefferson to Washington, on the same day, “must be considered as a voluntary one, until they can determine with themselves to be inoffensive in word as well as in deed.†

“Governor Hamilton and his companions,” also wrote Jefferson to one who was a prisoner to the British and had been in the Lieutenant Governor’s power but who now pleaded leniently for him, in hopes of effecting an exchange of himself, “were imprisoned and ironed, first in retaliation for cruel treatment of our captive citizens by the enemy in general; (2d) for the barbarous species of warfare which himself and his savage allies carried on in our western frontier; (3d) for particular acts of barbarity, of which he himself was personally guilty, to some of our citizens in his power. Any one of these charges was sufficient to justify the measure we took. Of the truth of the first

* “Seventy-five days they [Hamilton, Dejean and Lamothé] were loaded with irons in a dungeon nine by ten feet, and no one admitted to have access to them except the jailors.” — Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 189.

† *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, 230 n. Silas Farmer (*History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 254), infers that the three prisoners were a second time ironed; but this was not the case; they were continued in prison, but not again fettered.

yourself are witness. Your situation, indeed, seems to have been better since you were sent to New York; but reflect on what you suffered before that, and knew others of your countrymen to suffer, and what you know is now suffered by that more unhappy part of them who are still confined on board of the prison ships of the enemy. Proofs of the second charge, we have under Hamilton's own hand; and of the third, as sacred assurances as human testimony is capable of giving. Humane conduct on our part was found to produce no effect; the contrary, therefore, was to be tried."*

"As we had suffered already," afterwards wrote Hamilton, in giving his reasons for the prisoners not accepting this parole, "from the simple asseverations of obscure persons — one of whom, John Dodge, was known by several Virginians to be an unprincipled and perjured renegade, and as we had experienced the inhumanity of the executive power; it plainly appeared that this parole was offered for no other motive than to lay us open to the malice of the first informer, when we should probably have been imprisoned as before, with the additional stigma of having broken our parole, which it was next to impossible to observe in all its parts."†

The soldiers who formed a part of the party held in confinement, were, on the ninth of October, sent from the debtors' room in the jail to the barrack, where, being allowed to cut wood, "a part was sent to the jail for us," is the language of Hamilton. "And

* Jefferson to Mathews, Oct. 1779. *Memorandum in Proceedings of Virginia Council*, MS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

even the American soldiers on guard," he added, "though miserably bare of clothing themselves, used to share a part of their own fuel for dressing our victuals."* On the eleventh, Dejean and Lamothe wrote a memorial stating they wished to have their paroles tendered them that they might be enlarged, and remain no longer in confinement, although they had before been unanimous in rejecting it. They were accordingly discharged.† They repaired, of course, to Hanover Court House in accordance with the terms of their paroles. Lieutenant Schieffelin being indisposed was told he could be admitted on parole; and he sent to the authorities the following:

"GENTLEMEN: Having been informed that it has been a general practice to permit prisoners of war on parole to procure themselves an exchange, or wherewith to defray necessaries of life during their captivity, my present unhappy situation prompts me to take this mode of requesting that the indulgence be granted me to proceed to New York for the same purpose. I shall sign the usual parole, and a strict adherence shall be paid thereto. Relying that my request will be taken into consideration, —

"I am, with respect, gentlemen, your humble servant,

1st Lieut. Detroit Volunteers.

"JACOB SCHIEFFELIN,

"Williamsburg Prison, Oct. 11, 1779.

"The Gov. and Council of Va."

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 189. "Captain Lamothe and Mr. Dejean sometime in last October," afterward wrote Hamilton, "accepted the parole formerly rejected." (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.) But the statement of Hamilton was taken by him from his notes of August 1, 1780; hence the words "sometime in last October."

"The jailor returned with answer that they were resolved to keep us confined until we had signed the paroles first tendered to us."*

Haldimand, at Quebec, was much concerned at the treatment meted out to Hamilton and those with him, by the Virginia authorities; but he consoled himself with the belief that the "rebels" would not venture to take their lives† — a matter really that had not for a moment been considered by either Jefferson or his Council. It was only Dodge who had wished it;‡ and, with him, the "wish was father of the thought."

"The measure of the Council," said Washington, in writing Jefferson, on the twenty-third of November, "in remanding Governor Hamilton and his companions back to confinement, on their refusing to sign the parole tendered them, is perfectly agreeable to the practice of the enemy." The particular part objected to by them — their not being allowed to say anything to the prejudice of the United States — the Commander-in-chief declared he had always understood entered into the paroles given by American officers to the enemy. "Of late," added Washington, "or rather since Sir Henry Clinton has had the command, the treatment of our prisoners has been more within the line of humanity and in general very different from that which they experienced under his predecessors."§

* Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 190.

† Haldimand to Bolton, Nov. 11, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. MSS.

‡ Dodge to Boyle, July 13, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

§ *Writings of Washington* (Ford's ed.), vol. VIII, pp. 121, 122.

“Hamilton, Hay and four others,” wrote Jefferson to Washington on the twenty-eighth of November, “are still obstinate. They were continued therefore, in close confinement, though their irons have never been on since your second letter on the subject. I wrote full information of this matter to General Phillips also, from whom I had received letters on the subject. I cannot, in reason, believe that the enemy, on receiving this information, either from yourself or General Phillips, will venture to impose new cruelties on our officers in captivity with them. Yet their conduct, hitherto, has been most successfully prognosticated by reversing the conclusions of right reason. It is, therefore, my duty, as well as it was my promise to the Virginia captives, to take measures for discovering any change which may be made in their situation. For this purpose, I must apply for your Excellency’s interposition. I doubt not but you have an established mode of knowing, at all times, through your commissary of prisoners, the precise state of those in the power of the enemy. I must, therefore, pray you to put into motions, any such means you have, for obtaining knowledge of the situation of the Virginia officers in captivity. If you should think proper, as I could wish, to take upon yourself to retaliate any new sufferings which may be imposed on them, it will be more likely to have due weight and to restore the unhappy on both sides to that benevolent treatment for which all should wish.”*

On Christmas day, Hamilton’s imprisoned soldiers were marched away to King Williams’ Court House.†

* *Jefferson’s Works*, vol. I, p. 237.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

"The weather at this time," the Lieutenant-Governor wrote subsequently, "became so intensely cold that we could not rise from the floor, but continued day and night in our blankets. The scurvey began to make its appearance and our legs to swell. The jailor then concluding we could not survive the severity of the cold, in our present situation, took us to an upper room in the jail, where prisoners had formerly been kept; this, though it had no window but an open grate was more tolerable than the dungeon. We could light fire in the chimney, and by sacrificing part of our blankets to stop the grated window, and stuff the cracks in the ceiling, we made a shift to endure in the day time; at night we were remanded to our dungeon."*

"The whole winter," wrote one of the officers, "did we pass without a stick of wood allowed us. Blankets were demanded for us by the keepers, who got for answer that no blankets could be given us; that their friends who were at New York were ill-treated by our people, some starved for want of provisions and blankets. This is the consolation they received from their cruel masters. General Phillips was so obliging as to order a supply of clothing from Albermarle. When it came to our hands, one third only was delivered to us. The balance was laid on the wagoner: poor restitution! The Executive restricted us from having our meals as usual from the tavern at our own expense, but ordered us to be put on prison allowance — salt beef damaged, and Indian meal."

"In January, a Mr. William B. St. Clair, volunteer of the Forty-fourth regiment, with ten troopers of the Seventeenth Dragoons, were committed in close

* Id.

confinement and kept four days without an ounce of provision issued for them. Governor Hamilton sent out of the mess a supply, or they would have starved. The Executive power of the rebels in Virginia were pleased to accuse Governor Hamilton and others of having raised the Indian tribes to murder women, children and defenceless men — most infamous falsehoods, propagated by them to inveterate the commonality against the British, on the frontiers. They say it is cruel in them to act with Indians.”*

Lieutenant Schieffelin, on the nineteenth of April, 1780, at 7 P. M., made his escape from the prison in Williamsburg.† With him went Rocheblave in violation of his parole, as Governor Jefferson afterward claimed.‡ The two made their way to Little York, and embarked on board a schooner Schieffelin engaged, and made their way to the eastern shore, where they remained concealed for nine weeks.§ “After great risks and difficulties” both reached New York in safety. In thus escaping, Rocheblave declares he did not break his parole.||

* Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 190. Schieffelin then gives in full the Virginia resolutions of May 21, 1776, as to the employment of Indians in regular warfare.

† Schieffelin: *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 190. Hamilton gives the previous day as the date of Schieffelin and Rocheblave's escape. (Letter to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.) But Schieffelin, for this, is the better authority.

‡ *Jefferson Works*, vol. I, p. 258.

§ Schieffelin: *Loose Notes*, loc. cit.

|| Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 374. For Rocheblave's subsequent career, see the same work, pp. 375-381.

On the first of August, Francis Maisonville destroyed himself.* "This poor man" . . . are the subsequent words of Hamilton, "was not . . . proof to the long confinement he underwent at Williamsburg. The gloominess of his situation affected his spirits first; the apprehension of suffering an ignominious death lowered them still more, till his reason began to be impaired. The surgeon, a man of great humanity, though attached to the cause of rebellion, wrote to the Governor and Council of Virginia, to solicit a little enlargement for this poor man as the only means likely to save him. What the answer was I know not; but the unfortunate creature put an end to his miseries and his life, in spite of two persons who watched him and were aware of his situation."†

Hamilton and Major Hay, on the day of Maisonville's death, were sent to the jail at Chesterfield; McBeath and Bellefeuille to King William Court House. Another parole was offered Hamilton subsequently for his consideration, "which varied so little," he afterwards wrote, "from the first that we chose to remain prisoners rather than accept it."‡

"While at Chesterfield" is the language of the Lieutenant Governor, "our confinement was rendered very tolerable; and several of the military and others who were convinced of the injustice and illiberality of our treatment, showed by their behavior what opinion they had of the executive power. In this jail Ma-

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 20, 1780. — Haldimand MSS.

† Same to same, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

‡ Id.

for Hay and I had a very severe though short attack of fever, which was pretty generally felt through the country: we were well attended. We had liberty to walk about in the neighborhood of the jail.”*

The imprisonment of the Lieutenant Governor called out on part of General Haldimand a retaliation, but in a mild form. He says: “From the barbarous treatment of our prisoners by the rebels in many instances, particularly in that of Lieut. Gov’r Hamilton and the troops taken with him, (who are still confined in dungeons upon scanty and unwholesome provisions), and their obliging many, even in the character of gentlemen, to work for their maintenance, I have given orders to the commanding officers of the several posts to employ the rebel prisoners in whatever work they may be most useful, if necessary under a guard, allowing them a full ration and pay equal to the soldiers who are employed as laborers — which is to be applied to clothe them. The air and exercise will preserve their health, and there cannot be a doubt of their being treated with humanity.”†

On the fifth of September, the attention of the Governor of Virginia was called, by Washington, to the confinement of Hamilton, in a letter of that date.

* Id. Farmer (*History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 255) confounds the American Brigadier General Hamilton with Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, giving a letter from Col. James Wood mentioning, as he (Farmer) supposes, the latter; which would indicate that the prisoner was, on the 15th of June, 1780, in confinement at Charlottesville, Va.; but this is error. None of the British taken by Clark and sent to Virginia were held at the place last named.

† Haldimand to Sinclair, Aug. 10, 1780.—Haldimand MSS.

The Commander-in-chief was desirous that Virginia should consent to his being exchanged. "I was honored yesterday," wrote Governor Jefferson, on the twenty-sixth, in reply, "with your favor of the fifth instant, on the subject of prisoners, and particularly of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton. You are not unapprised of the influence of this officer with the Indians, his activity and embittered zeal against us. You also, perhaps, know how precarious is our tenure of the Illinois country, and critical is the situation of the new counties on the Ohio. These circumstances determined us to retain Governor Hamilton and Major Hay within our power, when we delivered up the other prisoners. On a late representation from the people of Kentucky, by a person sent here from that country, and expressions of what they had reason to apprehend from these two prisoners in the event of their liberation, we assured them they would not be parted with, though we were giving up our other prisoners.

"Lieutenant Colonel Dabusson, aid to Baron de Kalb, lately came here on his parole, with an offer from Lord Rawdon to exchange him for Hamilton. Colonel Towles is now here with a like proposition for himself, from General Phillips, very strongly urged by the General. These, and other overtures do not lessen our opinion of the importance of retaining him; and they have been, and will be, uniformly rejected. Should the settlement, indeed, of a cartel become impracticable, without the consent of the states to submit their separate prisoners to its obligation, we will give up these two prisoners, as we would do anything rather than be an obstacle to the general good. But no other circumstances would, I believe, extract them from us.

These two gentlemen, with a Lieutenant Elligood, are the only separate prisoners we have retained, and the last, only on his own request, and not because we set any store by him. There is indeed a Lieutenant Governor [British Commandant] Rocheblave, of Kaskaskia, who has broken his parole, and gone to New York, whom we must shortly trouble your Excellency to demand for us, as soon as we can forward to you the proper documents.”*

Colonel Towles,† already mentioned, arrived on the twenty-third of September, at Chesterfield. He had been a long time prisoner to the English on Long Island. He had hopes, as we have seen, of procuring an exchange, and came, under permission, to Virginia to effect it if possible. He brought Hamilton letters from friends, which gave him to understand that, unless he accepted a parole, there was little probability of his (Hamilton's) exchange. Being, therefore, pretty well assured that the only hopes of returning to his friends lay in signing it, and having written to a “rebel” officer (Brigadier General Hamilton) requesting the continuance of his kindness to the residue of the prisoners then removed to Frederick Town, the Lieutenant Governor accepted and set his name to one:

“I, Henry Hamilton, Lieutenant Governor, and Superintendent of Detroit, hereby acknowledge myself a prisoner of war to the Commonwealth of Virginia;

* *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 258. It will be remembered that Rocheblave claimed he did not break his parole. It seems that no farther action was taken by Jefferson in the matter.

† The Colonel's name is incorrectly given in Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 (Germain MSS.) as “Fowler.”

and having permission from his Excellency, Thomas Jefferson, Governor of the said Commonwealth, to go to New York, do pledge my faith and most sacredly promise upon my parole of honor, that I will not do, say, write, or cause to be done, said or written, directly or indirectly, in any respect whatever, anything to the prejudice of the United States of America, or of any of them, until I shall be enlarged from my captivity by exchange or otherwise with the consent of the said Governor of Virginia or his successors; and that I will return when required by the said Governor or his successor, to such place within the said Commonwealth as he shall point out and deliver myself up again to him or the person acting for or under him.

“In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and seal at Chesterfield, this 10th day of October, 1780.

“HENRY HAMILTON.”

“The within mentioned Henry Hamilton, having signed a parole, of which this is a copy, has permission to go to New York and to remain within such parts of that State as are in possession of the armies of his Britannic Majesty, until he shall be exchanged or otherwise liberated with the consent of the Governor of Virginia for the time being, or until he shall be recalled by him.

“Given under my hand and seal of the Commonwealth of Virginia, at Richmond, date within written.

“TH. JEFFERSON [L. S.]”

Major Hay accepted and signed a like parole at the same date.*

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781.

On this very day — October tenth — Washington wrote: “The State of Virginia, sensible of the dangerous influence which Governor Hamilton holds over the Indians, has absolutely refused to exchange him on any terms, for the present at least.”*

On the twenty-fifth, Jefferson wrote Washington that “on some representations received by Colonel Towles that an indulgence to Governor Hamilton and his companions to go to New York, on parole, would produce the happiest effect on the situation of our officers on Long Island, we have given him, Major Hay, and some of the same party at Winchester, leave to go there on parole. The two former go by water, the latter by land.”†

Hamilton and Hay had no sooner accepted a parole than they hastened to Williamsburg on their way to Hampton where they were stopped by the Lieutenant Governor of Virginia, who, as General Leslie had just arrived, thought it not advisable to let them pass, giving orders for their being escorted back to Richmond. This treatment Hamilton resented and the order was rescinded. As soon as he had given certificates recommending to General Leslie such of the inhabitants as had shown an attachment to the British government (thereby, virtually, violating his parole) or had been kind to him and his company in their distress, he with Hay proceeded to York, where some turbulent people were minded to set a guard over them and stop their progress; however, they finally reached Hampton. This short journey cost the British Lieutenant Governor one thousand pounds in the de-

* *Washington's Writings* (Sparks's ed.), vol. VII, p. 240.

† *Id.*, p. 291.

preciated paper money then in circulation. At Hampton, the two received civil treatment. They were furnished with a canoe, which, to their "inexpressible satisfaction," put them on board his Majesty's sloop, the *Delight*, Captain Inglis, who, by his kind reception of them "presently recruited" their "lowered spirits."*

The Lieutenant Governor and Hay next went to wait on Captain Gayton (in the *Romulus*), the Commodore of the British squadron. The cartel vessel which was to have conveyed them from Hampton to New York, had been taken, and the master's certificate not appearing genuine, he, with his vessel, was detained. Having paid their respects to General Leslie, who received them with the greatest politeness, the two returned to the *Romulus*. Finally the cartel master was suffered to go to Hampton to prepare for his voyage. The stores which General Leslie and Captain Gayton had most liberally supplied the Lieutenant Governor and his companions with "were plundered by the Americans on shore," as the two did not care to risk themselves out of a king's ship in an effort to save them.†

"At length," says Hamilton, "we set off from the *Romulus* in our cartel, a little miserable sloop, of thirty-five feet keel, for a passage, in which we were obliged to pay four hundred hard dollars. A violent gale of wind obliged us to anchor off Smith's island, where we were very near perishing. Our crew was three hours at work to get the anchor out of the ground. At last we got it home, leaving one flock be-

* Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

† Id.

hind; and, to our no small mortification were obliged to put back to Hampton. Here we were on the point of being detained by order of General Nelson, who had assembled some militia, but our skipper being desirous to get us away, and having got another anchor, we once more set sail for New York."

"A very severe gale of wind," continues the Lieutenant Governor, "took us near the capes of Delaware, when our skipper, not having a lag-line on board laid the vessel to; and we had reason in the morning to admire our good fortune, for the wind was right on shore and it was twelve at night when he lay to. Judging by the sun, we were [now] opposite Delaware Bay (as it proved); for we had [been] driven seven leagues up the bay from the time of laying to."

"We arrived at New York," are Hamilton's further words, "very squalid spectacles, not having had any sleep for three days and nights, our clothes ragged, shoes broken, and [we] so altered in face and figure that our acquaintances could scarcely recollect us."†

Not long after reaching New York, Hamilton wrote to his Commander-in-chief, giving him something of an idea of his own and his companions' suf-

† Id. On the eleventh of November and before Haldimand had learned of the acceptance by Hamilton and Hay of a parole, he wrote that he was much concerned to find how Hamilton and those with him had been treated, but he did not think the "rebels" would "venture to take their lives" (Haldimand to Bolton — Haldimand MSS.) "The treatment of Hamilton by the titular Governor and Council of Virginia has been so barbarous that his Excellency [General Haldimand] will not set at liberty any prisoners from that State till Hamilton is liberated." (Mathews to Campbell, Dec. 28, 1780 — Haldimand MSS.)

ferings since they had been made prisoners, and recommending to his consideration the services of his officers :

"It has been," said he, "matter of great concern to me, that my situation has put it out of my power to know for a certainty whether or not the different letters I have had the honor of addressing to your Excellency, have found their way to Quebec.

"Neglect in point of respect to your Excellency, or willful remissness of duty, have not a place among my failures. I have, it is true, experienced the misfortune of having undertaken an enterprise which has been attended with great expense and fallen totally short of success, yet I have a confidence in your Excellency's candor and generosity, that the unexampled treachery of those whom I had endeavored to win by kind treatment, will appear to have disappointed my measures and that at least I have made the best use in my power of the means I had for distressing the enemy.

"It would be far beyond the compass of a letter, were I to enter into a detail of facts, necessary for clearing up this point, so necessary for your Excellency's information and my own vindication. My confinement since my being a prisoner of war, has been so strict, and the watch over my actions so exact, that I have but very imperfect minutes whereon to build my defence; yet, while the candid few suspend their opinions, I shall quiet myself as to the malicious censures of the many.

"After some months confinement in a dungeon, the Governor of Virginia offered a parole, which we all rejected, as it was manifestly constructed to the

purpose of ensnaring us and taking advantage of some new ground for crimination.

"I have since that time been an entire year a prisoner, the greater part of the time in a dungeon, with Major Hay and other of the gentlemen made prisoners of war at the same time. A second and a third parole have been tendered to us in the course of that time, the last I accepted with some regret, and am now on parole; but as yet unexchanged and restricted to the limits of the lines dependent on this garrison.

"However, by the goodness of his Excellency, Sir Henry Clinton, and the extraordinary kindness of Major General Phillips, who has given himself infinite trouble on our accounts, I am in hope we shall all be finally exchanged shortly.

"Major Hay's situation is truly pityable; upward of two years absent from his numerous family, of whom he has had no intelligence, his anxiety and distress are more easily imagined than described. His misfortune will recommend him more strongly to your Excellency, than can a person who himself stands so greatly in need of your protection and support. I must, however, in justice to Major Hay, lessen my own pretensions to your Excellency's favor, by avowing, that on every occasion, his advice and assistance were my chief resource. He voluntarily embarked, on my projecting the enterprise against the rebels, and his fortitude has supported him in the most trying circumstances, ignorant of the fate of his wife and seven children. Your Excellency will, I hope, pardon my zeal, for a very deserving person, an officer of so long standing, if I presume to mention his eldest son being in his sixteenth year.

“Captain Lamothe’s health suffered much by his confinement, and he is now ill; were it practical and his exchange effected, he would attempt crossing the Lakes this winter to receive your Excellency’s commands.

“Lieutenant Schieffelin, who has set out for Quebec, will, I hope, have the honor of acquainting your Excellency with some particulars, which, in my present situation, I am not at liberty to enter upon. He effected his escape out of prison, last April; has been, on all occasions, devoted to the service, and has done his duty with alacrity and diligence. The unfortunate Mr. François Maisonville put an end to his miseries in the prison with us the first day of August last. Mr. Bellefeuille has behaved with great propriety, and is a young man of unexceptionable character. He has been upon pay as an interpreter at one dollar per diem. I shall take the liberty of continuing that to him, till I can have your Excellency’s orders and instructions, as the young gentleman is exposed to expense at this place, and has no other resource as yet. Should your Excellency judge proper to order Captain Lamothe’s company to be recruited I would beg leave to recommend Mr. Bellefeuille as second lieutenant of it.

“Mr. McBeath, who willingly accompanied me to Vincennes, and has shared our fatigues and hardships, gave up what views of advantage in his profession, he was pursuing at Detroit and being now debarred the support of his relations and friends at so great a distance from home, I hope it will appear but reasonable to your Excellency, that I should con-

tinue his pay likewise, till further orders, as his situation is, owing to his misfortune, not to his fault.

"I have the honor of transmitting by the opportunity of a vessel, bound to Halifax an account of bills drawn and cash disbursed, directed to Captain Brehm, your Excellency's secretary; the vouchers shall be forwarded as soon as possible, which I hope will be by the hands of Major Hay.

"Should my exchange take place speedily, I shall, with the approbation of Sir Henry Clinton sail for England, and lose no time to put myself under your Excellency's orders."*

"His Excellency Sir Henry Clinton, Major General Phillips, and Lord Rawdon," are the concluding words of Hamilton, in his Journal proper, "were so good as to take several steps toward procuring our exchange, which finally took place on the fourth day of March, 1781. We took our passage for England the tenth, but the packet not sailing till the twenty-seventh of May, our arrival in this country was so late as the twenty-first of June."†

On the sixth day of July, Hamilton, then in London, wrote to Haldimand at Quebec: "The last letter I had the honor of addressing to your Excellency," said he, "was dated May the seventh, 1781, and was accompanied with returns of the prisoners and general account of the disbursements and of cash received at different times, duplicates of all which shall be sent by the first opportunity. The packet which brought Major Hay and myself sailed from Sandy Hook on the

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 12, 1780. — Haldimand MSS.

† Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.

twenty-seventh of May and arrived in Falmouth, on the twenty-first of June.”*

It gave Haldimand much satisfaction to hear of Hamilton's enlargement and exchange, and he wrote his congratulations, trusting he would derive benefit from his trip to England. He informed him of the arrival in Quebec of Captain Lamothe and of Rocheblave and Bellefeuille. He generously assured the Lieutenant Governor that he would try what could be done by Dr. McBeath.†

On the recall of General Haldimand, in 1785, Hamilton was appointed Lieutenant Governor of Quebec. He held his position one year, when he went to England, and was, soon after his arrival there, made Governor of Dominica. He died at Antiqua in September, 1796.‡ Hay was rewarded with the office of Lieutenant Governor of Detroit. As might be presumed, Dejean did not return to Canada;§ however, the criminal proceedings against him and Hamilton, which had been commenced at Montreal were not approved by the home government. “The presentments,” wrote Germain, “of the grand jury at Montreal against Lieutenant Governor Hamilton and Mr. Dejean, are expressive of a greater degree of jealousy than the transaction complained of in the then circumstances of the Province appear to warrant.”

* Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXIII.)

† Haldimand to Hamilton, Oct. 23, 1781. — Haldimand MSS.

‡ Morgan's *Celebrated Canadians*, p. 108.

§ Dejean to Haldimand, from Vincennes, July 28, 1780, and to De Peyster from the same place, at same date. — Haldimand MSS.

“Such stretches of authority,” continues Lord George, “are, however, only to be excused by unavoidable necessity and the justness and fitness of the occasion; and you will therefore direct the Chief Justice to examine the proofs produced of the criminal’s guilt, and if he shall be of opinion that he merited the punishment he met with, although irregularly inflicted, it is the King’s pleasure that you do order the Attorney General to grant a nolle prosequi and stop all further proceedings in the matter.”* And they were stopped.

* Germain to Haldimand, April 16, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

CHAPTER XXIII.

JUST as, on the twenty-seventh of February, Colonel Clark in Vincennes was getting anxious because of the non-arrival of the *Willing*, the bateau made its appearance. It was three o'clock in the afternoon when the boat was made secure at the landing. It had been detained by the strong current, of the Ohio and the Wabash. On board were the lieutenants — Rogers (the commander) and another — and forty-eight men, two having been added to the original number — they were those dispatched by Clark on the nineteenth to drop down the Wabash until they met the *Willing*. The armament remained intact — two iron four-pounders and four swivels.*

Great was the mortification on the vessel when all learned the particulars of the siege and surrender of the fort that they had been denied the privilege of taking part in the attack.† But good humor soon took the place of disappointment; and no one was more happy than the Colonel himself; it was because of the arrival, in the galley, of William Myres, who had been sent by him as an express from Kaskaskia and had now returned from Williamsburg, having been taken up on the Ohio by the commander of the *Willing* and brought back to the mouth of the Wabash, and taken thence to Vincennes.

The package delivered by Myres contained the official letter of the Governor to Clark of January 1,

* Clark's *Journal* (entry of Feb. 27, 1779). — Haldimand MSS. But the Colonel says there were five swivels on the *Willing*. In this he was in error; there were only four.

† "Bowman's Journal" — entry of the 27th of February.

preceding, and one to him on private affairs from his Excellency. One also was received by the Colonel from Benjamin Harrison, speaker of the House of Delegates, with the vote of thanks of the House enclosed. There were, besides the instructions of Governor Henry to Clark of December 12, copies of those issued to John Todd as Lieutenant of Illinois county, and to Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery, both of the date last mentioned. Captain Bowman, too, received his commission as Major.* The whole gave encouragement for the future to the Colonel. His battalion was to be completed (he might expect) in a few months, and an entirely new regiment for service in the Illinois was to be raised.

“What crowned the general joy,” afterward wrote Clark to the Virginia Governor, “was the arrival of William Myers, my express to you, with your letters, which gave general satisfaction. The soldiery being made sensible of the gratitude of their country for their services, were so much elated that they would have attempted the reduction of Detroit, had I ordered them.”†

The American commander, on the ninth of March, busied himself in writing to the Virginia executive and others on public affairs — answering the letters he had received. He was particularly careful to give Governor Henry full details in answer to the letter

* “Came [Feb. 27, 1779] William Myers express from Williamsburgh, with very good news. Capt. Bowman receives a Major’s commission inclosed from the Government.” (“Bowman’s Journal” — State Department MSS.)

† Clark to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779 — *Jefferson’s Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXIV.)

of the latter of the first day of January; but it never reached its destination: nor did his Journal, which he had kept from the time of leaving Kaskaskia to the final capture of Vincennes.* "By William Myres," said he to Henry, in reply to the letter from the Governor relating wholly to private matters, "you wrote me to procure you, if possible, some horses and mares. Nothing could give me greater pleasure than to serve you, but I think, at present, it is out of my power, as my situation and circumstances are much changed. There are no such horses here as you request me to get; and I have so much public business to do, especially in the Indian department, that I doubt if I shall be able to go to the Illinois for some time."

Changing his subject to other matters that Governor Henry had written him about, the Colonel said: "I thank you for your remembrance of my situation respecting lands on the frontiers. I learn that [the Virginia Government] has reserved lands on the Cumberland for the soldiers. If I should be deprived of a certain tract on that river which I purchased three years ago and have been at considerable expense to improve, I shall, in a manner, lose my all. It is known by the name of the 'Great French Lick,' on the south (or west) side, containing three thousand acres. If you can do anything for me in saving it, I shall ever remember it with gratitude. There are glorious situations and bodies of land in this country formerly purchased. I am in hopes of being able, in a short time, to send you a map of the whole."†

* See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXVII; also Note CXXV.

† Clark to Gov. Henry.—Haldimand MSS. The letter had for its heading—"Fort Patrick Henry, Vincennes;"

The next day, the Colonel wrote to Benjamin Harrison, Speaker of the House of Delegates of Virginia, acknowledging, in fitting terms, his appreciation of the action of the House, of the twenty-third of the previous November, in voting their thanks to him and his men for their services in capturing the Illinois towns.

"I must confess, sir," he said, "that I think my country has done me no more honor than I merited; but you may be assured my study shall be to deserve it." "By my public letters," he added, "you will be made fully acquainted with my late successful expedition against Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, who has fallen into my hands with all the principal partisans of Detroit. This stroke will nearly put an end to the Indian war. Had I but men enough to take advantage of the present confusion of the Indian nations, I could silence the whole in two months."

As it was, he hoped to accomplish some effective work with the help of five hundred men reported as ordered out to reinforce him. "If they arrive," he wrote, "with what I have in this country, I am in hopes it will enable me to do something clever."*

Now more than at any previous time, did Clark yearn for an opportunity to March against Detroit. Nay, he even flattered himself the auspicious moment for such an undertaking was near at hand. "Never," says he, "was a person more mortified than I was, at this time, to see so fair an opportunity to push a

and the concluding words were — "My compliments to your lady and family." [See Appendix, Note CXV. (Letter No. 1).]

* Clark to Harrison, March 10, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. [See Appendix to our narrative, (Letter No. 2), Note CXV.]

victory — Detroit — lost for want of a few men . . . Having at once all the intelligence I could wish for from both sides, I was better able to fix my future plans of operation against that post. By his Excellency's letter, I might expect to have a complete battalion in a few months. The militia of Illinois I knew would turn out; and I did not doubt of getting two or three hundred men from Kentucky; which put the matter out of any uncertainty. I contented myself on that presumption.”*

“Early in the month of March, I laid before the officers,” wrote Clark subsequently, “my plans for the reduction of Detroit and explained the almost certainty of success and the probability of keeping possession of it until we could receive succor from the States. If we awaited the arrival of the troops mentioned in the dispatches from the Governor of Virginia, the enemy in the meantime might get strengthened, and probably we might not be so capable of carrying the [post] with the expected reinforcement as we should be with our present force, in case we were to make the attempt at this time; and in the event of our being disappointed in the promised reinforcement, we might not be able to effect it all. There were various arguments made use of on this delicate point. Every person seemed anxious to improve the present opportunity, but prudence appeared to forbid the execution and induced us to wait for the reinforcement.”

“The arguments,” continues Clark, “which appeared to have the greatest weight, were, that, with

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 75, 76.

such a force we might march boldly through the Indian nations; that it would make a great [impression] on them as well as the inhabitants of Detroit, and have a better effect than if we were now to slip off and take the place with so small a force; that the British would not wish to weaken Niagara by sending any considerable reinforcement to Detroit; that it was more difficult for that post to get succor from Canada than it was for us to receive it from the States; and that the garrison at Detroit would not be able to get a reinforcement in time to prevent our designs, as we might with propriety expect ours in a few weeks.”*

Myres, with two men, on the fourteenth, set out by land from Vincennes for the Virginia capital, — sent again as an express by Clark.† He was enjoined to hasten and, if necessary, to press whatever he might need for the service, even using force, if necessary; such were the orders given him the day before in writing;‡ but the three returned the next day, not being able to proceed because of the country being overflowed with water. However, Myres soon started again, this time with three men, going in a canoe down the Wabash to its mouth and up the Ohio to the Falls. Thence, not earlier than the fourth of April,

* Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 159, 160. The argument that it was more difficult for Detroit “to get succor from Canada” than for Clark to receive it “from the States” was (if really made) a fallacy, it may be premised, soon to be made apparent.

† “Bowman's Journal” of March 14th.

‡ From the Haldimand MSS. — Clark's Instructions to Myers. [See Appendix, Note CXV, (Letter No. 3.)]

he set out for his destination by land.* He had intrusted to him not only letters of Clark and of some of his officers and men but the Journal of the Colonel containing an account of the march from Kaskaskia to Vincennes and of the capture of Hamilton and his garrison.†

On the fifteenth an express arrived at Vincennes from Kaskaskia with the information that forty-one men from New Orleans had reached there. This was Captain James Willing's Company;—the Captain, after resigning his command to Robert George, had started with a companion for Philadelphia.‡ Captain George, on his arrival, took charge of the garrison in Fort Clark.§

“On my return from New Orleans,” afterward wrote George, “I had positive written orders to join Colonel Clark in the Illinois or the commanding officer there, who was to give me order for my future destination. These orders [to join Clark] I received from Mr. Pollock, agent for the United States, and also from Captain Willing.”||

It was now a question with the American commander what he should do with the residue of his

* “Bowman's Journal” — Department of State MSS. (See Appendix, Note CXVI.)

† Appendix, Note CXVII.

‡ “Bowman's Journal.” The number of men under command of Capt. George is given in De Peyster to Haldimand, June 27, 1779 — Haldimand MSS.

§ Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 83. The Colonel declares that George's company was a considerable reinforcement to the little party in the Kaskaskia fort.

|| George to Colonel Daniel Brodhead at Fort Pitt, Sept. 25, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

prisoners, having, he says, more than he knew what to do with.* Besides, he was not ignorant of the fact of the great desire of those who had families in Detroit to return home; and, not doubting that his good treatment of these volunteers — all inhabitants of Detroit — would promote his interests there, he, upon their application,† discharged the greater part of them (but none who had been with Indian parties against the American settlements) on their taking “the oath of neutrality;” that is to say, they were paroled. “They went off,” says the Colonel, “huzzaing for the Congress and declaring though they could not fight against the Americans they would for them” (a few, it seems, remaining in Vincennes, joining Clark’s force). This was on the sixteenth. There was sent with them a copy of the alliance between France and the United States. Clark was now much relieved; for, after so many of his volunteers had returned to their homes, his prisoners numbered almost as many as his own men.

With those set at liberty, Clark sent a letter to Captain Lernoult at Detroit. It ended with a sarcasm doubtless irritating to that officer:

“I learn by your letter to Governor Hamilton that you were very busy making new works. I am glad to hear it, as it will save the Americans some expense in building.” The Colonel then added these words:

* Clark to Gov. Henry, April 29, 1779 (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n.)

† Capt. Joseph Bowman to Capt. R. B. Lernoult, March 20, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXVIII.)

"The officers of Fort Patrick Henry solicit Captain Lernoult to present their compliments to the officers of his garrison."*

From the moment of the arrival of Clark at Vincennes, the Piankeshaws and Kickapoos of the village had given him no concern. It is true they had met Hamilton in council and declared themselves thenceforth his followers, but the British commander very well understood it was more through fear than kindly regard. The Colonel declares that, having matters a little settled at Vincennes, he turned his attention to the Indians of the Wabash, calling together the Piankeshaws, Kickapoos and others, who, as he had been informed (though erroneously), had refused to listen to the Lieutenant Governor. "I knew," says Clark, "that Mr. Hamilton had endeavored to make them [the Indians] believe that we intended at last to take all their lands from them, and that, in case of success, we would show no greater mercy for those who did not join him than those that did. I endeavored to make myself acquainted with the arguments he used."

"I made a very long speech to them in the Indian manner," continues the Colonel; "extolled them to the skies for their manly behavior and fidelity; told them that we were so far from having any design on their lands that I looked upon it that we were then on their land where the fort stood, that we claimed no land in their country, that the first man that offered to take their lands by violence must strike the tomahawk in my head, that it was only necessary

* See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXIX.

that I should be in their country during the war and keep a fort in it to drive off the English, who had a design against all people; after that, I might go to some place where I could get land to support me."

The treaty was concluded to the satisfaction of both parties. The Indians, the American commander declares, were much pleased at what they heard and they begged him to favor them the next day with his company at a council of theirs; so, on the sixteenth of March, he attended their meeting, — the great part of the time being spent in ceremony. Finally, they told the Colonel they had been meditating on what he had said to them the day before; that all the nations of the Wabash would be rejoiced to have him always in their country as their great father and protector; and as he had said he would claim no land of theirs they were determined that they would not lose him on that account, and had resolved to give him a piece, but larger than they had given to all the French at Vincennes.

Clark was well pleased at the Indians' offer, as it gave him an opportunity to refuse the acceptance of it, — the farther to convince them that he did not want their land; but they appeared dejected at his refusal; whereupon, he waived any further talk on that or other subjects, recommending a "frolic," as he terms it, that night, "as the sky was clearer than ever." He then presented them with a quantity of tafia and provisions to make merry on and left them.*

After the treaty with the Indians of the Wabash,† the American commander was gratified to see coming

* See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXX.

† The Miami Indians of Eel river, it seems, did not take kindly to the American cause (*History of the Girtys*, p. 107),

into Vincennes and craving audience, some Chippewas and others that had been with Hamilton. The Colonel soon granted them a hearing. They begged him to excuse their blindness and take them into favor. After the warmest solicitations for mercy, Clark told them that the Big Knives were merciful, which proved them to be warriors; that he would send belts and a speech to all the nations; and that they [the savages present], after hearing of it, might do as they pleased; but [they] must blame themselves for future misfortunes. He then sent them off.

It was the opinion of Clark that nothing destroys the interest of Indians in one so soon as wavering sentiments or speeches that show the least fear. He, consequently, had observed, as he declares, one steady line of conduct among them. Hamilton who was almost deified by them being captured by the Colonel, it was a sufficient confirmation to the Indians of everything the latter had formerly said to them and gave great weight, in his view, to the speeches he intended to send them. Expecting that he would shortly be able to fulfill his threats with a body of troops sufficient to penetrate into any part of their country and by reducing Detroit bring them to his feet, he sent the following speech to the different tribes near the lakes, which were at war with the Americans:

"To the Warriors of the Different Nations. Men and Warriors:— It is a long time since the Big Knives sent belts of peace among you soliciting of you not to listen to the bad talks and deceit of the English, as it would, at some future day tend to the destruction of your nations. You would not listen but joined the English against the Big

doubtless because the residue of that nation at the head of the Maumee still adhered to the British.

Knives and spilt much blood of women and children. The Big Knives then resolved to show no mercy to any people that hereafter would refuse the belt of peace which should be offered, at the same time one of war. You remember last summer a great many people took me by the hand, but a few kept back their hearts. I also sent belts of peace and war among the nations to take their choice; some took the peace-belt others still listened to their great father (as they call him) at Detroit, and joined him to come to war against me. The Big Knives are warriors and look on the English as old women and all those that join them, and are ashamed when they fight them because they are no men.

“I now send two belts to all the nations, — one for peace and the other for war. The one that is for war has your great English father’s scalp tied to it and [is] made red with his blood. All you that call yourselves his children make your hatchets sharp and come out and revenge his blood on the Big Knives; fight like men, that the Big Knives may not be ashamed when they fight you, that our old women may not tell us that we only fought squaws. If any of you are for taking the belt of peace, send the bloody belt back to me that I may know who to take by the hand as brothers; for, you may be assured that no peace for the future will be granted to those that do not lay down their arms immediately. It is as you will, — I do not care whether you are for peace or war, as I glory in war and want enemies to fight us as the English cannot fight us any longer, and are become like young children begging the Big Knives for mercy and a little bread to eat. This is the last speech you may ever expect from the Big Knives; the next thing will be the tomahawk. And you may expect in four moons to see your women and children given to the dogs to be eat, while those nations that have kept their words with me will flourish and grow like the willow trees on the river-banks under the care and nourishment of their father, the Big Knives.”

Now that Clark had fixed all matters at Vincennes “so as to promise future advantage,” having sent letters to Colonel John Bowman, the County Lieutenant of Kentucky County, solociting him to make some

preparatory movements towards joining him when called on, with all the force he could raise, he made preparations to return to Kaskaskia.*

Lieutenant Brashier was to be left in command of Fort Patrick Henry, and with him forty picked men, sergeants and corporals included. Under him were Lieutenants Bayley and Chapline. The whole were to remain until relieved from Kaskaskia. Captain Helm was given command of Vincennes, in civil matters. He was also made Superintendent of Indian affairs. Moses Henry was appointed Indian Agent and Patrick Kennedy quartermaster.†

On the nineteenth of March, orders were issued by Clark to have six boats put in readiness to start for Kaskaskia. Two of these were the *Willing* and *Running Fly*—the latter a small craft. Captain McCarty was given command of the *Willing*, “now made perfectly complete;” while a sergeant and six men were to manage the *Running Fly*. Captain Worthington and Lieutenant Keller, and two ensigns were to have charge, each of them, of a boat.‡ With

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 82. “Bowman's Journal” — entry of March 19, 1779. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXI.)

† Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 163, 164. “Bowman's Journal,” of the date March 20, 1779.

‡ In “Bowman's Journal” — Department of State MSS. — the names of the two ensigns are given as Montgomery and Lawvin; in the printed Journal, as Montgomery and Lorraine, and Lieutenant Chapline appears erroneously as “Chapman” (see *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 110). In the place last cited, as well as in the Department of State MSS., Lieutenant Keller is erroneously spoken of as “Captain Keller.”

them were to be sent all the prisoners yet remaining in Vincennes, as well as all the goods — “the spoils of the war” — not previously disposed of, including such as had been set aside for a specific purpose.* The brass field-piece captured from Hamilton was also to be taken along.†

On the twentieth, at 4 o'clock in the afternoon, Clark started with all his force (save those left to guard Fort Patrick Henry and the few who had been charged with other duties) for Kaskaskia. Out of abundant caution eighty of his men whom he styles his “guard” were armed and equipped for instant and effective service; for, besides the danger which might impend from an unknown and concealed enemy, there were his prisoners to be watched.‡

Says one of his men who did not go along and who noted the incident at the moment of starting: “The boats, after much rejoicing, are now out of sight. God send them a good and safe passage!”§ The trip of three hundred and fifty miles was made without accident; and the soldiers, after a campaign of about seven weeks' duration were happy in getting

* That goods were taken along of those secured from the enemy, is made certain by the statement to be found in the *History of the Girtys*, p. 106. Other evidence will hereafter be adduced.

† *History of the Girtys*, loc. cit.

‡ Clark in his Memoir erroneously gives seventy as the number of his “guard” and speaks of them as though there were none beside them taken along.

§ “Bowman's Journal” in Department of State MSS., where the wording is different from what is printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 110. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXII.)

back to the Illinois.* The American commander found, on his return, that the presence of Captain George and his company, because of the protection they gave, afforded much satisfaction to the inhabitants of Kaskaskia.† And these new friends received with great joy their victorious countrymen.

“The season of the year,” wrote one of Clark’s men soon after, “when the expedition against Vincennes was undertaken, and the good conduct of those engaged in it, show what can be done by an army, let the difficulties be what they may. Perseverance and steadfastness will surmount all obstacles, as is shown in the acts of our brave commander, and all his officers, not forgetting his soldiers. Although a handful in comparison to other armies, they have done themselves and the cause they were fighting for, credit and honor; and they deserve a place in history that their posterity may know the difficulties their forefathers went through for their liberty and freedom; particularly the back-settlers of Virginia may bless the day they sent out such a commander, such officers and men—to root out the vipers that were every day ravaging on their women and children; which I hope will soon be at an end, as the leaders

* Clark’s *Memoir*—Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 164. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXIII.)

† “During my absence,” wrote the Colonel, “Captain Robert George, who now commands the company formerly commanded by Captain Willing, had returned from New Orleans, which greatly added to our strength. It gave great satisfaction to the inhabitants, when acquainted with the protection which was given them.” (Clark to Jefferson, April 29, 1779—*Jefferson’s Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n.)

of these murderers will soon be disposed of by Congress."*

* From "Bowman's Journal" as printed (see *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 111.) I have not followed the words of the writer closely, but have endeavored to give the sense intended to be conveyed by him. (Consult, in this connection, Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXII.)

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE Delaware Indians inhabiting the White river country had, most of them, before the capture of Hamilton and his force, joined the British; but now, that matters had taken a decided change, a few concluded it best to make peace with the conquerors, or at least to be on friendly terms with them.

A party of these savages visited Kaskaskia; but, "getting drunk with some loose young fellows" of the town, they made threats, forgetting their peaceable resolutions. Their menaces were met by like demonstrations on the other side. Thereupon one of the Indians flashed his gun at a woman. This aroused the animosity of the Creoles and two of the Delawares were shot down and the rest pursued by the townsmen some distance down the Kaskaskia, with the result of another being killed and some wounded. Clark, it seems, while returning from Vincennes, on his way up that river had observed some fresh Indian camps, which it was plain had been left in great haste. Upon his arrival at Kaskaskia, the mystery was soon cleared up when the circumstances were explained to him of the pursuit and shooting of the fleeing Delawares.

Some days afterwards, an express arrived from Vincennes, bringing the intelligence from Captain Helm, that a party of traders who were going by land to the Falls of the Ohio had been killed and their goods taken by White river Delawares, and that it appeared their designs were altogether hostile, as he had learned (but this was an erroneous report) they

had received a belt from the great council of their nation — that of their people residing on the Muskingum, to take up the hatchet. Clark quickly decided it was cause for war with these savages (he was really glad to find some cause for attacking them, as he had all along considered them enemies); he therefore, sent back the express to Vincennes with orders to Captain Helm at once to attack them. Clark declares that upon the first arrival of the Americans in the country they had “hatched up a kind of peace” with them; but he always knew they were for open war, yet he never could get a proper excuse before for driving them from the country, which he knew they would be loth to leave, and that the other Indians wished them away, as “they were great hunters and killed up their game.”

“I was sorry for the loss of our men,” subsequently wrote Clark, “otherwise pleased at what had happened, as it would give me an opportunity of showing the other Indians the horrid fate of those who would dare to make war on the Big Knife; and, to excel them in barbarity I knew was and is the only way to make war and gain a name among the Indians. I immediately sent orders to Vincennes to make war on the Delawares, to use every means in their [Captain Helm and his men’s] power to destroy them, to show no kind of mercy to the men, but to spare the women and children. This order was executed without delay, their camps were attacked in every quarter where they could be found; many fell and others were brought to Vincennes and put to death, [and] the women and children secured.

“They immediately applied for reconciliation, but were informed that I had ordered the war . . .

and that they [the Americans] dare not lay down the tomahawk without permission from me; but that if the Indians were agreed, no more blood should be spilt until an express should go to Kaskaskia, which was immediately sent. I refused to make peace with the Delawares, and let them know that we never trusted those who had once violated their faith, but if they had a mind to be quiet, they might, and if they could get any of their neighboring Indians to be security for their good behavior, I would let them alone; but that I cared very little about it, privately directing Captain Helm how to manage.

“A council was called of all the Indians in the neighborhood; my answer was made public; the Piankeshaws took on themselves to answer for the future good conduct of the Delawares; and the Tobacco’s son, in a long speech, informed them of the baseness of their conduct, and how richly they had deserved the severe blow they had met with; that he had given them permission to settle that country but not to kill his friends; that they now saw the Big Knife had refused to make peace with them, but that he (the Tobacco’s son) had become security for their good conduct, and that they might go and mind their hunting, and that if they ever did any more mischief — pointing to the sacred bow he held in his hand — . . . he himself would for the future chastise them. Thus ended the war between us and the Delawares in this quarter, much to our advantage, as the nations about said that we were as brave as the Indians, and not afraid to put an enemy to death.”*

* Clark’s *Memoir* — Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 164, 165. But Clark in writing to Mason (*Clark’s Campaign*

Upon Clark's arrival at Kaskaskia from his successful campaign against Hamilton, things in general seemed to be tranquil (excepting only the hostility of the Delawares, just mentioned) ; so he resolved to spend a few weeks in diversions, which he had not done since his arrival in the Illinois ; but his resolution came to naught, as he found it impossible to throw off the care and anxiety which continually beset him. Then there was the reduction of Detroit which he had continually in view, not as a motive for applause but from a desire to establish a profound peace on the frontiers. He was, as he fondly imagined (but in this, he was undoubtedly mistaken) so well acquainted with its situation, strength and influence that, in case he was not disappointed in the number of troops he expected, he accounted the place his own.* He would rendezvous at Vincennes, marching them up the Wabash —, such were the plans he revolved in his mind.

“Receiving letters from Colonel Bowman at Kentucky,” says the commandant, “informing me that I might expect him to reinforce me with three hundred men whenever I should call on him if it lay in his power, at the same time receiving intelligence from Colonel Montgomery,—I now thought my success reduced to a certainty. I immediately set about making provision for the expedition, to be ready against

in the Illinois, p. 83) was, for some reason, careful not to enter upon a description of the bloody work performed by Capt. Helm as a retaliation. All he says is: “The war was carried on pretty equally on both sides for several months; but they [the Delawares], at last thought proper to solicit a peace.”

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, loc. cit.

the arrival of troops, to give the enemy as little time as possible to complete the new fortifications I knew they were then about."* Clark sent an express to Colonel Bowman desiring him to join him at Vincennes on the twentieth of June with all the force he could possibly raise, agreeable to his letters to him. He also sent out one of his captains among the different nations of Indians to receive their congratulations on his late success, and the submission of those that had resolved to desert the English, and to get fresh intelligence from Detroit.

The civil department in the Illinois had hitherto robbed the Commandant of much of his time he thought ought to have been given to military matters; but he was now likely to be soon relieved by John Todd, who had been appointed (as Clark gladly learned) lieutenant of the county of Illinois, with civil jurisdiction of much importance — more, in fact, than had ever before been delegated to an officer of the kind in Virginia.† I "was anxious," wrote Clark, "for his arrival and happy in his appointment, as the greatest intimacy and friendship existed between us."

Clark was now in high spirits. On the twenty-ninth of April, he wrote the Governor of Virginia at considerable length, not only giving him many details, but again answering the letters received by him at Vin-

* Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 83, 84. The intelligence from Montgomery was to the effect that he (Montgomery) would be able to bring a considerable force of recruits by way of the Tennessee river, and that he had been commissioned a lieutenant-colonel.

† As to the fiction that Todd was one of Clark's soldiers on his expedition to the Illinois, see Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXIV.

cennes at the hands of William Myres, the express sent from Williamsburg;— why this was done will now appear. “A few days ago,” said Clark, “I received certain intelligence of William Myres, my express to you, being killed near the Falls of the Ohio, — news truly disagreeable to me, as I fear many of my letters will fall into the hands of the enemy at Detroit, although some of them, as I learn were found in the woods torn in pieces.”* What the Colonel feared, actually happened; his journal, reciting the particulars of his march to Vincennes, and the surrendering to him of Fort Sackville with its garrison and stores, was captured, together with all the letters in possessions of the express, several of which afterward found their way to Detroit.† It is evident, therefore, there were white men with the Indians on that occasion.

The Colonel also wrote that he was proud to hear that Congress intended putting its forces on the frontiers under the direction of the Governor of Virginia. “A small army,” said he, “from Pittsburgh, conducted with spirit, may easily take Detroit and put an end to the Indian war. Those Indians, who are active against us are the Six Nations [Mingoes], part of the Shawanese, the Miamies, and about half of the Chippewas, Ottawas, Iowas, and Pottawattamies, bordering on the lakes. Those nations who have treated with me, have since behaved very well; they are the Piankeshaws, Kikapoos, Weas, of the Wabash river; the Kaskaskias, Peorians, Mitchigamies, Sacs and Foxes, Iowas, Illi-

* Clark to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779 — *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n.

† See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXV; also Note CXXVII.

nois, and Pottawattamies, of the Mississippi and Illinois rivers. Part of the Chippewas have also treated and are peaceable. I continually keep agents among them to watch their motions and keep them peaceably inclined. Many of the Cherokees, Chickasaws, and their confederates, are, I fear, ill disposed. It would be well if Colonel Montgomery should give them a dressing as he comes down the Tennessee. There can be no peace expected from many nations while the English are at Detroit. I strongly suspect they will turn their arms against the Illinois, as they will be encouraged. I shall always be on my guard, watching every opportunity to take advantage of the enemy; and, if I am ever able to muster six or seven hundred men, I shall give them a shorter distance to come and fight me than this place."

There was one circumstance very distressing to the country, Clark thought, and that was the discredit which American paper money, had fallen into in the Illinois,—caused by the great number of traders who had come there in his absence, "each outbidding the other, giving prices unknown in this country by five hundred per cent.," said the Colonel, "by which the people conceived it to be of no value, and both French and Spaniards refused to take a farthing of it." Provisions had advanced three prices in two months, and supplies were not to be obtained in any other way than by the commander giving his own bonds, or exchanging goods,* or taking what he wanted by force. Several of the merchants were advancing considerable

* That is, such as he had brought from Vincennes taken from the enemy. (See *History of the Girtys*, p. 106.) These goods did not include, of course, such as had been set aside for the expected reinforcement from the east.

amounts of their own property rather than the service should suffer, by which Clark was sensible they would lose greatly, unless some method was taken to raise the credit of the money in circulation or a sum be sent to [New] Orleans for the payment of the expenses of this place, which would at once reduce the price of every species of provisions, money being of little service to them unless it would pass at the posts they trade at. The Colonel said he had drawn some bills on Mr. Pollock in New Orleans, as he had no money with him. Pollock would accept the bills, but had not the cash to pay them off, though the sums were trifling; "so that," said Clark, "we have little credit to expect from that quarter."*

Clark assured the Virginia Governor that he would take every step he possibly could for laying up a sufficient quantity of provisions,† and he hoped the Executive of the State would immediately send him an express with instructions. Public expenses, he declared, had "hitherto been very low" and might continue so, in the Illinois, if a correspondence was fixed at New Orleans for payment of the expenses of the country, or if gold and silver could be sent. "I am glad," says Clark, "to hear of Colonel Todd's appointment. I think the government has taken the only step that it

* *History of the Girtys*, in the place last cited, confirms this statement.

† May 22, 1779, Clark drew for \$300 "in favor of Mr. Rapicault or order," on the Treasurer of Virginia or Oliver Pollock at New Orleans, "for supplies, etc., furnished garrison" at Kaskaskia. Also, on the next day, he drew in favor of the same for \$617, on the Treasurer of Virginia "for the use of the Commonwealth." (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 320.)

could to make this region flourish. No other regulation would have suited the people.”*

It was Clark's opinion that one regiment of troops would be able to clear the Mississippi, and do great damage to the British interests in Florida. If they [the American soldiers] would properly conduct themselves, he thought they might perhaps gain the affection of the people so as to raise a sufficient force “to give a shock to Pensacola.” “Our alliance,” he added, “with France has entirely devoted this people to our interest.” “By your instructions to me,” continues Clark, “I find you put no confidence in General McIntosh's taking Detroit, as you encourage me to attempt it if possible. It had been twice in my power. Had I been able to raise five hundred men when I first arrived in the country, or when I was at Vincennes could have secured my prisoners and only have had three hundred good men, I should have attempted it, and I since learn there could have been no doubt of success, as, by some gentlemen lately arrived from that post, we are informed that the town and country kept three days' feasting and diversions on hearing of my success against Mr. Hamilton; and they were so certain of my embracing the fair opportunity of possessing myself of that post that the merchants and others provided many necessaries for us on our arrival,—the garrison, consisting of only eighty men, not daring to stop their diversions. They are now completing a new fort;

* The “regulation” referred to by the Colonel was the creation of the county of the Illinois and the appointment of John Todd as its Lieutenant; the news of which had reached Clark while he was yet in Vincennes, by the hand of William Myers.

and I fear it will be too strong for any force I shall ever be able to raise in this country.”*

Notwithstanding Clark's letter dated the day previous to the last one of April, was intended to apprise the Governor of Virginia (now that Myres had been killed on his way, with the first one written) of his success at Vincennes, yet as early as the eighteenth of May, as already shown, the news had reached Williamsburg; and the letter of Governor Henry to the Virginia House of Delegates of that date gave the information officially to that body. “Unfortunately,” said the Governor, “the letters from Colonel Clark, containing no doubt particular accounts of this affair, were in possession of an express who was murdered by a party of Indians on his way through Kentucky to this place. The letters as I am informed were destroyed. As the facts which I have mentioned are sufficiently authenticated, I thought it material that they should be communicated to the Assembly.”†

On the next day, Governor Henry also wrote to his friend, Richard Henry Lee:

“Governor Hamilton of Detroit is a prisoner, with the judge of that country, several captains, lieutenants, and all the British who accompanied Hamilton in his conquest of the Wabash. Our brave Colonel Clark (sent out from our militia), with one hundred Virgin-

* Clark to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779. The messenger intrusted with this letter was one St. Vrain, a resident of Kaskaskia. (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n.) The instructions which Clark speaks of as having been received by him from Gov. Henry were sent by the latter in care of Myers, who, as we have seen, delivered his package to the Colonel at Vincennes upon his arrival in the *Willing*.

† *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 319, 320. Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. III, p. 241.

ians besieged the Governor in a strong fort with several hundreds, and with small arms alone fairly took the whole corps prisoners and sent them into our interior country. This is a most gallant action and I trust will secure our frontiers in great measure. The goods taken by Clark are said to be of immense amount, and I hope will influence the Indians to espouse our interests. Detroit now totters; and if Clark had a few of McIntosh's forces the place would be ours directly. I have lately sent the French there all the state papers, translated into their language, by the hands of a priest, who I believe has been very active. I cannot give you the other particulars of Clark's success, his messenger to me being killed and the letters torn by the Indians."*

For the greater security of the inhabitants of the county of Illinois, a Virginia law was passed providing for the raising of a troop of horse. This was in May. The troop was to consist of one captain, one lieutenant, one cornet, and thirty-two privates. The same law declared that "every soldier who enlisted into the corps of volunteers commanded by Colonel George Rogers Clark and continued therein till the taking of the several posts in the Illinois country" should, "at the end

* Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. II, pp. 30, 31. It will be noticed, from the concluding words of the Governor, that he had not, at date of writing, received Clark's letter from Kaskaskia, of April 29, giving details of the capture of Hamilton. Twenty-one days were too few for its transmission by express from Kaskaskia to Williamsburg. It is not, therefore, at all surprising that Gov. Henry (relying solely upon reports) should have underestimated Clark's force when the latter attacked Fort Sackville and overestimated Hamilton's. McIntosh's forces which he speaks of were really Brodhead's; as the former was then no longer in command at Fort Pitt of the Western Department.

of the war, be entitled to a grant of two hundred acres of any unappropriated lands" within that Commonwealth. And every able-bodied freeman who should enlist, or who, having enlisted for a period unexpired, should re-enlist to serve during the war, among the forces ordered for the protection and defense of the county of Illinois, should receive a bounty of seven hundred and fifty dollars, and at the end of the war, should be entitled to one hundred acres of land.

John Todd, who had been commissioned a lieutenant of Illinois county, did not reach Kaskaskia from his home in Kentucky until the month last mentioned. When he came Colonel Clark was "happily rid of a piece of trouble" that he "had no delight in"—the administration of civil affairs. But the powers granted to Todd were greater than had ever before been given the Lieutenant of a county by Virginia, and greater than were afterward given to such an officer by that State. He could even pardon all offenses except murder and treason.*

The reinforcement which was to be recruited by Colonel Montgomery for Clark to enable the latter to fill up his battalion was only ready to move in March, 1779,—one hundred of his men under Major Slaughter having marched in January for the Falls of the Ohio; but had it not been that, early in the year the Cherokees and other southern Indians became hostile, extending their ravages from Georgia to Pennsylvania, a regiment (or battalion) of twelve-months men which had been enlisted for Clark, in addition to the force

* Consult in this connection the Act creating Illinois county, Hening's *Virginia Statutes at Large*, vol. IX, p. 552, and a sketch of, and the Instructions to Todd in Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, pp. 286, 289-294.

raised by Montgomery, dispatched to him; but now, for the cause just mentioned, they were withheld.

Montgomery, after getting together as many more men as possible, numbering, however, only one hundred and fifty, started for the Illinois, but he engaged an enemy before reaching his destination not anticipated when his force was enlisted. It happened in this wise. There was a settlement of renegade Cherokees on the Tennessee, at and below the mouth of the Chickamauga. These Indians were now exceedingly hostile; and a considerable force under Evan Shelby prepared to march against their towns.

Montgomery, as he was to go down the Tennessee, could, with little trouble, join Shelby on the proposed expedition; and he actually did reinforce him with his whole party. The general rendezvous was at the mouth of Big creek, near the present town of Rogersville, in Tennessee. The army floated down the river for three hundred miles, attacked the savages, killed some of their warriors, burnt their towns, and destroyed their provisions.* Montgomery then continued down the Tennessee, reaching Kaskaskia by way of that river, the Ohio, and the Mississippi, on the

* The idea expressed by Clark in his letter of the twenty-ninth of April, to the Governor of Virginia, that "it would be well if Colonel Montgomery should give them [the Cherokees] a dressing as he comes down the Tennessee, thus became, with the aid of Shelby, a reality. And it here may be said that the capture of Hamilton and the "dressing" given the Cherokees, effectually put an end to any efforts put forth because of the plan sent by the first mentioned in the previous December to the British Indian agent Stuart, "to reconcile the Southern Indians with the Shawanese and other Northern nations, and to concert a general invasion of the frontiers."

twentieth of May, but with not half the number of men expected by Clark. This was a great disappointment to the Colonel.

Clark still resolved to rendezvous at Vincennes, thinking that, if he could raise three hundred men, he would risk the undertaking against Detroit; as the new fortification there, although the work was being vigorously prosecuted by Captain Lernoult, was not completed, nor could it be according to the plan, before he could reach the place.

“We had,” says Clark, “a prospect of a considerable reinforcement from Kentucky, and we yet flattered ourselves that something might be done: at least we might maneuver in such a manner as to keep the enemy in hot water and in suspense and prevent their doing our frontiers much damage. We went on procuring supplies and did not lose sight of our object.”

The news of the success of the Americans and their volunteer allies of the Illinois against Hamilton's force in Vincennes, although more than a month in reaching the Kentucky settlements, was every where hailed with the liveliest expressions of joy among them; and when finally, it became known generally throughout Virginia, there was great delight manifested, especially in the border counties. It was, indeed, a source of pleasure to the whole country. But Governor Jefferson would wait for direct information from Clark before notifying Washington officially of Hamilton's capture. Past the middle of June, he wrote the Commander-in-chief: “I have the pleasure to enclose you the particulars of Colonel Clark's success against Vincennes as stated in his letter lately received; the messenger, with his first letter, having been killed. I fear it will be impossible

for Colonel Clark to be so strengthened as to enable him to do what he desires. Indeed, the express [St. Vrain] who brought this letter, gives us reason to fear Vincennes is in danger from a large body of Indians collected to attack it, and said, when he came from Kaskaskia, to be within thirty leagues of the place.”*

Jefferson's reply to the Colonel upon receiving the letter was brief and (purposely) vague, but easily understood by Clark. The Governor knew the danger of its transmission and, instead of a lengthy answer, gave St. Vrain, the messenger, full verbal instructions to be repeated to the Colonel. The real meaning of what he wrote was that his (Clark's) wishes would be attended to; that much solicitation would be felt for the result of the expedition to Detroit (by way of the Wabash); that it would at least delay any movement towards the frontier by the enemy from that post; and that, if successful, it would have, ultimately, an important bearing in establishing the northwestern boundary of the United States.†

The rapid transmission of the news of Hamilton's capture to Detroit was in striking contrast to the slowness of the information reaching the Virginia author-

* Jefferson to Washington, from Williamsburg, June 23, 1779. (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 221). The letter mentioned by Jefferson as "lately received" was the one written by Clark April 29, after his return to Kaskaskia from Vincennes. But Washington by the reception of "Bowman's Journal" had already been put in possession of more particulars concerning the march of Clark and his capture of Hamilton than Jefferson had obtained. There was no foundation for the report brought by St. Vrain of a large body of hostile Indians being within thirty leagues of Vincennes.

† Only a fragment of the letter has been preserved. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXVI.)

ities in Williamsburg. But Captain Chesne (with two Wyandot Indians) safely arriving at the first mentioned place, in the first half of March, made his report. It was as a thunderbolt from a clear sky to Captain Lernoult — a “most unlucky shake,” as he termed it. Such a catastrophe he had not dreamed of. That Vincennes had been “retaken by Colonel Clark,” and the Governor and whole garrison made prisoners, was astounding news. The Captain soon dispatched the armed sloop *Felicity* to Fort Erie with a letter to Colonel Batton at Niagara, conveying the surprising information to the commandant,* who lost no time in transmitting it to General Haldimand.

As the loss of Fort Sackville opened a new road for the Americans to his post by the Maumee, Lernoult urgently requested that a strong reinforcement be sent him from Niagara, especially as his new fort was not yet in a state to be properly defended. “The loss of Governor Hamilton,” said the Detroit commander, “is a most feeling one to me; I find the burden heavy without assistance; it requires, I confess, superior abilities and a better constitution [than I have]; I will do my best however”.†

The Canadians in Detroit received the account of Captain Chesne with unbounded satisfaction. Lernoult declared they were “all rebels to a man.” The Captain needed help upon his new fortification. “The Canadians,” he wrote, “exceedingly assuming on our bad success and weakness, not one of them will lend a hand.”‡ It was true then what Clark subsequently wrote: “We are informed that the town and country

* Lernoult to Bolton, March 26, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

† Id.

‡ Id.

[Detroit] kept three days' feasting and diversions on hearing of my success against Mr. Hamilton."

It may be presumed that the Canadians sent home from Vincennes by the Colonel, on their parole, upon reaching Detroit added not a little to the excitement. The Colonel declares that after they had gone he had spies constantly "to and from Detroit," and that he learned by them that the returned prisoners "answered every purpose he could have wished for by prejudicing their friends in favor of America. So certain were the inhabitants of that post of my marching immediately against it, that they made provision for me in defiance of the garrison." But he added: "Many of them have paid dearly for it since." "We learned," are his words years after, "that they made great havoc with the British interest on their return . . . publicly saying that they had taken an oath not to fight against Americans, but they had not sworn not to fight for them, etc.; and matters were carried to such a height, that the commanding officer [Lernoult] thought it prudent not to take notice of any thing that was said or done." However, the commandant was not so complaisant, as we know, and as his words to the Niagara commander plainly indicate. He soon began to repress the ardor of the "rebels," having received full authority for so doing from the Commander-in-chief, who wrote him on the thirteenth of June:

"SIR:—Having certain Intelligence that many of the inhabitants in your neighborhood are not only disaffected to Government, but in the present critical situation of public affairs, may possibly prove dangerous enemies to the King. I have judged it necessary for His Majesty's service, hereby to authorize you to apprehend any person or persons whom you may have cause to believe is in any manner directly or indirectly aiding, or abetting the rebels or their allies, either

with provisions, intelligence or otherwise, and that you immediately send them to Niagara, to be detained there or forwarded to Carleton Island as Lt. Col. Bolton may judge best for the public service.

"And it is also your duty to require, and obtain from all persons of doubtful character, such hostages as may effectually prevent them or any part of their family from taking an active part against His Majesty's Government, or the troops under your command."*

There were added to the forces in Detroit late in the Spring two hundred men from Niagara, mostly regulars; a few, however, were "prisoners who were bought of the Indians and made soldiers of." To add to the security of Detroit, one of the largest of the armed vessels upon Lake Erie was stationed at the mouth of the Maumee to gain intelligence of any farther movement of Clark, and to convey the news quickly to Captain Lernoult,—also to render any other necessary assistance on that line of communication.

It will be readily presumed that, of all the precautions taken by Captain Lernoult to guard against the capture of Detroit by the Americans who might come either from Pittsburgh or Vincennes,—to hurry the work on his new fort was the one which engaged his chief attention. He did not slacken his efforts in that regard whatever else might seem to demand his time.

Early in April, General Haldimand dispatched to Niagara and Detroit Captain Brehm, his aid-de-camp, to look into affairs to the westward. To Captain Lernoult, the General wrote: "Anxious to be exactly informed as soon as practicable, of the true state of things in the Upper Country, I send Captain Brehm, my aid-de-camp, as far as Detroit; and it is my re-

* Haldimand MSS.

quest you would open yourself to him with the utmost freedom as to a person in whom you may safely confide upon all matters which concern the King's service in those parts. Captain Brehm is directed to give you my orders respecting your post, which he is to deliver you in writing, signed with his own hand, and to which you will in every part thereof exactly conform yourself".*

Captain Brehm did not reach Detroit until the twenty-fifth of May. Three days thereafter, he sent his first letter to the Commander-in-chief. To him, Lernoult "declared that the arrival of the two hundred men at his post had made a great alteration in the inhabitants and even among the Indians; the former, before that, were insolent and almost daring in their behavior." "The rebels," continued Brehm, "having spread among all the Western or Wabash or [and] Illinois Indians by some disaffected savages [the report] that the French, Spanish (even Germans) and Americans are all joined together to drive the English out of America; [and this] has not only an effect among the Indians, but likewise among the French from the Illinois and Wabash through this whole country." But Captain Brehm assured the Commander-in-chief that Captain Lernoult was not idle in counteracting the designs of the "rebels." As to the condition of the new fort at Detroit, the writer declared it was very much advanced; and, if it could be finished before being attacked, it would be very tenable.† He wrote some days after that Lernoult and

* Haldimand to Lernoult, April 8, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

† Brehm to Haldimand, May 28, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

his garrison were very busy in working upon the fort — “they have already finished a bomb-proof magazine and store-house and are now making barracks for officers and men all to be small-shell proof.”*

The general effect produced by the capture of Hamilton and his force was expressed in the clearest manner by one at Detroit who fully comprehended how matters stood a few months afterward with the Indian allies of Britain: “[It] has not only discouraged many tribes well disposed, but inclined others who were wavering, to stand neuter, so that a force to act in conjunction with them appears necessary to engage them again to act with vigor against the enemy.”†

It was over a month after Hamilton's surrender before the tidings reached Michilimackinac. De Peyster was astounded.

On the arrival of Captain Langlade at Green Bay from his attempt to induce the Ottawas and Chippewas at the Grand river to march to the aid of Hamilton, he received from the latter an order acquainting him that he would winter at Vincennes, and requiring him and Gautier to join him early in the Spring, by way of the Illinois river. The Captain accordingly set out with some Indians, in good time, going by way of Milwaukee, “where he received accounts of Mr. Hamilton being taken, when the Indians disheartened, would proceed no farther;” so the Captain returned. De Peyster was informed by Langlade, who went to Michilimackinac, arriving there on the twelfth of May, that a Canadian at the head of twenty horsemen was traveling through the Milwaukee and Sac country, at the

* Same to same, June 23, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

† Alexander McKee to Haldimand, July 16, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

time of his visit, purchasing horses for Colonel Clark, —telling the Indians that the Colonel would be at Green Bay soon with three hundred men. Also on the twentieth of February, Mr. Chevalier, of St. Joseph, wrote De Peyster, that the “rebels” had employed Canadians to purchase horses in the neighborhood of Chicago, to mount their cavalry. Gautier, upon receiving Hamilton’s order, gathered together a considerable band of Winnebagoes and Menomonees; marched with them down the Wisconsin but was turned back by the Sacs and Foxes, before news reached him of the surrender of Hamilton.

“I do not care,” wrote De Peyster on the thirteenth of May, to General Haldimand, “how soon Mr. Clark appears, provided he comes by Lake Michigan and the Indians prove staunch; and, above all, that the Canadians do not follow the example of their brethren at the Illinois, who have joined the rebels to a man. I am in hopes that their connection at Montreal will be a check upon them. If I had armed vessels I could make them constantly coast Lake Michigan to awe the Indians and prevent the rebels building boats. There is a small sloop here, as already reported, but no sailors, nor will my present garrison admit of any detachment, it not being by one-half sufficient to do the necessary duty here. I shall allow the traders to come to this post; but if things do not greatly change, I will not let one go the Green Bay road. The Sacs and Foxes seem easy about the matter; but they will soon open their eyes, if it is possible effectually to restrain that trade.” The commandant adds: “If Detroit should be taken, it is evident we would have but a dismal prospect”.*

* Haldimand MSS.

The first of June, De Peyster wrote that the Indians were growing very importunate since hearing that the French were assisting the "rebels." Hamilton's defeat had cooled the savages in general; but the Michilimackinac commander declared he had a great number to send to Detroit, if they should be wanted. Gautier reached De Peyster's post during the latter half of May, with a large band of Winnebagoes and Menomonees, which had been with him to the Mississippi, and had been stopped by the Sacs and Foxes on their way to join Hamilton. They soon went home, however, fearing the Chippewas of the plains and the Sacs would in their absence, disturb their villages. "They are gone," wrote De Peyster, "with promises to bring me some prisoners from Kaskaskia; scalps I have positively forbid, to prevent cruelty and lest they should pawn old ones or those of innocent persons, a deceit I think them often guilty of."

"The Sioux Wabasha," continues the commandant, "was on his march to join Hamilton, but stopped on hearing of his defeat. He has sent the interpreter with his son and some young men, with a pipe, telling me that he waits my further orders; that he has silenced the Foxes; and desires to know if he shall strike the Sacs for having had talks with the rebels; which he is ready to, as well as all opposers of his Majesty's arms. I am sending off some powder and clothing to his nation as well as to the Winnebagoes and Menomonees, to endeavor to keep them in our firm alliance; if they continue so, we have nothing to fear from the Indians of that quarter."*

* De Peyster to Haldimand in same.

Not understanding well the idle habits of savages and scarcely comprehending the numbers who were dependent on De Peyster for supplies, General Haldimand asked the Michilimackinac commandant by letter during the winter, whether some plan — such as the use by his garrison of dried venison and of fish — could not be hit upon to lessen the great expense of furnishing his post with provision. But the Commander-in-chief was informed that any such scheme was not possible to be carried out. “Supplying the troops here,” he wrote on the first of June, “with anything but store provisions is impracticable; the taking of fish is too precarious; most of what they take now, I supply the Indians with. And as to the Indian meat, there are not five carcasses of any kind brought to this post in the course of a year. Formerly, there used to be more, but there are fewer animals; and the Indians, since the beginning of the war, are become very idle, even in the hunting season. I am obliged to help maintain all who live within fifty or sixty miles of this place. Were it not for the sugar in the spring, many would starve.”

By the middle of June, the Indians were “hanging upon” De Peyster in great numbers, to know if they were to be employed to go against the “rebels.” That officer could not learn from below whether Captain Lernoult needed the assistance of any; and he was loath to send off parties to the Illinois without the express orders of the Commander-in-chief for so doing; for, at best, in his judgment, “it would only be productive of much cruelty perhaps exercised upon the undeserving;” still many parties “would steal off”.

So soon as De Peyster received the news of the surrender of Fort Sackville, he took every pains to place his fort in as proper state of defense as possible. He threw down such houses as encumbered it, making use of the timber "together with the cedar fences," to help strengthen the fortification. On the twentieth of June, he wrote General Haldimand, that the whole fort was lined with good, strong cedar pickets and a banquet thrown up so as to fire from a good height through the loop-holes. Although the barracks would hold but seventy-two men, "still there are traders houses left," De Peyster declared, "which may be purchased and easily fitted to serve the purpose." The sand hills which commanded the fort were sources of much trouble. One of these still remained to be removed. After every storm, the drifts of sand like drifts of snow, were to be seen, and these had to be removed.

Towards the last of June, De Peyster had received pretty full accounts from the Illinois. He was glad to know that Kaskaskia was not fortified and that the fort there was a "sorry" affair — "an enclosure round the Jesuits' college, with two plank houses at opposite angles, mounting two four-pounders each on the ground floor." Besides these, there were some swivels mounted. But there was one thing that gave the Michilimackinac commander uneasiness. "One Godefroy Linctot," had joined the "rebels." "He has," declared De Peyster, "too much to say amongst the Indians; every method should therefore be used to get him into our hands; for which purpose (and to reconnoiter) I send off Gautier with a party of Indians

* De Peyster to Haldimand. — Haldimand MSS.

for Le Pee [Peoria], a small fort on the Illinois river, where he [Linctot] is at present with some other traders who had better be here. Gautier has orders to burn the fort." "The Pay' adds the Michilimackinac commandant, is about eighty leagues from Kaskaskia."*

* Same to same, June 27, 1779. — Haldimand MSS. "The Pay" had a number of synonyms: Peoria, Le Pee, Le Pay, Au Pay, Opa, the Pé, Pay, Pays, Pe, Pees. The village was situated on the west bank of Peoria Lake, one and a half miles above its outlet. (Matson's *Pioneers of Illinois*, pp. 216, 217.) In a letter written by Patrick Sinclair, then Lieutenant Governor at Michilimackinac to Brehm, Oct. 29, 1779, he said that Mons. Durand upon oath related the affairs of the Illinois to be much in the condition represented by Major De Peyster to his Excellency [Gen. Haldimand, June 29, 1779], except that there was no fort at the Pé.

CHAPTER XXV.

HITHERTO, there had been no desertions from Kaskaskia to the enemy; now, however, by the wiles of one of Captain George's officers who had determined to go over to the British, three were induced to forsake the cause of liberty and put themselves under the protection of Captain Lernoult at Detroit. These are the particulars: George Girty, a second lieutenant in what was formerly Captain Willing's company (now Captain George's), hearing that his brothers, Simon and James Girty, had joined the British at Detroit, determined to forsake his companions-in-arms,—in short, to desert. He made known his intentions to some of the prisoners taken by Clark at Vincennes, who had been brought to Kaskaskia. He offered to conduct them safely to Captain Lernoult. Sixteen of them agreed to the proposition; but one entering an information and making oath against Girty, he was seized, put in irons, and closely confined. On the fourth day of May, he found means to effect his escape to the Spanish side of the Mississippi. Upon his arrival in St. Louis, the commandant of the Spanish garrison ordered him into confinement, but next morning, after some inquiry, released him, informing him that it was not his intention to interfere with or molest any person on either side, unless for murder or some capital offense against civil society, and that it was his desire to remain in tranquility, and to treat all well who behave as becometh them.

Girty, now that he was set at liberty, plotted again to secure the escape of some of Clark's prisoners

— succeeding, finally, in collecting four soldiers of the King's (or 8th) regiment, three deserters from the Americans, and one prisoner from Captain Lamothe's company (a fifer). They set out on the nineteenth of June from the Illinois and reached Detroit on the eighth of August following.* Whether the three deserters were all from Captain George's company is unknown.†

As a first movement looking to an attack on Detroit, Clark dispatched from Kaskaskia Godefroy Linclot (a Canadian, formerly an ensign in the French service but latterly a merchant of Vincennes,‡ and who now joined the Colonel's forces) on a reconnoissance to the northward and northwestward, with a company of forty mounted volunteers — “forty rebel Canadians,” as an Englishman afterward termed them. Linclot was instructed to ascend the Illinois river as far as Peoria,§ cross the country to Wea, and proceed thence to Vincennes. He was to go among the different nations of Indians under pretense of visiting them as a friend, receive their congratulations on the late suc-

* *History of the Girtys*, pp. 105–108.

† That the Spanish territory, at this time, afforded complete protection for deserters from American forces, is shown by a letter of Capt. George to Col. Brodhead, 25 Sept., 1779. — Haldimand MSS. The four soldiers of the kings (or 8th) regiment were not the only ones of Clark's prisoners taken by him to Kaskaskia, who finally escaped from captivity. At Rogers' defeat (before mentioned as occurring on the twenty-seventh of September following), seven were rescued who were being sent over the mountains, as had been those with Lieutenant Governor Hamilton. (John Campbell to Lernoult, Oct. 23, 1779 — Haldimand MSS.)

‡ *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 501.

§ That is, “Le Pé” or “the Pay.”

cess of the Americans upon the Wabash, encourage such a desire to submit to the latter and desert the English, but above all to get the latest intelligence from Detroit. It was the Colonel's idea that this manœuvre would result not only in attaching the Illinois river Indians but also those upon the upper Wabash more firmly to his interest and prevent meanwhile the British and such savages as were their active allies from taking the field and distressing the frontiers. Linclot proved himself, as will presently be seen, a most effective partisan.

John Todd from the time of his arrival at Kaskaskia in the first half of May was, as lieutenant and commandant of Illinois county very busily engaged in the discharge of his official duties. On the fourteenth, he made out commissions for the militia officers appointed by him for the District of Kaskaskia. Richard Winston was made commandant. There were organized two companies and one at Prairie du Rocher. Two companies were also completed and properly officered at Cahokia. Courts were soon dispensing justice at the first and last places mentioned, with Gabriel Cerré as president in Kaskaskia and Godin Toranjean at Cahokia.*

It was well understood by Todd that the act creating the county of Illinois was sufficient in its scope to include not only the Illinois villages but also those on the Wabash; it behooved him, therefore, so soon as the machinery of civil government had been put in motion in the towns just mentioned, that he should repair to Vincennes to there organize the militia and

* Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, pp. 294-296.

establish a court of justice. By the middle of June, he was ready to leave Kaskaskia for that purpose; but, before starting, he issued orders in writing to Winston: "During my absence," said he, "the command will devolve upon you as commander of Kaskaskia. If Colonel Clark should want anything more for his expedition, consult the members of the court upon the best mode of proceeding. If the people will not spare willingly (if in their power) you must press for what is wanted, valuing the property by two men under oath. Let the military have no pretext for forcing property. When you order it and the people will not find it, then it will be time for them to interfere. By all means keep up a good understanding with Colonel Clark and his officers. If this is not the case, you will be unhappy."*

Once at Vincennes and the County Lieutenant addressed himself to the task of organizing the militia of that place. Major Legras was advanced to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel while Captain Bosseron was promoted to Major. The number of militia companies formed was four. A court with Colonel Legras as president was also organized. In July, Colonel Todd returned to Kaskaskia.†

Early in June, Colonel Montgomery was dispatched from Kaskaskia, by Clark, to go by water to Vincennes, with all the necessary stores,‡ including it seems, seven pieces of heavy cannon and four mor-

* Id., p. 302.

† Id., pp. 295, 296. See, also, Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 169.

‡ *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 441. (See, also, Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 353.)

tars;* while Major Bowman marched with the principal force by land. The hopes of an actual organization of the expedition rested wholly upon the promised reinforcement of Colonel John Bowman from Kentucky. But when the American commander learned, as he did in due time, that the militia under that officer had gone across the Ohio to attack the Shawanees, he began to be apprehensive that the number to reach him at Fort Patrick Henry would be small. On the twenty-seventh, the Colonel with a party of horse started for Vincennes, reaching there in four days, where in a short time thereafter his whole force had safely arrived.† Only a small force was left by the commander in Fort Clark‡ and in Fort Bowman,§ — with Captain Lieutenant Harrison in command at the post first mentioned.||

The intended undertaking against Detroit was in reality, one of the movements which Clark had thought of, as we know, even before starting on his campaign against Kaskaskia. It is to be considered therefore as much the result of the conquest of the Illinois as was the expedition against Vincennes. First, the Illinois towns, then, finally on to Detroit,—was his ambition from the start. But how leisurely were the preparations—how much less the anxieties—how full of hope the anticipations—now, in his setting out for Vincennes, from those of a few months previous. Now, the population and troops at the place just men-

* Lorraine to Lernout, July 18, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

† Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXVII.

‡ At Kaskaskia.

§ At Cahokia.

|| *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 324; also Appendix to our narrative, CXXXI.

tioned were all Americans at heart. Now, the weather was warm and the streams were low. There was now a plentiful supply of provisions taken along by Major Bowman, for the march (including cattle on foot), let the time be procrastinated as it might. And instead of the many weary days of the preceding February journey, four days now were enough for Clark, well-mounted as he was, to reach the Wabash town.*

Upon Clark's arrival at Vincennes (the first of July), instead of there being in the place two or three hundred Kentuckians that he was promised, he found only about thirty volunteers. Their meeting with (what was looked upon as) a repulse from the Shawanese had discouraged the Kentuckians generally; † and it was not in the power of the Commander, Colonel Bowman, to march them as militia to join Clark. ‡

In after years, Clark wrote: "Instead of three hundred men from Kentucky, there appeared about thirty volunteers, commanded by Captain McGary."

The American commander had, under his immediate orders at Vincennes, about three hundred and

* Appendix, Note CXXVIII.

† See *History of the Girtys*, p. 96.

‡ "Arriving there [at Vincennes] in July, 1779, he [Clark] found only thirty from Kentucky of the three hundred promised him. There were no tidings of recruits from Virginia; and Major Bowman, his trusty companion in former campaigns was fighting the Shawanese on the Ohio at a disadvantage." (Dr. William Frederick Poole, in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 730.) Major Joseph Bowman is here confounded with Col. John Bowman, lieutenant of Kentucky county. And the latter did not fight "the Shawanese on the Ohio," but a good many miles north of that river — not far from the present Xenia, Ohio.

fifty men. A council of war was called, and all his officers except two voted to go on with the expedition. But Clark, after mature consideration, decided not to undertake the campaign. The small number of troops would not justify an undertaking of such magnitude, although the chiefs of several Indian tribes solicited the privilege of taking part with their warriors in the enterprise — the result of the effective work done by Linclot, who had previously reached Vincennes and of the stirring and fearless “speech” sent among the various nations by the Colonel.*

Clark readily found an excuse to his officers for his course. “I pretended it was on account of General Sullivan’s marching on Niagara (of which we had just heard) that stopped us — that there was no doubt of his success. Detroit would fall, of course, and consequently it was not worth our while marching against it; although I knew, at the same time, Detroit would not fall with Niagara, as they had an easy communication with Montreal through another channel by way of Grand [Ottawa] river.”†

The resolve of Colonel Clark to rendezvous at Vincennes preparatory to marching against Detroit,

* Exactly what Indian chiefs were anxious to join Clark is not known: but, of the Wabash tribes there was undoubtedly a portion of one — the Miami Indians, of Eel river — which did not ask the privilege; as they took a neutral attitude towards the belligerents. (*History of the Girtys*, p. 107.)

† Clark to Mason — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 86, 87. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXIX.) As a matter of fact General Sullivan did not march “on Niagara,” but against Indians of the Six Nations, particularly the Senecas. (*Washington-Irvine Correspondence*, p. 110 n.)

should circumstances permit, seems to have been an "open secret" at Kaskaskia, for, not later than the twentieth of May, the news was on its way to Detroit and Michilimickinac.

It was not a surprise to Captain Lernoult. It had all along been if not really anticipated by him, at least judged not to be impossible. He was prepared not only for this emergency but for a movement against his post from Pittsburg,—to the extent (in either event) not only of having received the reinforcement of two hundred regulars for his garrison but of having made considerable progress on his new fort. Whether, in case of an attack, he would abandon the old fort—he would let circumstances determine. However, in the end he found that, in all probability, he would not be compelled to decide the question,—having received what seemed to be reliable information that Clark had abandoned the proposed expedition; still, it was the close of September before he ceased his watchful care, having, as he says, "filled up my magazines in the new fort that we may not be taken unawares should the enemy advance this way, which they probably may to burn and destroy the grain belonging to the [Indian] nations."* The new fortification received the name of "Fort Lernoult."

Naturally, the Captain had not at this juncture slackened his efforts in repressing "rebels" in Detroit. Depositions and declarations of those loyal to Britain were taken implicating some who had indiscreetly expressed themselves as being in sympathy with the

* *History of the Girtys*, pp. 109, 110. Lernoult to Bolton, Sept. 25, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

Americans, and informing against at least one other who was giving aid to Colonel Clark.* And he soon received from the Commander-in-Chief additional authority to act at once when an invasion was imminent — for the good of his Majesty's service and for the protection of trade and of his Majesty's loyal subjects and their effects. That this might be accomplished, he was empowered to hold general courts martial for the punishing of all offenders and transgressors of all descriptions and degrees whatever, according to the nature of their offenses, as they should appear upon trial before the same. He had power to put in execution all sentences pronounced by the court even to the "pains of death." But he must first declare martial law on the approach of an enemy to attack Detroit or any of its dependencies, before exercising such power over the lives of persons.†

It was about the first of July that the news reached De Peyster concerning the movement intended by the Americans from Kaskaskia. "Having received intelligence," he wrote to Haldimand on the ninth, "that an attack is intended against Detroit by the rebels from the Illinois, who are to march by the Wabash and St. Joseph, I have detached Lieutenant [Thomas] Bennett with some traders and canoemen, twenty soldiers and two hundred Indians to endeavor to intercept one Linclot, who is to march with a body of horse by St. Joseph." In another letter of the same date, he said: "On the 29th of June I acquainted your Excellency that I was sending off a party towards the Pée [Peo-

* Depositions of H. Iago, John Laughton, William Miller, John Cornwall, John Higgins, William Humphreys — all taken in July and August, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

† Brehm to Lernoult, July 29, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

ria]. Since then I have received information from St. Joseph [which they (the people there) had from the Illinois so late as the twenty-eighth of May], that the rebels were in great forwardness to march with seven hundred men to the Wabash against Detroit and that one Linclot is to march four hundred horse by St. Joseph.”*

“In consequence of this intelligence,” added De Peyster, “I have detached Lieutenant Bennett who went off the next day with twenty soldiers and about sixty traders and canoe Indians to endeavor to intercept Linclot [by marching first to St. Joseph, then to Chicago and crossing to the Illinois] or attempt anything in that quarter which may be conducive to distress the rebels. The numbers of the Indians will daily increase. Allowing the whole of this report to be false, the movement will answer a good purpose, as it will secure the wavering Indians, particularly the Pottawattamies, keep up the spirit of the inhabitants of Detroit settlement, and greatly deter the rebels from any attempt that way, seeing they are much disturbed in thinking that the Indians would remain neuter and let them pass. I have purchased the *Welcome* [of John Askin] and will let her stay [at the River St. Joseph] with provisions and some goods to enable Mr. Bennett to speak to the Pottawattamies, Mascoutins, Kickapoos, and Miamis.”

De Peyster had already (on the first of July) issued instructions to Langlade at “the Bay” to do his utmost to raise the Winnebagos and Milwaukee Indians, also others living on the borders of Lake Michi-

* It will be noticed that the reports received by De Peyster concerning Clark and his movements were in general exaggerated, especially as to the number of the Colonel's men.

gan, and with them hurry and join Lieutenant Bennett at Chicago, and in case the latter had "passed forward, to follow him in forced marches, overtake him before his arrival, and to travel with him for the good of the service, in accordance with the orders" which he (the Lieutenant) had received from the Michilimackinac commandant.

On the twenty-first of the month De Peyster complained to the Commander-in-Chief that no vessel since the opening of navigation had been sent from Detroit to his post. "I once sent the sloop *Welcome* thither, and she returned; since which, I am obliged to employ her on Lake Michigan. It would be necessary for the good of the service (if your Excellency thought proper) to order a vessel to ply constantly between the two places, in the situation we are in at present. The Indians are in constant alarm, and are often so much persuaded that Detroit is taken that they are ready to leave their habitations — so much are they exposed to the impositions of designing people, which I have not in my power to contradict for want of more frequent intelligence. The commanding officer at Detroit gives me all the intelligence he receives; but, to hear often, that all is well, would be most essential service in the management of the Indians."

The destination of Lieutenant Bennett under orders from De Peyster, was, St. Joseph, as just intimated, where he was to assemble the Pottawattamies of that vicinity. He arrived out on the twenty-third of July, and threw up an entrenchment sufficient to oppose a superior number of savages, in case their intentions were found to be hostile to British interests. But the Pottawattamies who were first seen were found

submissive and he sent out parties to endeavor to get some intelligence of the enemy and if possible to bring in some prisoners, or to distress the "rebels" in any manner they might think could be most easily accomplished. He also dispatched an express to Captain Lernoult at Detroit informing him of the disposition of the savages (at least as it appeared to the Lieutenant) and begged to know if he could render him any service, either with his own party or in conjunction with any other the Captain might send to join him from his post.

It was perhaps well that Lieutenant Bennett took the precaution to throw up a fortification at St. Joseph, for he soon wrote his superior officer a discouraging letter. "In my last," said he, "I informed you what fine speeches the Pottawattamies made me. Two days afterwards, a chief called the Petit Bled, from Nipicous, came at the head of the different bands of the Pottawattamies and told me what was said before his arrival was without any other design than mere compliment; but he was now come to give his pure sentiments; that they returned the detested hatchet and pipe which were brought here only to render their village miserable; he said they desired tranquility but still insisted that he held sacred the hatchet of his former father, the French King, and would never quit it. As soon as he returned to his village, the others came and made an apology for their insolence. I gave them an answer such as I thought they deserved."*

Langlade reached St. Joseph with only sixty savages — Chippewas; and Lieutenant Bennett soon

* Lieut. Bennett to Major De Peyster, from St. Joseph, Aug. 9, 1779. — Haldimand MSS.

found that no dependence could be placed on the Ottawas, as, upon their leaving Arbre Croche they were determined to go no further than St. Joseph; also, that the Pottawattamies were much disaffected. "Our scouts," he wrote to De Peyster, "have all been frightened back by Indian reports. They seem all to be debauched by the thoughts of a French war. We have not twenty Indians in our camp who are not preparing to leave us. . . Mr. Beaubien, an officer in Capt. Lernoult's department at the Miamis, has joined us to offer his service. He says there are not fifty rebels at Vincennes. . . . "As we have no account of an enemy near us unless treacherous Indians, I would immediately return to Michilimackinac did I not think myself obliged to wait Capt. Lernoult's answer whether he wants us at or near Detroit. I have deceived him much with respect to our numbers. I thought I could depend more upon the Ottawas; however, I have the pleasure to tell you that French and English are all well in spirits, and only wait for an order to march."*

Lieutenant Bennett finally, without hearing from Captain Lernoult at Detroit, concluded to return to Michilimackinac, which he reached the last of August, assuring De Peyster, upon his arrival, that the Canadians behaved with the greatest appearance of zeal for the service possible and seemed greatly disappointed at not having it in their power to distinguish themselves; — "also of the soldiers who were of the party," said he, "I flatter myself I need not inform you of their eagerness to meet the enemy."†

* Id.

† Lieut. Bennett's *Report* — Haldimand MSS.

"I have accounts," wrote De Peyster to General Haldimand on the ninth of August, "that Clark is on the march to Wea with five hundred men followed by two hundred oxen, the remainder of his provisions to go up the Ohio and Wabash. Linctot marches with a party from the Pay [Peoria], to join him at Wea or Miamis. Their object is said to be Detroit. I believe by this time we have five hundred Indians on the look-out to harrass them on their march and endeavor to draw them into an ambuscade, which I have ordered to be laid for them."

It will thus be seen that De Peyster had received an exaggerated account of the marching of Major Bowman to Vincennes with the principal part of Clark's force; and it is also to be noted, that, had Clark actually marched from that place towards Detroit, he would doubtless have encountered much opposition from the savages on the way, notwithstanding the friendly attitude of the Illinois river Indians toward him and of those of the Upper Wabash — thanks to the zeal and courage of Linclot.

It was not long after De Peyster had written the letter just mentioned to the Commander-in-Chief before he became convinced that Clark's intended expedition against Detroit had, some time before, been abandoned.

The attachment previously of the Indians for the French, the pains taken by the latter to renew it, the apprehensions that the savages who were professed allies had in contemplation to desert the British interests, the unfortunate miscarriage of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton against the Illinois, and the defection

of many of the inhabitants of Detroit, — had all impressed themselves strongly upon General Haldimand's mind as events portending evil for his cause in the West. He could plainly see that the causes mentioned had strongly served to alienate the affections of the Indians; and notwithstanding "they continue to profess their attachment to the King, they frame excuses for not going to war, and discover upon all occasions an indifference which indicates their intention to forsake us:" — such were his words to Lord George Germain.

And the General added: "From every information that has been received, it would appear that an expedition against Detroit is certainly intended under the command of a Colonel Clark who retook Vincennes. I have reinforced Detroit; and the forwardness of a most useful work now erecting there will, I hope, insure the safety of that place, unless the rebels should find means to make their way to it in great force; which, the growing slackness of the Western nations may perhaps enable them to effect."*

It was a great relief to the British Commander-in-Chief to learn, finally, that "a Colonel Clark" had given up his plan of attacking Detroit.

At the time when Clark had resolved to relinquish, for the time, all attempts against Detroit, the Piankeshaw Indians, to show their esteem for him, urged him to accept a gift of land two and one-half leagues square in some portion of their territory. The Colonel having previously refused any such present as being contrary to the Virginia constitution, now

* Haldimand to Germain, Sept. 13th and 14th, 1779, — Haldimand MSS.

thought it would be politic to accept the offer; so, on the sixteenth of June, the Tobacco's son, on behalf of all the Piankeshaws, executed a deed to Clark for the amount before mentioned, lying on the right bank of the Ohio, at the Falls, Clark suspecting that he might find it necessary to fortify there "for the convenience of free intercourse."*

It was now the opinion of Clark that the interests of the service required him to spend a few months at the Falls of the Ohio,—hoping upon his arrival there to be able to raise a sufficient force to punish the Shawanese in a more signal manner than had been done by Colonel Bowman. Having a number of supernumerary officers, he sent them into the settlements of Kentucky county to recruit for his battalion, at the same time giving proper instructions for the direction of the commands of the different posts.

Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery was to go to the Illinois. Under him was placed the company of Captain John Williams; which force, when joined by Captain Worthington's company, was to occupy Fort Clark, at Kaskaskia;—Captain Lieutenant Harrison, then at that post, was to have charge of the artillery. Montgomery was also to take with him Captain McCarty's command, which, after being reinforced by Captain Quirk's company, was to be stationed at Cahokia. The garrison at Fort Patrick Henry (Vincennes) was to be composed of Captain Shelby's and Captain Robert Todd's commands, to be joined by the companies of Captains Taylor and Keller. Captains Williams, McCarty, Todd and Shelby were to command their respective forces when augmented as stated.

* Appendix, Note CXXX.

Major Joseph Bowman was to proceed with the recruiting parties. Under him, upon that service, were the supernumerary captains — Quirk, Evans, Taylor, Worthington and Keller. Captain Robert George and Lieutenant Robertson, with their artillery company, were to go with Clark to the Falls, where "Headquarters" were to be established. Captain Helm was made Indian agent for Fort Patrick Henry and the Department of the Wabash.

Godefroy Linctot was directed to act as Agent of the Illinois river Indians and other western and northwestern tribes; and Antoine Gamelin, of the Weas. Linctot was to report to Montgomery; and Gamelin, although in Helm's Department, to "Headquarters" at the Falls, or to Kaskaskia.

"Captain Linctot will appoint," so ran the order, "an assistant for the upper part of the Mississippi, in the Indian Department, near the Dogs plains [now Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin], provided the appointment be approved of by Colonel Montgomery, or the commanding officer for the time being." These orders were promulgated on the fifth of August.*

"The body of the battalion," afterward wrote Montgomery, "marched back to the Mississippi to gar-

* Appendix, Note CXXXI, where this last General Order of Clark issued on his Illinois expedition is given in full. On the 25th of Sept., 1779, Capt. George at the Falls of the Ohio wrote to Col. Daniel Brodhead at Fort Pitt: "Col. Clark has divided the men under my command into detachments, which he has stationed at sundry places, so that there is not at this time above ten or twelve with me at this place Since my arrival in this country I have accepted a commission under the State of Virginia and conclude myself more immediately under Col. Clark's orders."

ri-son the towns of Kaskaskia and Cohokia. Colonel Clark finding the public interest required that he should reside at the Falls of the Ohio until provision should be made for the ensuing campaign, I was ordered to take command of the troops in the Illinois; to make, often, reports of the condition of that Department to the Colonel; and to be careful to have expenses of Government as moderate as possible, drawing bills of exchange on him or the treasury of Virginia for the payment of the expenses of the troops, studying the general interest of the State, and tranquility of the inhabitants of the different posts, letting all kind of oppression be the last shift. This is the substance of the orders I received.”*

“At Vincennes, on the fifth of August, 1779,” subsequently wrote Clark, “the Western troops were assigned to different posts agreeable to a general order. Lieutenant Colonel Montgomery was authorized by me to draw bills of exchange on myself or the treasurer of the State of Virginia, for defraying the necessary expenses of the troops in the Department, but not on any other person.”†

When everything at Vincennes had been satisfactorily arranged, the American commander “set out for the Falls,” where he arrived on the twentieth of August; issuing his orders thereafter from “Headquarters,” as “Colonel of the Illinois Battalion, and Com-

* *Montgomery to B'd. Com'rs. of Western Accts.*, Feb. 22, 1783 — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 441. Montgomery left Vincennes for Kaskaskia on the 14th of August.

† Clark to Colonel William Fleming, February 6, 1783, (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 433.)

mander-in-Chief of the Virginia Forces in the Western Department.”*

After an absence of nearly fourteen months, he now saw, upon the Kentucky shore, instead of a wilderness, as when he left the island, a considerable settlement. The “post” previously ordered by him to be removed “to the main land,” he found was a well-built but small fort, with which he was much pleased.†

Previous to the establishing of his headquarters on the Ohio, Clark was voted a sword by the General Assembly of Virginia as a proof of their appreciation of his “great and good conduct and gallant behavior.” It was purchased by the Governor “of a gentleman who had used it but little and judged it to be elegant and costly.” In transmitting it to the Colonel (it was sent in care of a Captain of the militia) the Lieutenant Governor, John Page, wrote him a kind — almost affectionate — letter dated the fourth of September, congratulating him on his successes and wishing him a continuation of them. The sword was received by Clark at the Falls and was highly appreciated.‡

Clark expended during the time he was actually engaged in the conquest of the Illinois and Wabash towns of cash received from the treasurer of Virginia and from Oliver Pollock, the State’s financial agent (and the United States’ as well) in New Orleans, over one hundred thousand dollars,— nearly one half being provided and sent to the Colonel by the last mentioned. who, because of his trouble and responsibility in so doing and for his activity and zeal in promoting the

* Appendix, Note CXXXII.

† Same, Note, CXXXIII.

‡ Same, Note CXXXIV.

interests of the country generally, is entitled to have his name enrolled high on the list of those the nation delights to honor. His genuine patriotism (for such it was) contributed greatly towards making the expedition a complete and permanent success.*

The grant made on the sixteenth day of June, 1779, by "Francis, son of Tobacco" to Clark, of two and a half leagues of land lying on the right bank of the Ohio opposite the Falls, being in contravention of the constitution of Virginia formed in May, 1776, was of course void as soon as made. But, the instrument of writing drawn up on the third of January, 1778, by Wythe, Mason and Jefferson, wherein they promised to use their influence to obtain a liberal bounty for each one joining Clark, in case of the success of the Illinois expedition, was, it may be premised, more than fulfilled as Virginia extended her liberality not only to the privates, but to Clark himself and to his officers, in a marked degree, by granting, in its act of the second of January, 1781, to them one hundred and fifty thousand acres of land, to be laid off on the northern borders of the Ohio adjacent to the Falls.†

And this grant was, on the first day of March, 1784, confirmed, so far as Virginia was concerned, by its deed of cession to the United States of all right, title and claim to the country northwest of the Ohio.

This action was taken because by an act of the second of January, 1781, the General Assembly of Virginia had resolved that, on certain conditions, they

* See *Magazine of American History*, vol. XII, pp. 415, 416; and Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, pp. 603-605. (Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXXIV.)

† Appendix, Note CXXXV.

would cede to Congress, for the benefit of the United States, all the right, title and claim which Virginia had to the territory northwest of the river Ohio. Congress, by an act of the thirteenth of September, 1783, agreed to accept the cession of the territory; and the General Assembly of Virginia, on the twentieth of December, thereafter, passed an act authorizing their delegates in Congress to convey the same to the General Government.

The deed was duly executed wherein was a condition that "a quantity not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand acres of land, promised by Virginia, shall be allowed and granted to the then Colonel, now General George Rogers Clark, and to the officers and soldiers of his regiment, who marched with him when the posts of Kaskaskia and Vincennes were reduced, and to the officers and soldiers that have been since incorporated into the said regiment, to be laid off in one tract, the length of which not to exceed double the breadth, in such place on the northwest side of the Ohio as a majority of the officers shall choose and to be afterward divided among the officers and soldiers in due proportion, according to the laws of Virginia."

Now, by provisions of the acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, of the third of October, 1779, and of the fifth of October, 1780, Clark and his officers and men were entitled to receive as follows:

Brigadier-General	10,000	acres
Colonel	6,666	2/3 "
Lieutenant-Colonel	6,000	"
Major	5,666	2/3 "
Captain	4,000	"
Subaltern	2,666	2/3 "
Non-commissioned officer	400	"
Soldier (private)	200	"

The deed of cession by Virginia having been duly accepted by the United States, the General Government were bound to see that Clark and his officers and privates received the several amounts which had been granted them by Virginia; and, finally, they obtained (they or their heirs or assigns) their reward.

The conquest of the Illinois and of the Wabash towns thus ended, was a glorious one for the originator and those engaged in the undertaking under him. The enterprise, divisible into two principal parts, (1) the taking of the Illinois, and (2) the capture of Hamilton and his garrison — two acts of a notable drama, of which these events were the opening and closing — must be considered as one campaign, in which the efforts of Clark were great and effective and for which America will ever cherish his memory. No other militia officer accomplished as much during the Revolution; and none other in that arm of the service achieved so much renown. His success resulted greatly to the advantage of Virginia, especially to that part of the State organized into Kentucky county;* and, in the end, it proved of signal importance to the United States.†

* Appendix, Note CXXXVI.

† Appendix, Note CXXXVII.

CHAPTER XXVI.

FOR over three years after his conquest of the Illinois and Wabash towns and his return to the Falls of Ohio, Clark led an active life. He soon received an express from Governor Jefferson bringing intelligence that a reinforcement would be sent him, and that it was intended to erect a fortification (as had already been mentioned by Governor Henry in his private instructions to the Colonel) at or near the mouth of the Ohio.* During the fall, Clark busied himself in issuing orders looking to its speedy commencement. All other plans in a military way he was forced to lay aside owing to the low stage of water in the river; and, throughout the succeeding months of winter, he accomplished little so far as public interests were concerned.

In April, 1780, the Colonel began operations actively upon the fortification alluded to, locating it

* Jefferson's letter to Clark was dated June 28, 1779, not 1778, as stated by Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 112, 113). This mistake has caused some confusion. (See Henry's *Life of Patrick Henry*, vol. I, p. 587.) It has been claimed (Pitkin's *United States*, vol. II, p. 95) that the erection of Fort Jefferson in conformity with instructions from Gov. Jefferson was in order to fortify the claim of the United States as to its western boundary being the Mississippi, south of the Ohio (see also Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 112). That it afterward did fortify, in a measure, the claim of the General Government is true; but the immediate cause for the determination of Jefferson to build the fortification was for the advancement of Virginia's claim of like nature, as evidenced by its being garrisoned by that State alone, after being completed by her troops.

on the left (east) bank of the Mississippi, about five miles below the mouth of the Ohio. He named it "Fort Jefferson" in honor of the Virginia governor.

Hearing of the approach of a considerable British and Indian force against Cahokia and St. Louis, Clark hastened with a party to the relief of the former place, reaching there in time to repel the enemy. Learning then that an army from Detroit was marching to invade Kentucky, he returned hastily to Fort Jefferson, marching thence to Louisville with what men could be spared from his post; but he arrived there too late to prevent the reduction of two interior stations and the securing by the enemy under Captain Henry Bird of a considerable number of prisoners.* Thereupon, he gathered about a thousand men, invaded the Shawanese country north of the Ohio, defeating the Indians and laying waste two of their villages. This was early in August.†

Before the close of the year Clark's attention was again directed against Detroit. Going to the Virginia capital, he arranged with the Virginia Governor

* For an account of Bird's invasion of Kentucky, see *History of the Girtys*, pp. 118-120. Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 115, 116), gives currency to the absurd tradition that Clark, on his way to Louisville, had but two companions; and that all three "painted themselves like Indians." His account has been extensively copied. (See *History of the Girtys*, p. 121.) "The apprehension of a large body of the enemy in motion from Detroit towards the Falls of the Ohio, has called him [Clark] there [from Fort Jefferson] *with what men he could well spare* from this country, before he had well breathed after the fatigues of an expedition up the Mississippi." (John Dodge to Gov. Jefferson from Fort Jefferson, Aug. 1, 1780 — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. 1, p. 368.) The italicising is mine.

† *History of the Girtys*, pp. 121, 122, 406.

and his Council for the undertaking, which met the approval of Washington; but before anything could be accomplished, Arnold's invasion of Virginia, in January, 1781, occurred, when Clark temporarily headed two hundred and forty riflemen and ambuscaded a party of the enemy on James river. He then (having been commissioned the twenty-second of the month just mentioned a Brigadier General) made strenuous efforts to carry forward the Detroit expedition; but because of the defeat of a portion of his force under Colonel Archibald Lochrey while on its way down the Ohio to join him on that river, and of the passage of an act by Virginia, authorizing the Governor to stop the expedition, the General was compelled to abandon the undertaking after reaching Louisville. This was in September.*

For the residue of the year 1781, after the abandonment of the expedition against Detroit, there was nothing of particular note accomplished by Clark beyond watching and guarding the Kentucky settlements. But in the Spring of 1782, he was busying himself at the Falls in the erection of a new fortification and later in building an armed boat to ply on the river. His new and "formidable fortress" was named "Fort Nelson."

* *Washington-Irvine Correspondence*, pp. 53-56, 76, 77, 83, 154, 229-231. *History of the Girtys*, pp. 129-131. "From this time forth," says Lewis Collins (*Historical Sketches of Kentucky*, p. —), "his [Clark's] influence sensibly decreased, and the innate force and energy of his character languished and degenerated." It is not to be presumed, however, that the failure of this expedition was the only cause for this, if, indeed, it was the principal one. Concerning his loss of prestige, more will be said hereafter.

In August, Captain William Caldwell with Rangers and Indians gained a signal victory over the Kentuckians at the Blue Licks, but Clark was not in command of the latter. This success of the enemy induced the General, as a counter stroke, again to lead a considerable force — over a thousand men — across the Ohio. He attacked, in November, the savages on the Great Miami and destroyed their villages and means of subsistence.* This was his last important military service during the Revolution. He had already become tired of his command and had solicited the Virginia governor to be recalled.† But it was not because the northwestward Indians (except the Piankeshaws and those near the settlements on the Mississippi) had wholly engaged in the war against the Americans,‡ nor was it because of the desperate straits of Virginia in a financial way, causing him to dispose of some lands he was possessed of to obtain stores for his soldiers at Louisville.§ He had, as he believed, other reasons; and he would in the early spring, go over the mountains to confer with the Governor; but it was his intention to return, notwithstanding, to Louisville, to reside there.

The Governor gave General Clark liberty to relinquish his command in the West, and the latter early in the Spring wrote Harrison thanking him for the

* *Washington-Irvine Correspondence*, p. 401.

† Clark to Gov. Harrison, Oct. 22, 1782: *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 351. Same to same, Nov. 27, 1782, in the same vol., p. 381.

‡ Same to same, Oct. 18, same year: *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 345 (where Clark's initials are not given, but the letter "S." appears in their place).

§ Same to same, Nov. 30, same year (see the work last cited, vol. III, p. 386).

permit, at the same time giving him his reasons for the request he had made, which he declares were not because of the smallness of his command, but quite a different cause. Every exertion in his power had been made for many years for the defense of his Department he declared. Knowing that the safety of the frontier down the Ohio and upon the Mississippi and Wabash depended upon his activity, he says he took pleasure in encountering the greatest fatigues, leaving nothing in his power undone, either by dividing the councils of the Indians by taking necessary steps to keep large numbers in American interests, or by making necessary excursions into their country to distress the enemy and cause the friendly-disposed to remain so. He spoke of a clan of partisans who resided in Philadelphia ("pretended proprietors," as he calls them), who were endeavoring to divide the counsels of the people in the Kentucky settlements and to destroy their interest at the seat of the Virginia government, "more effectually to complete their disaffection to the State." The General really believed their efforts were in an especial manner directed against him, whose desire above all things was to save the country, but which, if the war continued, he would be unable to effect because of their machinations. He wished "to be clear" of their evil designs; so he would leave the West.*

In the first half of May, the General had reached Richmond, then the Virginia seat of Government;

* Clark to Gov. Harrison of Va., March 8, 1783, from Lincoln county, Kentucky — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, pp. 453, 454. (See Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXXVIII.)

but, from the following letter, it is evident he was distressed for necessaries :

“RICHMOND, May 21st, 1783.

“SIR: Nothing but necessity could induce me to make the following request of your Excellency, which is, to grant me a small sum of money on account. I can assure you, Sir, that I am exceedingly distressed for the want of necessary clothing, etc., and don't know of any channel through which I could procure any except that of the Executive. The State, I believe, will fall considerable in my debt. Any supplies that your Excellency favors me with might be deducted out of my accounts. I have the honor to be your Excellency's obedient servant,

G. R. CLARK.

“His Excellency Governor Harrison.”*

The next day Clark gave to Governor Harrison, at his request, a “plan of such offensive measures” as he believed the general interest required to be put in execution that season against the Indians.† However, the preliminary articles of peace had been signed between the United States and Great Britain and the latter power had made fair promises to call in her savage allies and restrain them from farther hostilities against the Americans.

We now come to the last act of Clark in a public way while yet a Brigadier General. A meeting was held in Richmond on the twenty-seventh day of May, 1783, of a number of State officers, “for the purpose of endeavoring to get proper means adopted for locating, allotting and surveying their lands: to have their certificates put upon proper footing, and measures taken to give them a sufficient credit; and to have their claim to half-pay finally determined by the As-

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 487.

† *Id.*, pp. 488-490.

sembly." General Clark acted as president of the meeting. Resolutions were passed that a memorial be presented to the Assembly requesting that officers and soldiers of the State Line and Navy be put on the same footing with the officers and soldiers of the Virginia Continental Line, with respect to land, bounties, etc.; and stating that, in lieu of their half-pay for life, they preferred to receive full pay for five years only. Clark and seven other (officers) were appointed to draw up the memorial.

The General (together with a like number of officers as last mentioned) was also appointed to superintend the surveyors employed to survey the lands, in conjunction with the officers appointed by the Continental Line for that purpose, and to see that the regiments and corps that had served "in the westward" were duly provided for, as all other troops, in the memorial to be prepared for the General Assembly.

The officers appointed to draw up the memorial presented it according to order, which having been signed by the president, was on the next day given to the Assembly.*

Clark had not sent in his resignation even after remaining in Richmond over two months; however, nothing in his instructions to the officer left in command at Fort Nelson, or in letters to the County Lieutenants of the counties of Jefferson and Lincoln, Kentucky, indicated his intention of returning to his

* See *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, pp. 492, 493. It will be noticed that, by Clark's appointment as one of the committee to superintend the surveyors employed to survey the lands which had been granted them in the West, he intended to return to Kentucky.

command and again assuming the direction of military affairs in the West. And now the State of Virginia, for reasons set forth in a communication to him from its Governor, had no longer a desire to continue him in office:

“IN COUNCIL, July 2d, 1783.

“SIR: The conclusion of the war, and the distressed situation of the State with respect to its finances, call on us to adopt the most prudent economy. It is for this reason alone I have come to a determination to give over all thoughts for the present of carrying on an offensive war against the Indians, which you will easily perceive will render the services of a general officer in that quarter unnecessary; and [you] will therefore consider yourself as out of command; but before I take leave of you, I feel myself called upon in the most forcible manner to return you my thanks and those of my Council, for the very great and singular services you have rendered your country in wresting so great and valuable a territory out of the hands of the British enemy, repelling the attacks of their savage allies, and carrying on successful war in the heart of their country. This tribute of praise and thanks so justly due, I am happy to communicate to you as the united voice of the Executive. I am, with respect, Sir, yours, etc.,

“BENJAMIN HARRISON.”*

But Clark, although no longer in the service of his State, lost none of his interest in affairs down the Ohio. On the twelfth of October, before returning to the Falls (Louisville), he wrote Governor Harrison:

“SIR: I have been informed that your Excellency hath lately received despatches from the Westward. Being anxious to know the success of the Commission to the Chickasaws induces me to take the liberty of writing to you, hoping that some moments of leisure might offer, and that your Excel-

* This letter of dismissal has been several times published. Concerning Virginia's subsequent treatment of Clark, see Appendix to our narrative, Note CXXXIX.

lency would honor me with the information. From report, I fear all is not well in that quarter. I hope, Sir, that you will pardon this intrusion; and [I] beg leave to subscribe myself your Excellency's humble servant."*

After Clark had become a private citizen, the General Assembly of his state recognized the fact of his signal services, by the passage, in October, 1783, of an act laying off a town on the opposite side of the Ohio from Louisville, naming it "Clarksville," and constituting him one of its trustees.

Clark's return in the latter half of the year last mentioned to the West brought with it no particular demonstration on the part of the citizens of Kentucky, and he soon engaged at the Falls in private business.† But the Congress of the United States honored him with an appointment as "commissioner plenipotentiary," along with two others, to hold a treaty with the Ohio Indians. As a result, "the treaty of Fort McIntosh" was concluded January 21, 1785, between "George Rogers Clark, Richard Butler and Arthur Lee," of the one part, and the sachems and warriors of the Wyandot, Delaware, Chippewa and Ottawa nations, of the other.

Virginia, by her deed of cession of her claims to the territory northwest of the Ohio in March, 1784, to the United States, and the acceptance by the General Government of the same, confirmed the grant of lands previously made to Clark and the soldiers who were in the service under him; yet, as it may be premised, this did not result for a long time to their

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 535.

† At least one of the employments he made arrangements to engage in, was that of purveyor of "buffalo beef, bear's meat, deer hams and bear oil," for the denizens of Louisville.

advantage for the reason that the hostile savages beyond the Ohio prevented surveys being made.*

The year 1786 found Clark still engaged on behalf of the General Government as Commissioner to endeavor to bring the savages beyond the Ohio into proper relations with the United States; and another treaty was conducted, — this time between “George Rogers Clark, Richard Butler, and Samuel H. Parsons for the United States,” with the Shawanese Indians, January 31, the year last mentioned, at the mouth of the Great Miami river, where a fortification was erected for that purpose, called Fort Finney.†

After the return of Clark from Fort Finney to Louisville, much of his time for some months was given up to a voluntary consideration of public affairs because of the alarming increase of Indian hostilities. The presence of imminent danger changed to a considerable extent the feeling of the Kentucky people who had harbored prejudice against him;‡ for yet fresh in their minds were his success over the savages beyond the Ohio; and they were now inclined to look to him again for advice and aid, as they saw he was in favor of marching against the Indians — particularly those upon the Wabash.

Benjamin Logan, County Lieutenant of Lincoln county, Kentucky, wrote the Virginia governor on the nineteenth of April, giving an account of recent Indian

* Appendix, Note CXL.

† *Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania*, vol. VII: *Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny*, p. 263.

‡ One of their complaints had been that Clark, as Commissioner, was trifling with the savages when the latter were really plundering the settlers; but, of course, there was no truth in the accusation.

marauds — adding, that he thought it his duty to inform the Governor of the circumstances and that General Clark was in the county of Jefferson, and had recovered from a low state of health, and was “likely to be able to serve the public.”*

“I make no doubt,” wrote Clark, in May, from Louisville to Governor Henry, “you have long since had a full account of the late Indian treaties at the mouth of the Miami. . . . What future effect they may have on the nations treated with it is impossible to tell; but some good consequences have already appeared in the peaceable behavior of some of those Indians. Notwithstanding, I do not think that this country [Kentucky], even in its infant state, bore so gloomy an aspect as it does at present. The loss of Colonel Christian (whom the inhabitants had great future hopes in) hath caused general uneasiness; [and we can] add to this the certainty of a war already commenced, and early this Spring declared, by the Wabash Indians in general, amounting in the whole to upwards of fifteen hundred warriors, encouraged by the British traders from Detroit, and their own inclination.

“When you take a view of our situation,” continued Clark, “circumstanced as we are — no prospect of support, at best for several months; so formidable and bloody an enemy to encounter; much irregularity in the [Kentucky] country; no power to order the militia out of the State for its protection; [because of these things] . . . I doubt [not a] great part of these beautiful settlements will be laid to waste if they are not protected by volunteers pen-

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. IV, p. 120.

etrating into the heart of the enemy's country. Nothing else will do. Scouts and forts on the frontiers answer but little purpose, and in the end cost more than an army that would do the business effectually at once.

"Were a sufficient force to appear in their country after a general action which I think should take place, they would sue for peace, and agree to any terms you pleased [to make] to save their country from total destruction. Such an example would have a great and good impression on those Indians already treated with, as fear would cause them to be peaceable, when presents make them believe we are afraid of them, and [are] rather an encouragement for them to make war upon us when they get poor. This is a notorious truth well known by those that are acquainted with their dispositions."*

But Clark's letter was not received until after the Executive Council of Virginia had taken action for the better protection of Kentucky. On the fifteenth of the same month in which Clark wrote, the Board determined that Governor Henry should direct the field officers of the Kentucky militia to assemble and take the necessary measures for the protection of the settlements (that it would, when so assembled, take the advice of Clark and order an expedition against the Indians, was a foregone conclusion). The Governor prepared instructions in accordance with orders received from the Executive Council and sent them at once to the County Lieutenants of Kentucky.

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. IV, p. 122. Col. Wm. Christian, spoken of by Clark, was killed by the Indians about the middle of April previous (see the vol. just cited, p. 119).

On the twelfth of July, Levi Todd, County Lieutenant of Fayette County, wrote Governor Henry acknowledging receipt of instructions. The field officers would have a meeting at Harrodsburg on the second day of August. There would be an expedition determined upon against the Wabash and White River Indians; but Todd adds:

“’Tis hard to say where we have the greatest number of enemies. Within this three weeks past, the whole of the north and west frontier of the District [of Kentucky] has been struck by small parties [of savages]. Much mischief has been done in different parts of the District this summer and much property lost. I conceive that all our neighboring Indians are just now commencing war avowedly. Much Kentucky blood will be spilt, though I hope that vigorous operations the ensuing fall will make much in our favor. The Wabash Indians have repeatedly said that the Kentucky people dare not march to the Wabash. Our patience hitherto has much encouraged and increased the number of our enemies. Necessity compels us now to pursue a different conduct. I fear it will be difficult to get ammunition in time. Provisions, I believe, may be procured. There is plenty in the District. . . . I am of opinion it would have been very agreeable to the District had General Clark been commissioned a General Officer for the present occasion.”*

“The Americans living there [at Vincennes],” wrote John May to Governor Henry, on the fourteenth of July, “have been very much distressed by the Indians ever since last winter, and have every

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. IV, p. 155.

reason to believe that they [the savages] were encouraged to continue their hostilities by the French inhabitants, who have not only refused the Americans any assistance, but would not suffer them to make use of the cannon which were left there for their defense at a fort which they were obliged to build; and when they, the French, were written to on the subject by General Clark, they returned for answer that they had nothing to do with the United States, but considered themselves as British subjects and should obey no other power. I understand there are British traders amongst them, who keep up this idea; and as Congress seems to have totally neglected them, it is not to be wondered at if they should still think themselves under the British government, especially when they see that the several British posts, which they were told were to be delivered up to the Americans, are still in the possession of the British.

“The Americans were very lately attacked by the Indians, but they repulsed them, whereupon Colonel Legras . . . issued his proclamation ordering all Americans to move away. They are now closely confined within their fort or houses and have every reason to expect the French will assist the Indians against them, and are under the most dreadful apprehensions of being totally cut off.

“The Wabash Indians and most of the Shawanese are all at war with us and put to death in a most cruel manner all the prisoners who are so unfortunate as to fall into their hands. . . . There are now letters here [in Lincoln county, Kentucky] from Vincennes requesting in the most moving terms, that assistance may be sent the Americans

to enable them to move away, and offering to give up every shilling's worth of property they possess in order to defray the expenses of moving them. There had a party of militia amounting to about one hundred and thirty men marched a few days before this intelligence came to hand to attack a party of Indians who were encamped on the other side of the Ohio, some distance below the Falls; but, upon General Clark's receiving the letter, he sent expresses after them and requested them to proceed immediately to the post [Vincennes].

"This country had determined to carry on a volunteer campaign against the Indians in August next, but your instructions have changed the plan, and they are now preparing for a regular campaign. I find that it is the unanimous opinion of the inhabitants of this country that General Clark is the properest person to take the command here, and (notwithstanding the opinion which prevails below of his not being capable of attending to business) I am of the same opinion with the rest of the country. I have been with him frequently and find him as capable of business as ever, and should an expedition be carried against the Indians I think his name alone would be worth half a regiment of men. . . . Colonel Logan is acquainted with the contents of this letter and has authorized me to say that in case a general officer should be appointed, he thinks General Clark's abilities and experience entitle him to the appointment."*

* *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. IV, pp. 156, 157. Concerning what is meant in this letter by Clark "not being capable of attending to business" as believed by some people, will presently more fully appear.

Already, however, had it been determined by the general voice of the people, that Clark (though without any commission in the militia), was to lead a strong force into the Indian country.*

On the tenth of August, Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar wrote from Fort Harmar, mouth of the Muskingum river, that one of his officers had arrived from the Miami (Fort Finney) and had brought intelligence that "an expedition was forming under the command of General Clark, and authorized by the State of Virginia, to attack the Indians."† But the authority spoken of was, in reality, confined to measures for protection of the frontier, and there was no power granted (nor could there be) by the Executive of the State to compel the militia to march across the Ohio, which now was the border line. However, an opinion by the Attorney General and Supreme Judges of the District of Kentucky that the Executive of Virginia had delegated all their power under the law and Articles of Confederation, so far as they related to invasion, insurrections, and impressments, to the field officers of the District, and that these officers in consequence thereof had a right to impress, if necessary, all supplies for the use of the militia that might be called into service by their order or orders under the order of Council‡—was construed to authorize an expedition into the Indian country. Therefore, "in consequence of the instructions from your Excellency and the advice of Coun-

* Compare Denny's *Journal*, p. 293.

† See the same vol., p. 490.

‡ *Opinion of the Attorney General and Supreme Judges of the District of Kentucky*. This may be found printed in Dunn's *Indiana*, p. 171.

cil, of the 16th of May," wrote Todd to the Governor of Virginia, on the twenty-ninth of August, "the field officers assembled from every county and a great majority of the whole, in the District. We unanimously resolved that an expedition against the Wabash and other inimical Indians in that quarter was, at this time, justifiable and necessary. . . . General Clark was appointed to command the army, which is to rendezvous at Clarksville on the 10th of September. We expect our number will be between 1,500 and 2,000. A great part of the necessary supplies is given up to the officers by consent [that is, voluntarily by the people] with expectation of being paid by government; and some [is] procured by impressment."*

About one thousand men under Clark marched from Clarksville for Vincennes and reached the vicinity of that place early in October, where for nine days they waited the arrival of provisions and stores which had been shipped on keelboats from Louisville and Clarksville. About one half the provisions was spoiled when the boats arrived and what had been moved by land was almost exhausted. The troops were ordered to move up the Wabash (they having been reinforced by a considerable number of the inhabitants of Vincennes) to attack the Indian towns on that river. On reaching the neighborhood of the mouth of the Vermillion river, Clark found that the villages of the savages on that river were deserted.

At this crisis, when the spirits of the officers and men were depressed by disappointment, hunger and fatigue, some persons circulated throughout the camp

* Levi Todd to Gov. Henry, from Fayette county — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. IV, p. 166.

a rumor that General Clark had sent a flag of truce to the Indians, with the offer of peace or war. This report, combined with a lamentable change which had taken place in the once temperate, bold, energetic, and commanding character of Clark, excited among the troops a spirit of insubordination which neither the commands, nor the entreaties, nor the tears of the General could subdue. Three hundred of his men in a body left the army and marched homeward. Clark then returned with the remainder to Vincennes.*

“Never had General Clark led so unfortunate a party [as that of 1786, against the savages of the Wabash,]” writes one of Kentucky’s historians; “hitherto victory seemed to have hung with delight upon his banner; and for him to appear was to conquer all opposing difficulties. At the same time, mournful as the truth is, and reluctantly as the record is wrung from the author, General Clark was no longer the same man, as the conquerer of Kaskaskia and the captor of Vincennes.”† Strong drink had conquered him.‡

Once again at Vincennes, Clark and his fellow-officers agreed that to establish a garrison there would be of essential service to Kentucky; and the General, assuming “supreme direction,” at once began to carry out the plan. However, in the end, his high-handed assumption of what was really a doubtful authority — his seizure of Spanish property in Vincennes, his attempts to hold Indian treaties without the direction of Congress, and other aggressions — frustrated the design, the Virginia Council disavow-

* Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 185, 186.

† Mann Butler: *History of Kentucky*, pp. 152, 153.

‡ But of this more will presently be said.

ing all his acts and the United States ordering the commanding officer of the troops of the General Government on the Ohio to effectually put a stop to the movement. This was in the spring of 1787.

The failure of Clark in his expedition against the Wabash Indians and the course pursued by him in endeavoring to found a military post at Vincennes, proved a blow to his influence from which he never recovered.

On the seventh of March, 1791, "when Indian hostilities were spreading terror through the West, and the authorities were casting about for a satisfactory commander for the frontier troops," Jefferson wrote to Innis of Kentucky: "Will it not be possible for you to bring General Clark forward? I know the greatness of his mind, and am the more mortified at the cause which obscures it. Had not this unhappily taken place, there was nothing he might not have hoped: could it be surmounted, his lost ground might yet be recovered. No man alive rated him higher than I did, and would again, were he to become again what I knew him."* But it was too late. Such was the mastery intemperance had gained over him that his advancement to such a command was out of the question.†

Once again, however, an effort was made by Clark to engage in public affairs, but it was both discreditable and transient — an attempt on his part in favor of France against the Spanish on the Mississippi, when Genet, the French minister, undertook to raise and organize a force in Kentucky for a secret expedition

* Jefferson's *Works*, vol. III, p. 218.

† Appendix, Note CXLI.

— Clark accepting in 1793 a commission as Major-General to conduct the enterprise. But Genet was recalled and Clark's commission annulled. After this, he sunk into almost total obscurity, remembered only as one of the most valorous of western patriots of the Revolution.

Clark never married.* He was a stout, rather short, square man, with a high broad forehead, sandy hair, blue eyes, and heavy shaggy eye-brows. His portrait indicates more than ordinary intellectual ability.† Though of quick temper, he was very companionable. His last years were spent all by himself in a rude dwelling on Corn island, until a sister took him to her home at Locust Grove near Louisville. He was in infirm health a long time. He died February 13, 1818, and was buried in Cave Hill cemetery, in what is now a suburb of that city. Of the Virginians, who nobly and unselfishly helped, during the Revolution, in the cause of liberty, history names with pride among the many), Washington and Jefferson, Henry and Mason, Harrison and Clark.

* Appendix, Note CXLII.

† Appendix, Note CXLIII.

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

NOTE I.

CLARK'S VISIT TO KENTUCKY IN 1775.

THE year 1775 was [is] memorable for the arrival of that most daring and sagacious officer, George Rogers Clark, who was soon destined to intertwine his memory with honors," . . . (Butler's *Kentucky*, pp. 35, 36). It is suggested that not at the date given was Clark an officer; he held no office civil or military during that year.*

Again, that writer says (p. 37): "Early in 1775 Clark visited Kentucky . . . In this visit, he either had a commission of major, or was, from his service in Dunmore's war and prominent talents, voluntarily placed at the head of the irregular troops then in Kentucky." But there were no "irregular troops" then in Kentucky.

"During this visit [to Kentucky, in 1775] he [Clark] was temporarily placed in command of the irregular militia of the settlements; but whether he held a commission is not known." [Collins's *Kentucky* ed. of 1877), p. 133.] Collins, in this, follows Butler, only making the statement more erroneous by substituting "irregular militia" for "irregular troops."

* The spelling of Clark's name with an *e* at the end, by Butler, was undoubtedly a typographical error; for that writer afterwards gives, in most instances, the correct orthography.

NOTE II.

CLARK'S MEMOIR.

The first suggestion of Clark's Memoir published, was by Thomas Jefferson. In writing to James Innes, March 7, 1791, concerning Clark, he said: "We are made to hope he is engaged in writing the accounts of his expeditions north of the Ohio. They will be valuable morsels of history, and will justify to the world those who have told them how great he was [*Jefferson's Works*, vol. III, p. 218]." From this it would seem that Clark had intended to make his Memoir more comprehensive — to include accounts of all his "expeditions north of the Ohio" — than it was finally written.

As to the exact date when the Memoir was completed, there is no information extant. If its heading be taken literally, it must have been written after the fourth of March, 1817, and before the eighteenth of February of the next year, as Monroe was inaugurated on the day first mentioned and Clark died on the day last given. It is clear, however, from the wording, that the heading is no clue to the period when the Memoir was composed. It is safe to conclude that it was not written until near the close of the century; and there are circumstances making it seem probable that it was not finished until several years later.

The Memoir was first used by Mann Butler in his *Kentucky* (in both editions of that work). In the Preface to his first edition (1834), Butler says:

"In the first place are the papers of Gen. George Rogers Clark; these contain a memoir by the great

western hero, of his public services, from 1775 to 1779. These periods embrace the most interesting epochs; the papers also include an interesting correspondence with Patrick Henry and Jefferson, the early and distinguished governors of Virginia, as with many military officers in the western country. These documents are now, after more than the lapse of half a century, for the first time submitted to the public.”*

“Butler’s words, “after more than the lapse of half a century,” refer, of course, to Clark’s correspondence — not to his Memoir. That historian relies implicitly upon all the statements of the latter, with one or two exceptions; but what is more objectionable is his frequent interpolation of unreliable traditions, — with the result that most of these have been taken by many subsequent writers of Western history as veritable accounts and frequently have been enlarged upon.

The next to use the Memoir was James T. Morehead, in his address of May 25, 1840, at Boonesborough. In the publication of his effort, in a note appended thereto, Morehead says (p. 165):

“The life and campaigns of General George Rogers Clark would be a most valuable accession to our Western history, and I am gratified to be able to state that the materials for such a work are in a state of preparation by L. Bliss, Jr., Esq., of Louisville. That gentleman has been so obliging as to submit to my perusal the autograph memoir of the distinguished

* But these documents, in their entirety, are by no means “submitted to the public” in that author’s history. They are *used*, simply, by him and, in some instances, not at all judiciously.

soldier, commencing with the period of his visit to Kentucky in 1776 [1775] and closing with the year 1777 [1779]. I have drawn freely upon it, although Mr. Butler's delightful narratives of the Illinois campaigns covered pretty much the same ground."

Morehead condenses the Memoir into about a dozen pages of his Address, following the story without attempting to add traditionary accounts, and adopting its errors—to him of course unknown.

Dillon's publication of the Memoir, in his history of Indiana (ed. of 1843, pp. 127-184; of 1859, pp. 115-167), is a literal copy of most of it. What he leaves not copied, he generally essays to supply in a condensed manner, in the nature of interpolations.

The three publications we have enumerated are, it is believed, sufficient to give the real import of every statement of any importance in this the labored recital of Clark; but care must be taken, particularly, to separate Butler's traditionary accounts from the residue of the narrative; which is not a difficult task.

Estimates, in detached sentences, of the general character of Clark's Memoir, are given by several late writers. Roosevelt is perhaps, on the whole, most severe in his strictures. In his *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, he says:

[I.] "Clark has left a full MSS. memoir of the events of 1777, 1778 and 1779. It was used extensively by Mann Butler, . . . and is printed almost complete by Dillon, on pp. 115-167 of his 'Indiana.' It was written at the desire of Presidents Jefferson and Madison; and therefore some thirty or forty years after the events of which it speaks. Valuable though it is, . . . it would be still more valuable had it

been written earlier; it undoubtedly contains some rather serious errors [p. 36n].”

[2.] “The ‘Memoir,’ written by an old man who had squandered his energies and sunk into deserved obscurity, is tedious and magniloquent, and sometimes inaccurate [p. 55n].”

[3.] “The account written by Clark [that is, his ‘Memoir’] in his old age, like Shelby’s similar autobiography, is, in many respects, not very trustworthy. It cannot be accepted for a moment where it conflicts with any contemporary accounts [p. 57n].”

[4.] “When Clark wrote his memoirs, in his old age, he took delight in writing down among his exploits all sorts of childish stratagems; the marvel is that any sane historian should not have seen that these were on their face as untrue as they were ridiculous [p. 63n].”

[5.] “In the latter [that is, in his Memoir], Clark makes not a few direct misstatements, and many details are colored so as to give them an altered aspect [p. 81n].”

[6.] “Unfortunately, most of the small western historians who have written about Clark have really damaged his reputation by the absurd inflation of their language. They were adepts in the forcible-feeble style of writing. . . . Moreover, they base his claims to greatness not on his really great deeds, but on the half-imaginary feats of childish cunning he related [in his Memoir] in his old age [p. 81n].”

Although the Memoir contains many errors, some of which were without doubt intentionally made, it is, nevertheless, of much value in throwing light on dark

passages to be found in Clark's early letters. It must, however, always be consulted with care, and its assertions closely scrutinized, to separate what is true from that which is erroneous. Wherever are brought forward his own deeds of valor or shrewdness, *there* is the greater necessity for a more careful and critical examination. As to the probable reason for most of the short-comings of the Memoir, see this Appendix, Note CLI.

NOTE III.

DATE OF LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR HAMILTON'S ARRIVAL AT DETROIT.

"In the month of April, 1775, I was appointed Lieutenant Governor and Superintendent of the settlement of Detroit at a salary of £200. In the month of September following, Sir Guy Carleton sent me to that post with verbal orders, the state of the Province [of Quebec] at that time pressing my departure." (Hamilton's *Memorial to the Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury*, MSS.)

. . . "Immediately on my arrival here (which was on the 9th of November last)" . . . are words used by him to the Earl of Dartmouth from Detroit, August 29 to September 2, 1776. (Haldimand MSS.)

Bancroft (*History of the United States*, ed. of 1885, vol. IV, p. 148) is ignorant of the date of Hamilton's arrival. He speaks of him as seeking to influence the Indians of the Northwest against the Colonies as early as in April, 1775, — which, of course, is error.

NOTE IV.

DODGE'S INTERVIEW WITH THE SAVAGES AT SANDUSKY.

Dodge says a party of savages from the neighborhood of the lakes came to his house on their way to the frontiers to strike a blow. He inquired of them why they had taken up the hatchet. They replied that Governor Hamilton had told them that the Americans were going to murder them all and take their lands, but if they would join him they would be able to drive them off; and that he would give them twenty dollars a scalp. On this, Dodge repeated to the warriors the Continental "talk" held with the Indians at Pittsburgh in October previous; and, making them a small present, they returned home, believing as he told them, that the Governor was a liar and meant to deceive them.

It is evident that the Indians practiced upon Dodge's credulity in their relation, as an excuse for their going upon the war path; for it is certain that Hamilton had not directed them to take up the hatchet, nor had he offered a reward for American scalps. And here it may be said that it is not beyond the bounds of probability that Dodge does not adhere strictly to the truth in his story.

NOTE V.

GEORGE MORGAN'S EARLY DESIGNS AGAINST THE ILLINOIS — HIS LETTER TO WINSTON AND KENNEDY AT THAT PLACE.

“LOWER SHAWNESE TOWN,
“July 6th, 1776.

“GENTLEMEN,

“This is all the paper I have left and this country affords no more, therefore I cannot write so fully as I wish.

“The bearer, Silver Heels, I have promised sixty dollars to carry this letter to you and bring your answer. What you advance to him you must advise me of.

“I am now here on public business for the United Colonies. I want to know the exact situation of affairs at the Illinois, and what quantity of flour and beef you could furnish a company or two of men with at Kaskaskia, the 25th of next December. This information I will depend on you for by the return of Silver Heels, who ought to be at Pittsburgh as early in September as possible, as there is a great treaty to be held in that month with all the Western Nations. If one of you could come along with him it may be much to your advantage, but you should be very secret with respect to your business.

“From what passed between Mr. Kennedy and myself I was in hopes you would have sent a parcel of horses and breed mares (particularly the latter of the Spanish breed) by land to Pittsburgh or Philada. I have never since then heard from you. The conveyance between New Orleans and Philada. is now blocked up by the misunderstanding between the Colonies and Britain. We are contending for our liberties and have hitherto succeeded beyond our hopes, for Quebec is the only post now occupied by the British forces in America.

“I have now to request that you will purchase and send to me at Pittsburgh so as to arrive there next October or November fifteen, twenty or thirty of the best mares and geldings or horses you can purchase and in May following

as many more — always preferring breeding mares or fillies of the Spanish breed and none to exceed 8 or 9 years old — for all which I will either allow you the cost and charges, or what they shall be valued at on their arrival at Pittsburgh by two persons to be mutually chosen by us or our attornies as you shall advise me by Silver Heels' return.

"I have some time since undertaken the disposal of the lands in Indiana on the Retribution Grant for the proprietors; of whom your R. Winston is one and considerably interested. I suppose his share will be near £3,000 sterling. They have appointed me Secretary and Receiver General of the Land Office, but the troubles prevent my proceeding further at present, especially as I am much engaged as Superintendent for Indian Affairs. But I think it will be well worthy your R. Winston's making a trip this way with Silver Heels. — By him I will expect at least 3 or 4 of the handsomest breeding mares you can purchase and send to me.

"Tomorrow I shall set out on my return to Pittsburgh where I shall generally reside and hope to hear very particularly from you if I do not see you with Silver Heels.

"I am with regard

"Your most obedient

"GEORGE MORGAN.

"Whatever remittances you can make in the bill way will be very acceptable. What could a few thousand pounds weight of powder and lead be purchased for at the Illinois? Do acquaint me with the price of dry goods in General. Encourage your friends to send an adventure to Pittsburgh this fall or next spring of Stroud, which sell there for £22.10 p. piece. Match coats are worth from £30 to £35. Linnens, such as used to sell at 2/6 and 3/—, are now 6/— and 9/—. Powder and lead are in great demand.

"To Messrs. Winston and Kennedy, Illinois."*

* From the Haldimand MSS.

NOTE VI.

THE HARRODSBURG MEETING OF JUNE 6, 1776.

“All Kentucky was still considered as a part of Fincastle county and the inhabitants were therefore unrepresented at the capital. They determined to remedy this; and after due proclamation, gathered together at Harrodstown early in June, 1776. During five days an election was held, and two delegates were chosen to go to Williamsburg, then the seat of government. This was done at the suggestion of Clark.” (Roosevelt’s *The Winning of the West*, vol. I, pp. 318, 319). But Clark expressly states the meeting continued but a single day.

It is generally stated by those writers who follow Butler and who essay to give the particulars of the Harrodsburg meeting that the two delegates were aware they could not obtain seats in the Virginia Assembly; but had this been the case, they would hardly have pressed the matter for admission, which they subsequently did, as will hereafter appear. Butler says:

“At this time, the claim of Henderson and Company, acquired under the treaty of Wataga, in March, ’75, with the Cherokees, made a great deal of noise, and added no little to the perplexities of the settlers. It became uncertain whether the south side of the Kentucky river appertained to Virginia or to North Carolina. These difficulties increased the necessity of ascertaining the disposition of the former; on the 6th of June, at the suggestion of Clark, a general meeting took place in Harrod’s Town, at which he and Gabriel John Jones were chosen members of the Assembly of

Virginia. This, however, was not the course intended by Clark; he wanted the people to choose agents with general powers to negotiate with the Government of Virginia, and if abandoned by it, to employ the lands of the country, as a fund to obtain settlers, and establish an independent State. The election had, however, proceeded too far to change its object, when Clark, who had been detained, arrived at the town; the gentlemen elected, although they were aware the choice would give them no seat in the Legislature, proceeded to Williamsburg, at that time the seat of Government [*History of Kentucky*, pp. 37, 38]” It will be noticed that Butler *now* sees in Clark’s plan much more than the simple defense of the Kentucky settlements.

NOTE VII.

WHY POWDER WAS ASKED FOR BY CLARK AND JONES.

The idea of getting a supply of powder for the infant settlements of Kentucky, and of watching their interests, were matters wholly foreign to the *real* object of the mission of Clark and Jones. The Harrodsburg meeting had not deputed them for that work. It was clearly an after-thought of the two “delegates.” And, besides, it readily suggests the inquiry, why was the powder asked for? Naturally it would be inferred that the reason was, the Indians, when Clark and Jones left the settlements, were constantly on the war-path south of the Ohio, and that ammunition was needed by the settlers. To a certain extent this was true, as will presently be shown. Enough savage aggressions had taken place to induce a general (but erroneous) *belief* that several of the Indian nations north of the Ohio

were then "at open war" with the people on the borders of Pennsylvania and Virginia. One of the principal men in the Kentucky settlements — John Floyd — the ablest of all Kentucky's early pioneers — revolved in his mind the propriety of an expedition being carried forward across the Ohio to relieve the people at the stations, in one of which (Boonesborough), he was then living. "If," he wrote on the twenty-first of July, "an expedition were carried on against those natives [of Indians] who are at open war with the people in general, we might be in a great measure relieved, by drawing them off to defend their towns." But, although it is altogether certain that the powder was intended for the settlers in defence of themselves and their families when attacked by lurking savages, the danger *as yet* was not as great as the borderers imagined or Clark apprehended.

"On reaching the county of Botetourt," says Butler, "it was found [by Jones and Clark] that the Legislature had adjourned; upon which Mr. Jones returned to the settlement on Holston, and left Clark to attend to the Kentucky mission." — *History of Kentucky*, p. 38. Here Jones is given too little credit and Clark too much. There was an excellent reason for Jones' return to Holston; and Clark was *not* "left to attend to the Kentucky mission."

NOTE VIII.

MANN BUTLER ON CLARK'S PLAN OF GOVERNMENT.

Butler, absurdly enough, takes it for granted that, had Clark carried out his determination, in the event of the payment for the transportation of the powder

having still been refused, and returned to Kentucky, the people would readily have fallen in with his plan, and that Kentucky would have become an independent State.: "This [the securing of the order for conveying the gun powder to Pittsburg] is the first step in the long and affectionate intercourse which has subsisted between Kentucky and her parent Commonwealth; and obvious as the reflection is, it may not be omitted, that, on the transportation of five hundred weight of gunpowder hung the connection between Virginia and the splendid domain which she obtained on the west of the Alleghany mountains [*History of Kentucky*, p. 40]."

NOTE IX.

FORMATION OF THE COUNTY OF KENTUCKY.

The act as passed was entitled "An act for dividing the county of Fincastle into three distinct counties, and the parish of Botetourt into four distinct parishes;" but the law did not take effect until "from and after the last day of December next ensuing;"—in other words, on the first day of January, 1777. All that part of Fincastle county which lay "to the south and westward of a line beginning on the Ohio, at the mouth of Great Sandy creek, and running up the same and the main or northeasterly branch thereof to the Great Laurel Ridge, or Cumberland Mountain, thence southwesterly along the said mountain to the line of North Carolina, shall be one distinct county and called and known by the name of Kentucky." (*Hening's Virginia Statutes at Large*, Vol. IX, pp. 257, 258). Fincastle county became extinct.

“At the fall session of the Legislature of Virginia, Messrs. Jones and Clark laid the Kentucky petition before that body; they were of course not admitted to Legislative seats, though late in the session, in despite of the exertions of Cols. Henderson and Campbell, they obtained the erection of the *County of Kentucky*, which then embraced the limits of the present State of that name. Thus our political organization was principally obtained by the generous daring of George Rogers Clark, who must be ranked as the earliest *founder of the Commonwealth.*” (Butler’s *Kentucky*, p. 40.) But the “generous daring” of Clark was not great, and his exertions were no more than those of his companion Jones; besides, both were simply carrying out instructions received from the people of the Kentucky settlements, which were in fact, as we have seen, not what Clark really desired. Neither Clark nor Jones was the earliest founder of Kentucky; that honor belongs to no person or persons in particular, unless to the Transylvania Company.

NOTE X.

ON THE SUPPRESSION OF JOHN GABRIEL JONES’S NAME
IN KENTUCKY HISTORY.

Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, Vol. I, p. 321), although giving a circumstantial account of the Harrodsburg meeting — of the selection of the “two delegates” — of their journey over the mountains — of the securing of the five hundred pounds of powder — of the formation of Kentucky as a separate county — of the transmission of the powder to Limestone

creek — does not once mention the name of Jones: “*Clark* took the powder down the Ohio river” — “*Clark's* fellow delegate being among the killed,” — “Before returning, *Clark* had attended the fall meeting of the Virginia Legislature” — “he [*Clark*] procured the admission of Kentucky as a separate county.” [The italicising is mine].”

And thus Bancroft (*History of the United States*, edition of 1885, Vol. V, p. 309) :

“On the sixth of June, 1776, the emigrants to the region west of the Louisa river, at a general meeting in Harrodston [*sic*,] elected George Rogers Clark, then midway in his twenty-fourth year, and one other, to represent them in the assembly of Virginia, with a request that their settlements might be constituted a county. Before they could cross the mountains, the legislature of Virginia had declared independence, established a government, and adjourned. In a later session they [Clark ‘and one other’] were not admitted to seats in the house; but on the sixth of December, 1776, the westernmost part of the State was incorporated by the name of the county of Kentucky.’”

Other writers also give (strange as it may seem) the *whole* credit to Clark for the favorable termination of the mission — the formation of a new county: “Our first political organization [the creation of Kentucky county] was . . . obtained through the sagacity, influence and exertions of George Rogers Clark, who must be ranked as the earliest founder of this commonwealth [that is, of Kentucky].” [Collins’ *Kentucky* (Ed. of 1877), p. 135.] But that the success met with by the two “delegates” in the object attained — that is, in getting a new county created was

as much due to the labor and influence of Jones as of Clark there is not a doubt.

“Early in 1775, Clark went to Kentucky and was occupied in surveying; but, as the western Indians were induced by the British to take up the tomahawk, he became the natural leader of the people in the defence of their infant settlements, was made a major of the militia in 1776, and chosen as a delegate to the Virginia Convention, to urge upon the State authorities of the colony for government and defense. He arrived at Williamsburg just after the convention had adjourned but succeeded in procuring the formation of the new county of Kentucky and a supply of ammunition for the defense of the frontier.” (Draper, in Appleton’s *Cyclopaedia of American Biography* Art. “George Rogers Clark.”)

This writer, during a period of nearly half a century, several times announced to the public that he was gathering materials for a life of Clark; but the “Life” never appeared. It is perhaps fortunate that it did not. The errors in the lines quoted are, (1) that Clark, in 1775, because of Indian marauds became the natural leader of the Kentuckians in the defense of their infant settlements; (2) that he was made a major of militia in 1776; and (3) that he alone (this is the inference) procured the formation of the county of Kentucky.

“A great leader was needed on the frontier and one was at hand. George Rogers Clark, a young Virginian of extraordinary character, had settled in Kentucky in 1776. *He* had secured the organization of Kentucky as a county of Virginia; he had persuaded the Executive Council to contribute 500 pounds of

powder to the defense of the frontier; and now his fertile brain was developing a great project." — Dunn's *Indiana*, p. 132. (The italicising is mine.)

"At the ensuing session of the General Assembly, Clark and Jones presented the memorial of the inhabitants of Kentucky, requesting that their delegates might be permitted to take seats in that body. It prayed also that the settlements on the western frontier might be considered as included within the territorial limits of Virginia, and that a company of riflemen should be sent to their relief. The petition setting forth their causes of complaint against the government of Transylvania was offered at the same time. The General Assembly took all these subjects into earnest consideration. They did not, of course, recognize the delegates as legislators, but they were received and treated with great civility as citizens, and the grievances of their constituents were most respectfully heard. Col. Henderson was himself at Williamsburg, maintaining the validity of his purchase, and consequently of the title of the company to the land contained in the deed from the Cherokees. He was a man of considerable abilities, of persuasive eloquence, of interesting manners, and wielded an influence which was not without its weight in the councils of Virginia. But Clark was a competitor whose powers were not easily overcome. After a severe contest, the General Assembly declared against the title of the Transylvania company, and on the 7th of December, 1776, passed a law to establish the "County of Kentucky." — Morehead's *Address*, pp. 55, 56. The injustice of naming Jones but once in this relation is manifest. The account was written *after* Clark became famous,

NOTE XI.

AS TO THE TRANSMISSION OF THE GUNPOWDER DONATED BY VIRGINIA, TO THE KENTUCKY SETTLEMENTS.

While it is true that, during the absence of Jones and Clark from the Kentucky settlements, Indian depredations had somewhat increased, nevertheless, most accounts of the return of these men depict, in too strong colors, the dangers which beset them on their journey from Pittsburg down the Ohio. Thus, in Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 135, we read:

“Having obtained these important advantages [that of a prospective representation in the Virginia Assembly, and a judicial and military establishment, by the creation of the county of Kentucky] from their mission, they [Clark and Jones] received the intelligence that the powder was still at Pittsburg, and they determined to take that point in their route home, and bring it with them. The country around Pittsburg swarmed with Indians, evidently hostile to the whites, who would no doubt seek to interrupt their voyage. These circumstances created a necessity for the utmost caution as well as expedition in their movements, and they accordingly hastily embarked on the Ohio with only seven boatmen. They were hotly pursued the whole way by Indians, but succeeded in keeping in advance until they arrived at the mouth of Limestone creek, at the spot where the city of Maysville now stands. They ascended this creek a short distance with their boat, and concealed their cargo at different places in the woods along its banks. They then turned their boat adrift, and directed their course to Harrodstown, intending to return with a sufficient escort to insure the

safe transportation of the powder to its destination. This in a short time was successfully effected, and the colonists were thus abundantly supplied with the means of defense against the fierce enemies who beset them on all sides." Afterward, in the same work, we have the following account (pp. 466, 467) :

"The five hundred pounds of powder which Maj. George Clark and John Gabriel Jones procured, by order of the Council of Virginia, on August 23, 1776, at Pittsburg, for the relief of the settlers in Kentucky, they brought down the Ohio and secreted at the Three Islands in what is now Lewis county, near Manchester, Ohio, and about eleven miles above Limestone (Maysville). Col. John Todd and a party of men were sent after this powder under the guidance of [John] Gabriel Jones ; but, on December 25, 1776, when near the Lower Blue Lick, being attacked by Indians and Jones, William Graden and Josiah Dixen killed, [they] abandoned the expedition. January 2, 1777, at Harrodsburg, Col. James Harrison raised a company of about thirty men to go after the powder. . . They went by McClellan's fort (now Georgetown), the Lower Blue Lick and May's Lick, then turned to the right a little and struck the Ohio at or near the mouth of Cabin creek." (See, also, pp. 552 and 656 of the same work). On the page last mentioned are some additional facts. One account makes the place where the first party started for the powder as McClelland's station, — the attack as having been on Johnson's Fork of Licking, and that Joseph Rogers was taken prisoner. But it gives the number of the party erroneously as nine, and the date of the encounter as the 28th of December.

Tradition has caused the most absurd mixing of facts with error concerning the journey of Jones and Clark from Pittsburg:

“Having at length performed the whole of his mission, Clark proceeded, early in the spring of 1777, to Fort Pitt, in order to attend personally to the transportation of the powder, which still remained at that point waiting his orders. This he embarked on a flat boat, and in company with Mr. Jones and four other men, committed himself and his treasure to the current of the beautiful river [the Ohio]. But scarcely had they floated out of sight of the garrison flag when they saw a canoe stealing forth from the bank, and knew at once they were watched by the savages. From this point the pursuit was unremitting, for the Indians had learned that the solitary ark bore the fortune of the detested Big Knives of Kentucky.

“We know of nothing that shows more strikingly by the tireless perseverance of these people than this long chase from Pittsburg into the heart of Kentucky, a distance of five hundred miles; at the end of which they were so close upon their prey that Clark himself was only saved from death or captivity by an unconscious exercise of his characteristic promptitude. For after, upon one occasion, concealing the powder upon the bank and setting the boat adrift, he had set off with his little party for Harrod’s fort, intending to return immediately with a large force, and convey it away. The next day they arrived at a cabin on a branch of the Licking, where he was informed that Colonel Todd was then in the vicinity with a number of men sufficient for his purpose. He remained here a few hours and then pushed on, not choosing to wait

an indefinite time for assistance, which he could certainly obtain by an additional tramp of fifty or sixty miles through the wilderness. Jones, unlucky for himself, chose to consult his ease by remaining behind. Clark had departed but a few hours when Todd came up with ten or twelve men, and thinking himself strong enough for the service, determined to transport the powder into the settlements without delay, taking Jones and his two companions as guides, the other two having accompanied the Colonel [Clark]. They had advanced but a few miles when they met a large party of Indians following swiftly upon Clark's trail, and a sharp fight at once commenced, in which the whites were quickly overpowered, Todd and Jones being killed, together with more than half their men and the rest made prisoners. Fortunately they proved true to their friends, and did not betray the secret of the concealed powder, which, in a few days was safely removed by Clark and distributed among the settlers, who were thus enabled to carry on the war with greater vigor than before." — Coleman, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 787.

A somewhat different narrative is given in Morehead's *Address* (pp. 56, 57), which says:

"Hearing that the powder which the Council had furnished was still at Pittsburg, they [Clark and Jones] resolved to take that place in their route, and superintend in person the transmission of an article so necessary to the safety of the people of the stations. On their arrival at Pittsburg, they discovered that a body of Indians had collected there, ostensibly for the purpose of negotiation, but employed, as they believed, in acquiring information of the movements of the em-

igrants, to enable them to intercept the passage of boats down the Ohio river, which was then. . . the principal thoroughfare of trade and transportation from the east to the west. It became important, therefore, that Clark and his colleague should counteract by the celerity of their movements, these mischievous designs of the Indians. They procured and manned a boat — descended the river with all possible expedition — landed at Limestone creek, the present site of the city of Maysville — carefully concealed the powder on its banks — and set out immediately to Harrodsburg for an escort to convey it to the stations. Thus far, they had met with no interruption; but they were now about to penetrate the haunted wilds of Kentucky, and who could answer for their safety? Halting on their journey at a cabin that sheltered a settler whose name was Hinkston, they ascertained from a party of surveyors that Col. John Todd was in the vicinity with a small company under his command. On the reception of this intelligence, Clark waited a short time for his arrival, but becoming hopeless of meeting him, he resumed his journey with two of his men, leaving the remainder of his little party with his colleague. Soon after his departure, Col. Todd arrived at Hinkston's, and confident of the sufficiency of his force, although he had but ten men along with him, he resolved upon an attempt to remove the powder from Limestone. The historian has not defined the position of Hinkston's cabin; it was probably not remote from the stream which now bears his name in the county of Bourbon. Todd marched on until he approached the Blue Licks . . . and was attacked by a party of Indians who were in pursuit of Clark. A skirmish

ensued which resulted in the defeat of Col. Todd, and the loss of several of his men. Jones, who had attached himself to the company, was among the number of the slain. Clark pushed on to Harrodsburg, from whence he sent a detachment to Limestone for the powder, which was conveyed safely to the station." This account is substantially the same as had previously been published by Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 40, 42).

In Appleton's *Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, Art.. "George Rogers Clark," it is said, by Draper that, "The 500 pounds of powder . . . was conveyed by land to the Monongahela and thence by water to the Three Islands a few miles above where Maysville now is, and there secreted while Clark and his escort went to Harrodsburg for horses and a guard for its conveyance to that station." This contains, by inference, an error — that Clark went on to Harrodsburg after the powder was secreted, not to complete his journey, but "for horses and a guard for its conveyance to that station." The facts are that he and Jones went on to McClelland's station; and, from that place, the *first* party, with Jones as a guide, set out for the powder; it was the *second* party that went from Harrodsburg.

One of the latest accounts concerning Clark's obtaining the powder and returning with it to Kentucky is the following:

"In the midsummer days — after the marriage of Samuel Henderson and Elizabeth Callerray by Squire Boone (the brother of Daniel, and a sort of amateur Baptist preacher) — George Rogers Clark returned from Virginia, bringing with him five hundred pounds

of powder. This he had extorted from the Legislature for the defense of Kentucky; for by this time the forests were full of Indians, seeking Yankee scalps, for which the British had offered rewards.

“‘I told the Virginia folks,’ said Clark, ‘that Kentucky would wait a reasonable length of time and then look elsewhere for assistance. I told them that a country that was not worth defending was not worth having.’” — Emma M. Connelley’s *The Story of Kentucky*, p. 57.

The idea of Clark “extorting” the powder from the Virginia Legislature which was not then in session seems to be an original one with that writer.

It seems the powder was put up in twenty-five kegs, twenty pounds only in each keg: “A volunteer with Robert Patterson and twenty-eight other pioneers of Kentucky, he [Kenton] accompanied Major George Rogers Clark from Harrod’s Station to the mouth of Limestone creek, for the purpose of escorting and transporting on foot twenty-five kegs of powder to the stations on Kentucky river.” (Monnett’s *Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. II, p. 63.)

NOTE XII.

. HAMILTON AUTHORIZED TO EMPLOY INDIANS.

“In the month of June [May], 1777, Lieut. Governor Cramahe’ [it was Governor Carleton] wrote me a letter containing a copy of Lord George Germain’s orders and instructions, by which I was authorized to appoint proper officers and interpreters and to send

them with the Indians against the rebels with the strictest injunction to discourage and restrain them from their usual barbarities."—Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781.—Germain Mss.

"In the month of June, [the month in which the letter was received], 1777, I was authorized to raise and employ the Indians, till which time I had exerted myself to restrain these people from taking an active part."—Hamilton to the Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury, 1783, MS. Carleton's letter was received by Hamilton on the sixteenth day of June.

NOTE XIII.

MOORE AND LINN GO AS MILITIA TO THE ILLINOIS.

Most writers who have mentioned the two young men sent to the Illinois by Clark give the name of Linn incorrectly as "Dunn"—following Butler, in his *History of Kentucky*, p. 46. The words of Clark, in his diary, as to sending these men—that they went as an "express to the Illinois"—imply they were dispatched by him as an officer of the militia and were to be paid by the State. They were both serving under Clark, and Linn was a lieutenant.

NOTE XIV.

MYTHICAL ACCOUNTS OF INDIAN SIEGES OF HARRODS-
BURG AND LOGAN'S FORT, 1777.

It is doubtful whether in the whole list of traditions preserved in Kentucky history one can be found more

completely mythical than that given at length in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, pp. 787-789, concerning a supposed siege, in 1777, of Harrodsburg. After relating the exploits of young Ray and the part taken by Clark, the writer says:

“What the number of the besiegers had been was now first seen; for, at the distance of four or five hundred yards from the fort, the whites came upon a camp, which, from every appearance, had been used the whole summer by at least five or six hundred warriors. Yet so closely had the settlers been confined during all that time that they had never suspected the existence of such an extensive establishment, though almost within sight of their own block-houses.

“These incidents give a vivid picture of the state of the country at that period, and of the kind of service in which Clark was occupied during the year. . . Besides, this siege of Harrodsfort is remarkable in the early history of Kentucky as the first instance in which the impatient warriors of the forest had so far deviated from their usual habits as to sit down for any great length of time before a fortified post” (p. 789).

At no time during the year 1777 were there as many as fifty Indians in one party near Harrodsburg, so far as known; and the visit of a savage band was always of brief duration. They came suddenly and quickly disappeared. This whole story of a siege is an exaggerated outgrowth of the various skirmishes with the Indians during the year. (Compare, in this connection, Butler's Kentucky, pp. 42-45.)

In Collins' *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 469, may be found a circumstantial account of the attack on Logan's fort May 30, 1777; but the date as there given (May 20) is error. However, the principal mistake in the account is that which makes the Indians remain *around the fort* until the appearance of Col. Bowman.

NOTE XV.

EXTRACTS FROM CLARK'S DIARY, 1777.

"April 20.—Ben. Linn and Samuel Moore sent express to the Illinois.

"April 24.—Forty or fifty Indians attacked Boonesborough, killed and scalped Daniel Goodman, wounded Capt. Boone, Capt. Todd, Mr. Hite, and Mr. Stoner. Indians, 'tis thought, sustained much damage.

"April 29.—Indians attacked the fort [Harrodsburg] and killed Ensign McConnell.

"May 6.—Indians discovered placing themselves near the fort [Harrodsburg]. A few shots exchanged — no harm done.

"May 12.—John Cowan and Squire Boone arrived from the settlement [that is, from over the mountains].

"May 18.—McGary and Haggin sent express to Fort Pitt.

"May 23.—John Todd and company set off for the settlement [i. e., for the settled portions of Virginia over the mountains,—Todd's destination as burgess-elect being Williamsburg].

"May 23 [?].—A large party of Indians attacked Boonesborough fort; kept a warm firing until eleven

o'clock at night; began it next morning and kept a warm firing until midnight, attempting several times to burn the fort; three of our men were wounded—not mortally; the enemy suffered considerably.

“May 26.— A party went out to hunt Indians; one wounded Squire Boone and escaped.

“May 30.— Indians attacked Logan's fort; killed and scalped William Hudson, wounded Burr Harrison and John Kennedy.

“June 5.— Harrod and Elliot went to meet Colonel Bowman and company; Glen and Laird arrived from Cumberland; Daniel Lyons, who parted with them on Green river, we suppose was killed going into Logan's Fort. John Peters and Elisha Bathey we expect were killed coming home from Cumberland.

“June 13.— Burr Harrison died of his wounds received the 30th of May.

“June 22.— Ben Linn and Samuel Moore arrived from the Illinois. Barney Stagner, Sen., killed and beheaded half mile from the fort [Harrodsburg].— A few guns fired at Boone's.

“July 9.— Lieutenant Linn married — *great merriment.*

“July 11.— Harrod returned.

“July 23.— Express returned from Pittsburgh.

“August 1.— Col. Bowman arrived at Boonesborough.

“August 5.— Surrounded ten or twelve Indians near the fort [Harrodsburg]—killed three and wounded others; the plunder was sold for upwards of £70.

“August 11.— John Higgins died of a lingering disorder.

"August 25.—Ambrose Grayson killed near Logan's Fort, and [the savages] wounded two others; Indians escaped.

"September 2.—Col. Bowman and company arrived at this place [Harrodsburg]; court held, etc.

"September 8.—Twenty-seven men set out for the settlement [i. e., for the settlements east of the mountains].

"September 9.—Indians discovered [at Harrodsburg] — a shot exchanged — nothing done [that is, no one hurt].

"September 11.—Thirty-seven men went to Joseph Bowman's for corn; while shelling they were fired on; a skirmish ensued; Indians drew off, leaving two dead on the spot and much blood; Eli Gerrard was killed on the spot and six others wounded.

"September 12.—Daniel Bryan died of his wounds received yesterday.

"September 17.—Express sent to the settlement [i. e., over the mountains]; Mrs. Sanders died.

"September 23.—Express arrived from Boone's and says that, on the 13th Captain Smith arrived there with 48 men — 150 more on the march for this [place — that is, for Harrodsburg]; also, that General Washington had defeated Howe — *joyful news, if true.*

"September 26.—Brought in a load of corn — frost in the morning."

NOTE XVI.

CLARK PERMANENTLY MADE A HERO.

"The space allotted to this brief sketch [of Clark] will not admit of a detailed narrative of the adventures

of Major Clark after his return to Kentucky [from Williamsburg with his associate, Jones] Let it suffice to say, that he was universally looked up to by the settlers as one of the master spirits of the time, and [was] always foremost in the fierce conflicts and desperate deeds of those wild and thrilling days.”—Collins’s *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 135. The same writer says that Clark “appears to have taken a peculiar pleasure” in that series of private and solitary adventures [in 1777] in which he embarked after he returned from Virginia [late in December, 1776].”

But these statements are too inflated. There is no cotemporary evidence that he was “universally looked up to by the settlers as one of the master spirits of the time;” besides, it is certainly not true that he was “always foremost in the fierce conflicts and desperate deeds of those wild and thrilling days.” The writer of these sentences had considerable knowledge of Clark’s subsequent career, and he makes him a hero permanently.

NOTE XVII.

OF CLARK’S LETTER TO GEORGE MASON, NOV. 19, 1779.

“From this letter [of Clark] to George Mason, presented by him to the Kentucky Historical Society, we learn of the almost paternal relation which Mason seemed to hold to the impetuous and gallant young soldier and of the warm regard and esteem that subsisted between the two friends. . . . He wrote from Louisville on the 19th of November, 1779, and prefaces his recital with the following respectful and

affectionate apology for former negligence: 'My dear Sir: Continue to favor me with your valuable lessons. Continue your reprimands as though I were your son; when suspicious, think not that promotion or conferred honor will occasion any unnecessary pride in me. You have infused too many of your valuable precepts in me [for me] to be guilty of the like, or to show any indifference to those that ought to be dear to me. It is with pleasure that I obey in transmitting to you a short sketch of my enterprise and proceedings in the Illincis, as near as I can recollect or gather from memorandums'." (Kate Mason Rowland's *Life of George Mason*, Vol. I, pp. 310, 311. See, also, *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 21.)

NOTE XVIII.

CLARK AS A HORSE TRADER.

Clark purchased a horse for £12, and traded with Isaac Shelby for another, getting £10 "to boot." But his diary is silent as to the value of the Shelby equine. We may surmise, however from what subsequently took place that even at £2, (the sum the second horse really cost him) there was no great bargain in the trade; for he subsequently "swapped" again, giving this time (instead of receiving) "boot money," to the amount of £7, 10s.

A late writer cannot brook the idea that Clark — his hero — could have been cheated; so he declares "he evidently knew how to make a good bargain, and had the true backwoods passion for barter" (Roosevelt:

The Winning of the West, vol. II, p. 34). But Shelby may have had the "true backwoods passion" as largely developed as Clark.

In his diary, under date of September 29, Clark also speaks of having purchased eighteen pounds of powder and twenty-two of lead, from Silas Harland and James Harrod; but this ammunition was probably for public use, not to sell or barter as his own property.

NOTE XIX.

SETTLEMENT OF CLARK'S ACCOUNT AS MAJOR.

In referring the matter of the payment of the Kentucky militia for their services to the Virginia House of Delegates, Governor Henry wrote as follows:

"WILLIAMSBURG, November 11th, 1777.

"SIR: Pay rolls for the militia of Kentucky have been laid before the auditors, in order to obtain warrants for payment. The auditors have scrupled to allow this militia the pay fixed by law for those on actual duty, because they were obliged for their own personal safety and the security of their wives and children, to keep themselves in forts and remain on the defensive against parties of Indians continually infesting that country, too numerous to permit the inhabitants to return to their plantations. The pay rolls are properly authenticated by the commanding officer [Major George Rogers Clark] under whose orders the men acted. In this state of the case, the advice of the Executive power is requested, and as I am in doubt on the subject, I am to pray, Sir, to take the sense of the Assembly on it. I am sensible that many instances have occurred similar to this, in which pay has been allowed, and I wish to put a stop to such a practice if it is wrong, and that no doubt of its rectitude may remain if it is proper. It may be observed, that 250

men have been ordered by government from the more interior counties to that place for its protection, the time of whose arrival there I cannot ascertain.

"I have the honor to be,

"Sir, Your Most humble Servant,

"P. HENRY.

"The HON^{BLE} GEORGE WYTHE, ESQ.,

"*Speaker of the House of Delegates.*"

Clark's entries in his diary for the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth of November are somewhat vague. (See Note XX, following.) On the first day mentioned, he says he called upon the auditors and laid before them the Kentucky accounts; the auditors refused to settle them without the consent of the Council. So far his entries are correct; but, on the eighth, his entry is, "Got an order from the Council to settle them [the accounts]." This is probably an error in the date. Again, on the tenth, he writes: "Passed the accounts with the auditors, except my own, which they refuse to settle without consent of the Council. This, too, is probably an error in the date. Both incidents mentioned took place *after the eleventh*, as shown by the letter of Governor Henry; however, it is possible that the mistake is in the letter and not in the diary, but this is not probable, as a careful study of the diary sufficiently discloses.

It is evident that when his own accounts were settled, the Major resigned his commission, although there is no record evidence extant of the fact. Thereupon he immediately replenished his stock of clothing, — purchasing "a piece of cloth for a jacket, price £4, 15s; buttons, etc., 3s." (See Note XX, following.)

NOTE XX.

ADDITIONAL EXTRACTS FROM CLARK'S DIARY,
OCT. 14 — NOV. 22, 1777.

The following extracts include the entries made by Clark on his way to Williamsburg, after leaving the Wilderness Road:

"Oct. 14.— Left Capt. Pawling; marched 15 miles.

"Oct. 15.— Crossed Powell's river; marched 20 miles; camped on the south side of Powell's mountain.

"Oct. 16.— Got to the 'rye cocks',— 9 miles.

"Oct. 17.— [Got] to Blackamoore's,— 6 miles.

"Oct. 18.— Parted with the company; lodged at More's fort,— 20 miles.

"Oct. 19.— Lodged at Capt. Kincaid's, 22 miles.

"Oct. 20.— Crossed Clinch mountain; met Mr. Maulding; and heard from my friends; lodged at Col. Campbell's,— 24 miles.

"Oct. 21.— Lodged at Jasper Kindser's; got my horse shod on the way; breakfast and feed, 1s, 3d.,— 22 miles.

"Oct. 22.— Cloudy morning, no rain; lodged at Sawyer's; expenses 1s. 3d.,— 28 miles.

"Oct. 23.— Falling in company with Capt. Campbell, an agreeable companion, we travelled 33 miles; lodged at Cook's; poor fare; expenses 6s. 6d.

"Oct. 24.— Sold my gun to Mr. Love [for] £15; swapped horses with I. Love; gave £7, 10s. boot; lodged at H. Neelie's, 25 miles.

"Oct. 25.— Received a letter from Capt. Bowman, informing me that he had an order of court to carry salt to Kentucky; . . . lodged at Botetourt,— 25 miles: 412 miles from Harrodsburg.

"Oct. 26.— Rain, staid at Lockhart's tavern.

"Oct. 27.— Rain; expenses £1. 4s.

"Oct. 28.— Rain; started after breakfast; rained slowly all day; lodged at Bartlett's, expenses 4s.,— 25 miles.

"Oct. 29.— Parted with my companion, Capt. Campbell; lodged at J. McClung's; 5s.,— 28 miles.

"Oct. 30.— Crossed the Blue Ridge; lodged at Black's at foot of the mountain; 5s.,— 23 miles.

"Oct. 31.— Bought a pair of shoes in Charlottsville; lodged at . . . ,— 35 miles — (15 miles from Charlottsville).

"Saturday, Nov. 1.— Got to my father's at about 10 o'clock at night — *all well* — 55 miles: in the whole, 620 miles from Harrodsburg.

"Nov. 2.— Staid at my father's.

"Nov. 3.— Started for Williamsburg; lodged at Mr. Gwathmey's,— 40 miles.

"Nov. 4.— Lodged at Warren's; 1s. 6d.— 29 miles.

"Nov. 5.— Got to Williamsburg; lodged at Anderson's; had a confirmation of Burgoyne's surrender.

"Nov. 6.— Bought a ticket in the State Lottery, £3, number 10,693, first class.

"Nov. 7.— Went to the auditors; laid before them the Kentucky accounts; they refused to settle them without the consent of the Council.

"Nov. 8.— Got an arder from the Council to settle them.

"Nov. 9.— Sunday, went to church.

"Nov. 10.— Passed the accounts with the auditors, except my own, which they refused to settle without the consent of the Council.

"Nov. 18.— Settled with the auditors; drew the money of the treasurer, £726; bought a piece of cloth for a jacket, price £4. 15s.; buttons, etc., 3s.

"Nov. 19.— Left Williamsburg after breakfast — expenses £9. 18s.; lodged at Warren's.

"Nov. 20.— Got to Mr. Gwathmey's,— expenses, 13s.

"Nov. 21.— Staid at Gwathmey's.

"Nov. 22.— Came to my father's."

NOTE XXI.

CONCERNING CLARK'S PURPOSE IN LEAVING KENTUCKY IN 1777.

Most historians who have written of Clark's resolve, made in the summer of 1777, to return over the mountains from Kentucky, have concluded his object was to try to induce, if possible, the Virginia authorities to undertake the conquest of the Illinois. Now, in his Memoir, he does not state in so many words that the object of his leaving Kentucky for Williamsburg, in the fall of the year just mentioned, was to promote an expedition against that country, but such is the fair inference to be drawn from what he says:

"The commandants of the different towns of the Illinois and Wabash, I knew were busily engaged in exciting the Indians. Their reduction became my first object — expecting probably that it might open a field for further action." Following this, he mentions the sending of the "two young hunters" to those

places (including, as he says, the Wabash towns as well as the Illinois) "as spies, with proper instructions for their conduct, to prevent suspicion." "Neither did they," he adds, "nor any one in Kentucky ever know my design until it was ripe for execution. They returned to Harrodstown with all the information I could reasonably have expected." Then he recites briefly what the two "spies" reported; following it by declaring that when he left Kentucky he saw plainly that every eye was turned toward him as if expecting some stroke in their favor (see Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 118, 119). Then he adds: "Some doubted my return, expecting I would join the army in Virginia. I left them with reluctance promising them that I would certainly return to their assistance, which I had predetermined."

In the foregoing there are several erroneous statements. Rocheblave in the Illinois and Abbott at Vincennes were not busily engaged in exciting the Indians against the Americans. Before sending the two "spies" on their journey, Clark had not planned an undertaking for the reduction of the different towns of the Illinois and Wabash; nor were his "spies" sent "to those places," but only to Kaskaskia. He had no design of conquest while in Kentucky to keep from the people there which, in the future, it was intended by him should, if possible, ripen into execution. He had formed an opinion, simply, as already explained, that the conquest of the Illinois was feasible — that was all. When he left Kentucky he was not burning with an ambition to lead an expedition across the Ohio, either to the Illinois towns or to Vincennes upon the Wabash. On the contrary, he

declared, as already shown, he would accept no command whatever unless he should find a very great call for troops and his country in danger.

Now, even before the Memoir had been used by any historian, Marshall, one of the earliest Kentucky writers, said: "The possibility of making conquests so important to the future security of the western boundary of the state derived considerable probability and vivacity from the ardent and confident representations of the Mr. Clark, whose name has been previously mentioned as being in Kentucky the preceding year [1776]. While there it appeared that he, affected by the scene of hostility in which he found himself, and hence induced to reflect on its causes and the means of removing the effects, had instituted inquiries into the situation and condition of the Indians and the posts most contiguous to Kentucky — about which he had received extensive information, and which he, prompted by an ardent passion for military fame, propagated with the zeal of one who had a presentiment of being employed. It was certainly his desire. And no less certain that his information and representations contributed much to excite and confirm the public sentiment in favor of an enterprise which was probably suggested by him, but thought both hazardous and eventful by those who could alone authorize its execution. [*History of Kentucky*, vol. 71, p. 66]." But all this was the outgrowth of the knowledge possessed by that writer as to the outcome of Clark's undertaking.

A later Kentucky historian declares: "So strongly was he [Clark] impressed with the importance of this movement, that in the summer of '77, he had

dispatched two spies of the names of Moore and Dunn [Linn], to reconoitre the situation of these remote parts of the enemy. These emissaries reported great activity on part of the militia, as well as the most extended encouragement to the Indians in their barbarous depredations upon the Kentucky frontier; yet, notwithstanding the enemy had essayed every art of misrepresentation to prejudice the French inhabitants against the Virginians, by telling them that these frontier people were more shocking barbarians than the savages themselves, still the spies reported strong traces of affection for the Americans, among some of the inhabitants. Not that the spies, or anybody else, were acquainted with the contemplated expedition till it was ripe to be laid before the governor and council of Virginia. To this body he determined to submit the matter; when, on the 1st of October, 1777, he left Kentucky." . . . (Butler: *History of Kentucky*, p. 46.)

But, when this was written its author had not seen Clark's letter to Mason, which so conclusively shows that his resolution to "to submit the matter," was not fixed upon until sometime after his arrival in Williamsburg. And it may here be well to notice, also, that "these emissaries" did not report "extended encouragement to the Indians in their barbarous depredations upon the Kentucky frontier." It will be seen that while Butler essays to follow Clark in his Memoir, he at the same time adds unwarrantable statements.

Some years after the appearance of the foregoing, the following statement was published by another Kentucky writer who gives as a prelude the convictions of Clark as to the purposes of the British commanders

at their posts beyond the Ohio; of their instigating the savages against Kentucky; and of the necessity of attacking their stronghold: "With these convictions deeply impressed upon his [Clark's] mind, he determined to recommend to the Governor and Council of Virginia, an immediate expedition into Illinois. Not sufficiently assured of a favorable reception of his views, in his absence from the seat of government, he left Kentucky on the first of October, 1777, and repaired in person to Williamsburgh, to enforce by argument, and if need be by entreaty, the policy of his scheme."—Morehead's *Address*, pp. 60, 61. That writer, too, had not, it is evident, seen Clark's letter to Mason. (See *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, compare, in particular, in this connection, pp. 21, 22).

In Coleman's article in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 789, it is stated that "he [Clark], on his own account, sent two spies to Kaskaskia and Vincennes whose reports were at once favorable and alarming. Favorable, because he learned that a negligent guard was kept over the fortifications, and that the sentiment of the French inhabitants were secretly not at all hostile to the American cause. Alarming, because he was informed that preparations were already on foot for a combined invasion of Kentucky by the British and Indians, to be commenced the next summer. This was to be anticipated, and Clarke [*sic.*] resolved to hasten once more to Virginia and lay his plans before the Governor and Legislature. For this purpose he set forth on his third journey through the forest, which lay unbroken by a single habitation between Licking River and the frontiers of Virginia. The people saw him depart with

regret and fear. Knowing his great qualities so well themselves, they dreaded lest such inducements might be held out as would tempt him to remain in the East, or that the threatened storm might burst upon them in his absence."

In reply to the last, it may be said (1) that Clark did not send his two "spies" to Vincennes at all; (2) that he did not learn that the French inhabitants were, secretly, not at all hostile to the American cause; (3) that he was not informed that preparations were already on foot for a combined invasion of Kentucky by the British and Indians, to be commenced the next summer; (4) that Clark did not resolve to hasten once more to Virginia and lay his plans before the Governor and Legislature; and (5) that he did not for that purpose set forth on his third journey through the forest for Williamsburg. That some of the settlers saw him depart "with regret" is probably true; but none saw him go with "fear." None of them "dreaded lest such inducements might be held out as would tempt him to remain in the East," for the reason that it must have been known he did not intend to return.

Now, many other writers (those who have read but not sufficiently considered Clark's words to Mason) have been entrapped by his Memoir. Of these, no one expresses himself with more directness than one of the latest to record the doings of Clark in 1777, already cited in this connection:

"On the first of October, having matured his plans for the Illinois campaign, he [Clark] left for Virginia to see if he could get the government to help him put them into execution." (Roosevelt—*The*

Winning of the West, Vol. II, p. 17.) Again: "Clark knew he could get from among his fellow-settlers [in Kentucky] some men peculiarly suited for his purpose [of attacking the Illinois]; but he also realized that he would have to bring the body of his force from Virginia. Accordingly, he decided to lay the case before Patrick Henry, then Governor of the State of which Kentucky was then only a frontier county." (Roosevelt, in the Vol. last cited, p. 34.)

Another writer, who has evidently noticed the variance between Clark's declaration in his letter to Mason and that given in his Memoir, cautiously says:

"With this information [that obtained from the two men from Kaskaskia, sent from Kentucky] Clark set out for Williamsburg in the fall of 1777, having for his main object the settlement of his accounts in reference to the Kentucky militia, of which he was the commander. Some of the Kentuckians looked to him for an enterprise for their relief, others expected him to join the army in Virginia, and never to return to them. He left the country reluctantly, and with promise of return to their assistance." (Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, p. 582. Compare, in this connection, Appleton's *Encyclopedia of American Biography*, art. "George Rogers Clark," by Draper.)

A Kentucky author we have frequently mentioned, declares that hitherto [that is, previous to Clark's arrival at Williamsburg, in November, 1777], the war in Kentucky had been carried on by the perseverance and the gallantry of the backwoodsmen themselves, with little assistance from the power of Virginia, excepting that which was procured by the devotion of Messrs. Clark and Jones. The tremendous struggle

of the Revolution, involving everything dear to a free and generous people, demanded all the energies of the Commonwealth. The State had not disposable means to act on so remote a frontier." (Butler: *History of Kentucky*, p. 45.)

But before Clark started on his journey from the Kentucky settlements, Captain Smith, as we have seen, arrived at Boonesborough with forty-eight Virginia militia to assist the settlers in repelling savage aggressions and Captain Montgomery reached Logan's fort with thirty-eight; besides these, he soon met fifty more men under Captain Watkins, on their way to Boonesborough; so that, it is clear, Virginia was then protecting, with at least a respectable force, "her remote frontier;" and that then the war was not carried on by the backwoodsmen alone. It is the testimony of Governor Henry, as hereafter seen, that 250 men had been ordered by Virginia from more interior counties of the State, to the county of Kentucky for the protection of the settlements there.

"The government of Virginia [did not] appear," continues the writer just quoted, "to have been distinctly aware of the important diversion of the Indian force which might be effected by supporting the exertions of Kentucky. As little did she perceive the rich acquisitions offered to her military ambition in the British posts in the Western country. Yet every Indian engaged on the frontier of Kentucky was saved to the nearer frontier of the parent state. These combined views acquired greater weight with the progress of the Revolution, and the increasing population of Kentucky; they were particularly aided by the ardent and impressive representations of Major Clark. He

had witnessed the rise and growth of this section of the country from its earliest buddings; he had penetrated its condition and its relations with the instinctive genius which stamped him the most consummate of the western commanders. He had seen at a glance that the sources of the Indian devastations were to be found in the British possessions of Detroit, St. Vincents [Vincennes] and Kaskaskia. The heart-rending ravages spread by the barbarians of the western hemisphere . . . were stimulated by the ammunition, arms and clothing supplied at these military stations. If they could be taken, the streams of hostility which had overflown Kentucky with horrors would be dried up and a counter influence established over the savages.”*

But the assertions here made are by far too sweeping in their character. Virginia fully appreciated what would be “the rich acquisitions offered to her military ambition,” by the capture of the British posts in the Western country. Vincennes and particularly Kaskaskia had done little to encourage aggressions of the Indians against Kentucky; and even Clark himself believed that more mischief was concocted in these places than there really was. The fact was the chief source of trouble was Detroit, as the General Government and the Virginia authorities well knew, and as was known by Clark himself; nevertheless, could Kaskaskia be taken, much good, it was evident, would be accomplished. But an expedition to reduce the Illinois was not to be recommended simply for the better protection of the Kentucky settlements. Clark’s idea was that it would redound, if successful, to the

* *Ibid.*

greater security of the whole Western frontier, especially as it might lead to the conquest of Vincennes and Detroit.

A recent writer (E. A. Bryan, in *Magazine of American History*, vol. XXI, p. 399) not only sees in the sending of the two spies a purpose to reduce Vincennes as well as the Illinois villages, on part of Clark, but dispatches the latter to Virginia to lay the matter before the Virginia governor. These are his words:

“The name of George Rogers Clark, misrepresented, belittled, maligned though it has been, is as fair a name as adorns the roll of our Revolutionary heroes. He was a man of strong will, of lofty imagination, of unconquerable courage, of great daring combined with wonderful shrewdness, a lover of freedom and of his native land. A Virginian by birth, soon after attaining his majority he had cast his fortunes with the handful of settlers in Kentucky. It was here that the Indian massacres, which had been incited by British gold, led him to the conviction that Post Vincennes must be conquered, not only for the sake of controlling the Indians and protecting the frontier, but also for the sake of wresting this vast and fertile territory from England. Having dispatched two spies to learn the temper of the French and Indian population of the posts, and to ascertain the strength of the forts and garrisons, he goes to Virginia, lays the matter before Governor Patrick Henry, who, as does also Jefferson, sees the far-reaching importance of the scheme.”

The whole matter may be summed up in this way: Clark being fully advised of the “alarming situation”

— that “the Americans were as sorely pressed by the English from the seaside as they were by the Indians from the western wilderness,” as a recent writer happily expresses it—he was fully imbued with the idea that a decisive movement across the Ohio would be a most opportune undertaking; he would, therefore, encourage it.

In after years, with a treacherous memory to guide him, his “design,” he says, was made known because Burgoyne’s army had been captured and things seemed to wear a pleasing aspect [see his *Memoir*—Dillon’s *Indiana* (Ed. of 1859), p. 119]. Many writers have copied this error.

“The capture of Burgoyne, however, put a different aspect upon affairs, and induced him [Clark] to suggest to a few leading men—George Wythe, George Mason, and Thomas Jefferson—the plan of attacking the British posts in the Illinois country.” (Henry’s *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, p. 583.) As a matter of fact, however, it was according to Clark in his letter to Mason, not Burgoyne’s surrender that fixed his (Clark’s) resolution to promote the expedition, but, as before mentioned, the desperation of the British on the seaboard and of their savage allies in the West.

In his *Memoir* he states: “On the tenth of December I communicated my design to Governor Henry;” yet, as a matter of fact, his suggestion was not made to the latter, but, as may be premised, “to a few gentlemen,” who laid the subject before the Governor.

That any one while denouncing Clark’s *Memoir* should adopt, and even add to its errors in writing of the expedition planned against the Illinois, is, to

say the least, very strange. But this is what occurs in the following extract:

“After a week’s rest [at his father’s house], he [Clark] went back to the capital [Williamsburg], laid his plans before Patrick Henry, and urged their adoption with fiery enthusiasm. (Roosevelt — *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 36.) And that author previously declares that he (Clark) had “decided” before leaving Kentucky “to lay the case before Patrick Henry” (same vol., p. 34), and that “Clark knew he could get from among his fellow-settlers [in Kentucky], some men peculiarly suited for his purpose, but he also realized that he would have to bring the body of his force from Virginia.”

NOTE XXII.

ACT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA AUTHORIZING AN EXPEDITION AGAINST WESTERN ENEMIES (under which Clark organized his Undertaking against Kaskaskia), passed at the October session, 1777. (See Hening’s *Virginia Statutes at Large*, vol. IX, pp. 374, 375).

An act for better securing the commonwealth, and for the farther protection and defence thereof.

For more effectually securing the commonwealth against the designs and attempts of certain evil-minded persons, now or lately in the counties hereinafter mentioned, who, lost to all sentiments of virtue, honor or regard for their country, have been induced to aid the enemy:

Be it enacted by the General Assembly, That Samuel Washington, Gabriel Iones, and Joseph Reed, esquires, commissioners appointed by the United States of America in Congress assembled to repair to Fort Pitt in order to investigate the rise, progress, and extent of the disaffection in that quarter, or such other persons as shall be appointed in their room and shall undertake to execute the office, be authorized and empowered and they are hereby authorized and empowered, at any time within six months after the passing of this act, to apprehend such inhabitants of the counties of Ohio, Monongalia and Yohogania as shall appear to the said commissioners to have been concerned in any conspiracy or plot against the said states, or any or either of them, and to deliver the offenders over to the proper civil officer to be prosecuted according to law. And to provide for the farther protection and defence of the frontiers, Be it farther enacted, That the governor, with the advice of the privy council, may order such part of the militia as may be most convenient, and as they shall judge necessary, consistently with the safety of the commonwealth, to act in conjunction with any troops on any expedition which may be undertaken by desire of the United States of America, in congress assembled, against any of our western enemies; and also that the governor, with advice of the privy council, at any time within nine months after the passing of this act, may empower a number of volunteers, not exceeding six hundred, to march against and attack any of our social enemies, and may appoint the proper officers and give the necessary orders for the expedition.

NOTE XXIII.

GOV. HENRY'S ORDER TO "SECURE" LINN AND MOORE.

The whole clause, in which "the two men from Kaskaskia" are mentioned by Governor Henry in his Private Instructions to Clark, reads as follows: "For the transportation of the troops, prisoners, etc., down the Ohio, you are to apply to the commanding officer at Fort Pitt for boats; and during the whole transaction you are to take especial care to keep the true destination of your force secret. Its success depends upon this. Orders are therefore given to Captain Smith to secure the two men from Kaskaskia. Similar conduct will be proper in similar cases." Who Captain Smith was, and why he was selected for that particular service will soon appear.

That, "to secure the two men from Kaskaskia," implied that they were to be arrested, there can be no doubt; but this does not necessarily convey the idea that Clark had actually communicated to Linn and Moore any particular reason for sending them to the Illinois and that he had informed Governor Henry what that reason was. But the latter could not fail to see that both these men might, upon learning that Clark was on his way down the Ohio with a considerable force, conclude he was going on an expedition to the country they had visited as "spies;" and for fear their suspicions might be mentioned in the Kentucky settlements, it was thought best by the Virginia governor, to have them "secured."

NOTE XXIV.

ERRORS IN THE PRIVATE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY GOV. HENRY TO CLARK, AS FOUND IN "CLARK'S CAMPAIGN IN THE ILLINOIS," pp. 96, 97.

In second paragraph, for "expectation" read "expedition;" in third paragraph, for "&c," read "&"; in fourth paragraph, for "way," read "ways;" in fifth paragraph, for "of Ohio," read "of the Ohio."

The Private Instructions, as printed in Monnette's *History of the Mississippi Valley*, vol. II, p. 415n, are with less errors than are to be found in the document given in the work above mentioned. In Henry's *Patrick Henry*, they are printed with literal exactness as to capitals, etc., which Butler does not attempt.

NOTE XXV.

CONCERNING THE DISCRETIONARY POWER GIVEN CLARK.

The concluding words of the following from Bancroft's *History of the United States* (ed. of 1885) vol. v, p. 310., indicating that Clark was given a discretionary power to attack "the British dominion on . . . the Wabash," is misleading, and is doubtless the result of that historian following Clark's Memoir (the italicising is mine):

"In the latter part of 1777 Clark took leave of the woodsmen of Kentucky and departed for the East. To a few at Williamsburg, of whom no one showed more persistent zeal than George Mason and Thomas

Jefferson, he proposed a secret expedition to the Illinois. Patrick Henry, the governor, made the plan his own, and, at his instance, the house of delegates, by a vote of which 'few knew the intent,' empowered him to aid 'any expedition against their western enemy.' On the second of January, 1778, Clark received from the governor and council a supply of money, liberty to levy troops in any county of Virginia, and written and verbal instructions clothing him with large discretionary authority to attack the British dominion on the Illinois *and the Wabash.*"

NOTE XXVI.

GEORGE WYTHE, GEORGE MASON AND THOMAS JEFFERSON'S PLEDGE TO CLARK ON THE 3D OF JANUARY, 1778.

The letter written by George Wythe, George Mason, and Thomas Jefferson (the first mentioned, speaker, and the others, members, of the House of Delegates), pledging themselves in exerting their influence to obtain from the legislature of Virginia a bounty of three hundred acres of land for each recruit in the expedition, in the event of its success, has been lost. The words of Clark, in his Memoir (Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 119, 120), are — "as an encouragement to those who would engage in said service [meaning the service against the Illinois towns] an instrument of writing was signed, wherein those gentlemen promised to use their influence to procure from the assembly three hundred

acres of land for each in case of success." But, in this writing, the *real* object of the expedition could not have been mentioned, else the secret would have been disclosed as to what service was expected of those who enlisted.

Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 37) says the three gentlemen "agreed in writing to do their best to induce the Virginia Legislature to grant to each of the adventurers three hundred acres of *the conquered land*, if they were successful." (The italicising is mine). To have made such an explanation would have disclosed the secret as to the destination of the expedition. What Butler says (and he had the letter in his possession doubtless when he wrote) is this: "The result of these deliberations [with Clark as to the plan of attacking the Illinois] was, a full approbation of the scheme, and in order to encourage the men, those patriotic gentlemen [George Wythe, George Mason and Thomas Jefferson], like worthy sons of Old Virginia, pledged themselves by an instrument of writing in case of success, to exert their influence to obtain from the Legislature a bounty of three hundred acres of land for every person in the expedition [History of Kentucky, p. 47.]"

In a recent work is to be found the following: "It was during this winter of 1777-8 that Col. George Rogers Clark visited Williamsburg, and in interviews with Governor Henry and the leading men of the Assembly, the famous Illinois campaign was projected. George Mason was an intimate and revered friend of the gallant young soldier, and he was one of the leaders with whom Henry conferred on the subject

of Clark's plans. A letter was written by George Wythe, George Mason and Thomas Jefferson, on the 3d of January, 1778, in which these gentlemen pledged themselves, in case of the success of the expedition, 'to exert their influence to obtain from the legislature a bounty of three hundred acres of land for every person in the expedition [Butler's History of Kentucky,' p. 47 (and foot-note)]. The papers of G. R. Clark were in 1834, in possession of his brother, General William Clark, and they were used by Mann Butler in his history of Kentucky. Copies of some of these papers were given by Butler to the Hon. Lyman C. Draper of Wisconsin, for his contemplated biography of George Rogers Clark. The letter signed by Wythe, Mason, and Jefferson was, however, never seen by Mr. Draper." (Kate Mason Rowland's *Life of George Mason*, vol I, p. 290.)

NOTE XXVII.

AS TO WILLIAM HARROD AND WILLIAM B. SMITH.

Although a former resident of the Redstone country, William Harrod had been for some time located in Kentucky, but had now, for some reason unknown, returned to the Monongahela region. (As to his residence in Kentucky, see Hall's *Romance of Western History*, p. 384. Compare, also: Monnette's *History of the Mississippi Valley*, vol. I, p. 398,)

Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310] says: "It was probably there [at Redstone] that he [Clark] met with Captain Wil-

liam Harrod and his company;" and he (Bancroft) gives, as authority for this "probability," a MS. memorandum of L. C. Draper. But it is clear, if Captain Harrod had there a company, it was the result of his recruiting as mentioned by Clark. In any event, therefore, to say that the latter probably *met with* Captain Harrod and his company at Redstone, conveys an erroneous impression.

Clark, in his Memoir, erroneously speaks of William B. Smith as "Major." He was only a captain. He was the one who was ordered by Governor Henry "to secure the two men from Kaskaskia," as he was expected to reach Kentucky in advance of Clark. Smith could not have been told *why* he was to secure these men. If he had been, he would have been put in possession of the secret as to Clark's true destination. It is certain, however, that Clark's officers as well as his enlisted men knew nothing of the real object of the expedition until some time after.

NOTE XXVIII.

MANN BUTLER ON CLARK'S RECRUITING TROUBLES.

[Ante Chap. V, p. —.]

Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p 48) says: "At Fort Pitt [it was at Redstone], he [Clark] met with some difficulties arising from the disputed dominion, which then agitated the friends of Pennsylvania and Virginia; many thought the detachment of troops to Kentucky was a wanton dispersion and division of

strength. The secrecy of his real destination and the ostensible one of Kentucky, led many to declare it better to remove the Kentuckians than weaken the country by undertaking their defence. Little did these objectors know the innate vigor, the indomitable energy of the backwoodsmen of Kentucky and of the West, when they talked of removing them like so many chattles." This is certainly pardonable in Butler, being himself a Kentuckian; but only a year before, the Governor of Virginia, it will be remembered, said to an officer of militia he was about to send out there,—“in case it shall be judged impossible to hold the country . . . they [the militia] are to escort all the people, with their effects to the nearest place of safety.” (Instruction of Gov. Henry to the Lieutenant of Montgomery County, March 10, 1777.)

NOTE XXIX.

THE FALLS OF THE OHIO TO BE CLARK'S FINAL RENDEZVOUS.—WHEN THE EMBARKATION TOOK PLACE FROM REDSTONE.—WHO PROPERLY TO SHARE WITH CLARK THE CREDIT OF PLANNING THE EXPEDITION.

Clark, in his letter to Mason (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p 25), says he “set sail for the Falls [of the Ohio]” and that he had previously received letters from Captain Smith, informing him that he would meet him *at that place*. This makes it certain that the final rendezvous had been fixed upon, and that it was the Falls.

The Colonel, it will be noticed, had been in Redstone, active in collecting men — some of whom were Pennsylvanians, but most of them Virginians — for over two and a half months. In his Memoir, he says it was late in May before he could leave the Redstone settlement; but this is certainly error. The date — twelfth of May — is sufficiently corroborated by circumstances afterward transpiring, which are spoken of by the Colonel in his letter just cited.

“Early in the ensuing spring, at the age of twenty-six, he [Clark] embarked, sole commander of an enterprise wholly his own in conception and plan, which had been for three years the daring object of his ambition.” (*Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, pp. 789, 790.) But the enterprise, while it was his (Clark's) own *conception*, was by no means, as already shown, wholly his own *plan*. Much of the credit of arranging the details of the expedition is due Gov. Henry and his Council. To say that the undertaking had been for three years the daring object of Clark's ambition, is stating for him what he, at the time, did not claim.

NOTE XXX.

CLARK'S FORCE UPON LEAVING REDSTONE.

As Captains Bowman and Helm brought to the Colonel only about thirty-five men, he must have obtained at Redstone about one hundred and fifteen. That the whole force was formed into three companies, see Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 48, And the same is to be inferred from Hamilton to Haldimand [Sept.

5], 1778 — Haldimand MSS., where a deserter gives the information of the arrival in Kentucky of that number, but erroneously states (designedly it may be) that there were seventy men in each company.

Singularly erroneous is Monnette's account (*History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, p. 416) as to Clark's force just before leaving Redstone:

"Selecting from his whole force four companies of picked men, under well-known captains, he [Clark] prepared to descend the [Ohio] river upon the hazardous enterprise. The companies were commanded by Captains Montgomery, Bowman, Helm and Harrod." But the Colonel was only too glad to get almost any kind of recruits, without stopping to "pick" them; and, besides, Captain Montgomery was then in Kentucky.

"Proceeding to Pittsburg, on Feb. 4, he [Clark] succeeded, after extraordinary exertions, in raising three companies."—Moser's *Illinois*, vol. I, p. 147. The inference from this is that Clark left Williamsburg on February 4th; that he proceeded thence to Pittsburgh; and that, at the place last mentioned, he succeeded in raising three companies. But, as already shown, all this is error, but Moses follows, substantially, Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 48.

NOTE XXXI.

A NUMBER OF FAMILIES FOLLOW CLARK.

In his Memoir—Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 121—Clark says there went with him "a considerable

number of families and private adventurers." This is followed by Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 50).

A remark afterwards made by Clark makes it probable that there were about twenty of these families, as stated in the text. See, also, Col. R. T. Durrett, in *The Southern Bivouac*, for January, 1884.

Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 39) erroneously remarks that "the presence of these families shows that even this [Clark's] expedition had the usual peculiar western character of being undertaken half for conquest, half for settlement." Surely, enough has already been disclosed to show the fallacy of this. It was an undertaking wholly for conquest. The families collected at Redstone did not belong to the expedition; and their desire to go along with the Colonel down the Ohio, was for the protection which his force would give them from attacks by the savages.

NOTE XXXII.

CLARK AND HIS RECRUITS AT PITTSBURGH AND WHEELING.

It is evident that Colonel Clark, upon reaching Fort Pitt, must have informed General Hand of the true object of his expedition. Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310] says: "At Redstone — old-fort, with the cordial aid of Hand, its commander, he [Clark] collected boats, light artillery, and ammunition." General Hand extended no aid to Clark at Redstone; and the latter collected no light artillery here or elsewhere, as he took none

with him.* What help he received from the commander of the Western Department was at Fort Pitt and Wheeling.

“He [Clark] tried to raise recruits at Fort Pitt with but little success; but while here [there] he received information that his subordinate officers were progressing more rapidly.” (Dunn’s *Indiana*, p. 133.) It is evident that “Redstone” ought to have been substituted for “Fort Pitt” by Mr. Dunn. And it was only one subordinate — Captain Smith — who sent news, particularly, of a more rapid progress; and even what he sent was not an accomplished fact; — the Captain *intended* to do much.

“Under authority from the State of Virginia, and with some aid from that state in money and supplies, Clark enlisted two hundred men for three months, with whom he embarked at Pittsburg.” [*The History of the United States of America*. By Richard Hildreth (First Series), vol. III, p. 260.] There is in this statement not only an error as to the number of men who embarked with Clark, but also as to the place of embarkation, when starting upon his expedition.

We quote again from Bancroft: “These [“Captain Leonard Helm of Farquier (*sic*), and Captain Joseph Bowman of Frederic (*sic*) each with less than half a company’] and the adventurers of his [Clark’s] own enlistment, together only one hundred and fifty men, but all of a hardy race, self-relying, and trusting in one another, he [Clark] was now to lead near a thousand miles from their former homes

* This error of Bancroft has been frequently followed. As an instance, see *History of the Girtys*, p. 72.

against a people who exceeded them in number and were aided by merciless tribes of savage allies." [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310.] That they were in reality marching against a people exceeding them in number is true; but that the latter "were aided by merciless tribes of savage allies" is not strictly correct, as will hereafter be shown. Why Bancroft speaks of the *former* homes of Clark's men, it is impossible to understand.

As General Hand furnished the Colonel "with every necessary" he wanted, it must have included the prime one — powder. The "stores" taken in at Wheeling included, probably, a portion of what were furnished him by the Fort Pitt commandant, as that post was supplied by the latter. The "Linn powder," mentioned by Governor Henry in his private instructions to Clark, was secreted either at Wheeling or near there, but was not disturbed by the Colonel. One writer — Horace Edwin Hayden (*Magazine of American History*, vol. XXII, p. 415) — erroneously concludes that Clark supplied himself with it.

NOTE XXXIII.

CAPTURE OF DANIEL BOONE AND PARTY AT THE BLUE LICKS.

"On the first day of January, 1778, I went," says Boone, "with a party of thirty men to the Blue Licks, on Licking river, to make salt for the different garrisons in the country. On the seventh day of February, as I was hunting to procure meat for the com-

pany, I met with a party of one hundred and two Indians and two Frenchmen, on their march against Boonesborough, that place being particularly the object of the enemy. They pursued and took me, and brought me on the eighth day to the Licks, where twenty-seven of my party were, three of them having previously returned home with salt. I, knowing it was impossible for them to escape, capitulated with the enemy; and, at a distance, in their view, gave notice to my men of their situation, with orders not to resist, but surrender themselves captives." [Boone's *Narrative* (by Filson), added to *The Discovery, Settlement, and Present State of Kentucky*, in Imlay's *Topographical Description of the Western Territory of North America* (London: 1793), p. 340. Hamilton to Carleton, Jan. 25 — Apr. 25, 1778: Haldimand MSS.]

I have followed Boone as to the number of the Indians of Beaubien's party, his specific statement being the result, doubtless, of actual count. Hamilton says four-score Shawanese had been engaged; but some Miami Indians were also in the expedition.

There is again a variance between Boone's statement and Hamilton's — this time as to the number of men captured; the former says there were twenty-seven; the latter gives twenty-six. Boone would hardly have made a mistake in their number.

There are a number of manifest errors in the Narrative of Boone. It is always to be cited with caution. Beaubien first went to Piqua and Chillicothe with his twenty-two Miami Indians, where he succeeded in persuading eighty Shawanese to accompany him; and the whole force marched thence to the vicinity

of the Blue Licks, on their way to attack Boonesborough, when they came upon Boone. Then followed the capture of the latter and his men. And because the Indians, particularly the Miamis, would not continue the march and attack Boonesborough, Beaubien was offended, and soon left the Miami village for Detroit.

NOTE XXXIV.

“LOOSE NOTES” OF LIEUT. JACOB SCHIEFFELIN.

These “Notes” were first printed in the *Royal Gazette*. They refer mostly to the principal subject of our narrative—the conquest of the Illinois and Wabash towns and the immediate consequences resulting therefrom to a number of British and their allies who, as will hereafter be seen, fought against the American forces.

In the *Magazine of American History*, vol. I, these “Notes” are reprinted from the *Gazette* and erroneously credited to Hamilton (p. 192). Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 86n) blindly adopts the error, citing the *Gazette* evidently without having seen that periodical.

NOTE XXXIV.

CAPTAIN O'HARRA'S VIRGINIA COMPANY.

The history of this [Captain O'Harra's] Virginia Company is faintly traced in *Jefferson's Works* (*The*

Writings of Thomas Jefferson. Edited by H. A. Washington. New York: 1854), vol. 1, p. 236, and in *Pennsylvania Archives*, First Series, vol. XII, pp. 126, 165, 167, 198.

Says Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310]: "At Fort Kanawha, in May, they [Clark and his men] were reinforced by Captain O'Harra and his company." This is misleading. It carries the idea that Captain O'Harra and his company joined Clark to go upon the expedition to the Illinois; whereas, they were only to accompany him down the Ohio, intending to leave him where he should first land.* And this they did. Just here it may be said, that there was no "Fort Kanawha;" it was "Fort Randolph."

Singularly enough, in Henry's *Henry*, p. 590, Captain O'Harra's company is mentioned as "Captain Harrod's."

At least one writer has supposed that Captain Willing's company of mariners, which preceded Clark's force down the Ohio only three or four months, was connected with the latter — that is, that it was under Clark's command (see the statement of Isaac Craig, in *Magazine of American History*, vol. III, p. 513); but this is error. Compare also Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, pp. 416, 417.

* This error has been frequently copied. See, as an instance, *History of the Girtys*, p. 72.

NOTE XXXV.

NO POST INTENDED TO BE ERECTED BY CLARK AT THE MOUTH OF THE KENTUCKY.

Whatever were the declarations of Clark in after years as to his having, when reached the mouth of the Kentucky, some thoughts of fortifying a post there, it is evident from his assertions made soon after his expedition took place, that he had no such intentions — that he did not seriously consider any such plan — at any time while moving down the Ohio. What he really meant in informing County Lieutenant Bowman of his resolve to erect some kind of a fortification at the Falls will hereafter be fully discussed (see Note XXXIX of this Appendix).

NOTE XXXVI.

ESCAPE FROM THE ISLAND OF THE HOLSTON RECRUITS.

Roosevelt says (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 40) that “the Kentuckians who had horses pursued the deserters.” This carries the idea that some of the Kentuckians who had joined Clark brought horses along; and that these recruits were the ones that pursued the malcontents; but, the statement, as made by Butler, does not imply this (see his *Kentucky*, p. 50). The following, also, conveys an erroneous impression — Captain Dillard’s men not having previously “shown a disinclination to the service”: “These [Clark’s men] were encamped on what is now known

as Corn Island, in order to prevent the desertion of Captain Dillard's company, which had shown a disinclination to the service." — *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 790. Other published statements inaccurate in a greater or less degree, may now be considered.

"They [those of Captain Dillard's company who escaped] suffered greatly for their crime, and endured every degree of hardship and fatigue; for the Kentuckians spurned them from the gates of the wooden forts, and would not for a long time suffer them to enter." — Roosevelt: *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 40. And that writer adds that they were hounded "back to the homes they had dishonored" after they had "suffered greatly for their crime"; and that "their action [in leaving Clark] was due rather to wayward and sullen disregard of authority than cowardice." It is suggested, however, in view of the fact that they had enlisted, as they doubtless supposed, to go no farther than Kentucky, that their "deserting" was not, in their minds, a crime, nor were their homes dishonored by their leaving. Their act, they believed, was neither cowardice nor a wayward and sullen disregard of authority.

Another record says: "Only a very few [of Captain Dillard's men who escaped from the island] were recaptured, while the rest, with the lieutenant, made their way to Harrodsfort, where the garrison for a long time refused them admittance. Many of these cowardly fellows perished from exhaustion or by the hands of the Indians, on their way home through the wilderness, the settlers everywhere refusing indignantly either to receive or hold communication with them" (*Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 790). This,

of course, is an exaggerated statement: none died so far as known.

Dunn, in his *Indiana* (p. 134), says: "Here [on the island] Clark first informed his men of the real design of the expedition, and naturally enough it put a damper on the ardor of many of them. A number of the Tennessee men asked leave to return home but were refused; guards were placed over the boats to prevent desertion. In the night a part of the Tennessee men evaded the sentinels, waded to the Kentucky shore, and started for the settlements." But none of Dillard's men were from Tennessee; they were all Virginians.

"The island on which the landing [by Clark] was made, since known as 'Corn Island,' was not, a hundred years ago, the little pile of rocks and sand which we now see at low water only, on the upper side of the great railroad bridge across the Ohio just above the rapids. It was then a large island, extending from about the present Fifth to Thirteenth street [of Louisville], some four thousand feet in length, with an average breadth of about one-fourth its length. Its upper end was principally rocks, but the lower third was covered with large trees and cane. Here were sycamores and cottonwoods that ranked with the giants of the forests, and here little cane-brakes, from among whose stalks peeped wild flowers of the brightest colors." (E. T. Durrett, in *The Courier-Journal* of August 2, 1883.)

NOTE XXXVII.

OF THE KENTUCKIANS WHO JOINED CLARK.

Butler says that the Kentuckians who joined Clark consisted of one company and part of another (*History of Kentucky*, p. 49). Clark speaks of them as "a few Kentuckians," — see his letter to Mason: *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 26. As to their being but twenty, see Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, p. 418n; — vol. II, p. 101.

"Clark was organizing an expedition against . . . Kaskaskia and invited as many settlers at Boonesborough and Harrodsburg as desired to join him. The times were so dangerous that the women, especially, in the stations objected to the men going on such a distant expedition." — Collins' *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 446. But Clark sent out no invitations to settlers to join him in a movement "against Kaskaskia," and no women in the settlements knew of the real object of his undertaking until after Colonel Bowman reached the island in answer to Clark's call, — bringing with him what militia he could well take along.

As already mentioned, Monnette (*History of the Valley of the Mississippi*) is relied upon as giving the correct number of Kentuckians who were retained or, rather, accepted by Clark. I have not hesitated to give credence to that author so far as that number is concerned, as a tradition (seemingly reliable) gives the same; but Monnette, in some other statements, is wholly unreliable. For instance, in vol. I, (p. 418n), he says that "he [Clark] succeeded in recruit-

ing only four companies at his rendezvous on Corn Island." And he further asserts (forgetting that he had previously (though erroneously) stated that Montgomery was one of the captains at Redstone under Clark) that it was "here [on the island] he became acquainted with the brave Captain Montgomery, 'an Irishman and full of fight,' who engaged in the enterprise with great ardor."

The American commander speaks of Montgomery as "Colonel," but he went to Kentucky only as Captain, as already shown; but, at date of Clark's letter to Mason, he was a Colonel. It is evident that the time for which his original company had enlisted had expired. He did not bring these men to Clark; he had "Kentuckians" with him, according to the Colonel's statement to Mason.

Clark nowhere in his correspondence of the period mentions the name of Kenton; but the evidence is overwhelming that he went upon the expedition. That he was with Captain Montgomery when he joined Clark's force is not so certain; but, as the Colonel mentions no other Kentuckians except those under the Captain, it is probable that such was the fact. In a traditional account (which is, of course, erroneous), it is stated that Kenton and one Haggins were the only ones who went from Kentucky. See Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 446, for this, as follows:

"Clark was organizing an expedition against Kaskaskia and invited as many of the settlers at Boonesborough and Harrodsburg as desired to join him. The times were so dangerous that the women, especially, in the stations objected to the men going on such an expedition; consequently to the great morti-

fication of Clark, only Kenton and Haggin left the stations to accompany him."

NOTE XXXVIII.

CONCERNING CAPTAIN LINN'S JOURNEY DOWN THE OHIO WITH A LETTER FOR CLARK GIVING INFORMATION OF THE FRENCH ALLIANCE WITH THE UNITED STATES.

Hall speaks of Linn as having been "allured by the kindred spirit of Clark and the prospects of gathering laurels in a distant field," and gives these as the reasons for his going down the Ohio with Campbell's letter to Clark. Now, evidently, "a distant field" refers to the Illinois; but Linn, until he reached Clark and the latter had divulged his secret, knew nothing of the Colonel's real destination. It is highly probable that Linn was sent by Campbell expressly to convey the news to Clark and the Kentucky settlements generally, of the French alliance. Butler intimates (*History of Kentucky*, p. 50), basing his conclusion upon what he supposes is the statement of Clark in his Memoir (Dillon's *Indiana*, ed. of 1859, p. 122), that the Colonel received the news while going down the Ohio *after leaving* the island. It is evident, however, that such was not the case. The rapidity of the Colonel's movement precludes this idea.

Campbell was a Continental officer: "They [the 'rebels'] intend erecting forts at the Falls and other places on the Ohio to secure a communication down the Mississippi. One John Campbell, of Fort Pitt,

received a commission from the Cengress last winter with orders to collect or raise men for that purpose." — Hay to Brehm [Sept. —, 1778]. — Haldimand MSS.

NOTE XXXIX.

FICTION OF CLARK HAVING SELECTED THE FALLS OF THE OHIO AS A PLACE FOR A MILITARY POST WHILE ON HIS EXPEDITION AGAINST THE ILLINOIS.

Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 49) declares that Clark fixed upon the Falls as a more desirable position for a fortification than the mouth of the Kentucky (where, for some time after landing, he had thoughts of "fortifying a post") not only because of its more western locality but for the reason that there the craft in the river trade would be compelled to stop in order to prepare for the passage of the rapids, and which without fortification would be much exposed to the hostilities of the Indians. But there was no river trade at that time. And it was far from the Colonel's intention to undertake, at that time, the "fortifying of a post" anywhere on the Ohio, or even to select a place for a fortification, to protect the prospective river trade or the Kentucky settlements.

Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 39), in attempting to follow Butler, travels farther into the realm of fiction: "This spot he [Clark] chose, both because from it he could threaten and hold in check the different Indian tribes, and because he deemed it wise to have some fort to protect in the

future the craft that might engage in the river travel when they stopped to prepare for the passage of the rapids."

Another historian declares: "On arriving with his forces at the Falls of the Ohio, Colonel Clark took possession of an island which contained about seven acres. He divided this island among a small number of families, for whose protection he constructed some light fortifications." [*Dillon's Indiana*, (ed. of 1859) p. 121.] The last half of this extract conveys an erroneous impression,—the inference being that the "light fortifications" were "constructed" solely for the "small number of families" on the island.

"In 1778 . . . Gen. George Rogers Clark, with a few families and adventurers located at the 'Falls' [of the Ohio], which was then probably the frontier settlement in 'the dark and bloody ground.'" (Isaac Smucker, in *The American Historical Register*, vol. II, p. 60.) But Clark did not settle at the Falls of the Ohio during that year. And the same writer still further confuses matters by stating (p. 61) that Clark settled *permanently* in Kentucky in 1776.

NOTE XL.

NUMBER OF CLARK'S MEN ON LEAVING THE ISLAND.

As to the number of men under Clark who started down the Ohio from the island, Captain Bowman, in his letter to Hite, of July 30, 1778 says: "The force consisted of about 170 or 180 men"; and the Virginia governor, Patrick Henry, in his letter to the delegates

in Congress from his state, of the fourteenth of November, following, says the same — at least by inference. [See this last mentioned letter in Butler's *Kentucky* (2d ed.), p. 533; also, in Moses Coit Tyler's *Life of Patrick Henry*, p. 230; and in Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. II, p. 16 and vol. III, p. 200: before cited. See, too, George Mason's *Plan for Cession of the Territory of the Northwest to the United States*, dated July 27, 1780 (Kate Mason Rowland's *Life of Mason*, vol. I, p. 365). Mason says there were "about one hundred and eighty" officers and men.]

Allowing one hundred and fifty men as the number that came with Clark down the Ohio, and adding the twenty men who came to him and were put under Captain Montgomery, and the result is a force of one hundred and seventy. There were, it is true, a few of Dillard's men, those that did not desert, and six or eight more who did, but were brought back; but from these we must deduct the number left behind on the island, as stated in the next paragraph in the text and in the foot-note thereto. There could not have been less, therefore, than 170 men and, probably, there were a few more — in all, as stated in the text, about 180 including officers.

It was afterward the positive declaration of Kenton that Clark's force when it finally left the island amounted to "one hundred and fifty-three fighting men." (Compare McDonald's *Sketches*, p. 219; Monnette's *History of the Mississippi Valley*, vol. I, p. 418, note.) But it is evident his memory, in this regard, was at fault.

NOTE XLI.

AS TO THE FAMILIES AND SOLDIERS LEFT UPON THE ISLAND.

“About twenty families that had followed me much against my inclination I found now to be of service to me in guarding a block-house that I had erected on the island to secure my provisions.” (Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 27.) This is calculated to mislead. Standing, as it does, alone, without any reference to a detachment of soldiers having been left on the island, the inference is, that the men of these families were the only ones remaining as guards for the post, which is error. The Colonel had also forgotten that a number of the families had gone into the settlements.

“We left ten or twelve families with a quantity of provisions and a few men to guard them.” — Bowman to Hite. Some traditions give thirteen as the number of families left on the island. (See Marshall's *Kentucky*, vol. I, p. 67.)

The detail of soldiers was composed of Isaac Ruddle, James Sherlock, Alexander McIntyre, William Foster, Samuel Finley, Neal Doharty, and Isaac McBride. (Durrett, in *The Southern Bivouac*, Jan., 1884.)

“Clark had weeded out all those whom he deemed unable to stand fatigue and hardship; his four little companies were of picked men, each with a good captain.” (Roosevelt — *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 41.) But this conveys a wrong impression; Clark simply left behind those he thought clearly

unable to bear the toil which he was satisfied would be the lot of all.

Tradition gives this description of the depository and defensive work left by Clark on the island:

"The highest ground on the northwest corner . . . was chosen for the site of the buildings. The huge cottonwood trees were felled, cut into sections and split into large rails for making the walls of the houses. Two rows of one-story double cabins, four in each row, were erected, with a wide road between them; one row facing the Indiana, the other the Kentucky shore. On the eastern front of these were erected two triple cabins, or cabins with three rooms each; so that the ground-plan of the whole was in the form of an Egyptian cross. The buildings had no floors and the roofs were of riven boards, held on by skids. The doors were puncheons, with wooden hinges, and the windows simply holes in the walls, from which logs had been removed." And these structures, with some picketing, formed the fort. (Durrett.)

"From thence [that is, from the mouth of the Great Kanawha]," wrote Captain Bowman (letter to Hite), "we continued down to the Falls of the Ohio, where we erected a small garrison upon an island." This implies rather more than a mere depository for provisions. It is probable that work continued on the buildings for some time after Clark's departure. Hamilton afterward wrote that, from what he could learn, "it was very insignificant in its present state." (Hamilton to Haldimand, Dec. 4, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.)

NOTE XLII.

CLARK LEAVES THE ISLAND FOR KASKASKIA.

Concerning Clark's starting from the island, and of the eclipse of the sun which happened immediately thereafter and of its effects upon the ignorant ones of his force, much has been written. In his Memoir, Clark says the eclipse caused various conjectures among the superstitious of his men. Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 50) follows the Memoir substantially: "The next day, when the sun was in a total eclipse, the boats passed the Falls. This circumstance divided the men in their prognostications, but not quite with the terror and alarm we read of in ancient armies." But Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 41) improves on Clark: "On the 24th of June Clark's boats put out from shore, and shot the falls at the very moment that there was a great eclipse of the sun, at which *the frontiersmen wondered greatly, but for the most part held it to be a good omen* [the italicising is mine]."

Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 310] makes a confused statement of Clark's leaving the island:

"On the day of an eclipse of the sun they glided over the falls of the Ohio, below which they were 'joined by a few Kentuckians' under John Montgomery. On the twenty-sixth of June, Clark and his companions, Virginians in the service of Virginia, set off from the falls, and with oars double-manned, proceeded night and day on their ever-memorable enterprise."

By this it will be seen that Bancroft supposed Clark and his men "glided over the falls" before stopping on the island; and that they started for the Illinois two days after the eclipse.

"About the 24th of June, he [Clark] commenced his voyage down the river [from the island], after communicating to his officers the object and design of the expedition.

"Arrangements for additional supplies had been made by the Federal authorities, through Captain William Lynn and Captain James Willing, to be obtained from the Spaniards in New Orleans for the supply of all the posts in the region of the Ohio, as well as for the expedition to the upper Mississippi." (Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, pp. 416, 417.) But, as we have seen, Clark communicated not only to his officers but to the rank and file "the object and design of the expedition" before leaving the island for Kaskaskia. Neither the Federal nor the Virginia authorities made any arrangements through "Lynn" or Willing, for Clark's expedition; — that is, for "the expedition to the upper Mississippi."

NOTE XLIII.

CLARK'S ERRONEOUS ASSERTION THAT HE HAD
THOUGHTS OF FIRST ATTACKING VINCENNES.

"My force [on the island] being so small to what I expected," are the words of Clark years after, "owing to the various circumstances already mentioned, I found it necessary to alter my plans of oper-

ation. As Post Vincennes, at this time, was a town of considerable force, consisting of near four hundred militia, with an Indian town adjoining, and [with] great numbers [of savages] continually in the neighborhood, and in the scale of Indian affairs of more importance than any other, I had thought of attacking it first; but now found I could by no means venture near it. I resolved to begin my career in the Illinois, where there were more inhabitants, but scattered in different villages, and less danger of being immediately overpowered by the Indians: in case of necessity, we could probably make our retreat to the Spanish side of the Mississippi, but if successful, we might pave our way to the possession of the Post Vincennes.

“I had fully acquainted myself that the French inhabitants in those western settlements had great influence among the Indians in general and were more beloved by them than any other Europeans; that their commercial intercourse was universal throughout the western and northwestern countries; and that the governing interest on the lakes was mostly in the hands of the English, who were not much beloved by them. These, and many other ideas similar thereto, caused me to resolve, if possible, to strengthen myself by such train of conduct as might probably attach the French inhabitants to our interest, and give us influence at a greater distance than the country we were aiming for.” Clark’s *Memoir* — Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 122. But it could not have been that Clark, on the island, changed his “plans of operation.” He was on his way to Kaskaskia direct, before he descended the Ohio at all; and this plan to have de-

viated from, and first to have marched against Vincennes, would have been certainly, in violation of his Private Instructions. As to what Clark says about the influence of the French with the Indians and as to their commercial intercourse throughout the Northwest,—it is probable he drew on subsequent information, largely, for that; so, also, as to the governing interest on the lakes being mostly in the hands of the English, who were not much beloved by the savages.

“Colonel Clark for some time meditated a blow against St. Vincennes [Vincennes], but on reviewing his little body . . . he determined to prosecute the original object of his expedition. The facility of retreat to the Spanish possessions, as well as the more dispersed state of the French settlements in the Illinois, as it was called, seem to have had great weight in this selection. To this was added a hope that he might attach the French to the American interest, whose influence over the Indians throughout these extensive territories was strengthened by time, and maintained by a tact and versatility which have been undiminished for two centuries.” (Butler’s *Kentucky*, p. 50.) It will be seen that that writer entirely overlooks the Private Instructions given by Gov. Henry to Clark, which he publishes in full on p. 395 of his history (ed. of 1834). Nor is there any evidence extant, that, in any oral instructions given by Governor Henry to the Colonel, the latter was authorized to attack Vincennes *before going to Kaskaskia*. “I was ordered to attack the Illinois,” are the words of Clark to Mason (*Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 23), and “*in case of success, to carry my arms to any*

quarter I pleased [the italicising is mine]." And see, also, pp. 31 and 32 of the same work.

It is clear that the clause in the Memoir, therefore, which we have quoted, is mostly erroneous. The writer, who, of all others, has builded most upon these errors is E. A. Bryan, in his article, "Indiana's First Settlement," in *Magazine of American History*, vol. XXI.

NOTE XLIV.

AS TO THE HUNTERS CAPTURED BY CLARK; ALSO CONCERNING FORT MASSAC.

"He [Clark] doubled-manned his oars and rowed night and day until he reached a small island *off* the mouth of the Tennessee, where he halted to make his final preparations, and was there joined by a little party of American hunters, [the italicising is mine]." (Roosevelt, in *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, pp. 41, 42.) But it is evident the island was not *off* the mouth of the Tennessee (i. e., in the Ohio), but *in* that river. As to these hunters being "American" in sentiment — that is not altogether certain. Clark in his letter to Mason says they "appeared to be in our interest"; nevertheless, he required them to take the oath of allegiance. They having just come from Kaskaskia, is a circumstance militating against the idea of their being in favor of the independence of America, even though they formerly came, as Clark says in his Memoir they did, "from the States." However, they now resolved, possibly from a love of adventure, to cast their lot with Clark.

Roosevelt, also, same volume, (p. 42), in attempting to follow Clark's *Memoir* travels outside of it in stating that Rocheblave's militia were not only well drilled but "in constant readiness to repel attack"; and that "the Indians and the *coureurs des bois* were warned to be on the look-out for any American force." In view of the fact that some of the Illinois hunters were English, the substitution of "coureurs des bois" for the word "hunters" is of course absurd.

A writer in *The North American Review*, vol. XLIII, (July, 1836), p. 15, already cited, adds to what is said by Clark in his *Memoir* as to his determination to improve upon the information received of the hunters, in these words:

"Colonel Clark saw, that by wisely managing this prejudice [which he was told by the hunters existed in the Illinois against Americans], and the information he had received on the [Ohio] river, of the treaty between France and the United States, he might be able to secure the assistance of the French; without this he could have little hope of ultimate success."

"Clark had a hard winter's work in enlisting men, but at length, in May, 1778, having collected a flotilla of boats and a few pieces of light artillery, he started from Pittsburg with 180 picked riflemen, and rowed swiftly down the Ohio river a thousand miles to its junction with the Mississippi." — Fiske: *The American Revolution*, vol. II, p. 105. That was about sixty miles farther upon the river than the Colonel actually rowed, as already shown. He did not reach the Mississippi by about that distance. As to artillery, Clark took none down the Ohio.

Fort Massac was on the north side of the Ohio, ten miles below the mouth of the Tennessee river. Its official name — given by the French when they built it and who then occupied the valley of the Ohio — was "l'Assomption." It was erected in 1756 (some writers claim it was only strengthened, and was built much earlier) to counteract the building, by the English, of Fort London on the upper waters of the Tennessee. A description of the fort is in the Archives of the Marine, Paris, France. (See Douglas Brymner's *Report on Canadian Archives*, 1887, p. ccxviii.) It was, of course, unoccupied at date of Clark's visit. For additional mention of this fortification, see *N. Y. Colonial Documents*, vol. X, p. 1092; Monnette's *Mississippi Valley*, vol. I, p. 317; Pownalls' *Topographical Description of the Middle British Colonies*, pp. 3, 5; *Bouquet's Expedition* (Cincinnati: Robert Clark & Co's reprint, 1868) p. 143; Hutchin's *Topographical Description of Va.*, etc., p. 12; Washburn's *Edwards Papers*, p. 55; *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 28; Scharf's *St. Louis*, vol. I, p. 71. Consult, also, Collot's *Journey in North America*; McBride's *Pioneer Biography*, vol. II; and Nicollet's *Report*. In subsequent years, the fortification was occupied by U. S. troops, for a time.

NOTE XLV.

CLARK'S ROUTE FROM THE OHIO TO KASKASKIA.

Both in his letter to Mason (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 29) and in his Memoir (Dillon's

Indiana, p. 124) Clark speaks of starting in a north-west course: "took a route to the northwest"—"set out [in] a northwest course" (not in a northeast direction, as some writers affirm).

The distance from where the Colonel left the Ohio to Kaskaskia is given by Rocheblave as sixty leagues (see his letter to Carleton of August 3, 1778, from the Haldimand MSS., in Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 418). These were French leagues—two and four-tenths miles each—making the whole equal to one hundred and forty-four miles.

Clark did not, as many have supposed, follow the "old Fort Massac trail" leading to Kaskaskia and Fort Chartres. This trace, at that time, had, in some places, from disuse, wholly disappeared.

It took the French four days brisk travel on horseback to go from Fort Massac to Kaskaskia by that trail. This trace is distinctly laid down on Thomas Hutchins' *New Map of the Western Parts of Virginia, Pennsylvania,*" etc., London, 1778.

"A military road," says an early Illinois writer, "was opened and marked, each mile on a tree, from Massac to Kaskaskia. The numbers of the miles were cut in ciphers with an iron and painted red. Such I saw there in 1800. This road made a great curve to the north to avoid the swamps and rough country on the sources of Cash river, and also to obtain the prairie country as soon as possible. This road was first made by the French when they had dominion of the country and was called the Old Massac road" [by the Americans].—John Reynolds [*The Pioneer History of Illinois*, p. 281 (ed. of 1887)].

It is evident that the description of this road as given by Reynolds does not agree with what Clark says as to his route in so far as marking trees is concerned, after about fifty miles — when he reached “level plains;” that is, the prairies. Of course, there were no trees to be found “each mile,” to be marked, as the Illinois author describes. His own statement immediately after, disproves this, as the route “made a great bend to the north . . . to obtain the prairie country as soon as possible.”

Some writers of Western history state that the route taken by Clark was *wholly* a new one. One of these historians (John Moses, in his *Illinois*, vol. I, p. 148) has the following: “Kaskaskia, the objective point, was one hundred and twenty miles away and the hitherto untrodden route lay through wilderness and swamp.” Evidently this is error, as “untrodden” here applies to the entire distance, and we have Clark’s statement (by inference) that the last part was along the “hunters’ road” [Dillon’s *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), loc. cit.]

Rufus Blanchard (*History of Illinois, to Accompany an Historical Map of the State*, pp. 121, 122) says: “The trail of George Rogers Clark from Fort Massac to Kaskaskia marks an epoch in American history of transcendent import. It passed close by the present site of Marion [Illinois], and afterward became a well frequented trail between Golconda and Kaskaskia.” Mr. Blanchard also has laid down on the map accompanying his “History,” the supposed “trail.”

But Clark and the few men constituting his force, all on foot as they were and traveling the last of June

and the first days of July, left no signs behind them, after the prairie country was reached, that could be relied upon as pointing out subsequently their route to the "hunters' road." If, therefore, we are to consider what Blanchard marks, to be the route, nevertheless it must be wholly an imaginary one after about fifty miles from the Ohio, until the "hunters' road" is reached; and just where that was, is unknown.

An early Kentucky historian says:

"The route to be pursued from this place [where he (Clark) hid his boats] lay in a direction somewhat to the north of west through a low, uncultivated region, interspersed with ponds of various dimensions — with the geography and general character of which, Colonel Clark was not unacquainted. At the head of his regiment, he took up his line of march, on foot, with a rifle in his hand and his provisions on his back." (Marshall's *Kentucky*, vol. I, p. 67.)

Another Western writer gives this relation concerning the route:

"He [Clark] was now [at the point where he hid his boats] distant from Kaskaskia about one hundred and thirty miles, and the intervening country — with which the writer is familiarly acquainted — must have been at that period, when in a state of nature, almost impassable." (Hall: *The Romance of Western History*, p. 295.)

See further as to mention of the route from the Ohio to Kaskaskia, the next Note of this Appendix.

NOTE XLVI.

CONCERNING CLARK'S TROUBLE WITH HIS GUIDE IN
MARCHING FROM THE OHIO TO KASKASKIA.

The statement by Clark in his Memoir concerning the difficulty he had with his guide is that he asked him (Saunders) various questions, and from his answers he could scarcely determine what to think of him;—whether he was lost or was attempting to deceive. The cry of the men was that he was a traitor. He begged that he might be suffered to go some distance into a prairie that was in full view, to try and make some discovery whether or not he was right. “I told him [Saunders],” says Clark, “he might go, but that I was suspicious of him from his conduct; that, from the first day of his being employed, he always said he knew the way well; that there was now a different appearance; that I saw the nature of the country was such that a person once acquainted with it, could not in a short time forget it; that a few men should go with him to prevent his escape; and that if he did not discover, and take us into, the hunters’ road that led from the east into Kaskaskia, which he had frequently described, I would have him immediately put to death, which I was determined to have done; but after a search of an hour or two he came to a place that he knew perfectly, and we discovered that the poor fellow had been, as they call it, bewildered.” The only variance of any note in this account with that given by Clark to Mason is where he speaks of letting Saunders go in search of the hunters’ road having with him a few men.

Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 311] says:

Apprised of the condition of Kaskaskia by a band of hunters, Clark ran his boats into a creek a mile above Fort Massac, reposed there but for a night, and struck across the hills to the great prairie. On the treeless plain his party 'in all about one hundred and eighty' could be seen for miles around by nations of Indians, able to fall on them with three times their number; yet they were in the highest spirits, and he felt as never again in his life a flow of rage,' an intensity of will, a zeal for action."

These words convey several erroneous ideas, some directly; others by inference: (1) that, because of the information received from the band of hunters, Clark ran his boats into a creek a mile above Fort Massac; (2) that he struck across the hills (by inference near the Ohio) to the great prairie; (3) that the nations of Indians in the country around could muster about three times as many as Clark's men and, would do so if they knew of his coming; (4) that Clark's flow of rage was against the British and their Indian allies.

Clark intended *when he left the island* to strike across the country from a point at or near the site of Fort Massac. He did not reach the great prairie for fifty miles after leaving the Ohio. The various indian nations within striking distance had not generally taken up the hatchet against the Americans. And Clark's rage was only against his guide.

NOTE XLVII.

THE SUFFERING FROM HUNGER OF CLARK'S FORCE
ON THE MARCH.

It is altogether certain that Clark expected to reach Kaskaskia after leaving the Ohio, in four days and had only taken along provisions for that length of time; but, as his journey was protracted to six days, the last two were days of fasting.

In his Memoir, Clark says: "The weather was favorable; in some parts water was scarce, as well as game; of course we suffered drought and hunger, but not to excess." (Dillon's *Indiana*, ed. of 1859, p. 124.) But as Bowman in his letter to Hite, cited in the text, wrote only a few weeks after the march, his recollection would be vivid as to the hunger; and he plainly indicates that it caused considerable distress. In his letter to Mason, Clark is silent upon the subject. A recent writer says:

"On the evening of the fourth of July, weary, foot-sore and hungry, Colonel Clark and his little army came within sight of Kaskaskia. Only the river flowed between them and the fort, of which they hoped soon to take possession." [Mary Cone, in "The Expedition and Conquests of General George Rogers Clarke, in 1778-9": *Magazine of Western History*, vol. II. (May, 1885). p. 143]. But Clark does not say that, at their first halt, they were in sight of Kaskaskia as this extract implies; it is evident they were not; nor had they yet reached the river Kaskaskia. But this lady truly affirms, "the river flowed between them and the fort, of which they hoped soon to take possession." That

fortification was Fort Gage; and Clark and his army were on the east side of the stream. (See next note in this Appendix.)

NOTE XLVIII.

AS TO THE CROSSING OF THE KASKASKIA RIVER, THE LOCATION OF FORT GAGE AND ITS CAPTURE, AND THE TAKING OF THE TOWN.

The language of Clark both in his letter to Mason and in his Memoir plainly indicates that after reaching the Kaskaskia, it was the next step to secure boats for the Colonel and his men — not a part of them — to cross over the river to the town. A recent writer (Mary Cone) truthfully says:

“They waited under cover until darkness, whose friendly hand should spread its veil over the scene and conceal them from the eyes of the enemy. When the shades of night had thickened so as to render them invisible they marched to a farm-house which was less than a mile from the fort and making the family prisoners, took possession of the house. Here they found boats to cross the river, and, having crossed in silence and stillness, they took up their line of march for the fort. They approached so noiselessly that neither the town, nor the fort was aware of his coming.” (*Magazine of Western History*, article “George Rogers Clark,” vol. II.)

Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 52) erroneously writes:

“A sufficient quantity of boats for transportation of the troops was soon procured; two divisions of the

party crossed the river with orders to repair to different parts of the town, while Colonel Clark, with the third division took possession of the fort . . . on this [the east] side of the river in point blank shot of the town." Here, for the first time, Butler refuses to follow Clark's Memoir; but the latter is correct in this regard, and Butler is in error.

Reynolds (*Pioneer History of Illinois* (ed. of 1887, p. 93) goes still farther astray:

"Two parties were to cross the Kaskaskia river and the other was to remain on the east side so as to capture the town and fort at the same time. The fearless Captain Helm commanded the troops [which were] to cross the river and take the village; while Clark himself commanded the other wing to capture the fort. Boats and canoes were procured to cross the river."

The importance attached to the exact location of Fort Gage, and the fact that it is a matter of controversy, justify the bringing forward proofs that are at command — all showing unmistakably that it was not on the east side of the Kaskaskia, but on the west side, and in the village. Until a late date, this fort, ever since the Revolution, has been by all writers of Western history (as well as by tradition) confounded with the fort built by the French — the same which previous to its destruction by fire in 1766, stood upon the east bank of the Kaskaskia river.

"It is now [1887] the popular belief of the residents in the vicinity and it has been the positive statement of all writers on the subject [except that of Mary Cone, in the *Magazine of Western History*, vol. II, p. 153] that the fort in which Colonel Clark captured Rocheblave was on the high bluff opposite the town,

where there is still abundant evidence that a fort once existed, and now is known by the name of 'Fort Gage.' The spot is daily pointed out to visitors as perhaps the most noted locality in the Western country. During the past year [1886] a historical painting (40 x 30 feet), illustrating Col. Clark's capture of Kaskaskia has been placed on the walls of the State House at Springfield, Ill. In the centre of the picture is the site of the old fort on the bluff, and near it stands the Jesuit church. In the foreground is Col. Clark addressing a council of Indians." (William Frederick Poole, in "The West," in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 719 n.)

In a criticism upon Mary Cone's assertion that the fort was upon the west side of the river — that "only the river [Kaskaskia] flowed between them [Clark and his men] and the fort of which they hoped soon to take possession"—Mr. John Moses (in the same Magazine, vol. II, pp. 268, 269) says: "But the river did *not* flow between the Colonel and the fort. Fort Gage was on the left or eastern side of the river, which 'flowed' between it and the village [of Kaskaskia]. And so was Colonel Clark. Now it might not make much difference to any one at the present time to place the great Cæsar on the wrong side of the Rubicon, so far off, and which he crossed so long ago, but to place Washington on the wrong side of the Delaware, or Colonel George Rogers Clark on the wrong side of the Kaskaskia, will hardly be permitted without objection and complaint." But Mr. Moses soon changed his views on the subject; for, in his *Illinois*, vol. I, p. 151, he ingeniously writes: "There is no evidence, indeed, that Col. Clark ever occupied the old

fort on the hill [on the *east* side of the Kaskaskia]"; — a safe proposition as there was no fort there to be occupied, nor had there been for twelve years prior to Clark's appearance.

"It [the French fort] was an oblongular quadrangle," wrote one who visited Kaskaskia a short time after its destruction, "290 by 251 feet" and was built of very thick squared timber. "An officer and twenty men [British]," he adds, "are quartered in the village."* An account written before the British took possession of the Illinois — that is, before 1765, says:

"Two leagues up this [the Kaskakia] river, on the left, is the settlement of the Kaskasquias [Kaskaskia] which is the most considerable of the Illinois. There is a fort built upon the height on the other side of the river, over against Kaskasquias; which, as the river is narrow, commands and protects the town. I don't know how many guns there may be, nor how many men it may contain. There may be about 400 inhabitants [in the town]."[†]

The site of the old fort (which fortification never had any specific name, it being designated, along with the town, simply as "the Kaskasquias") was 500 yards from the river, and after being burned down, as just mentioned, was not rebuilt, although a plan "which would cost a good deal of money," was submitted to General Haldimand in 1767, for a new one.[‡]

* Pittman: *Present State of the European Settlements on the Mississippi*, loc. cit.

[†] *Bouquet's Expedition against the Ohio Indians*, pp. 145, 146.

[‡] Haldimand to Gage, April 31 [30 ?], 1767, from Pensacola — Haldimand MSS.: "L't. Pittman has arrived from

The French fort (that is, the fort which was on the east side of the Kaskaskia river previous to 1766) must have had an English garrison only a short time, as it was burned the next year after the British took possession of the Illinois.* It is not a little remarkable that a citizen of Illinois, who, as early as 1800, resided in Kaskaskia, should have left this record: "The English government [in 1772] abandoned Fort Chartres and established its authority at Fort Gage, on the bluff east of Kaskaskia." [Reynolds: *My Own Times* (ed. of 1879), p. 31.] Again: The British garrison occupied Fort Gage, which stood on the Kaskaskia river bluffs opposite the village." [*Pioneer History* (ed. of 1887), p. 81.] He adds: "This fort continued the headquarters of the British while they possessed the country. Fort Gage was built of large square timbers and was an oblong, measuring 290 by 251 feet. There were in this fort, in the year 1772 an officer and twenty soldiers. In the village of Kaskaskia there were two French companies organized and in good discipline ready to march at a moment's warning." And in reference to Clark's movements when the Colonel reached the stream his words are (p. 94): "Two parties crossed the river; the other party remained with Colonel Clark to attack the fort."

The declaration in Butler's *Kentucky* (p. 52) that two divisions [of Clark's force] crossed the river, while Illinois; sends the plan of a fort to cost a good deal of money."

* Mr. Moses, in his *Illinois*, vol. I, pp. 149-151, supposes that the fort built by the French, was, after its occupation by the British, known as "Fort Gage." But the words of Hamilton to Carleton, June 26, 1777, hereafter given in this Note, imply the contrary.

Clark with the third division took possession of the fort on this [the east] side of the river, in point-blank shot of the town," is an error which may be found repeated, with slight variations or additions in many works of Western history. It may also be stated that Blanchard, in his *Historical Map of Illinois* which is attached to his *History of Illinois* (Chicago: 1883), marks Fort Gage erroneously on the *east* side of the Kaskaskia — making it identical with the position formerly occupied by the French fort.

It may be said here that Clark's Memoir when published in Dillon's *Indiana* and his letter to Mason when printed by Robert Clark & Co., were both calculated to direct public attention to the fact that the fort captured by Clark (Fort Gage) was not on the *east* side of the Kaskaskia; nevertheless, Mary Cone's article in the *Magazine of Western History*, already cited, gave it such prominence as to awaken, *for the first time*, the spirit of inquiry concerning its true location; and this, under the intelligent examination of William Frederick Poole, soon determined not only that the fortification was on the *west* side, but that it was the *real* "Fort Gage."

"The fort, in which resided the commandant. . . stood on the western bank of the stream." (Coleman, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 790.) This is true as to the fort; but he complicates matters by adding that it was "opposite to and within point-blank range of the town;" while, as already mentioned, it was actually *in* Kaskaskia.

There are several statements in Clark's letter to Mason and in his Memoir, referring to events which transpired subsequent to his capture of Fort Gage,

which clearly show it to have been located in Kaskaskia. Other authorities are not wanting proving beyond a peradventure that such was its position.*

It was about the middle of the eighteenth century that the Jesuits built the stone building in Kaskaskia, known as their seminary, or college. But their order was suppressed in France and its colonies in 1763, and their property confiscated to the Crown. What they were possessed of in and near Kaskaskia consisted of two hundred acres of cultivated land, a very good stock of cattle, and a brewery. They had, too, their college in the southeast portion of the village, while their church edifice (also of stone) was near the center, both of which, considering the out-of-the-way region in which they had been erected, made "a very good appearance." Such of the property of the Jesuits as was needed for public use was retained, and the remainder sold.

[Philip Pittman's *Present State of the European Settlements on the Mississippi* (London: 1770), p. 43. Compare William Frederick Poole's article "The West," in Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, pp. 719-722.] One portion not disposed of was the college building and grounds, and it was this edifice that was afterward fortified and named "Fort Gage," as the following extracts sufficiently prove:

"Fort Gage — the Jesuits' House at Kaskaskia — [was] so named by Captain Lord of the Royal Irish, who, in 1772, surrounded it with stockades 15 feet

* Among these are the letter of Captain Bowman to Hite (before cited) and "Bowman's Journal" (hereafter to be described).

high. It is in the town of Kaskaskia." (Hamilton to Carleton, June 26, 1777: Haldimand MSS.)

"I must inform you that the roof of the house of the fort, which is of shingles, is entirely rotten, being made twenty-five years ago, and that it rains in every where, although I am continually patching it up. If there is much longer delay in putting on a new roof, a house which cost more than forty thousand piasters to the Jesuits will be lost." (Rocheblave to Carleton, February 18, 1778.)

Subsequently to the captain of Fort Gage — that is in June, 1779 — De Peyster at Michilimackinac, wrote:

"The Kaskaskias no ways fortified; the fort being still a sorry picketed enclosure round the Jesuits' college."

The words of Clark that he "broke into the fort," make it certain that some obstacle was overcome in getting inside;—that he did not enter "by a western gate that had been left open," as stated by Mann Butler in his "Valley of the Ohio," in *The Western Journal*, vol. XII, p. 167. And in his *History of Kentucky*, (p. 53), Butler also says:

"The fort was taken; Clark entered it by 'a postern gate left open on the river side of the fortification,' which was 'shown by a hunting soldier, who had been taken prisoner the evening before.' (Judge David Todd, of Missouri, obligingly communicated this circumstance from the papers of the late General Levi Todd, who acted as aid to Colonel Clark.)"

Upon this subject, Bowman, in his letter to Hite, is silent. He only says: "About midnight we marched into the town without being discovered; our object was

the fort, which we soon got possession of.”—Almon’s *Remembrancer* (1779), vol. VIII, p. 82.

The honor of being the first one of Clark’s men to enter the fort is claimed for John Todd:

“The following year [1778] he [Todd] accompanied George Rogers Clark in his expedition to the Illinois and was the first man to enter Fort Gage at Kaskaskia when it was taken from the British.” . . . [Mason’s *Illinois in the Eighteenth Century*, p. 51. See likewise, Davidson and Struve’s *Illinois*, p. 202]. Compare, also, that writer’s article in *Magazine of American History*, vol. VIII, p. 587 and his *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 286, already referred to. (But whether John Todd was in the army at all, doing service under Clark, will hereafter be considered.)

Some Western writers have asserted that, at its capture, Fort Gage was occupied by a considerable force and that all, with Rocheblave, were made prisoners; but this is error.

In the *Magazine of Western History*, vol. II, p. 144, Mary Cone, in her article on the “Expedition and Conquest of George Rogers Clarke” says that “the garrison was well prepared for resistance.” This is successfully criticised by John Moses in the same periodical (vol. iii, p. 269): “There was no garrison to speak of there.” What the first mentioned writer says, is this: “The garrison was well prepared for resistance, and but for the suddenness and unexpectedness of the attack together with their ignorance in regard to the very small number of the attacking force, the taking of the fort would apparently have been impossible.” But, from what is known of Clark’s subsequent valor and of that of his men, under conditions

similar to what would have existed had his coming been known to Rocheblave, it is not *very* apparent that he would not have captured the fort.

Tradition has erroneously given Simon Kenton credit for leading a detachment into the fort and capturing Rocheblave. The substance of this tradition is that Colonel Clark, leading his column, was conducted silently by a guide he had captured, through a postern gate into the open fort, and while with his sturdy warriors he surrounded the sleeping garrison and controlled the defenses of the post, the fearless Simon Kenton at the head of a file of men, advanced softly to the apartment of the commander. While quietly reposing by his wife, he was aroused by a gentle touch, only to behold his own captivity, and to order the unconditional surrender of the fort and its defenders. (See for this fiction and more, Hall's *Sketches of the West*, vol. II, pp. 118, 119; Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 53; Monnette's *History of the Mississippi Valley*, vol. I, p. 418; *Magazine of Western History*, vol. III, p. 269.)

That Kenton was the first man to enter Fort Gage is not impossible, though improbable; and it is certain he did not lead any detachment against the fort. Clark's own words show the fallacy of that assertion: "With the other [division] *I* broke into the fort [the italicising is mine]".

Another version of the tradition is, that a Pennsylvanian had just been captured in one of the houses, "who entertained but little affection for the English name" and who cheerfully acted as guide to Kenton's detachment. But it is clear no house in Kaskaskia was entered before Clark "broke into the fort."

One among the earliest of Illinois historians helps to perpetuate the Kenton error :

“Simon Kenton was with Colonel Clark in the campaign of 1778 to Kaskaskia and headed a party on the night of the 4th of July of that year, who entered Fort Gage and captured Lieut.-Governor Rocheblave in his bed.” [Reynolds, *Pioneer History of Illinois* (ed. of 1887), p. 87.]

But this is not all the fiction that has found its way into print concerning incidents said to have transpired at the time Clark captured Fort Gage. We quote :

“The night on which his [Clark’s] little party from Kentucky reached the Kaskaskia river at Menard’s Gap, they saw, on the opposite bank, the Jesuits’ seminary lighted up, and heard issuing from it the sounds of the violin. Clark, leaving his horses and most of his men on the eastern side, waded across at the warm ford. It was a ball given by the British officers to the French inhabitants. He placed one of his men quietly at each door, outside, with orders to let none pass. He himself, wrapped in his blanket capot, his arms folded, leaning against the door-cheek, looked in upon the dance. An Indian who lay on the floor of the entry, intently gazing at his features in the light reflected from the room, suddenly sprang to his feet and gave the war-whoop. The dancing ceased, the ladies screamed, and the Frenchmen rushed to the door. Clark, without moving from his position, or changing his grave expression, desired them to go on with the dance. ‘The only difference is’, said he, ‘you now dance under Virginia, instead of Great Britain.’ At day-light he and his mounted men were opposite to Fort Chartres, on the crest of the bluff, and by march-

ing along its profile so as to be seen from the fort, countermarching out of sight and again showing themselves in a continuous file, his force appeared so large that the much more numerous enemy capitulated without a shot." From a *Memoir of Ebenezer Denny*, by William H. Denny, prefixed to the Military Journal of the former, in the *Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania*, vol. VII, pp. 217, 218.) That this ridiculous story should have been inspired by Clark himself would indeed be beyond belief were it not that there is sufficient reason showing such to be the fact. (See Note CLI of this Appendix, third paragraph.)

That the Colonel crossed the Kaskaskia river before reaching the fort — "the Jesuits' seminary," is the only reliable statement in the whole story.

A recent writer in combining a small portion of the Kenton fiction with a large part of the erroneous relation last given, says:

"Inside the fort the lights were lit, and through the windows came the sounds of violins. The officers of the post had given a ball, and the mirth-loving creoles, young men and girls, were dancing and revelling within, while the sentinels had left their posts. One of his captives showed Clark a postern gate by the river-side, and through this he entered the fort, having placed his men round about at the entrance. Advancing to the great hall where the revel was held, he leaned silently with folded arms against the doorpost, looking at the dancers. An Indian, lying on the floor of the entry, gazed intently on the stranger's face as the light from the torches within flickered across it, and suddenly sprang to his feet uttering the un-

earthly war-whoop. Instantly the dancing ceased; the women screamed, while the men ran towards the door. But Clark, standing unmoved and with unchanged face, grimly bade them continue their dancing, but to remember that they now danced under Virginia and not Great Britain. At the same time his men burst into the fort, and seized the French officers, including the commandant, Rocheblave." (Roosevelt: *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, pp. 45, 46.) That writer, after giving as fact what is quoted above (which is as we see, not a small part of the story), says in a footnote: "The story was told to Major Denny by Clark himself, some time in '87 or '88 [it was in 1785]; in process of repetition it evidently became twisted, and, as related by Denny, there are some very manifest inaccuracies, but there seems no reason to reject it entirely." By a careful comparison of the relation as first published with Roosevelt, some additional rhetorical "twists" will readily be discovered. Under the Roosevelt version, the lights are "torches"; the dancers are restricted to "the mirth-loving creoles, young men and girls;" a "great hall" is introduced "where the revel was held"; the Indian war-whoop becomes (as well it might! (an "unearthly" one; and Clark's desire to have the dance continued is now a command — "grimly bade them continue their dancing." "At the same time," Clark's "men burst into the fort, and seized the French officers, including the commandant, Rocheblave"— which last relation Roosevelt does not credit Denny with, but gives it as his own — a "twist" nearly equal to any given by the Major.

Butler, in his *History of Kentucky* (p. 53), erroneously declares that the public papers in the fort were

not captured, out of delicacy to the wife of the commander, she "presuming a good deal on the gallantry of our countrymen by imposing upon their delicacy towards herself". . . . "Better, ten thousand times better," Butler adds, "were it so, than that the ancient fame of the sons of Virginia should have been tarnished by insult to a female."

And Reynolds (*Pioneer History of Illinois*, 2d ed. p. 95) says: "the gentlemanly bearing of Col. Clark made him respect female prerogative, and the lady [Mrs. Rocheblave] secured the [public] papers in that adroit manner peculiar to female sagacity."

In another history of that state, the men who captured Rocheblave — "the British governor"— are mentioned as "Kentuckians"; and it is asserted they captured a few of his public papers only, "as they were secreted or destroyed by his wife, whom the Kentuckians were too polite to molest." [Collins's *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877) p. 137.] But Bowman declares *all* were secured by Clark; and such undoubtedly was the fact, still, we will add what Coleman says (*Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 791): "There were important papers in this gentlemen's [Rocheblave's] possession which Clark was anxious to obtain; but Madame Rocheblane [Rocheblave] resolutely seated herself upon the chest that contained them in order to prevent a search; in which she was more successful than the Queen of Poland, who tried the same manœuvre with Frederick the Great, when that ungallant monarch captured Dresden. But Clark had not got rid of his American respect for the sex."

Much has been written concerning the taking of Kaskaskia. One writer says:

“But, although the town was taken, the work was hardly begun. The object was to act on the minds of the inhabitants. For this purpose, not force, but judgment and tact were necessary. . . . Let us imagine then the situation of this ancient place, which contained about two hundred and fifty houses, and had stood for a century and a half in the midst of a blooming prairie, its simple and peaceful French inhabitants dealing only with the Indians and the present generation of them almost ignorant of any other race. Taught to regard the Americans as monsters of cruelty, they found their town suddenly fallen into their hands. Gloom and fear dwelt visibly on the faces of all. To increase this feeling, Clark commanded all intercourse among the inhabitants and between them and the soldiers to cease.” [The *North American Review*, vol. XLIII (July, 1836), pp. 15, 16.]

In this there are two important errors to be noticed: (1) Kaskaskia “had stood” not “a century and a half,” but a little over three-quarters of a century. (2) Clark ordered the inhabitants “on pain of death,” as he says (Clark to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 31) “to keep close to their houses”; and in his Memoir — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 125 — he states: “the men of each detachment who could speak the French language, were to run through every street and proclaim what had happened, and inform the inhabitants that every person who appeared in the streets would be shot down.” The conclusion is drawn from these last words by the reviewer, that Clark commanded all intercourse among the inhabitants and between them and the soldiers to cease.” But the state-

ment is based on a previous one given by Butler in his *Kentucky*; and it may here be stated that all other matters given by the former in the same relation have a foundation in the same history, of which that article is a review.

What Clark really says in his Memoir (pp. 124, 125 of Dillon's *Indiana*) is this:

"With one of the divisions, I marched to the fort, and ordered the other two [one] into different quarters of the town. If I met with no resistance, at a certain signal a general shout was to be given, and certain parts [of the town] were to be immediately possessed; and the men of each detachment who could speak the French language, were to run through every street and proclaim what had happened, and inform the inhabitants that every person who appeared in the streets would be shot down. This disposition had its desired effect. In a very little time we had complete possession; and every avenue was guarded, to prevent any escape, to give the alarm to the other villages in case of opposition. Various orders had been issued not worth mentioning. I don't suppose greater silence ever reigned among the inhabitants of a place than did at this at present: not a person to be seen, not a word to be heard from them for some time; but designedly the greatest noise kept up by our troops through every quarter of the town, and patrols continually the whole night round it; as intercepting any information was a capital object; and in about two hours the whole of the inhabitants were disarmed, and informed that if one was taken attempting to make his escape he should be immediately put to death."

Coleman (*Harper's Magazine*, vol XXII, p. 791) says, concerning the effect produced upon the Kaskaskians by the "horrid uproar" of Clark's men: "He [Clark] ordered his men to patrol the streets during the whole night with whoops and yells, while the inhabitants remained with closed doors, listening shudderingly to the horrid uproar; expecting every instant to hear the shrieks and groans of their kindred and friends announcing the commencing of a general massacre."

"In his 'Memoir' Clark dwells at length," says Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 47n) "on the artifices by which he heightened the terror of the French; and Butler [in his *Kentucky*, pp. 54, 55] enlarges still farther upon them. I follow the letter to Mason [*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 31], which is much safer authority, the writer [Clark] having then no thought of trying to increase the dramatic effect of the situation — which in Butler, and indeed in the 'Memoir' also, is strained till it comes dangerously near bathos."

Just how closely Roosevelt follows Clark to Mason the following comparison will show:

(I.) Clark to Mason (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 31: "In fifteen minutes, I had every street secured, [I] sent runners through the town ordering the people on pain of death to keep close to their houses, which they observed, and before day light [I] had the whole town disarmed. Nothing could excel the confusion these people seemed to be in, being [having been] taught to expect nothing but savage treatment from the Americans."

(II.) Roosevelt (*The Winning of the West*, vol. II, pp. 46, 47): "Immediately Clark had every street secured, and sent runners through the town ordering the people to keep close to their houses on pain of death; and by daylight he had them all disarmed. The backwoodsmen patrolled the town in little squads; while the French in silent terror cowered within their low-roofed houses. Clark was quite willing that they should fear the worst; and their panic was very great. The unlooked-for and mysterious approach and sudden onslaught of the backwoodsmen, their wild and uncouth appearance, and the ominous silence of their commander, all combined to fill the French with fearful forebodings for their future fate."

NOTE XLIX.

WHAT CLARK (ACCORDING TO HIS MEMOIR) SAID TO
THE KASKASKIAN DEPUTIES ON BEING SENT FOR
BY HIM.

The priest [Gibault] accompanied by several gentlemen waited on Colonel Clark, and expressed in the name of the village their thanks for the indulgence they had received. They were sensible that their present situation was the fate of war and that they could submit to the loss of their property, but they solicited that they might not be separated from their wives and children, and that some clothes and provisions might be allowed for their support. Clark feigned surprise at this request, and almost exclaimed:

“Do you mistake us for savages? I am almost certain you do from your language! Do you think the Americans intend to strip women and children, or take the bread out of their mouths?” “My countrymen,” said Clark, “disdain to make war upon helpless innocence. It was to prevent the horrors of Indian butchery upon our own wives and children that we have taken arms and penetrated into this remote stronghold of British and Indian barbarity, and not the despicable prospect of plunder.” That now the King of France had united his powerful arms with those of America, the war would not, in all probability continue long; but the inhabitants of Kaskaskia were at liberty to take which side they pleased, without the least danger to either their property or families. Nor would their religion be any source of disagreement, as all religions were regarded with equal respect in the eye of the American law, and that any insult offered it would be immediately punished. “And now, to prove my sincerity, you will please inform your fellow-citizens that they are quite at liberty to conduct themselves as usual without the least apprehension. I am now convinced from what I have learned since my arrival among you that you have been misinformed and prejudiced against us by the British officers; and your friends who are in confinement shall immediately be released.”

In a few minutes after the delivery of this speech, the gloom that rested on the minds of the inhabitants had passed away. The agitation and joy of the village seniors, upon hearing what Clark had said may well be conceived; they attempted some apology for the implied imputation of barbarians, under the belief that the property of a captured town belonged to the

conquerors; Clark gently dispensed with this explanation and desired them to relieve the anxieties of the inhabitants immediately, requiring them to comply strictly with the terms of a proclamation which he would shortly publish. The contrast of feeling among the people upon learning these generous and magnanimous intentions of their conquerors, verified the sagacious anticipations of Clark. In a few moments, the mortal dejection of the village was converted into the most extravagant joy; the bells were set a ringing, and the church was crowded with the people offering up thanks to Almighty God for their deliverance from the horrors they had so fearfully expected. Perfect freedom was now given to the inhabitants to go or come as they pleased, so confident were our countrymen that whatever report might be made [it] would be to the credit and success of the American arms. (Butler's *Kentucky*, pp. 55-57; Dillon's *Indiana*, pp. 125-127.)

NOTE L.

AS TO THE WINNING OF VINCENNES TO AMERICAN INTERESTS BY FATHER GIBAULT.— ALSO CONCERNING SIMON KENTON ACTING AS A SPY FOR CLARK.

As the jurisdiction of Father Gibault in spiritual matters extended not only over the several villages in the Illinois country but over Vincennes as well, he had of course considerable influence with his creoles of the last mentioned town. "I sent for him," are Clark's words in his Memoirs, "and had a long conference with him on the subject of Vincennes." "In answer

to all my queries," continues Clark, "he informed me he did not think it worth my while to cause any military preparation to be made at the Falls for the attack of Vincennes, although the place was strong and [there was] a great number of Indians in its neighborhood, who, to his knowledge were generally at war; that Governor Abbott had a few weeks before left the place, on some business, for Detroit; and that he [Gibault] expected that, when the inhabitants there were fully acquainted with what had passed at Illinois and had been made fully acquainted with the nature of the war, that their sentiments would greatly change."

Gibault then suggested to Clark that he believed his (Gibault's) appearance at Vincennes would have great weight even with the savages in changing their sentiments; that if it was agreeable to the commander he would take this business on himself; that he had no doubt of his being able to bring the place over to the American interest without Clark being at the trouble to march against it; and that his work being spiritual, he wished that another person might be charged with the temporal part of the embassy but that he would privately direct the whole.

It has frequently been published that Clark sent for Gibault *to go to Vincennes* to win the people there to the American cause. But this, evidently, is error.

"The post of St. Vincent's [Vincennes] lay no great distance off between his [Clark's] present position and Kentucky and garrisoned by a force superior to any which Clark could possibly bring against it. Policy, therefore, and not force must again be resorted to."—*The North American Review*, vol. XLIII (July, 1836); p. 17. The use of the word "again" here implies

that policy and not force had only been resorted to in securing possession of the Illinois; which, of course, is erroneous. The force in Vincennes to guard the place was, as we have seen, three militia companies.

Clark, in his account detailed in his Memoir, giving what took place immediately after Vincennes had declared for America, evidently draws largely upon his imagination: "The people here [at Vincennes] immediately began to put on a new face, and to talk in a different style, and to act as perfect freemen. With a garrison of their own, with the United States at their elbow, their language to the Indians was immediately altered. They began as citizens of the United States, and informed the Indians that their old father, the king of France, was come to life again, and was mad at them for fighting for the English, that they would advise them to make peace with the Americans as soon as they could, otherwise they might expect the land to be very bloody. . . . The Indians began to think seriously."

Clark speaks of the disaffected in Vincennes as being "emissaries" of Abbott; but this is misleading. It is evident they were only traders. Some writers have gone so far as to declare they were British soldiers, which is certainly error.

Mr. Moses (*Illinois, Historical and Statistical*, vol. I, p. 153) says: "Post Vincennes" was "called by the British Fort Sackville." But it was simply the fortification that was thus known. The village *and* the fort were called "Post Vincennes" — "Post St. Vincents" — "the Post —" "St. Vincents" — or, "Vincennes" as now known.

Much error has been printed in the histories of the West concerning Simon Kenton's return from the Illinois: "After the fall of Kaskaskia," says one account, "he [Kenton] was sent with a small party to Kentucky with dispatches. On their way, they fell in with a camp of Indians, in whose possession was a number of horses, which they took and sent back to the army [i. e., to Clark's army]. Pursuing their way by Vincennes, they entered the place by night, traversed several of the streets, and departed without being discovered, taking from the inhabitants, who were hostile, two horses for each man. When they came to White river, a raft was made, on which to transport the guns and baggage, while the horses were driven in to swim across the river. On the opposite shore, a party of Indians were encamped, who caught the horses as they ascended the bank. Such are the vicissitudes of border incident! The same horses that had been audaciously taken, only the night before, from the interior of a regularly garrisoned town, were lost, by being accidentally driven by the captors into a camp of the enemy. Kenton and his party, finding themselves in the utmost danger, returned to the shore from which they had pushed their raft, and concealed themselves until night, when they crossed the river at a different place, and reached Kentucky in safety." (Hall's *Romance of Western History*, pp. 300, 301.)

Other printed statements vary this in some particulars: "No sooner had the Illinois posts and country been subdued and quietly occupied by the Virginians, than Kenton, seeking more active adventures in Kentucky, was made the bearer of dispatches to Colonel Bowman at Harrodsburg, and undertook, in

his route thither, to reconnoiter the British post at Vincennes, on the Wabash, in order to furnish Colonel Clark with correct information of its condition, force and the feelings of the people. At Vincennes, after lying concealed by day and reconnoitering by night for three days and nights, he transmitted to Colonel Clark the true state of the post, informing him of its weakness and the disaffection of the people. Thirteen days after his departure from Vincennes, he arrived in Harrodsburg and delivered his dispatches safe to Colonel Bowman." [Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. II, pp. 66, 67; — McDonald's *Sketches*, p. 220.)

Another writer gives these particulars :

"His [Kenton's] active and enterprising spirit had induced him to join Colonel George Rogers Clark and [he] was with him at the capture of Kaskaskia. After the fall of that place Butler [Kenton] with others was sent to Kentucky with dispatches; on their way they fell in with a camp of Indians with horses; they broke up the camp, took the horses, sent them back to Kaskaskias, and pursued their route by post St. Vincennes. Entering that place by night, they traversed several streets and departed without discovery or alarm after taking from the inhabitants who were hostile two horses for each man. When they came to White river a raft was made on which to transport the guns and baggage, while the horses were driven in to swim across the river. On the opposite shore there lay a camp of Indians who caught the horses as they rose the bank.

"Butler [Kenton] and his party now finding themselves in the utmost danger permitted the raft to float

down stream and concealed themselves till night, when they made another raft at a different place on which they crossed the river; returned safe to Kentucky and delivered the letters as they had been directed; some of them were intended for the seat of Government [of Virginia.]” (Marshall’s *Kentucky*, vol. I, p. 74.)

“After the conquest of Kaskaskia, Col. Clark sent Kenton with dispatches to the ‘Falls,’ and to pass by Vincennes in his route. Kenton lay concealed during the day for three days, and reconnoitered the village of Vincennes during the nights. He acquitted himself as usual in this service to the satisfaction of his general. He employed a trusty messenger to convey the intelligence of the feelings, numbers, etc., of the people of Vincennes to Col. Clark at Kaskaskia.” [Reynolds: *The Pioneer History of Illinois* (ed. of 1887), p. 87. Compare Collins’s *Kentucky* (ed. of 1877), p. 446.]

Says a writer in *Harper’s Magazine* (vol. XXVIII, p. 302): “Kenton acted as guide to Clark on his famous expedition into the Illinois and was sent back by him with dispatches of great importance; on which occasion he passed through the town of Vincennes (then garrisoned by the enemy) in the night, examined minutely its condition, sent back to Clark the information thus gained, by a companion, stole a horse, and made his way alone to the Falls [of the Ohio].”

NOTE LI.

FICTION CONCERNING AN ATTACK MEDITATED AGAINST KENTUCKY FROM THE BRITISH POSTS NORTHWEST OF THE OHIO RIVER.

Concerning the securing by Clark of the people of Vincennes in the interest of the Americans a modern writer says:

“But a more serious trouble now [that is, after Capt. Bowman had taken possession of Cahokia] began to weigh heavily upon Clark’s mind. He had barely made himself master of Kaskaskia before he learned how very timely his bold enterprise had been. For he was informed by the people that the British Governor of these posts [Rocheblave, whose true name was unknown to this writer] was actively engaged in organizing an expedition against Kentucky, backed by the whole power of the Indian tribes residing between the Ohio, the Mississippi and the lakes. The expedition was to move simultaneously from Detroit and Kaskaskia — one party entering Kentucky by way of the falls of the former river [Ohio, now Louisville] while the other made its way down the Great Miami and up the Licking; both being furnished with field artillery. This expedition, which had been anticipated by the promptness of Clark’s own attack, was to have set out in the following spring — of 1779 — and Governor Abbott [of Vincennes] straining every resource to complete its organization, had proceeded, a few days before the arrival of the Americans, from Vincennes to Detroit in order to attend to the equipment of the regulars and Canadian volunteers destined to co-oper-

ate with the savage host in this grand movement, leaving the latter place, with all the artillery and stores there collected, under the care of the local militia. It was absolutely necessary for Clark to gain possession of this place [Vincennes]; for he could not permit so strong a post within striking distance of his present position to remain in the enemy's hands. Besides, the possession of these very stores and guns had been specified in his instructions as one of the great results expected from the enterprise.

[It was the stores and guns at Kaskaskia, not Vincennes, that were hoped for, in the instructions given by Governor Henry to Clark.]

“But how was it to be done? After the detachment under Bowman was made [to go to Cahokia], he [Clark] had remaining with him less than one hundred and fifty men. He dared not make any further division of this small force, lest it should be cut off in detail by the savages, large parties of whom were hovering around him at a distance. [But there were no Indians hovering around Clark at this time.] While meditating on his desperate situation the good priest Gibault happened to pay him a visit, and being made acquainted with his perplexity, at once volunteered to relieve him of it by going to the people of Vincennes, who were also under his pastoral charge, and inducing them, like their neighbors of Kaskaskia and Cahokia, to throw off the English yoke, and accept the protection of Virginia. The result justified his confidence. The people eagerly complied with his advice, and in an hour the English flag was hauled down and the stars and stripes run up over the fort, much to the amazement of the Indians, who were assembled around

the place in great numbers." (Coleman, in *Harper's Magazine*, vol. XXII, p. 792.)

That Rocheblave had taken any steps towards "organizing an expedition against Kentucky" previous to Clark's arrival at Kaskaskia is error; neither had Lieutenant Governor Abbott at Vincennes exerted himself in any manner to forward such a movement; nor was his return to Detroit in any wise to aid such an undertaking; and for the best of reasons: no such enterprise was in contemplation (much less in actual preparation) either at Kaskaskia, Vincennes or Detroit. What, as will hereafter be seen, was, at one time, subsequently, much desired (and possibly, suggested) by Hamilton is made to travel backwards, forming a story wholly without foundation. And it is substantially the same fiction that some writers have asserted as fact, and that the information was brought to Clark by the two "spies" sent by him to the Illinois in the year 1777.

NOTE LII.

AS TO M. CERRE AND HIS TREATMENT BY CLARK.

Mann Butler, in his *History of Kentucky*, says: "During the night [of the capture of Kaskaskia] several persons were sent for to obtain intelligence; but little information could be procured beyond what had already been received except that a considerable body of Indians lay at this time in the neighborhood of Cahokia, about sixty miles higher up the Mississippi; and that M. Cerre (the father of the present Madame Auguste Chouteau) of St. Louis, the princi-

pal merchant of Kaskaskia, was at that time one of the most inveterate enemies of the Americans. This gentleman had left town before Clark had captured it, and was now in St. Louis on his way to Quebec whence he had lately returned, in the prosecution of extensive commercial operations; his family and an extensive assortment of merchandise were in Kaskaskia. By means of these pledges in his power, Colonel Clark thought to operate upon M. Cerre, whose influence was of the utmost consequence in the condition of American interest, if it could be brought to be exerted in its favor. With the view of gaining this gentleman, a guard was immediately placed around his house and seals placed on his property as well as on all the other merchandise in the place [pp. 53, 54].”

And the author also says :

“About this time, M. Cerré . . . uneasy that his family at Kaskaskia should be the only one placed under guard and fearful of venturing into the power of the American officer without a safe conduct, procured the recommendation of the Spanish Governor at St. Louis, as well as [that of] the commandant at Ste. Genevieve, supported by the influence of the greater part of the citizens, for the purpose of obtaining this security. It was all in vain; Colonel Clark peremptorily refused it; and intimated that he wished to hear no more such applications; that he understood M. Cerré was ‘a sensible man’ and if he was innocent of the charge of inciting the Indians against the Americans, he need not be afraid of delivering himself up. This backwardness would only increase the suspicion against him. Shortly after this expression of Clark’s sentiments, M. Cerré, to whom they were no

doubt communicated, repaired to Kaskaskia and without visiting his family, immediately waited on Colonel Clark, who informed him that the crime with which he stood charged was [that of] encouraging the Indians in their murders and devastations on our frontiers. An enormity, whose perpetrators, continued the American commander, it behöoved every civilized people to punish whenever they got such violators of the laws of honorable warfare within their power. To this accusation, M. Cerré frankly replied that he was a mere merchant, and had never been concerned in affairs of state beyond what the interests of his business required; moreover, his remote position had prevented him from understanding the merits of the war now raging between the United States and Great Britain. He defied, he said, any man to prove that he had encouraged the Indian barbarities, while many could be produced who had heard him express his disapprobation of all such cruelties; though, at the same time, it was necessary to inform Colonel Clark that there were numbers indebted to him, who might by his ruin seek to discharge their pecuniary obligations to him. In fine, this eminent French merchant declared his willingness to support the strictest inquiry into the only heinous charge against him. This was every thing the American officer required; he desired M. Cerré to retire into another room while he sent for his accusers: they immediately attended followed by the greater part of the inhabitants. M. Cerré was summoned to confront them; the former immediately shewed their confusion at his appearance; the parties were told by Colonel Clark that he had no disposition to condemn a man unheard; that M. Cerré was now present, and he

(Clark) was ready to do justice to the civilized world by punishing him if guilty of inciting the Indians to commit their enormities on helpless women and children. The accusers began to whisper to one another and retire; until but one was left of six or seven at first; this person was asked for his proof, but he had none to produce, and M. Cerré was honorably acquitted, not more to his own satisfaction than to that of his neighbors and friends. He was then congratulated by Colonel Clark upon his acquittal and informed that, although his becoming an American citizen would be highly acceptable, yet if he did not sincerely wish to do so, he was perfectly at liberty to dispose of his property and to remove elsewhere. Cerré, delighted at the fair and generous treatment he had met with, immediately took the oath of allegiance and became a 'most valuable' friend to the American cause [pp. 59-61]."

NOTE LIII.

BOWMAN'S LETTER TO HITE.— ROCHEBLAVE SENT A PRISONER OF WAR TO WILLIAMSBURG.

In Bowman's letter to Hite, the Captain says, after mentioning that Rocheblave was made prisoner when the fort at Kaskaskia was taken, — "and [he, Rocheblave,] is now [July 30, 1778 — the date of his letter] on his way to Williamsburg under strong guard." But, as this was written at Cahokia, it is not surprising that the writer of the letter made a mistake; as he doubtless had been informed that the prisoner would start on before that day, — when, as a matter of fact he was still in his prison.

As Bowman entrusted his letter to his brother, who was one of Clark's soldiers who concluded to return at the expiration of his enlistment, it is probable it was sent off from Cahokia the day it was written.

The letter, as printed, has this heading: "Baltimore, Dec. 29, [1778]. Copy of a letter from Capt. Joseph Bowman, at a place called *Illinois* Kaskaskias, upon the Mississippi, to his friend, Col. JOSEPH HITE, of Frederick county, Virginia, dated July 30, 1778."

That the letter was written at Cahokia, its contents clearly disclose. The Captain, after mentioning the circumstance that there were three hundred at that village who had taken the oath of allegiance, adds:—"and now [these inhabitants] appear much attached to our cause. But *as this is in so remote a part of the country* [of the Illinois] and [as] the Indians [are] meeting with daily supplies from the British officers, who offer them large bounties for our scalps [but in this he was in error], *I think it prudent to leave a guard here.*" [The italicising is mine.]

And thus the Captain begins his letter: "I embrace this opportunity to give you some information of our proceedings since our embarkation from Monongahela till our arrival *at this place.*" (The italicising in this extract also is mine.)

Now, as the last "proceedings" he mentions were at Cahokia,—it will be seen that "at this place" must refer to that village.

"Being anxious," concludes Bowman, "to do everything in my power for my country in order to establish peace and harmony once more amongst us—this will engage my attention the ensuing winter.

"The inhabitants of this country upon the Mississippi have without any kind of doubt, influenced the several nations of Indians in this quarter, as also upon the Ohio; so that ere it be long, I flatter myself we shall put a stop to the career of those bloodthirsty savages who glory in shedding the blood of the innocent.

"For further particulars, I must refer you to my brother, the bearer hereof. And I am, etc.,

"JOSEPH BOWMAN."

It is a tradition (but an erroneous one) that Clark was at first inclined to treat Rocheblave leniently; that he had, upon reflection, determined to give him back his slaves; and that he invited his prisoner to dine with himself and officers, when he would take occasion to restore them to their owner; but that the violent and insulting language of the deposed Frenchman entirely frustrated the Colonel's benevolent design. This would be creditable to Clark's kindness of heart — if true. Kentucky historians have added to this account, in a way to make it more emphatic, but with the result of increasing its improbability. Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 64) says:

"In regard to this officer [Rocheblave] who expressed himself with great bitterness of the Americans and the natives who had sided with them, Colonel Clark exerted himself very much to procure a restoration to Mrs. Rocheblave, of his slaves, that had been seized as public plunder. This was attempted by inviting him to a dinner with some of the officers as well as with his acquaintance [sic.] where this restitution was, it seems, to have been offered; but it was entirely frustrated by the violent and insulting lan-

guage of the former commandant; he called them a parcel of rebels, and provoked such indignation that he was immediately sent to the guard house; all further thoughts of saving his slaves were now abandoned."

"In 1778, when Colonel George Rogers Clark, and his Virginia militia, numbering less than two hundred men, achieved the bloodless conquest of the Illinois, not a single British soldier was found doing duty in the country, they having all been withdrawn to other and more important points. M. de Rocheblave was still in command for the English at Fort Gage; but, owing to his contumacious behavior, he was sent a prisoner of war to Virginia." . . . Wallace: *The History of Illinois and Louisiana under the French Rule*, (p. 402).

But it is evident that Rocheblave's conduct had nothing to do with his being put in irons, with his slaves being finally disposed of, nor with his being sent a prisoner of war over the mountains. The same policy, as will hereafter be seen, was adopted by the American commander in even a more notable instance, of sending dangerous prisoners to Williamsburg to be out of harm's way. It was, indeed, a policy that would naturally have recommended itself to Clark, however excellent might have been the behavior of the captured.

The confiscation of Rocheblave's private property was not approved of by Governor Henry; and he subsequently issued orders that it must be restored to his wife, if possible; but, if that could not be done, his family was to be supported at the public expense (Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 293.)

NOTE LIV.

CONSPIRACY OF A PARTY OF WINNEBAGOES AND OTHER INDIANS AT CAHOKIA TO CARRY OFF CLARK.

Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 72-75) gives the following account of the conspiracy of the Winnebagoes and other Indians at Cahokia, to get possession of the person of Clark — declaring it was their intention to kill him :

“A party of Indians, composed of stragglers from various tribes, by the name of Meadow Indians, had accompanied the other tribes, and had been promised a great reward if they would kill Colonel Clark. For this purpose they had pitched their camp about a hundred yards from Clark’s quarters, and about the same distance in front of the fort, on the same side of Cahokia creek with the one occupied by the Americans. This creek was about knee-deep at the time, and a plot was formed by some of the Indians to pass the creek after night, fire their guns in the direction of the Indians on the other side of the creek, and then fly to Clark’s quarters, where they were to seek admission under pretense of fleeing from their enemies, and put Colonel Clark and the garrison to death. About one o’clock in the morning while Colonel Clark was still awake with the multiplied cares of his extraordinary situation, the attempt was made ; and the flying party, having discharged their guns so as to throw suspicion upon the other Indians, came running to the American camp for protection, as they said, from their enemies, who had attacked them from across the creek. This, the guard, who proved to be in greater force than was

anticipated, prevented by presenting their pieces at the fugitives, who were compelled to return to their own camp.

“The whole town and garrison were now under arms, and these Indians, whom the guard had recognized by moonlight, were sent for, and on being examined, they declared it was their enemies who had fired upon them from across the creek, and that they had sought shelter among the Americans. Some of the French gentlemen who knew these Indians better than the new conquerors, called for a light, and discovered their moccasins and leggings to be quite wet and muddy, from having passed the creek over to the friendly camps. This discovery quite confounded the assassins; and, as there were a great many Indians of other tribes in the town, Clark thought the opportunity favorable to convince them of the closest union between the Americans and the French; he therefore surrendered the culprits to the French, to do what they pleased with them. Secret instructions were, however, given that the chiefs ought to be sent to the guard-house in irons; these directions were immediately executed.

“In this manacled condition they were brought every day into council, but not suffered to speak until all the other business was transacted, when Colonel Clark, ordered their irons to be taken off, and told them everybody said they ought to die for their treacherous attempt upon his life, amidst the sacred deliberations of a council. He had determined to inflict death upon them for their base attempt, and they themselves must be sensible that they had justly forfeited their lives; but, on considering the meanness of watching

a bear and catching him asleep, he had found out that they were not warriors, only old women and too mean to be punished by the Big Knife. 'But, as you ought to be punished,' said he, 'for putting on breechcloth like men, they shall be taken away from you, plenty of provisions shall be given you for your journey home, as women don't know how to hunt, and during your stay you shall be treated in every respect as squaws.' Then, without taking any further notice of these offenders, Colonel Clark turned off and began to converse with other persons.

"This treatment appeared to agitate the offending Indians to their very hearts. In a short time one of their chiefs arose with a pipe and belt of peace, which he offered to Clark, and made a speech; but he [Clark] would not suffer it to be interpreted, and a sword lying on the table, he took it and indignantly broke the pipe which had been laid before him, declaring the Big Knife never treated with women. The offending tribe then appeared busy in conversation among themselves; when suddenly two of their young men advanced into the middle of the floor, sat down, and flung their blankets over their heads, to the astonishment of the whole assembly, when two chiefs arose, and, with a pipe of peace, stood by the side of these victims, and offered their lives to Colonel Clark as an atonement for the offense of the tribe. They hoped the sacrifice would appease the Big Knife, and they again offered the pipe. Clark would not yet admit a reconciliation with them, but directed them in a milder tone than before to be seated, for he would have nothing to say to them. After keeping them some time longer in suspense, Colonel Clark, deeply affected

by the magnanimity of these rude sons of the forest, ordered the young men to rise and uncover themselves, said he was glad to find there were men in all nations, and through them granted peace to their tribe.”

NOTE LV.

CLARK'S COUNCIL WITH INDIAN TRIBES AT CAHOKIA.

According to Clark's Memoir — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 131-135, at the commencement of the council a speech was made by an Indian chief and replied to the next day by Clark. On the third day a rejoinder by the Indian speaker was listened to. All these speeches were first copied by Butler from the Memoir of Clark before they were seen by Dillon. (See his *History of Kentucky*, pp. 68-71.) It is clear that Clark draws largely upon his imagination in giving so circumstantially these oratorical efforts, after many years had elapsed since their delivery.

Dillon, in his *Indiana* (ed. of 1859, p. 135), says that Clark made peace, at Cahokia, with the Piankeshaws, Weas, Kickapoos, Illinois, Kaskaskias, Peorias, and branches of some other tribes that inhabited the country between Lake Michigan and the Mississippi. But the three tribes first named — the Wabash Indians — were not treated with at Cahokia; and Clark had previously made peace with the Kaskaskias and Peorias.

“Before the close of September,” says Monnette (*History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol I, p. 423), “Colonel Clark had commenced his negotiations

with the Indian tribes occupying the regions drained by the Illinois and Upper Mississippi rivers. Believing it impolitic, and a mistaken estimate of Indian character, to invite them to treaties of peace and friendship, he lost no opportunity of impressing them with the power of the Americans and the high sense of honor which regulated all their military operations, no less than the unalterable determination to punish their enemies. Long acquainted with the Indian character, he maintained his dignified and stern reserve until they should ask for peace and treaties; *and he fought them fiercely until they did sue for peace.*" (The italicising is mine).

But Colonel Clark had no contest with Indians at this period; he did not fight any — neither those whose homes were not far away nor those who had their villages upon the Illinois and Upper Mississippi rivers, or elsewhere. The nearest approach to any hostilities was when some "Puans [Winnebagoes] and others" endeavored, at Cahokia, to carry off Clark, the latter making promises of the savages who engaged in the undertaking, putting some of the greatest chiefs among them in irons, but soon releasing them, as already fully explained.

" 'Domestic affairs,' says the Colonel [Clark], 'being thus pretty well settled, the Indian department came next to be the object of my attention.' This, indeed, was the most delicate and difficult portion of his task. To win the friendship, or at least secure the neutrality of the Indians was one of the primary objects of the campaign. The Chippewas, Ottawas, Potawatamies, Sacs, Foxes — in a word, nearly all the leading tribes of the West — were represented in the

repeated conferences held between Col. Clark and the savages, delegations of braves in some instances traveling a distance of five hundred miles in order to be present." — John Moses, in *Illinois: Historical and Statistical*, vol. I, p. 153. But no nation east of the *Wabash* or *Maumee*, in the West, was represented at any conference held by Clark.

"Those nations who have treated with me have behaved since very well, to-wit: the Piankeshaws, Kickapoos, Weas, of the *Wabash* river; the Kaskaskias, Peorias, Mitchigamies, Foxes, Sacs, Opays, Illinois and Pones [Pottawattamies], nations of the Mississippi and Illinois rivers. Part of the Chippewas have also treated and are peaceable." — Clark to the Governor of Va., Apr. 29, 1779, from Kaskaskia.

The list in Clark's letter to Mason (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 41) includes the Winnebagoes ("Puans") and Miamis, also the Ottowas and one or two others — all treated with at Cahokia.

NOTE LVI.

CLARK'S INTERVIEW WITH THE CHIPPEWA CHIEF BLACKBIRD.

Concerning Clark's interview with the Chippewa chief, Blackbird, Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 75, 77) says:

"Colonel Clark now turned his attention to Saquina, or Blackbird, and Nakioun, two chiefs of the Sotairs [Chippewas] and Ottawa tribes bordering on Lake Michigan. The former of these chiefs had been

in St. Louis, when Clark first invaded the country, and not trusting to Spanish protection, had returned to his tribe; though he had sent a letter to Clark apologizing for his absence. He was found on inquiry to possess so much influence over considerable bands about St. Joseph's, of Lake Michigan, that Colonel Clark departed from his usual distant policy and invited him by a special messenger to come to Kaskaskia. The invitation was immediately complied with and Blackbird visited Colonel Clark with only eight attendants. After the party had recovered from their fatigue, preparations were made as usual for a council, with the ceremonies generally practiced. These were no sooner noticed by the sagacious chief than he informed Colonel Clark that he came on business of importance to both, and desired that no time might be lost on ceremonies. This chief declared he wanted much conversation with Colonel Clark, and would prefer sitting at the same table with him to all the parade and formality which could be used. Accordingly a room was prepared for this straightforward and direct chief and his American cotemporary: they both with their seats at the same table, having interpreters seated to the right and left. Black Bird opened the conference by saying, 'he had long wished to enjoy a conversation with a chief of our nation: he had conversed with prisoners, but he could not confide in them for they seemed to be afraid to speak the truth. That he had engaged in the war against us was true, although doubts of its justice always crossed his mind owing to our appearing to be the same nation with the British. Some mystery hung over the matter which he wanted removed; his anxiety was to hear both sides, while he

had hitherto only been able to hear one.' Clark readily undertook to satisfy this inquisitive chief and compelled as he was to employ smiles for so many ideas foreign to barbarous society, it took him nearly half a day to answer the inquiries of the Indian. This was accomplished to his entire satisfaction and he expressed himself convinced that the Americans were perfectly right; he was glad that their old friends the French, had united their armies with ours, and the Indians ought to do the same. But as we did not wish this, his countrymen he thought, ought at least to be neutral. He was convinced the English must be afraid because they gave the Indians so many goods to fight for them; his sentiments, he said, were fixed in our favor; and he would no longer listen to the offers of the English. He would put an end to the war, and would call all his young men in as soon as he could get home and have an opportunity of explaining the nature of the war to them.

“This display of the chief's sentiments may well be conceived to have given Clark the utmost satisfaction; and he promised to write to the Governor of Virginia respecting his friendly conduct, and to have him registered among the friends of the Big Knife. In a few days the chief set off for his native forests accompanied at his desire by an agent of Clark. A couple of pack-horses were loaded with provisions and presents for this sagacious and sensible Indian, who continued a faithful friend to American interests.”

NOTE LVII.

CLARK AND DE LEYBA'S CONVIVIALITY.

Clark speaks of De Leyba as "Lieutenant-Governor of Western Illinois," instead of "Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana;" as the former designation was still in vogue.

"Fernando de Leyba, governor of the western part of the Illinois [that is, of that part lying *west* of the Mississippi, which then belonged to Spain] was in command at St. Louis from June 14, 1777, to June 27, 1780, when he died. According to traditional report in St. Louis generally accepted (see *Primm*, p. 10, who, however, exaggerates), De Leyba was given to conviviality and indulged occasionally over much in the wine cup. Clark himself was fond of pleasure and his glass. It is not unlikely the 'intimacy' he speaks of and the 'freedom almost to excess,' that gave the greatest pleasure were illustrated in social entertainments in which he and De Leyba, boon companions for the time being, put aside reserve and enjoyed themselves freely. On these occasions, Clark probably preferred the stronger stimulant to which he was accustomed, and the Spaniard chose the weaker, but equally effective, juice of the grape.

"There was besides another tie uniting Clark and De Leyba . . . namely, Francis Vigo. This gentleman early interested himself in Clark's success and was practically active in promoting it; their relations were certainly intimate. Vigo was not only a personal friend of De Leyba, but connected with him in business. When the Spanish Lieutenant Governor died he

appointed Vigo his testamentary executor." . . .
 [O. W. Collett, in *Magazine of Western History*, vol.
 I (Feb. 1885), p. 274n.]

Collett thinks that when this conviviality existed
 in so marked a manner between the two was when
 Clark was at Cahokia.

NOTE LVIII.

BRITISH ACCOUNTS OF THE TREATMENT ACCORDED ROCHEBLAVE AND CERRE' BY COLONEL CLARK.

The news of the bad treatment accorded to M.
 Cerre' (and Rocheblave as well) upon Clark's first
 arrival in the Illinois, as it reached the far-away post
 of Michilimackinac, stirred a feeling of sympathy in
 the breast of at least one warm friend of these men.
 This sympathiser was one M. Monforton, a French-
 man of ability. In writing to Cerre', subsequently,
 and after he (Monforton) had gone from Michilimack-
 inac to Detroit, he expressed, in a most intelligent
 manner his regret that affairs had turned out so badly
 at the Illinois. "I feel warmly and I share all the
 pain of the bad treatment," said he, "which, with M
 Rocheblave, you have experienced from those who
 treat as enemies the persons whom honor and religion
 held submissive and faithful to their Prince." Mon-
 forton deplored, also, "the fatal movement in which,
 without help," Rocheblave had been "surprised and
 taken," which he declared was, as reported, "of a
 fury less to intimidate than provoke those whom Cap-
 tain Lord had confided to his care." "Could Captain
 Lord," asks Monforton, "have chosen a successor who

was more worthy of favor?— for, by his love of justice, his zeal for the public good, and his disinterestedness, he has justly merited this title from the inhabitants of the Illinois.” What advantage,” he also asks, can the people of the Illinois draw from an independence such as the Virginians would offer them?

The conduct of the Americans in their invasion of Arkansas and other posts, their contraventions of the rights of men in respect to M. Rocheblave, “whose sole motive was to render himself useful to a people among whom a long residence had rendered him dear,” — was, in Monforton’s judgment, particularly reprehensible.

The inhabitants of the Illinois towns, Monforton declared, are promised more real advantages than those which they could procure from the British government. That they had not enjoyed what was really their due, under the command of Colonel Wilkins, he was ready to admit; but the proofs the people had given of their attachment to Captain Lord, the regret which they testified at his departure, seemed, to the writer, to have destroyed the false ideas which his predecessor had raised in their minds; and if, like himself, they had occasions for knowing the spirit and character of the British nation, they would be fully convinced “that the change with which they are threatened cannot but be fatal in its consequences.”* However, these strictures, if they ever reached the ears of M. Cerré, found him deaf to all appeals from his intelligent countryman. But the writer thereof had, as Hamilton afterward expressed himself, “done what was in his power to open the eyes of the French people at the

* Monforton to Cerré, Sept. 22, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

Illinois". The Lieutenant Governor declared that Monforton was "a man of sense and information far above the common standard in this country"* — which, it is evident, was praise well merited.

Clark's treatment of Rocheblave is spoken of by Hamilton years after with indignation and, probably, with exaggeration.

"On the 6th [8th]. of August, 1778, intelligence was brought me by Mr. Francis Maisonville, of the attack of the Illinois by Colonel Clark; the shameful treatment of Monsieur de Rocheblave, who was laid in irons, and put into a place where hogs had been kept, ankle deep in filth; the indignities offered Madame de Rocheblave, [and of] the destruction of his [Rocheblave's] property." . . .—Hamilton to Haldimand July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.

"On the 6th [8th] of August [1778], I received intelligence of the rebels having pushed considerable detachments to the Illinois, where they made prisoner, Mons. La Rocheblave, whose activity as superintendent occasioned his being treated with shameful indignity."—Hamilton to the Com's of His Majesty's Treasury, 1783, MS.

And De Peyster, soon after the events transpired, wrote thus:

"MICHILIMACKINAC, 31 August, 1778.

"SIR: — I have this moment received a letter from Mons'r Chevalier, of St. Joseph informing me that the rebels are in possession of all the Illinois; that the party at Kaskaskia, consisting of two hundred and fifty commanded by one Willing [Clark] is a part of 700 on their way for that country. Willing [Clark] has put Mr. De Rocheblave, the commandant,

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Oct. 4, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.

and one Mr. Cerré, in irons for having refused [to take] the oaths of allegiance to the King of Spain, the French king, and the Congress. The traders in that country, and many of them [are] from this post, are plundered; and the whole country [is] in the greatest confusion, being at a loss to know which route the rebels will take next.

"I am, etc.,

"A. S. DE PEYSTER."

NOTE LIX.

JOHN HAY TO CAPTAIN BREHM. [SEPT., 1778].*

"It is thought by many that the rebels that took possession of Kayhaskia and Cahokia have by this time evacuated those places, but I am of a very different opinion, they had certainly Bills upon the Spanish Governor which were answered on their being produced, and they bought up a quantity of cloth which was to be made up in regimentals for them: and as we have but too much reason to believe they were well received by the Inhabitants they will not lose their holds so soon, particularly while they can get provisions, etc., for their parties that are or may be in the Ohio. Some of the consequences will be that by the assistance of the Spaniards and well wishers to the *Monague* the Indians in the Wabash Country will probably remain nuter until they find themselves sufficiently supplied with necessaries, from that quarter and there we may expect they will be at least overbearing, and perhaps insolent, which will affect those nearer in so much as to require more expence and great diligence to keep them to their duty. The four Nations of the Lakes viz. The Autawas, Chippewas, Hurons and Powtowattamies have shewn great attachment to His Majesty and Government and Shanawese, Mingoes and part of the Delawares have been very active, they are stimulated as much by the late incursion of the Virginians under Lord Dunmore and their cruelties since, as

* From the Haldimand MSS.

anything else; some of them took up the Hatchet before they were asked, the rest upon deliberation and in assurance of their being supported by Government and I must confess there never was known an Indian War carried on with as little of their wanton cruelty; indeed the sparing of the lives of prisoners, the aged men, women and children was insisted on from the first, and they have paid great attention to it, and never went without some reward for their compliance.

“Great part of the Delawares are and have been neuter or rather in the Interest of the Rebels there is one of that Nation who is just returned from War sitting by me who tells me, there has lately been great quantity of provisions etc. brought to Fort Pitt and The Great Cantiana, which may be the case as they intend erecting Forts at the Falls and other places on the Ohio, to secure a Communication down the Mississippi one John Campbell of Fort Pitt received a commission from the Congress last winter with orders to collect or raise men, for that purpose, they have three Forts at Kentuckie which are great eye sores to the Indians being in the heart of their best hunting country. There is a body of Indians now out there accompanied by Lieut Dequindre and ten Volunteers of the Indian Department from this place we expect daily to hear what they have done.

“This is so remote a place and I am so small a subject that it may appear presumption in me to form opinion of futurity yet I cannot help thinking that this place will become of more consequence in a little time than you or I were aware of when we used to talk of the growth of this country, the principal fort the Rebels have below Fort Pitt is at the great Canhawa Garrison by a camp any of their regulars and some country people—they have several more between that and Fort Pitt, but not so considerable. We have many more parties out but Governor Hamilton (for want of fresh Instructions or orders) has confined himself to the tenor of those *just* received viz. carrying continual alarms to draw the attention of the rebels to the Frontiers preventing the resettling the country already abandoned, and harrassing those destined to keep up a communication between this small fort, which you may imagine they have done as three different

parties sent from this since Spring have taken thirty three prisoners and eighty scalps with the loss of 8 principal Hurons, one Ottawa and one Powtawatame 14 of the different Nations wounded and what you may believe as a fact there has been but one instance of savage cruelty exercised upon any of them. Seventeen of the above prisoners were delivered up here, but there are many more among them that as yet we know nothing of.

"I am, Dear Brehm, Your real well wisher and most humble servant,

NOTE LX.

OF WEA AND "THE MIAMIS."

Wea,* "a miserable place," as Hamilton afterward designated it, was located on the north side of the Wabash, just below the site of the present city of Lafayette, Indiana. It stood about seventy yards from the river and consisted of a few cabins surrounded by pickets. During the Revolution it was frequently spoken of by English writers as "Ouiatanon"—of which Wea ("Ouia"), was an abbreviation. The term "the Miamis" employed by Hamilton in this letter cited in the text, as of — was one in general use in the West during the Revolution to indicate the principal village of the Miami Indians. It was at the head of the Maumee — the site of the present city of Fort Wayne, Indiana, and was the beginning of the portage leading across to the waters of the Wabash. It was a post of some importance, one of the dependencies of Detroit.

"He [Hamilton] believes he can set out the 1st of October, and asks me to address my letters under cover to Captain Lernoult. As he sees the Indians do not

look upon the Virginians with pleasure, but that the French appear to favor them, there is no time to lose; he will try to anticipate my views in preventing the rebels from settling themselves solidly at the Illinois." — (*Remarks of Haldimand on Hamilton's Letters: Haldimand MSS.*)

NOTE LXI.

HAMILTON'S EXPEDITION TO INFLAME THE SAVAGES AGAINST THE AMERICANS.

Many were the expedients employed by Hamilton to inflame the savages against the Americans and to win them over to the side of Britain. On one occasion, the Indians were drawn up in two lines, extending from the Detroit river to the woods: their kettles and fires were between the lines. An ox was killed, and his head cut off: a large tomahawk was then struck into the head, and thus loaded, it was presented to the Governor. He was requested to sing his war song along the whole line of the Indians — for he had a song of his own. The ox's head represented the head of an American; and as the British were the principals in the war, it was necessary for them to take up the tomahawk first. [See *Ontwa, the Son of the Forest. A Poem.* (New York: 1882), pp. 124, 125. The poem was written by Col. Henry Whiting; the Notes are by Lewis Cass.]

NOTE LXII.

CONCERNING CAPT. LERNOULT'S AID TO HAMILTON AND
THE ARRIVAL OF CAPTAIN BIRD IN DETROIT.

"Captain Lernoult who, at that time, commanded the detachment of the King's (8th) regiment, assisted me greatly in forwarding everything necessary to be provided, and gave permission to Lieutenant Shourd, two sergeants, and thirty [one] rank and file, (who were all volunteers), to accompany me." — Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS. To be added to the regulars were one lieutenant fire worker and two matrosses.

"His [Hamilton's] preparations were finally completed, and he waited only for the arrival of Captain Bird and fifty of the King's Regiment from Niagara. They came on October 7, 1778, and on the same day Hamilton and his party set out for Vincennes." — Farmer's *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 250. The arrival of Bird resulted in Hamilton securing a promise of the regulars mentioned by him, but the Lieutenant-Governor had not awaited the Captain's coming. Lernoult's permit was given *after* Bird reached his destination and too late for the marching *at once* of the detachment with Hamilton.

NOTE LXIII.

AS TO THE FORCE WHICH LEFT DETROIT UNDER
HAMILTON.

"To dispossess the Americans of the Illinois country and Vincennes," says Bancroft [*History of the*

United States (ed. of 1885), Vol. V., p. 312], "on the seventh of October, Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton left Detroit with regulars and volunteers and three hundred and fifty warriors picked by their chiefs out of thirteen different nations." This error as to the number of Indians (some writers enumerating more, some less) is also to be found on the pages of several Western histories. As an instance:

"It was not long before this state of things [Captain Helm having possession of Fort Sackville, at Vincennes, 'with only two soldiers and a few volunteer militia' and the whole regular force under Clark, at Kaskaskia and Cahokia being reduced to less than one hundred men] was made known to Governor Hamilton, commandant at Detroit. Alarmed at the rapid success of the Virginia troops, and mortified at the disasters of the British arms, he determined to make an energetic invasion of the Illinois country, and retrieve the honor of his Majesty's arms by the recapture of all the posts on the Wabash and [in the] Illinois, and by leading Colonel Clark and his followers captive to Detroit.

"Having assembled six hundred warriors, in addition to his force of eighty regular soldiers and some Canadian militia, he set out upon the expedition to Vincennes." (Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, Vol. I., pp. 424, 425.)

There were three interpreters from the Indian Department, each ranking as captain who were to go upon the expedition: Charles Reaume, Isidore Chésne and Alexander McKee. There were also other "Indian officers" from the same Department — Lieutenants Fontenoy De Quindre, Lepiconiere De Quindre,

Ponchartrain De Quindre and Joseph Bondy. Augustine Lefoi and Amable St. Cosme were armorers and Nicholas Lasalle storekeeper. (Return of Hamilton, of Sept. 30, 1778 — Haldimand MSS.) But Captain McKee had, as already shown, gone to the Shawanese, to engage warriors from that nation for the enterprise, preceded by Captain Chésne, who was with a war-party engaged in besieging one of the Kentucky forts; and, also, commanding the same party, was Lieut. Fontenoy De Quindre.

The officers commanding the volunteer militia were captains Normond McLeod and Alexis Maisonville; Lieutenants Jacob Schieffelin, Joncaire Chabert, Chevalier Chabert, Pierre St. Cosme and Medard Gamelin — the latter acting as adjutant: Over Captain Lamothe's company and the militia was placed Jehu Hay as major, who, as Deputy Indian Agent, had also charge of a large amount of Indian presents, which were to be taken along to conciliate the savages.

A man by the name of Chapman went as quartermaster and John McBeath as surgeon to the expedition; Antoine Bellefeuille as interpreter; in addition to those before mentioned, Charles Lovain, as commissary of provisions at the Miamis — head of Maumee; Adhemar St. Martin, as commissary for the detachment and Indians; Francis Maisonville, as boatmaster; and Amos Ansly, as master carpenter. (Hamilton's *Return*, loc. cit.) Farmer, in his *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 250, says Hamilton was accompanied by Philip Dejean, his secretary. But it was some months before Dejean followed the Lieutenant-Governor.

St. Martin is usually mentioned by his first or given name, but not always: "Late in November, 1775, the *Chippewa* was wrecked on the southern coast of Lake Erie. Lieut. Col. Caldwell judged it expedient to have her cargo destroyed. Mr. Adhemar St. Martin was the principal sufferer on this occasion, his loss [being] upwards of four hundred pounds [sterling]. A memorial from this place was sent in his behalf, but he has never heard of its having been attended to. He has a large family with a good reputation for its chief (almost only) support. His losses by the Government, hitherto unrepaid, have distressed him in a degree I need not paint to your Excellency — loss of goods — loss of opportunity — while the traders on every side are enriching themselves in this time of trouble; and he has known upwards of one hundred per cent. given for articles indispensibly necessary to the service and rendered valuable by their great scarcity — pitch, tallow, salt, sugar, soap, one half a dollar the pound. Powder £30 and £40 the hundred weight. I humbly recommend Mr. Adhemar, therefore, to your Excellency's compassionate feeling for his distress."—Hamilton to Haldimand [Sep. 5] 1778—Haldimand MSS. Of the regulars and "irregulars" of his force, Hamilton afterward wrote:

"Our numbers . . . were as follow: Of regulars, one lieutenant fireworker, two matrosses, — [also] one lieutenant, two sergeants, thirty [one] rank and file of the King's (8th) regiment. Of irregulars [Captain Lamothe's company], one captain and lieutenant, two sergeants, 4[0] rank and file." (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781—Germain MSS. On the 30th of September, 1778, he enumerates, of the

militia, seventy-one exclusive of officers; of the latter there were one major, two captains, four lieutenants, one adjutant, one quartermaster, one surgeon, four sergeants — in all, fourteen: total of militia, eighty-five.— (“*Return*” made at Detroit on the above date — Haldimand MSS.)

When the time came to march, there was a falling off in the number of Hamilton’s Indian allies, so that, as mentioned in the text, only about seventy made their appearance.

NOTE LXIV.

HAMILTON’S FIRST MARCH INTENDED ONLY TO REACH VINCENNES.

[Ante, Chap. X, p. —.]

Hamilton’s “winter movement of six hundred miles” only had reference to the distance from Detroit to Vincennes. It seems from Hamilton’s words that he made no preparations for the march beyond Vincennes; as there he would (as he suggested to Haldimand) wait for reinforcements; and, as will hereafter be seen, additional supplies were to be forwarded there as soon as any could be spared from Detroit. A recent writer says: “This news [that conveyed by Sir Guy Carleton to Hamilton, in his letter of Sept. 26, 1777, wherein he states that the conduct of the war has been taken entirely out of his hands, and the management of it upon the Western frontier given to the Lieutenant-Governor] was doubtless pleasing to Hamilton, and there can be no doubt that, soon after this, he commenced to plan an incursion which he would

lead in person, Meantime, on June 26, 1778, General Haldimand succeeded General Carleton, and Hamilton, apparently, began to fear that his powers would be restricted. In great haste he completed his preparations for an attack on the American posts. He began to talk of what he proposed to do and was confident and even boastful. His preparations were finally completed [for starting on his march to Vincennes].” (Farmer’s *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 250.) The idea here conveyed as to Carleton’s meaning is evidently a mistake. Sir Guy only referred to the conduct of the war in Hamilton’s department, so far as the Indians were concerned, as indicated in the letter of Germain of the 26th of March, 1777. In that letter no authority is given the Lieutenant-Governor to organize an expedition of British troops, militia and Indians to go against the Americans.

NOTE LXV.

AS TO HELM’S FORCE SENT TO VINCENNES, AND THE TIME OF STARTING.

Some writers have stated, owing to supposed subsequent developments, that Helm took with him from the Illinois but one soldier. This is clearly an error.

As already shown, Hamilton at Detroit got intelligence by the middle of September that the “rebels” had sent three persons to Vincennes from the Illinois. Clark says he was not able to spare many men (see his letter to Mason — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 49). Reliance is to be placed upon the number re-

ported to Hamilton, as it was coupled with other intelligence of undoubted truthfulness. (Letter to Haldimand of Sep. 16, 1778, in the Haldimand MSS.)

It is evident that August was not far advanced when the Captain started, as he had reached Vincennes before the fourteenth of that month. (Hamilton to Haldimand, Jan. 24-28, 1779 — Haldimand MSS.) In his Memoir, Clark says that Helm set out to take possession of his new command about the middle of August. This is as near the time as he could remember years after.

One of Kentucky's historians writes: "Captain Leonard Helm was appointed by Colonel Clark commandant at St. Vincents [Vincennes] and 'agent for Indian affairs in the department of the Wabash.' This officer was particularly recommended to Clark for his knowledge of the department, and by the general prudence of his character. As Clark intended to place a strong garrison at this post when the reinforcements which he expected from Virginia should arrive, Captain Helm was made fully acquainted with his plans and received his utmost confidence." (Butler's *Kentucky*, p .65.) But when Helm was sent to Vincennes, Clark was not expecting any reinforcements whatever, either "from Virginia" or elsewhere. He had as yet not heard a word from the Virginia governor since his arrival in the Illinois.

Captain Helm and the two soldiers under him were the "three persons" mentioned by Hamilton to Haldimand in his letter of the sixteenth of September, referred to in a previous chapter.

NOTE LXVI.

CAPT. HELM'S COUNCIL WITH THE PIANKESHAW'S.

“I now, by Captain Helm, touched him [the Grand Door] on the same spring I had done the inhabitants [on the occasion of sending Gibault to Vincennes], and sent a speech with a belt of wampum, directing the Captain how to manage, if the chief was pacifically inclined, or otherwise. . . . He [Captain Helm] sent for the Grand Door and delivered my letter to him. After having read it, he informed the Captain that he was happy to see him — one of the Big Knife chiefs — in this town: it was here [at Vincennes] that he had joined the English against him; but he confessed that he always thought they looked gloomy; that as the contents of the letter was a matter of great moment, he could not give an answer for some time; that he must collect his counsellors [and advise with them] on the subject; and was in hopes the Captain would be patient. In short, he put on all the courtly dignity, that he was master of; and Captain Helm following his example, it was several days before this business was finished, as the whole proceedings was very ceremonious.

“At length the Captain was invited to the Indian council, and informed by the Tobacco [the Grand Door — son of Tobacco] that they had mutually considered the case in hand, and had got the nature of the war between the English and us explained to their satisfaction; that, as we spoke the same language and appeared to be the same people, he always thought he was in the dark as to the truth of it; but now the sky

was cleared up; that he found that the Big Knife was in the right; that perhaps, if the English conquered, they would serve them in the same manner that they intended to serve us; that his ideas were quite changed; and that he would tell all the red people on the Wabash to bloody the land no more for the English. He jumped up, struck his breast, called himself a man and a warrior; said that he was now a Big Knife, and took Captain Helm by the hand. His example was followed by all present, and the evening was spent in merriment. Thus ended this valuable negotiation and [which resulted in] the saving of much blood. . . .

In a short time, almost the whole of the various tribes of the different nations on the Wabash, as high as the Quiatenon [the Wea] came to Vincennes, and followed the example of the Grand Door chief. And as expresses were continually passing between Captain Helm and myself the whole time of [the holding of] these treaties, the business was settled perfectly to my satisfaction and greatly to the advantage of the public [that is, greatly to the advantage of the American interests].”—Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 129-131. But Clark's recollection was at fault in saying that nearly all the Wabash Indians *as high as Wea* followed the Grand Door's example in making peace.

The result of the council with the Piankeshaw Indians has given rise to a fictitious story which has found its way into print, wherein the meeting is spoken of as having been held at Kaskaskia and that Clark was holding the council when the Grand Door (or Big Gate, as he is therein called) made his appearance.

“Relieved by the result of Gibault’s diplomacy at Vincennes from apprehension of an attack from that quarter, Clark turned his whole attention to the pacification of the neighboring Indian tribes. His plan was to treat them with the strictest justice, adopting a manner kind, haughty, or contemptuous, as occasion demanded; but always reserved and dignified. Maintaining the superiority of the white, he never allowed himself to be provoked into any unseemly display of passion or excitement,—seldom offering presents; when he did so, it was always with the distinct understanding that it was a mere act of grace, and not intended as a bribe. Though anxious to secure the neutrality of the tribes of the Illinois, he never condescended to invite them to a council, and all the overtures for peace came from those who had begun the war.

“Yet, when necessary, no one could be more persuasive, as was proven by his interview with the Big Gate — so called from having, when a youth, shot a British officer standing on the *gate* of the fort at Detroit, during the attempt of Pontiac to surprise that place. This chief, a deadly foe to the Big Knives, had accidentally met a party of Piankeshaws coming to attend the great council, which was being held by the American commander at Kaskaskia; and although an avowed enemy, he resolved to accompany them in order to behold this mighty chief of the pale-faces whose fame had spread over the whole northwest. With the most audacious calmness, he appeared each day in the council, sitting conspicuously in the front of the room in full war-dress, wearing the bloody belt he had received from the English, and elaborately bedecked in

his war-paint. Thus he continued to attend for many days, saying not a word to the Americans nor they to him. But on the last day, when the deliberations were closed, Clark addressed him, apologizing for not noticing him until the public business was over. He said: 'Although they were enemies, still it was the custom of the white men, when they met in this way, to treat each other in proportion to their exploits in war.' On this account and because 'he was a great chief' the Colonel invited him to dinner — a compliment never extended to less distinguished men. The savage, taken completely by surprise, endeavored to decline; but Clark would take no denial.

"At last the chief, confused by such unexpected kindness and attention, and yielding to the spell of a superior mind, could contain his excited feelings no longer. Springing into the middle of the room, he flung down the war-belt and a little British flag that he carried in his bosom, and ended by stripping himself of every article of clothing except his breech-cloth. Then striking himself energetically upon the breast, he told his hearers that 'they all knew he had been a great warrior from his youth up and delighted in battle. That he had been out three times against the Big Knives in Kentucky, for the British had told him lies! That he was preparing for another war-party when Clark arrived, when he determined to rest himself awhile, and come and hear what the Americans had to say on their side of the question. Now he knew the Big Knives were right, and as an honest warrior, he would no longer fight against them'; upon which he shook hands with Clark and his officers and saluted them as brothers. He ever afterward remained true

to his new friends and in a private interview detailed to the Colonel the situation of Detroit, and offered to go out and bring him a scalp or a prisoner. Clark declined the offered scalp, but said that he would be glad to secure a prisoner, from whom he could obtain some information of the movements of the British. The chief, dressed in a fine laced suit, decorated with a silver medal, and bearing a captain's commission, set out on this expedition." (Coleman, in *Harper's Mag.*, vol. XXIII, p. 52).

And a writer in *The North American Review* [vol. XLIII (July, 1836), p. 17], erroneously speaks of Clark's negotiation with the Indians, as though it was carried on by the Colonel *in person*, both on the Wabash and at Cahokia. He says:

"Though Clark had effected so much, having taken two important posts from the British [Kaskaskia and Cahokia being considered as one and Vincennes as another] and having won the favor of the French, there was yet another influence to be propitiated, more important and more hostile than either. The business, now more difficult than anything he had yet accomplished, was to awe or persuade the Indians of the Wabash into an alliance with the Americans. And in this affair he displayed as much sagacity and perseverance as in his previous exploits. The French have [had] invariably succeeded in winning the friendship of the Indians. The English almost as invariably have [had] failed. By an attentive study of the Indian character, Clark had learned to combine the dignity and firmness which awe, with that ceremonious behavior which pleases the pride and vanity of the savage. In the treaties held by him at Cahokia and on the

Wabash, was displayed the correctness of this view of the Indian."

Indian speeches afterward reached the ears of Hamilton said (but without a semblance of truth) to have been made when the "rebels" first arrived at Vincennes: "Having called the Indians together, they [the 'rebels'] laid a war belt colored red and a belt colored green before them, telling them that if they delighted in mischief and had no compassion on their wives and children they might take up the red one; if, on the contrary, they were wise and preferred peace, the green one.

"The Old Tobacco, a chief of the Piankeshaws, spoke as follows: 'My brothers! You speak in a manner not to be understood. I never yet saw nor have I heard from my ancestors, that it was customary to place good and bad things in the same dish. You talk to us as if you meant us well, yet you speak of war and peace in the same minute. Thus, I treat the speeches of such men' — on which, with a violent kick, he spurned their belts from him.

"The son of Lagesse, a young chief of the Pottawattamies, of St. Joseph, spoke next to them:

"'My brothers! 'Tis because I have listened to the voice of our old men and because I have regard for our women and children, that I have not before now struck my tomahawk into some of your heads. Attend to what I say. I will only go to see in what condition our wives and children are [meaning, he would first place them in security] and then you may depend on seeing me again.'

"The rebel speaker [Captain Helm] then said: 'You are young men and your youth excuses your

ignorance — else you would not talk as you do. Our design is to march through your country, and if we find any fires in our way we shall just tread them out as we walk along; and if we meet with any obstacle or barrier we shall remove it with all ease, but the bystanders must take care lest the splinters should scar their faces.

“We shall then proceed to Detroit where your father is whom we consider as a hog put to fatten in a pen; we shall enclose him in his pen till he be fat and then we will throw him into the river. We shall draw a reinforcement from the Falls on the Ohio, and from there and the Illinois send six hundred men to Detroit.”

“To this the Indians replied: “You who are so brave, what need have you to be reinforced to go to Detroit — you that can put out our fires and so easily remove our barriers? — This we say to you: Take care that, in attempting to extinguish our fires you do not burn yourselves; and that, in breaking down our barriers, you do not run splinters into your hands. You may also expect that we shall not suffer a single Frenchman to accompany you to Detroit.”*

Mention being frequently made of two Piankeshaw chiefs — “Old Tobacco” and his son, by Western writers, by whom the two are considered as having the same name, care should be taken to distinguish between them.

“Captain Leonard Helm was put in command of Vincennes, and appointed Superintendent of Indian affairs on the Wabash by Clark. The principal busi-

* *Proceedings of the Rebels at Vincennes, as Related to Lieutenant Governor Hamilton by Neegik, an Ottawa War Chief, Oct. 14, 1778. — Haldimand MSS.*

ness entrusted to him was securing the friendship of the Indians of the Wabash, particularly of the Piankeshaws, as they were located at and near Vincennes. The head chief was Tabac, who, inasmuch as his tribe lived lower down the Wabash than any other, and therefore commanded its navigation, was called the Grand Door of the Wabash." — Dunn's *Indiana*, p. 137.

Dunn, in a foot-note to the word "Tabac" explains that it means Tobacco; and he then adds: "His father had the same name, hence this chief was sometimes called Young Tobac, or Tobacco's Son."

The father was everywhere known upon the Wabash as "Tobac," "Tobacco" or "Old Tobacco," by the whites; but no cotemporaneous account speaks of his son as being known by either of these names. In the various Indian languages of the New World, the son never took the name of the father, unless, indeed, so spoken of first by white people. It is true that Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 65), says that "near the post of St. Vincents [Vincennes], there was a chief by the name of 'Tobacco's Son,' whose name appears in the deed to the Wabash Company, in 1775, as 'Tabac';" but, in this the historian is in error. The deed mentions but the name of the father ('Tabac or Tobacco') and ("Tabac, Junior") the son, where the writer of the deed uses "Tabac, Junior" instead of "the Son of Tobacco," or "the Tobacco's Son." In a deed executed in 1779, the latter signs his name, "Francis, Son of Tobacco." "Big Door" (or "Big Gate"), as applied by the Piankeshaws to their chief, was a title of honor merely — he guarded the door or gate of the Wabash;

i. e., the mouth of the river, and thereby controlled largely its navigation.

Lieutenant Governor Hamilton, at Detroit, did not rely solely upon De Celoron for news concerning "rebel" movements in the Wabash valley: "Mr. Charles Beaubien, employed for his Majesty at the Miamis, writes that the savages at Vincennes will not take the rebels by the hand; that the [White river] Delawares, [the] Illinois, Ottawas, and Shawanese were determined to strike the rebels, but the Piankeshaws interfered. The latter want to know the determination of the Kickapoos and Weas. He adds that the French are said to be in the interest of the rebels."*

Subsequently, in person, Beaubien recounted the substance of what had been brought to him by a Miami Indian from Eel river — speeches of Chickasaws, Piankeshaws and "Virginians" to the Miami Indians at their town [at the head of the Maumee]. The savages first mentioned advised all the Wabash Indians including the Miamis to demand of the "Virginians" that they withdraw from the country. The Piankeshaws declared to the same tribes that they would have already struck the "Virginians," but awaited their reply; that it was their feeling these whites should be sent home; and that the Delawares of White river, also, the Illinois savages and the Ottawas, thought the same. The "speech" of the "Virginians" asked all the Wabash tribes and the Miamis to visit them; that they intended to attack Detroit soon, and would make an

* Hamilton to Haldimand, Sept. 16, 1778: — Haldimand MSS.

end of Hamilton; and that as for the Indians there, they regarded them as nothing.*

NOTE LXVII.

BANCROFT'S ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING THE
SPEECH SENT BY CAPTAIN HELM TO THE WEA SAV-
AGES.

“His [Gibault's] own offer of mediation being accepted [by Clark], he, with a small party, repaired to the post [of Vincennes]; and its people, having listened to his explanation of the state of affairs, went into the church and took the oath of allegiance to the United States. The transition from the condition of subjects of a king to that of the integral members of a free state made them new men. Planning the acquisition of the whole northwest, they sent to the Indians on the Wabash five belts: a white one for the French; a red one for the Spaniards; a blue one for America; and for the Indian tribes a green one as an offer of peace, and one of the color of blood if they preferred war, with the message: ‘The King of France has come to life. We desire you to leave a very wide path for us to pass through your country to

* *Speeches brought by Mr. Charles Beaubien to Detroit, the 27th [26th] Sept., 1778.* — Haldimand MSS. The information obtained from Beaubien by Hamilton must have satisfied the Lieutenant Governor that the Wabash savages (except the Piankeshaws) were not reconciled to the “Virginians;” and Capt. Helm, in deciding not to attempt a march to the Miami village at the head of the Maumee, doubtless came to the same conclusion.

Detroit, for we are many in numbers and we might chance to hurt some of your young people with our swords." — Bancroft's *History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, pp. 311, 312.)

It can hardly be said, however, with strict adherence to fact, that the inhabitants of Vincennes were changed to any great extent — certainly not "made new men" — by the turn affairs had taken. They naturally felt elated at the news brought by Gibault and would henceforth favor American interests; that was all: they by no means planned the acquisition of any territory, nor did they send any belts to the Indians to induce them to terms of peace with the Virginians. The inference in the extract just given is, that this speech was sent at the time of Gibault's visit, and by the people of Vincennes; which is contrary to the statement received by Hamilton. De Conague and his five white companions bringing to De Celoron "belts and speeches from the rebels," plainly implies that they came from the Americans — that is, from Captain Helm — otherwise the Wea commandant would not have taken his ignoble flight.

NOTE LXVIII.

THE WABASH LAND COMPANY'S PURCHASE FROM THE
PIANKESHAWS.

The Wabash Land Company was composed of "Louis Viviat, the Right Honorable John, Earl of Dunmore, Governor of the Colony and Dominion of

Virginia, the Honorable John Murray, son of the said Earl, Moses Franks and Jacob Franks, of the city of London, in the Kingdom of Great Britain, Esquires; Thomas Johnson, Jr., Esquire, attorney-at-law, and John Davidson, merchant, both of the city of Annapolis, in the Province of Maryland; William Russell, Esquire, Matthew Ridley, Robert Christee, Sen., and Robert Christie, Jr., of Baltimore town, in the said Province of Maryland, merchants; Peter Campbell, of Piscataway, in Maryland, merchant; William Geddes, of Newtown Chester, in Maryland, Esq., collector of His Majesty's customs; David Franks, merchant, and Moses Franks, attorney-at-law, both of the city of Philadelphia, in the Province of Pennsylvania; William Murray, and David Murray, of the Illinois country, merchants; Nicholas St. Martin and Joseph Page, of the same place, gentlemen; Francis Perthuis, late of Quebec city, in Canada, but now [Oct. 18, 1775] of Post St. Vincent [Vincennes]."

The negotiations resulting in the purchase of lands from the Piankeshaws were carried on for the Company by Louis Viviat, of the Illinois country — who acted as agent for the Association — at Vincennes and Vermillion. The deed conveyed the lands to the grantees, "or to his most sacred Majesty George the Third, by the grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, and so forth, his heirs and successors," for their use; and the number of acres bought were about thirty-seven million four hundred and ninety-seven thousand six hundred.

NOTE LXIX.

FICTION ABOUT CAPTAIN LEONARD HELM.

“There is an anecdote respecting Captain Leonard Helm, evincing an intrepidity which would ill be omitted: it has been communicated to the author through the friendly interest of Judge Underwood, and his venerable relative, Edmund Rogers, Esq., of Barren county [Ky.], a brother of Captain John Rogers, and personally intimate with Clark and his officers for years. It is as follows: When Governor Hamilton entered Vincennes, there were but two Americans there, Captain Helm, the commandant, and one Henry. The latter had a cannon well charged and placed in the open fort gate, while Helm stood by it with a lighted match in his hand. When Hamilton and his troops got within good hailing distance, the American officer in a loud voice cried out, ‘Halt!’ This stopped the movements of Hamilton, who, in reply, demanded a surrender of the garrison. Helm exclaimed with an oath, ‘No man shall enter until I know the terms.’ Hamilton answered, ‘You shall have the honors of war,’ and then the fort was surrendered with its garrison of one officer and one private. Such is a specimen of the character of Colonel Clark’s followers. They were the very choice of Virginia and the western frontier. Dangers they scarcely counted, and difficulties presented themselves but to be overcome.” (Butler’s *Kentucky*, p. 79n). There were, it is true, at the time of surrender, but two of Clark’s men inside the fortification — Captain

Helm and a private; but there were in addition three Vincennes militia.

As the particulars concerning the surrender of Fort Sackville by Captain Helm were written down by Hamilton almost at the very time of the happening of the events described; and as they are given in a letter which must be considered as an official report; the utmost credit is to be given the whole relation.

It must be admitted that the marching of Hamilton up to the fort at the head of five hundred whites and Indians (with a six-pounder ready for instant work), to demand its surrender, the Lieutenant Governor at the same time being fully advised that the garrison had forsaken Captain Helm until he was left "almost alone," savors strongly of the ludicrous; and it certainly required not a little amount of bravery for the British commander afterward to detail the whole affair to his Commander-in-chief.

Helm, in surrendering himself and his small garrison, acted, under all the circumstances, with commendable courage, confronted as he was (and as he could plainly see) by an overwhelming force of white men and savages. But the attitude assumed by the Captain at the time has, by tradition, been set off with grandiloquent language as one of mock-heroic defiance. It comes down to us in different histories, varying in the intensity of its absurdity.

As all the pleasantries (if such a term can here be properly employed) bestowed hitherto upon the event by American writers, depends for its point upon the smallness of the garrison when it was surrendered by Captain Helm, it is proper that what informa-

tion can be added as to the actual number, be now brought forward.

An eye-witness — a Lieutenant of one of Hamilton's companies — says that Captain Helm and "a few soldiers were made prisoners;"* while the frank admission of the Lieutenant Governor that the Captain when he surrendered "was almost alone" makes it altogether certain that Fort Sackville, when given up to the British, had but a handful (so to speak) of defenders. But it is important to know the exact number—if it can be determined.

The popular impression (and the one that has gained from tradition the most extensive circulation) is, that but one man — Moses Henry — was left in the fort besides the commander when Hamilton marched up to the gate and demanded a surrender. Upon the strength of this, accounts have been published of the most melo-dramatic character; as, for instance:

*The Lieutenant referred to was Jacob Schieffelin, of Captain Lamothe's company. (*Loose Notes—Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 186.)

"And what *few men* that composed the garrison, not being able to make the least defence., etc. [the italicising is mine]." — Clark to Gov. Henry, Feb. 3, 1779 (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 315). See, also, Clark's language in his letter of April 29, following (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222 n), as to the same matter.

"Captain Helm (Monnette — *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, p. 424) was left with only two soldiers and a few volunteer militia to protect the fort at Vincennes." The two soldiers were those who came with him from Kaskaskia; and there were *only* two, although that writer (vol. I, p. 422) speaks of Captain Helm being dispatched from Kaskaskia to Vincennes "with a small garrison."

“When Governor Hamilton entered Vincennes there were but two Americans there — Captain Helm, the commandant, and one Henry. The latter had a cannon well charged and placed in the open fort gate, while Helm stood by it with a lighted match in his hand. When Hamilton and his troops got within good hailing distance, the American officer, in a loud voice, cried out: ‘Halt!’ This stopped the movements of Hamilton, who, in reply, demanded a surrender of the garrison. Helm exclaimed with an oath, ‘No man shall enter until I know the terms.’ Hamilton answered: ‘You shall have the honors of war;’ and then the fort was surrendered, with its garrison of one officer and one man.” (Cutler’s *Kentucky*, p. 80.) The relation regarding the loaded cannon is undoubtedly fictitious.

“The brave captain [Helm] refused to surrender the fort when demanded, until terms — the honors of war — were granted him. Only himself and one soldier (Moses Henry) were surrendered.” (John Moses: *Illinois: Historical and Statistical*, vol. I, p. 155.) But, were there not other persons besides Henry with Captain Helm? According to reliable tradition, there were, as already stated, five men in Fort Sackville, besides Captain Helm, when it was surrendered — two Americans, and three citizens of Vincennes, of the militia of the town. I have been able to obtain, from a variety of sources, sufficient assurance of this, although no statement I have examined was made at the time of the surrender.

“When the fort was thrown open, Captain Helm and five men, with due formality, marched out and laid down their arms before the astonished com-

mander." (Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, p. 425).

But, as already seen, the Captain and his small force did not march out of the fort at all. The same writer (vol. I, pp. 425, 426) says: "Captain Helm and one other American were retained as prisoners of war, the other three being volunteer citizens of Vincennes." This gives the Captain but *four* men at the time Hamilton entered the fort. But there were, as a matter of fact, two Americans beside Helm inside the fort at the time, one being a soldier belonging to Clark's force (who had been detailed to march to Vincennes under Helm) and the other Moses Henry, already mentioned, a blacksmith, residing in the village, who was not in the military service. Captain Helm, it will be remembered, brought with him two soldiers from Kaskaskia; but one — Captain Williams' brother — who had been dispatched at the last moment with a letter to Colonel Clark, was, as before mentioned, captured, and, at the time of the surrender, was a prisoner in the hands of the enemy.

But "a garrison of five" has not restrained the pens of writers of Western annals from indulging in romantic relations:

"The news of Clark's success having at length reached Detroit . . . Hamilton, the British Governor, at once determined to recapture the post again, and accordingly with eighty regulars, a large number of Canadian militia, and six hundred Indians, he ascended the Maumee . . . crossed over to the Wabash, and made a rapid movement on Vincennes, thinking to take the fort by storm, and

destroy all within the garrison. Thus they moved forward. Helm was not to be dismayed. Full of confidence, and with an air that served to signify that the fort was full of soldiers, he leaped upon the bastion, near a cannon, and, swinging his lighted match, shouted with great force, as the advancing column approached, 'Halt! or I will blow you to atoms!' At which, the Indians precipitately took to the woods and the Canadians fell back out of range of the cannon. Fearing that the fort was well manned, and that a desperate encounter would ensue, Hamilton thought best to offer a parley; Captain Helm declaring that he would fight as long as a man was left to bear arms, unless permitted to march out with the full honors of war, which were at length agreed upon, and the garrison thrown open. Helm, and *five men*, all told, marching out, to the utmost astonishment of the British commander. But Helm was afterwards detained in the fort as a prisoner." (Brice's *Fort Wayne*, pp. 101, 102.)

A recent writer discourses thus on the surrender of the fort to Hamilton: "Poor Helm was promptly deserted by all the creole militia. The latter had been loud in their boasts until the enemy came in view, but even as they caught sight of the red-coats they began to slip away and run up to the British to surrender their arms. He was finally left with only one or two men, Americans. Nevertheless he refused the first summons to surrender; but Hamilton, who knew that Helm's troops had deserted him, marched up to the fort at the head of his soldiers, and the American was obliged to surrender, with no terms granted save that he and his associates should

be treated with humanity." — Roosevelt: *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 63.

It is to be noted in considering the foregoing, (1) that not *all* the creole militia deserted Helm; (2) that the deserters did not wait until the red-coats came in view; (3) Helm was left with more than one or two men and who were not all Americans; and (4) the terms granted were not expressly to Helm and his associates, but to the Captain only.

NOTE LXX.

SOME ERRORS BY HISTORIANS AS TO HAMILTON'S FORCE
WHEN HE LEFT DETROIT.

(1) "When these proceedings [the conquest and submission of the Illinois towns and Vincennes] came to the ears of Colonel Hamilton at Detroit, he started out with a little army of about 500 men, regulars, Tories, and Indians, and after a march of seventy days through the primeval forest reached Vincennes and took possession of it." (Fiske: "*The American Revolution*," vol. II, p. 106.) The principal errors in the foregoing are that Hamilton started out with five hundred men and that a portion of them was tories.

(2) "Gov. Hamilton at Detroit," says L. C. Draper (Appleton's *Cyclopædia of American Biography*, art. 'George Rogers Clark'), "marched a large force, mostly Indians, and retook Vincennes early in December [1778]." There are two errors, by implication, in this: (1) that the Lieutenant Governor

marched from Detroit with a large force, mostly Indians, and (2) that he retook Vincennes before the middle of the month.

NOTE LXXI.

CONCERNING THE OATH ADMINISTERED BY GOV. HAMILTON TO THE CITIZENS OF VINCENNES.

The oath began: "At Vincennes, this 19th December, 1778," and ended, — "In faith of which, we sign with our hands, or certify by our ordinary marks, the day and month above named, in the year 1778." Hamilton, in his letter of Dec. 18-30, gives the day of his convening the inhabitants in the church as the 18th, but the date of the oath corrects this; it was the 19th.

Notwithstanding the specious words of Hamilton to the citizens before the oath was administered, it is obvious that it amounted to a compulsion on part of the Lieutenant-Governor; and it was a bold assumption — the claim subsequently put forth — that the inhabitants of Vincennes took this oath "of their own free will:" "The inhabitants of the town of Vincennes, who had taken the oath of allegiance to the rebels, did, of their own free will, take a solemn oath of allegiance to his Majesty, acknowledging that they had offended God and man by having deviated from their first engagement; that they returned to their duty, and would show themselves good subjects in future, praying the clemency of his Majesty and the protection of Governor Hamilton." (Schieffelin: *Loose Notes, Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 186.)

NOTE LXXII.

WHY HAMILTON DETERMINED TO WINTER IN
VINCENNES.

Hamilton's reasons for wintering in Vincennes are set forth (1) in his letter to Haldimand of Dec. 18-30, 1778; and (2) in that of July 6, 1781. In the last letter cited, he says: "The state of our provisions, the length of the journey (240 miles) and the want of carriages, added to the nature of the country subject to inundations, all combined to direct our determination to fortify ourselves here [at Vincennes], and wait for reinforcements in the spring." But his estimate of the distance from Vincennes to the Illinois (that is, to Kaskaskia) was too great by about forty miles. He had, doubtless, mistaken the leagues of the French for English leagues, as the former always gave the distance as "eighty leagues," which would make about 200 miles. The Lieutenant-Governor gives no reason why it would be impracticable to attempt the journey by water, doubtless supposing General Haldimand would understand fully that he had no means of transporting five hundred men in that way; but the Commander-in-chief did not take this for granted. In commenting, afterward, upon Hamilton's letter of the 18-30th of December, he says: "On the 6th page, he gives reasons for not sending any body this winter to the Illinois by water to attack the rebels; it should be, he has no means to go by land" (*Remarks on Lieut. Gov. Hamilton's Letter.* — Haldimand MSS.) It will thus be seen that the Commander-in-chief misunderstood Hamilton. The General also made these comments:

"He [Hamilton] seems to think next spring to attack the two posts at the Illinois. It is hoped, in that case, that he will at least take one of the three pounders which he got at Vincennes along, so as to make a cross-fire, or else the rebels might easily cover themselves against one cannon; that is, if he expects nothing but stockades to attack; otherwise, a six-pounder field piece would not be sufficient. . . . Two royal mortars would be sufficient if he had more than two artillery men." — Haldimand: "Remarks on Lieut. Gov. Hamilton's Letter" [of Dec. 18-30, 1778 — Haldimand MSS.] The Commander-in-chief, in mentioning a six-pounder, referred to the six-pounder field piece brought by Hamilton from Detroit.

NOTE LXXIII.

BEGINNING AND ENDING OF DE PEYSTER'S INSTRUCTIONS TO LANGLADE AND GAUTIER.

The following was the opening paragraph:

"GENTLEMEN:—By the orders given me by his Excellency, General Haldimand, Commander-in-chief of the armies of his Majesty, the King of Great Britain in Canada, etc., etc., etc., to do all in my power to assist Lieutenant Governor Hamilton in all his enterprises against the rebels; and since I have been apprised by a letter of the Lieutenant Governor that he has gone to dislodge the rebels of the Illinois, asking me to give him assistance, you are ordered, by these presents to go and try to raise the nations."

"Given at Fort Michilimaquenac, this 26th day of October, 1778.

"AT. S. DE PYSTER,

Major of the King's regiment and Commander of the said post and Dependencies.

"To Capt. Langlade and Lieut. Gautier."

NOTE LXXIV.

NUMBER OF HAMILTON'S SOLDIERS (WHITE) WHEN HE OCCUPIED VINCENNES. ALSO AS TO THE PRICE OF PROVISIONS THERE AT THAT DATE.

Of the Royal Artillery, there were, with Hamilton, one lieutenant and two rank and file; of the Eighth regiment, two sergeants and thirty privates; of Captain Lamothe's volunteers, one captain, one lieutenant, three sergeants and forty rank and file; of the Detroit volunteer militia, one major, two captains, two lieutenants, one surgeon, one commissioner of provisions, one boat-master, four carpenters, four sergeants and sixty-three privates; of the Indian Department besides Mr. Hay (deputy agent), there were three captains, four lieutenants, one commissioner of provisions, two interpreters, one store-keeper and six privates: total white force, one hundred and seventy-six.

"Prices of provisions, etc., at Vincennes, Dec. 1778:

Budflour per hundred.....	£6.13.4;
Indian corn per bushel.....	18.8;
Fresh beef per lb.....	8;
Buffalo do	8;
Pork do	2.8;
Tafia per gallon.....	3.4.0;
Wine made here do.....	18.8;
Strard per ell.....	1.18.8;
Blankets	1.18.8;
Ruffled (Indian) shirts.....	2.8.0;
Plain do	1.8.0;
Vermilion per lb.....	1.18.8;
Powder do	13.4;
Ball	4.4."

NOTE LXXV.

GEN. HALDIMAND'S CRITICISMS ON HAMILTON'S COURSE
IN VINCENNES.

"He [Hamilton] intends to send back the militia from Detroit, which went with him for the campaign, as if he would stay there [at Vincennes]. By his return, they amount to 103 men, so that he expects more for a reinforcement besides the number to garrison Vincennes. He does not say what number will be wanted to keep the Indians to their professions." — Haldimand.

But Hamilton did not intend to include in "the volunteer militia" Lamothe's men, as Haldimand supposed. The latter were not to be sent back.

"He [Hamilton] requests the commander-in-chief's orders and a person to command [at Vincennes] to whom he will resign; as if he will neither stay at Vincennes nor proceed to the Illinois to reduce the rebels, which I thought was his design in leaving Detroit." — Haldimand.

Again: "He [Hamilton] seems to want positive orders . . . as if he doubted or was ignorant of the use that the re-taking of Vincennes could be — as if he had been ordered to attack it." — Id.

NOTE LXXVI.

CONCERNING HAMILTON'S ULTERIOR DESIGNS.

It has been extensively published that Hamilton had ulterior and much more extensive designs in

marching against the Illinois than to re-capture its towns and Vincennes. Thus one writer :

“Hamilton was methodical in the use of Indians. He gave standing rewards for scalps but offered none for prisoners. His continuous parties, of Indians and white volunteers, spared neither men nor women nor children. In the coming year he promised that as early as possible all the different nations, from the Chickasaws and Cherokees to the Hurons and Five Nations, should join in the expeditions against Virginia; while the lake Indians from Mackinaw, in conjunction with white men, agreed to destroy the few rebels in Illinois. He sent out detachments to watch Kaskaskia and the falls of the Ohio, and to intercept any boats that might venture up that river with supplies for the rebels. He never doubted his ability to reduce all Virginia west of the mountains.” [Bancroft: *History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), Vol. V., p. 312.]

But this idea of the numerous nations of savages joining Hamilton against Virginia (meaning that part lying to the south-eastward and eastward of Vincennes but west of the Alleghanies), was only an exaggeration of the extensive plan of the Southern savages mentioned in the text.

One of Kentucky's early historians says in speaking of Hamilton's designs, that they were first to re-take Kaskaskia; and next to cut off the inhabitants of the Ohio, up to Fort Pitt; after which he intended to desolate the remaining frontiers of Virginia.” (Marshall's *Kentucky*, Vol. I., p. 69.)

But this is the outgrowth of what Clark himself wrote, hastily and erroneously, on the 29th of April, 1779. (See note LXXXI, of this Appendix.)

NOTE LXXVII.

AS TO THE ATTACHMENT OF THE TOBACCO'S SON TO
CAPT. HELM.

The following account of the attachment of the Tobacco's son to Captain Helm [Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 161, 162], is wholly without foundation:

“He [the Tobacco's son] had conceived such an inviolable attachment for Captain Helm that, on finding that the Captain was a prisoner and not being as yet able to release him, he declared himself a prisoner also. He joined his brother, as he called Captain Helm and continually kept with him condoling their condition as prisoners in great distress, at the same time wanting nothing, that was in the power of the garrison to furnish. Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton knowing the influence of the Tobacco's son, was extremely jealous of his behavior, and took every pains to gain him by presents, etc. When anything was presented to him, his reply would be that it would serve him and his brother to live on. He would not enter into council saying that he was a prisoner, and had nothing to say; but was in hopes that when the grass grew, his brother, the Big Knife, would release him, and when he was free he could talk, etc. In short, they could do nothing with him.”

NOTE LXXVIII.

HAMILTON'S FORCE (WHITE) JANUARY 30, 1779.

Return of the state of His Majesty's Garrison of Fort Sackville, 30th of January, 1779:

	Majors.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Surgeons.	Bateau Master.	Matrossers.	Sergeants.	Rank and File.	Indian Depart.:					
									Captains.	Interpreters.	Storekeeper.	Volunteers.	Carpenters.	
Royal Artillery.	2
King's Regiment.	2	30
Detroit Volunteers.	1	1	3	34
Militia.	1	1	1	1	1	5
Indian Department.	3	2	1	3
Artificers.	3
Totals.	1	2	2	1	1	2	5	69	3	2	1	3	3	3

NOTE LXXIX.

ILLINOIS COUNTY ESTABLISHED.

“On the 19th of November, the letters and papers of Clark were read in the Virginia Assembly and referred to a committee composed of Thomas Mason, George Mason and others, who prepared a bill “for establishing a county to include the inhabitants of this [Virginia] commonwealth, on the western side of the Ohio River; and for the better government of those

inhabitants [the italicising is ours]." (Kate Mason Rowland's *Life of George Mason*, vol. I, p. 307.) For the act itself, see Hening's *Virginia Statutes at Large*, vol. IX, p. 552. It was passed between the 19th of November and the 12th of December, 1778 — not in October, as generally asserted, although at the "October session" of the legislature.

After giving a brief account of Clark's success, in the Illinois and the submission of Vincennes, at the instance of Gibault, John Fiske, in *The American Revolution* (vol. II, p. 106), says: "The territory north of the Ohio was thus annexed to Virginia as the 'county' of Illinois." But, of course, "the territory north of the Ohio" was never *annexed* to Virginia. It came to her, as she claimed, by her charter, long before Clark marched against the Illinois.

The county thus created by Virginia was the only one that had then (or that has since) been established in the United States without any boundary. This has given rise to many diverse opinions as to what was its real territory.

Mann Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 65), says: "Col. Clark having desired the Governor of Virginia to appoint a civil commandant, in October, 1778, an act was passed establishing the *County of Illinois*, embracing within its boundary all the chartered limits of Virginia west of the Ohio river."

Says E. B. Washburne (*The Edward Papers*, p. 73n): "Before the cession of the Northwestern Territory by Virginia to the United States, in 1784, the Virginia Assembly, in 1778, created the country which had been conquered by George Rogers Clark into the County of Illinois, the mother of all the counties

in the five States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin. . . . This [the County of Washington, embracing the eastern half of the present State of Ohio] was the first county made out of the mother county of Illinois."

And thus Henry Pirtle: "In October, 1778, the county of Illinois was established by the General Assembly of Virginia, covering all the territory ['between the Ohio and Mississippi river'] and provision was made for its protection by reinforcements to the army of Clark." (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 5.)

The views of William Frederick Poole are as follows: "The military conquest of the Illinois country now being complete, a civil government was forthwith established. The Assembly of Virginia was prompt to act as soon as the capture of Kaskaskia was known. In October, 1778, the territory northwest of the Ohio was constituted a county of Virginia, and was named the county of Illinois." ("The West," in *Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 729.)

Edward G. Mason (*Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 286), writes: "In October, 1778, the general assembly of Virginia passed 'an act for establishing the County of Illinois, and for the more effectual protection and defense thereof.' It provides that all the citizens of Virginia settled on the western side of the Ohio shall be included in a distinct county, to be called Illinois County. This practically included the whole region afterward known as the Northwest Territory."

The following we find in Kate Mason Rowland's *Life of George Mason*, vol. I, p. 314:

"It can easily be imagined with what pleasure this recital of interesting and heroic adventure [Clark's letter to Mason, from Louisville, Nov. 19, 1779] was read aloud to the family circle at 'Gunston.' Colonel Clark had probably been a frequent visitor there, and was regarded with pride and affection by the head of the house [that is, by George Mason] who advised and counselled his young friend evidently as if he were a son. George Rogers Clark was at this time about twenty-five [he only lacked a few days of being twenty-seven when he dated his letter]. He was a native of Albermarle County, but had been for several years a resident of Kentucky. Already distinguished in the border warfare as well as in the civil affairs of his new home, and identified in later life with its fortunes, he is claimed as one of the founders of this [Kentucky] commonwealth. Kentucky, however, was at this time a Virginia County, and it was as a Virginian and at the head of two or three thousand [less than two hundred] Virginia troops that Colonel Clark conquered for his state the new county of Illinois, from which five commonwealths [Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan and Wisconsin] were to emerge later.

A recent writer (Roosevelt: *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 168), declares:

"The Virginian Government took immediate steps to provide for the civil administration of the country Clark had conquered. In the fall of 1778 the entire region northwest of the Ohio was constituted the county of Illinois."

Says Wallace (*The History of Illinois and Louisiana under the French Rule*, p. 403):

“In October of the latter year [1778], the Virginia Legislature erected the conquered territory into the county of Illinois.”

And thus G. C. Brodhead in *Settlements West of the Alleghanys Prior to 1776*—*Magazine of American History*, vol. XXIX, p. 337: “In 1778, all the territory northwest of the Ohio was formed into one county called Illinois.”

Upon the creation of the new county, Governor Henry gave the following as part of his instructions to Clark (Dec. 12, 1778): “You are to retain the command of the troops now at the several posts in the county of Illinois. . . . [which posts, with those] on the Wabash . . . fall within the limits of the county now erected and called ‘Illinois county.’” It is evident, therefore, that when the new county was established, it was understood that its jurisdiction extended so as to include the Illinois towns and the Peoria as a dependency, with Vincennes and Wea upon the Wabash. Nowhere else were citizens (actually or constructively such) of Virginia, peaceably and lawfully “settled on the western side of the Ohio,” when the act was passed; hence, according to its terms, no persons in the western territory outside these towns lived in Illinois county: and, it is a well-known fact that, down to the date of the cession of the country by Virginia to the United States, no Virginians (actually or constructively such) were peaceably and lawfully settled anywhere “on the western side of the Ohio” northward of Peoria or eastward of Vincennes and Wea.

When John Todd took office as Lieutenant of Illinois county, he understood it included besides territory on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers, lands lying on the Wabash and Illinois rivers; but he claimed no jurisdiction throughout the entire length of the valley of these two streams. [Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 168. Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, p. 301.]

NOTE LXXX.

RESPECTING VIGO'S VISIT TO VINCENNES AND HIS
RETURN.

"Vigo was a 'Sardinian.' He was born in 1747, at Mondovi. As a Spanish soldier, he was with his regiment, first at Havana, and afterward at New Orleans, when that city was under the sway of Spain. He left the army and came to St. Louis, becoming the partner of Don Francisco de Leyba and was soon extensively engaged in the fur-trade." [H. W. Beckwith, in Reynold's *Illinois* (ed. of 1887), p. 423.]

Mann Butler, who, while writing his *History of Kentucky*, was in communication with Vigo, says (p. 79): "After all this success with the Indians, Colonel Clark began to entertain great apprehensions for St. Vincents [Vincennes]; no news had been received for a considerable length of time from that place, till on the 29th of January, 1779, Colonel Vigo, then a merchant in partnership with the Governor of St. Louis, now [1834] a venerable and highly respectable citizen of Vincennes, brought intelligence that Governor Hamilton had marched an expedition from De-

troit, which had, in December, captured St. Vincents, and again reduced it under the power of the British."

That January 29th was the day Vigo reached Clark there can be no doubt. "Bowman's Journal," in the archives of the Department of State, Washington—(Letters to Washington," vol. 33, p. 90). Clark to Mason—*Clark's campaign in the Illinois*, p. 62. Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 137. In "Bowman's Journal," as printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 99, the date is given as the 27th, but this is error.

In a letter dated February 3d, written by Clark to the Governor of Virginia, he speaks of Vigo's arrival the day previous (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316); but this is explained from the circumstance that the letter was in reality, written January 30th. Concerning Vigo's visit to Vincennes and his subsequent calling on Clark in Kaskaskia, the latter says: (I.) "Yesterday, I fortunately got every intelligence that I could wish for by a Spanish gentleman who made his escape from Mr. Hamilton." (Letter to the Governor of Virginia, from Kaskaskia, Feb. 3 [Jan. 30] 1779—*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 315, 316). (II.) "But, in the light of the hurry, a Spanish merchant, who had been at St. Vincennes [Vincennes] arrived and gave the following intelligence" (Letter to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779, from Kaskaskia—*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222n). (III.) "In the hight of our anxiety, on the evening of the 29th of January, 1779, Mr. Vigo, a Spanish merchant, arrived from St. Vincents [Vincennes], and was there at the time of its being taken [by Hamilton] and gave

me every intelligence I could wish to have." (Letter to Mason, Nov. 19, 1779 — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 62, 63.) (IV.) "On the 29th of January, 1779, in the high of the hurry, a Spanish merchant, who had been at Post Vincennes, arrived and gave the following intelligence" [Clark's *Memoir* in Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 137].

"Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS., has this to say of Vigo's arrival and of the information he imparted to Clark: "Mr. Vigo, a Spanish subject, who had been at Post St. Vincent [Vincennes] on his lawful business, arrived [Jan. 29th, 1779] and gave us intelligence that Gov. Hamilton and thirty regulars with fifty French volunteers and about four hundred Indians, had come last November [December] and taken that fort with Capt. Helm and several other Americans, who were there, with a number of horses designed for the settlement of Kentucky, etc."

One of Kentucky's early historians says: "While he [Clark] was digesting the plan of his future operations, he received undoubted information from an itinerant Spanish merchant [Vigo], who had recently left St. Vincennes, that Hamilton, reposing himself on the security which he derived from the superiority of his force, contemplated a leisurely execution of his projects." (Marshall: *History of Kentucky*, vol I, p. 69.) But Reynolds (see his *Pioneer History*, p. 101, ed. 1887) says Vigo was sent to Vincennes by Clark as a spy; that he was captured by the Indians and taken to Hamilton, who suspected the character of his mission; and that he was released on the ground of his being a Spanish subject, and having influential

friends among the French residents. The only assertion in all this that is not error (and that one is stated inferentially) is, that Vigo had influential friends among the French residents.

In Law's *Vincennes* (pp. 26-30), there is an extended account of Vigo's visit to Vincennes and his return, which is replete with errors. That writer says:

"It was well known that Governor Abbott, the commander here [at Vincennes], at the time of Clark's expedition to the Illinois had gone to Detroit on business; and that no great time would elapse before reinforcements would be sent from that post to Vincennes. Clark could not, even had he desired it, detailed any of his own command to garrison the place. Helm was here, a commandant in name simply, without a single soldier under his command. From the first of August, when M. Gibault returned [from Vincennes to Kaskaskia], until the 29th of January, 1779, Clark had not received a single communication from Vincennes. How he obtained it, and the consequences resulting from the communication, it is now my purpose to briefly unfold. . . .

"With an innate love of liberty, an attachment to republican principles, and an ardent sympathy for an oppressed people struggling for their rights, he [Vigo] overlooked all personal consequences; and as soon as he learnt of Clark's arrival at Kaskaskia, he crossed the line—went there and tendered him his means, and his influence, both of which were joyfully accepted. Knowing Col. Vigo's influence with the ancient inhabitants of the country, and desirous of obtaining some information from Vincennes, from which he had not heard for several months, Col.

Clark, in a conference with Col. Vigo, proposed that he should come and learn the actual state of affairs at the Post [Vincennes]. Col. Vigo did not hesitate a moment in obeying this command. With a single servant, he proceeded on his journey; and when on the river Embarrass, he was seized by a party of Indians, plundered of everything he possessed, and brought a prisoner before Hamilton, then in possession of the place, which, with his troops, he had, a short time before, captured, holding Capt. Helm a prisoner of war. Being a Spanish subject and consequently a non-combatant, Governor Hamilton, although he strongly suspected the motives of his [Vigo's] visit, dared not confine him; he accordingly admitted him to his parole, on the single condition, that he should daily report himself at the Fort. On his frequent visits there, his accurate and discerning mind, aided by the most powerful memory I ever knew, enabled him early to ascertain the state of the garrison, its numerical force, means of defence, position, in fine all the matters necessary to make an accurate report, as soon as liberated. Hamilton, in the meantime, embarrassed by his detention, besieged by the French inhabitants of the town, by whom he was beloved, for his release; and finally threatened by them, that unless released they would refuse all supplies to the garrison, yielded, on condition that Col. Vigo would sign an article 'not to do any act during the war injurious to the British interests.' This he absolutely and positively refused. The matter was finally adjusted, on an agreement entered into on part of Col. Vigo 'not to do anything injurious to the British interests *on his way to St. Louis.*' The

agreement was signed, and the next day he departed in a *pirogue* down the Wabash and the Ohio, and up the Mississippi, with two voyagers accompanying him. Col. Vigo faithfully and religiously kept the very *letter* of his bond. On *his way* to St. Louis he did nothing injurious in the slightest degree to British interests. But he had no sooner set his foot on shore there, and changed his dress, than in the same *pirogue* he hastened to Kaskaskia."

Law adds, subsequently (p. 55), more errors:

"It was entirely through the means of Father Gibault that Hamilton released Col. Vigo, when sent by Clark to ascertain the true situation of affairs at Vincennes. He was captured by the Indians and taken to 'Fort Sackville,' where he was kept a prisoner on parole for many weeks, and released, entirely by the interference of Father Gibault, and the declaration of the French inhabitants at Vincennes, who, with their priest at their head, after service on the Sabbath, marched to the fort and informed Hamilton 'they would refuse all supplies to the garrison unless Vigo was released.'"

The errors of Judge Law to be especially noted and guarded against are: (1) There were no reinforcements soon to be sent from Detroit to Vincennes after Gov. Abbott's departure. (2) Captain Helm was not in command of Fort Sackville without a single soldier under him. (3) Vigo did not go to Vincennes at the request of Clark — was not sent there by the latter. (4) Vigo was not seized by the Indians, plundered of everything he had, and then taken a prisoner before Hamilton. (5) Vigo was not paroled by Hamilton in Vincennes. (6) Hamilton

did not release Vigo upon any condition whatever, or at the request of any persons — he simply escaped from Vincennes, where Hamilton had detained him and on his way to St. Louis called upon Clark at Kaskaskia.

But these errors are somewhat varied by different writers. “While Clark was still at Kaskaskia Colonel Francis Vigo, of St. Louis, a Spanish subject in sympathy with the American cause, went to him and tendered his services. Clark gladly availed himself of the offer, and Colonel Vigo, with a single servant, proceeded to Vincennes to learn the strength of that post and the possibilities of its capture. As was anticipated, he was captured, and brought before Governor Hamilton. Being a Spanish subject, he could not be held as a spy in the absence of proof. He was, however, forbidden to leave the fort; but finally, on giving a written pledge not to attempt anything injurious to British interests while on his return to St. Louis, he was allowed to depart. Colonel Vigo kept his pledge by going to St. Louis without telling on the way anything he had learned of the force of Hamilton at Vincennes. He however, waited at St. Louis only long enough to change his dress and then hurried back to Kaskaskia, arriving there the 29th of January.” (*Farmer's History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 251.)

“The knowledge which Colonel Clark had of the condition or situation of the fort at that place [Vincennes], obtained through information received from Colonel Vigo, *sent there for that purpose*, enabled him [Clark]. to act intelligently and to know precisely what he would have to contend with [the italicising

is mine].” (John Moses, in *Magazine of Western History*, vol. III, p. 270).

An Indiana historian, writing at a late date, gives this relation:

“He [Vigo] became acquainted with Clark and tendered him his services. Clark requested him to go to Vincennes and report from time to time, the exact condition of affairs there, for which purpose Vigo at once departed, accompanied by one servant. At the Embarrass River he was captured by hostile Indians, who carried him before Hamilton, then lately arrived at the post. For several weeks he was held on a parole requirement to report every day at the fort, then called Fort Sackville, he having refused to accept liberty which was offered him if he would agree ‘not to do any act during the war injurious to the British interests.’ Father Gibault, who was at Vincennes, interested himself actively in Vigo’s behalf, and finally, after services one Sunday morning in January, went to the fort at the head of his parishioners, and notified Hamilton that they would furnish no more supplies to the garrison until Vigo was released. Hamilton, having no evidence against Vigo, and being desirous of retaining the friendship of the villagers, released his prisoner on condition that he should ‘not do anything injurious to the British interests on his way to St. Louis.’ Vigo embarked in a pirogue with two voyageurs and sped away, down the Wabash, down the Ohio, up the Mississippi, until the Illinois settlements were left behind and the village of St. Louis was reached. He spent a few minutes changing his clothes and obtaining a few supplies, and was in the boat again; the flying

paddles stir the chill waters; he is at Kaskaskia, and Clark has minute and exact intelligence concerning all matters at Vincennes." (Dunn's *Indiana*, pp. 139, 140.)

In an article by J. C. Wells, entitled, "Virginia's Conquest," printed in the *Magazine of American History*, vol. XVI, there is (pp. 453, 454) an account of Vigo's visit to Vincennes and his return. In it are to be found condensed most of the errors previously published by writers who have essayed to mention the subject.

NOTE LXXXI.

CLARK'S ERRORS AS TO INFORMATION BROUGHT HIM BY VIGO.

Nearly three months after Vigo's return from Vincennes Clark wrote: "That gentleman [Lieutenant Governor Hamilton], with a body of men, possessed himself of that post [Vincennes] on the 15th [17th] of December last, repaired the fortifications for a repository, and in the spring, meant to attack this place [Kaskaskia], which he made no doubt of carrying; where he was to be joined by two hundred Indians from Michilimackinac, and five hundred Cherokees, Chickasaws, and other nations. With this body, he was to penetrate up the Ohio to Fort Pitt, sweeping Kentucky on his way, having light brass cannon for the purpose — [to be] joined on his march by all the Indians that could be got to him. He made no doubt he could force all West Augusta. This expedition [the one against the Illinois] was

ordered by the Commander-in-chief of Canada. . . . I ordered Major [Captain] Bowman to evacuate the fort at Cohos [Cahokia] and join me immediately, which he did." (Clark to the Governor of Virginia, April 29, 1779, from Kaskaskia — *Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222n.)

Now, the inference to be drawn from this is, that the Colonel had been put in possession of the information he mentions even *before* ordering Captain Bowman to evacuate Cahokia. But this could not have been the fact; nor did he get any such news *after* that event while at Kaskaskia, down to the time immediately preceding the arrival of Vigo; and the latter only gave him a portion of these details.

There is no evidence that Hamilton had determined to "penetrate up the Ohio" with the Indians, or that he "made no doubt he could force all West Augusta." Any determination such as this would, beyond all question, have been communicated by the Lieutenant Governor to General Haldimand. But he gave the Commander-in-chief no intimation of any such design on his part, further than that he would like to assemble in the Spring the Indians north and south and concert with them a general invasion of the border settlements of Virginia and Pennsylvania. And Haldimand, in commenting on the news received from the Lieutenant Governor at Vincennes makes no mention of any particular determination of the latter beyond attacking the Illinois. In speaking subsequently of Hamilton, the Commander-in-Chief says:

"He seems to think, next spring, to attack the two posts at the Illinois. It is hoped, in that case, that he will at least take along one of the three

pounders which he got at Vincennes, so as to make a cross fire, or else the rebels might easily cover themselves against one cannon; that is, if he expects nothing but stockades to attack, otherwise, a six-pounder field piece would not be sufficient." "Two royal mortars," adds the General, "would be useful if he had more artillery men than two." ("Remarks on Lieutenant Governor Hamilton's Letter [of Dec. 18-30, 1778]:" Haldimand MSS.)

Clark, in his letter to Mason of the nineteenth of November, 1779, says: "Governor Hamilton's party consisted of about eight hundred men when he took possession of that post on the 17th day of December past. Finding the season too far spent for his intention against Kaskaskia, he had sent nearly the whole of his Indians out in different parties to war, but to embody again as soon as the weather would permit and complete his design. He had also sent messengers to the Southern Indians, five hundred of whom he expected to join him. He had only eighty troops in garrison." (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 63.)

The Colonel, as we have seen, was inclined to exaggeration. He indulged in this property occasionally in this letter, especially, it will be noticed, as to the number of the enemy under Hamilton when the latter took possession of Vincennes. There is no reason to doubt but that Vigo reported a little less than five hundred.

Years after Clark gives Vigo's recital as follows: "That the hostile Indians were to meet at Post Vincennes in the spring, drive us out of the Illinois, and attack the Kentucky settlements in a body, joined by

their southern friends; that all the goods were taken from the merchants of Port Vincennes for the King's use; that the troops under Hamilton were repairing the fort, and expected a reinforcement from Detroit in the Spring; that they appeared to have plenty of all kinds of stores; that they were strict in their discipline, but that he did not believe they were under much apprehension of a visit; and believed that, if we could get there undiscovered, we might take the place. In short, we got every information from this gentleman that we could wish for, as he had good opportunities and had taken great pains to inform himself with a design to give intelligence." [Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 137, 138.]

NOTE LXXXII.

SOME PUBLISHED ERRORS AS TO THE REASONS INDUCING CLARK TO UNDERTAKE THE CAPTURE OF HAMILTON IN VINCENNES.

The American commander in his letter to the Governor of Virginia, of the 29th of April, 1779, exaggerated the supposed dangers surrounding him: "Destruction seemed to hover over us from every quarter; detached parties of the enemy were in the neighborhood every day, but afraid to attack." (Jefferson's *Works*, vol. I, p. 222n.) There was only *one* party — the one under the Ottawa chief — of the enemy in the Illinois at this period; and it was only from *one* quarter that "destruction seemed to hover over" them.

"We now viewed ourselves," afterward wrote Clark, "in a very critical situation — in a manner cut off from any intercourse between us and the United States. We knew that Governor Hamilton in the Spring, by a junction of his northern and southern Indians (which he had prepared for) would be at the head of such a force that nothing in this quarter could withstand his arms — that Kentucky must immediately fall; and well if the desolation would end there. If we could immediately make our way good to Kentucky, we were convinced that before we could raise a force even sufficient to save that country, it would be too late, as all the men in it, joined by the troops we had, would not be sufficient; and to get timely succor from the interior countries [of Virginia] was out of the question. We saw but one alternative, which was to attack the enemy in their quarters. If we were fortunate, it would save the whole. If otherwise, it would be nothing more than what would certainly be the consequence if we should not make the attempt. . . . These and many other similar reasons, induced us to resolve to attempt the enterprise, which met with the approbation of every individual belonging to us." [Clark's *Memoir Dillon's Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 138.]

But Hamilton had not prepared for a junction with his northern and southern Indians. And it is evident that what Clark says about making his way to Kentucky and his inability to hold that country are thoughts conjured up years after.

"Colonel Clark," says a Western writer, "now began to entertain great fears for the safety of Vincennes. No intelligence had been received from that

post for a long time; but on the 29th of January, 1779, Colonel Vigo brought intelligence that Governor Hamilton of Detroit, had marched an expedition against the place in December, and again reduced the inhabitants and the fort, and re-established the British power. The expedition had been fitted out on a large scale, with the view of recapturing Kaskaskia, and making an assault along the whole line of the Kentucky frontier. But owing to the advanced period of the season, Governor Hamilton had postponed the further execution of this grand scheme of conquest until spring, when he contemplated reassembling his forces.

“Having received this timely intelligence of the British governor’s designs, Colonel Clark with characteristic promptitude and decision, determined to anticipate him, and strike the first blow. He accordingly made immediate preparation for an expedition against Vincennes.” [Collins: *History of Kentucky* (ed. of 1877) p. 138.]

But it does not appear that Clark, to the moment of Vigo’s arrival, had given much thought about Vincennes;—it was the Illinois he feared was the object of Hamilton’s movement before reported to him as being under way. That Hamilton, in marching from Detroit, had in view the making of an assault along the whole line of the Kentucky border is a declaration, as before explained, not warranted by the words of the Lieutenant Governor before or after leaving that place.

“Col. Clark, who kept himself well advised of the movements of the enemy, having also learned that Major de Peyster at Mackinac, had dispatched Capt.

Chas. de Langlade to raise a coöperative force of Indians to act with Hamilton at Vincennes or more directly by way of the Illinois River, upon Cahokia, decided with his accustomed daring and sagacity, not to wait for the favorable weather, the want of which had delayed the British commander, but to take advantage of the absence of the Indians, who were still marauding across the Ohio, and become the attacking party himself." (Moses, in his *Illinois: Historical and Statistical*, vol. I, p. 155, citing, as to De Peyster, *Magazine of Western History*, vol. III.) It is certain, however, that when the Colonel resolved to attack Hamilton in Vincennes he had no knowledge of what De Peyster had done at Michilimackinac to aid the Lieutenant Governor.

NOTE LXXXIII.

CONCERNING THE GUNBOAT WILLING.

"The boat," wrote Clark in his letter to the Virginia Governor, of February 3d, "is to make her way if possible and take her station ten leagues below St. Vincent [Vincennes] until further orders. If I am defeated, she is to join Col. [David] Rogers on the Mississippi [of whom mention is made in this narrative]. She has great stores of ammunition on board, and is commanded by Lieut. John Rogers. I shall march across by land with the rest of my boys." (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 316.)

In his letter of April 29, 1779, Clark says: "I immediately dispatched a small galley, which I had

fitted up, mounting two four-pounders and four swivels, — with a company of men and necessary stores on board, with orders to force her way, if possible, and station herself a few miles below the enemy; suffer nothing to pass her and wait for further orders.” (*Jefferson's Works*, loc. cit.)

In his Memoir, Clark says: “We had great dependence on this galley. She was far superior to anything the enemy could fit out without building a vessel; and, at the worst, if we were discovered, we could build a number of large pirogues, such as they possessed, to attend her, and with such a little fleet, perhaps, pester the enemy very much; and if we saw it our interest force a landing; at any rate, it would be sometime before they could be a match for us on the water” [Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 139]. But all this, it is clear, is a draw on his imagination.

A recent writer has the following concerning Clark's sending a part of his force by water:

“Sending a few boats, with light artillery and provisions, to ascend the Ohio and Wabash, Clark started overland from Kaskaskia.” (Fiske: *The American Revolution* (vol. II, p. 106.) But Clark repeatedly declares he only sent *one* boat; and all other contemporaneous statements which refer to the matter, confirm what he says.

Bancroft's language [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 313] concerning the commander of the *Willing* is calculated to mislead; for he speaks of the boat as having been put under the command of “*Captain* John Rogers [the italicising is mine.]”

NOTE LXXXIV.

ERRONEOUS TRADITION CONCERNING PROVISIONS TAKEN
BY CLARK ON HIS MARCH TO VINCENNES.

A tradition has found its way into print to the effect that nothing was taken along as food except parched corn and jerked beef (*Monnette's History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, vol. I, p. 427); but this is clearly erroneous. There was no lack of provisions in the Illinois towns at that date; there was plenty of flour and other necessaries. The writer just cited evidently had no suspicions that horses were taken along;—he not only fills the men's knapsacks with parched corn and jerked beef, but these supplies were to be carried by the soldiers, not to be taken on pack-horses.

NOTE LXXXV.

AS TO CLARK'S FORCE WHICH WENT AGAINST
VINCENNES.

The idea conveyed in Clark's letter to Governor Henry of "Feb. 3" (really Jan. 30) 1779, as printed in the *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, Vol. I., p. 315, is, that the *entire force* of the Colonel—both those which were to go by water and those to march by land—would consist of between one hundred and seventy and one hundred and eighty men; but, as a matter of fact, Clark raised one entire company of militia—Captain Charleville's—after writing that letter.

In "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS., under date of Feb. 5th, it is recorded "Raised another Company of Volunteers under the command of Capt. Francois Charleville, which added to our force, and increased our number to 170, including the artillery [men] and pack-horsemen." This, as to the number of men under Clark, is in the same words as printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois* p. 100. The same number is given in Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 136.*

It is evident the force on board the *Willing* (which had already departed) is not included in the number mentioned. And Schieffelin, afterward, in his *Loose Notes*, says Clark had 160 men — meaning, probably, exclusive of officers, and, *certainly* not including those on the *Willing*. The whole number, then, "with the boat's crew," and including officers, was 218, making "a little over two hundred," as stated by the Colonel — notwithstanding, in his letter to Gov. Henry, of April 29, 1779, as printed in *Jefferson's Works*, Vol. I., p. 222n, he gives his force that went by land as consisting of 130 men.

Clark's words in his letter of "Feb. 3" (really Jan. 30) are:

"I shall set out in a few days with all the force I can raise of my own troops and a few militia that I can depend on amounting in the whole to only [one] hundred and seventy — men, — — of which go on board

* In *Washington-Irving Correspondence*, p. 392, the force Clark marched with is erroneously put down as 175. So, also, in the *History of the Girtys*, p. 90, where it is said — "with a force of one hundred and seventy-six men, he started for Vincennes."

a small galley fitted out some time ago." The blank before "men" indicates that in the Colonel's judgment he would have over 170 but less than 180 men all told. Of these, a certain number, but he could not tell how many, is indicated in the next blanks as being those he would send on board the galley. William Wirt Henry, in his *Life of Patrick Henry*, Vol. III., p. 221, omits the first blank, and gives the word "some" in lieu of the two which follow the word "men." This changes the sense materially.

Lyman C. Draper, in Appleton's *Cyclopedia of American Biography* (art. "George Rogers Clark"), says: "[Clark] with fewer than 170 men, all told, marched across the country." This conclusion reached by Draper is, in reality, without meaning for want of definiteness, — "less than 170" might mean 169, or no more than 130 as printed in *Jefferson's works*, Vol. I., p. 222n.

NOTE LXXXVI.

AS TO THE DISTANCE TO BE TRAVELED BY CLARK FROM
KASKASKIA TO VINCENNES ON HIS MARCH
ACROSS THE COUNTRY.

Clark had been told by the inhabitants of the Illinois that it was eighty leagues to Vincennes, which was their estimate. The Colonel mistook these for English leagues — three miles each, whereas they were French leagues, making the distance about one hundred and ninety-two miles — a six days' journey on horseback ordinarily, although parties had been known, when hard pressed, to make the distance in four days;

and Clark himself afterwards, it may be premised, made it in that time. Of course the trail was by no means a "bee line." [See, as to the distance being called by the French eighty leagues, Denny's *Military Journal*, (*Memoir of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania*, Vol. VII.), p. 422.] As to its being an ordinary six day's journey, see *Bouquet's Expedition* (Cincinnati Reprint: 1868), p. 144. In reckoning the distance in miles, the number has been, by English writers, usually understood. Compare Denny's *Journal*, pp. 312, 422; Monnette's *History of the Valley of the Mississippi*, Vol. II., p. 427. E. A. Bryan, in *The Magazine of American History*, Vol. XXI, p. 401, puts the distance traveled by Clark as "some two hundred miles."

. . . "To the Illinois by land [from Vincennes], the road is chiefly through plains and extensive meadows — 240 miles . . . The above distances are all computed." ("Roads from Detroit to the Illinois by way of the Forts Miami, Wea and Vincennes, with some Remarks": Haldimand MSS.) And Hamilton makes the distance the same in his letters to Haldimand of Dec. 18-30, 1778, and July 6, 1781. But he and the itinerary before mentioned undoubtedly considered the French estimate — eighty leagues — as making two hundred and forty miles.

NOTE LXXXVII.

SOME ERRORS IN "BOWMAN'S JOURNAL" AS PRINTED,
CORRECTED BY THE MS. COPY IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

The entry for the 12th of February as printed, reads thus :

"12th. Marched across Cat plains ; saw and killed numbers of buffaloes. The road very bad from the immense quantity of rain that had fallen. The men much fatigued. Encamped on the edge of the woods. This plain or meadow being fifteen or more miles across, it was late in the night before the baggage and troops got together. Now twenty-one miles from St. Vincents."

But in the MS. Journal the entry reads as follows :

"12. Marched across Cat plain, [that is, "Cat Meadow," or "Cat Prairie.] Saw and killed numbers of buffaloe. The roads very bad from the immense quantity of rain that had fallen. The men much fatigued. Encamped at the edge of the wood, — this plain or meadow being fifteen or more miles across. It was late in the night before the troops and baggage got together. Now 21 leagues from St. Vincents." [These were undoubtedly French leagues, making the distance about fifty miles.]

NOTE LXXXVIII.

ROOSEVELT ON THE FEASTS ENJOYED BY CLARK'S MEN
ON THEIR MARCH TO VINCENNES.

The author of *The Winning of the West* (Vol. II, pp. 70, 71) says: "He [Clark] encouraged the men to hunt game; and to 'feast on it like Indian war-dancers' [quoting the *Memoir*], each company in turn inviting the others to the smoking and plentiful banquets. One day they saw great herds of buffaloes and killed many of them. They had no tents; but at night-fall they kindled huge campfires, and spent the evenings merrily round the piles of blazing logs, in hunter fashion, feasting on bear's ham and buffalo hump, elk saddle, venison haunch, and the breast of the wild turkey, some singing of love and the chase and war, and others dancing after the manner of the French trappers and wood-runners. Thus they kept on, marching hard but gleefully and in good spirits." . . . Evidently there is here somewhat of a draft on the imagination.

NOTE LXXXIX.

PLAN ADOPTED BY CLARK IN CROSSING THE LITTLE WA-
BASH AND ITS TRIBUTARY.

The plan described in the text seems to have been the one adopted in crossing the Little Waash and its northern affluent, so far as can be judged of from the meager accounts given. In his letter to Mason, Clark says:

“In three days, we contrived to cross by building a large canoe — ferried across the two channels—the rest of the way, we waded, building scaffolds at each [channel] to lodge our baggage on until the horses crossed to take it. It rained nearly a third of our march, but we never halted for it.”

NOTE XC.

CONCERNING CLARK'S ROUTE FROM KASKASKIA TO THE
EMBARRASS RIVER.

There is a trail laid down on, *A New Map of the Western Parts of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and North Carolina*, by Thomas Hutchins, London, 1778, as a “Road from Kaskaskia Village to Post Vincient.” This may have been followed as far as the Embarrass river by Clark, but no farther. On Blanchard's *Historical Map of Illinois*, “Clark's Route” is laid down even to Vincennes. It is, however, wholly unreliable. The first *known* point reached after leaving Kaskaskia is when the Little Wabash and its northern tributary was crossed, a short distance above their confluence, in the southeast part of the present Clay county, Illinois. The course thence to the Embarrass, it is certain, was nearly on a line towards Vincennes. The direction then taken will hereafter be considered.

NOTE XCI.

ESCAPE OF CAPT. WILLIAMS'S BROTHER FROM FORT
SACKVILLE.

“Bowman’s Journal” as printed — *Clark’s Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 102 — says it was Captain *Willing’s* brother who made his escape from Fort Sackville; but this is manifestly an error — either of the types or of the copyist; and the language of the same in the Department of State MSS., makes the correction, by giving the name as *Williams* — Captain *Williams’s* brother. But the words of the latter immediately following, are apt to mislead unless rightly considered. The sentence stands thus: “Captain William’s brother (who was taken in the fort) had made his escape also to us.” But he was not taken *in the fort*; and his having made his escape “to us” means, to the Americans — not directly to Clark’s force.

NOTE XCII.

FICTITIOUS ACCOUNTS AS TO THE METHODS OF CLARK
TO RAISE THE COURAGE OF HIS MEN.

What the favorite song was that Clark’s men indulged in is unknown. The following tradition concerning songs sung by the drummer of the force is certainly amusing:

“Part of the force . . . went by boat, but all of them really went by water. Daily rains made the

journey more and more disagreeable, yet nothing could dampen the ardor of the troops. The drummer of the party was a jovial little Irishman, with a rich voice and a memory well stored with comic songs, all of them full of the 'Begone-dull-care' spirit that animates the natives of Erin's Isle. When the men were wading through mud and water, Colonel Clark would seat the drummer on his drum, on which he floated and sang, keeping up the spirits of his men with his lively melodies." (Farmer's *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 252.) But Law (in his *Vincennes*, p. 32n) gives the account, it seems, first of any in print, and as follows:

"Without food, benumbed with cold, up to their waists in water covered with broken ice, the men composing Clark's troops at one time mutinied, refused to march. All the persuasions of Clark had no effect on the half-starved and half-frozen soldiers. In one of the companies was a small boy who acted as drummer. In the same company was a sergeant, standing six feet two inches in his stockings, — stout, athletic, and devoted to Clark. Finding that his eloquence had no effect upon the men, in persuading them to continue their line of march, Clark mounted the little drummer on the shoulders of the stalwart sergeant, and gave orders to him to plunge into the half-frozen water. He did so, the little drummer beating the *charge* from his lofty perch, while Clark, with sword in hand, followed them giving the command, as he threw aside the floating ice — 'Forward!' Elated and amused with the scene, the men promptly obeyed, holding their rifles above their heads and in spite of all obstacles, reached the higher land beyond them safely."

NOTE XCIII.

CLARK'S CONDENSED STATEMENT OF HIS MARCH FROM
KASKASKIA TO WARRIORS' ISLAND.

A condensed statement of the march from Kaskaskia to Warriors' Island as given by Clark in his letter of April 29, 1779, to the Governor of Virginia is as follows:

"Although so small a body, it took me sixteen days on the route. The inclemency of the season, high waters, etc., seemed to threaten the loss of the expedition. When within three leagues of the enemy, in a direct line, it took us five days to cross the drowned lands of the Wabash river, having to wade often, upwards of two leagues, to our breast in water. Had not the weather been warm, we must have perished. But, on the evening of the 23d, we got on dry land, in sight of the enemy."

NOTE XCIV.

CONCERNING THE DETACHMENT OF LIEUT. BAYLEY.

Clark, in his letter to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 68 — says: "I detached Lieutenant Bayley and a party to attack the fort at a certain signal, and I took possession of the strongest posts of the town with the main body." But Clark's Journal (in the Haldimand MSS.) makes it evident that no signal was to be waited for. The word "posts" is a misprint; it should be "parts."

Both "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS. and the printed one say Bayley had fourteen regulars with him, and Clark's Memoir — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 148, says the same; but the Colonel, in his Journal, mentions fifteen riflemen, and I have followed his statement. It is evident the men detached were not of the Kaskaskia or Cahokia volunteers.

NOTE XCV.

CONCERNING CLARK'S ENTRY INTO VINCENNES.

Captain Chësne, who had not before heard of the coming of the Americans, was, it is to be presumed, considerably frightened, as he saw but one flag — a white one — and heard but one drum. And thus Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), Vol. V., p. 313), who evidently sees with Chësne's eyes:

"On the twenty-third, just at evening, Clark and his companions reached dry land, and, making no delay, with a white flag flying, they entered Vincennes."

"Bowman's Journal" as printed — *Clark's Campaign, in the Illinois* (p. 105) — gives the time of the Colonel's arrival as mentioned in the text; so, also, the one in the Department of State. But the wording of the former is, — "After wading to the edge of the water breast high, we mounted the rising ground the town is built on, about 8 o'clock;" while the latter says: "After wading to the edge of the town in water breast high, we mounted the rising ground the town is built on about 8 o'clock."

The Colonel (in his Journal) says he entered the upper end of the town. This is error and is corrected by Chésne. Clark in his Memoir — Dillon's Indiana (ed. of 1859), p. 148, says, substantially, that the main body did not enter the town in the same place as that by Lieut. Bayley with his detachment.

“This [the march of Clark from Kaskaskia to Vincennes] was one of the most wonderful of the military expeditions recorded in our history, and paralleled only by that of Arnold from the Kennebec to the Chaudiere, in the late Autumn of 1775. For a week Clark and his followers traversed the ‘drowned lands’ of Illinois, suffering every privation from wet, cold and hunger. When they arrived at the Little Wabash, at a point where the forks of that stream are three miles apart, they found the intervening space covered with water to the depth of three feet. The points of dry land were five miles apart and all that distance, the hardy soldiers of the West, in the month of February, waded the cold snow-flood in the forest, arm-pit deep! It seemed to the people and soldiers at Vincennes, when their men [Clark's force] their faces blackened to hideousness by gunpowder, suddenly appeared as if they had dropped from the clouds. It was impossible, they thought, that these soldiers would [could] have traversed the country a hundred miles from the Ohio river.” (Benson J. Lossing, in *The American Historical Record*, Vol. II., p. 62n.) Clark blacked his face (also a few others did the same) on the 21st of February, with gunpowder, at the same time giving the war whoop. It was only a specimen of backwoods bravado to urge on his men. The powder quickly disappeared from their faces.

NOTE XCVI.

A FICTION CONCERNING CLARK'S APPEARANCE IN
VINCENNES.

Butler, in speaking of Clark's letter to the inhabitants of Vincennes, says: "Seldom has frank notice been given to an enemy and choice afforded to retire to his friends; it was resorted to in hopes that its imposing character would add to the confidence of our [Clark's] friends and increase the dismay of our [Clark's] enemies. So much did it operate in this way that the expedition was believed to be from Kentucky; it was thought utterly impossible that, in the condition of the waters, it could be from the Illinois. This idea was confirmed by several messengers [sent] under the assumed name of gentlemen known to have been in Kentucky, to their acquaintances in St. Vincents [Vincennes]; nor would the presence of Clark be credited until his person was pointed out by one who knew him (*History of Kentucky*, p. 83). This tradition (for it is evidently only a tradition), it is certain is wholly fictitious.

NOTE XCVII.

CONCERNING THE APPLE-TODDY FICTION.

A ridiculous tradition — one that has not a shadow of foundation to build on — has found its way into history, to the effect that while Helm was a prisoner and playing at piquet with Hamilton in the fort, one of Clark's men requested leave of his commander

to shoot at the Captain's headquarters, so soon as they were discovered, to knock down the clay or mortar into his apple-toddy, which he was sure that officer, from his well-known fondness for that fine liquor, would have on his hearth; that the soldier got leave to fire at the place he desired; and that when Helm heard the bullets rattling about the chimney, he jumped up and swore it was Clark, who would make all the garrison prisoners, though the rascals had no business to spoil his toddy.

The first publication of this fiction was in these words:

"There is an amusing anecdote connected with the siege, illustrative of the frank and fearless spirit of the times; that while Helm was a prisoner and playing at piquet with Governor Hamilton in the fort, one of Clark's men requested leave of his commander to shoot at Helm's quarters, so soon as they were discovered, to knock down the clay or the mortar into his apple-toddy, which he was sure the captain from his well-known fondness for that fine liquor would have on his hearth. It is added that when the Captain heard the bullets rattling about the chimney, he jumped up and swore it was Clark, and he would make them all prisoners though the d—d rascals had no business to spoil his toddy." *Louisville Directory*, p. 97. It is added that when Helm made this exclamation about Clark, Governor Hamilton asked, 'Is he a merciful man?' It seems an intelligence was kept up between Helm and Clark through the medium of Henry's wife, who lived in the town and who had free access to her husband in the fort. Helm cautioned the British soldiers against looking out at the port holes, 'for,' said

he, 'Clark's men will shoot your eyes out;' it accordingly happened that one was shot through the eye, in attempting to look out, when Helm exclaimed, 'I told you so.' " (From a letter of Edmund Rogers cited by Butler in his *Kentucky*, p. 84n.)

NOTE XCVIII.

AS TO CLARK'S SUPPLY OF POWDER ON REACHING VINCENNES.

Schieffelin, in his *Loose Notes, Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 187 — gives a second-hand report, which recites that "a Mr. Le Gras, a Major of militia, with other inhabitants, . . . met the rebels some distance from the town, furnishing them with ammunition, provisions, etc., — the rebels having damaged all theirs by the long route through the floods of water from Kaskaskia to the town." This erroneous report is afterwards made the basis for a positive declaration by Hamilton [in his letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781, (Germain MSS.)] that Colonel Clark was supplied by the inhabitants of Vincennes with powder, "his own to the last ounce, being damaged on the march."

But none of the citizens of Vincennes marched out to meet Clark; and the detaching of Lieutenant Bayley, before the Colonel himself had reached the town, *to fire on the fort*, shows they had powder fit for immediate use.

NOTE XCIX.

OF THE TREATMENT ACCORDED CAPT. FRANCIS MAISONVILLE.

In Schieffelin's *Loose Notes — Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 188 — and in Hamilton's letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781 (Germain MSS.), accounts are given of the treatment meted out to Maisonville by the "rebels:" the former declaring he was finally saved, after numberless solicitations, by the Illinois volunteers in the "rebel" service; while the latter says it was by a "rebel" brother. Clark's only mention of the treatment received by Maisonville is in his *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana*, (ed. of 1859), p. 151, where he gives this account: "A few of his [Lamothe's] party were taken, one of which was Maisonville, a famous Indian partisan. Two lads that captured him, tied him to a post in the street, and fought from behind him as a breastwork, — supposing that the enemy would not fire at them for fear of killing him, as he would alarm them by his voice. The lads were ordered by an officer who discovered them at their amusement, to untie their prisoner, and take him off to the guard, which they did, but were so inhuman as to take part of his scalp on the way. There happened to him no other damage." While little confidence can be put in this relation, still less can be placed in the declaration of Hamilton that the prisoner was partially scalped by Clark's order. Schieffelin says (loc. cit.): "They [the Americans] had the inhumanity to scalp him, after the repeated orders for so doing from Colonel Clark."

NOTE C.

WHAT "BOWMAN'S JOURNAL" SAYS CONCERNING HAMILTON'S PROPOSALS BROUGHT TO CLARK BY CAPT. HELM FROM FORT SACKVILLE.

The proposals as printed vary from those in the MS. copy of "Bowman's Journal." The word "promises" is given as "proposes;" the words "that he wishes" are, "that is, he wishes;" the words "further proposes" read "promises;" "remain a secret" have the word "a" omitted; "finally concluded" are rendered "finished;" and "before the gate" are given as, "by the gate." As printed in Clark's *Memoir* [Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 153] the word "promises" is retained; but in all the residue, the two printed versions are identical. The words which end them ("If Colonel Clark makes a difficulty of coming into the fort, Lieutenant Governor Hamilton will speak to him by the gate") refer back, it will be noticed, to the first proposals sent out by Hamilton and confirm the statement as to Helm's first appearance, made by Clark in his Journal, under date of Feb. 24, 1779 — in the Haldimand MSS. Besides, in the Journal last mentioned, the Colonel, in speaking of Hamilton's proposition for a three days' truce and cessation from offensive work, etc., expressly calls them the "second proposals" of the Lieutenant Governor.

The proposals in "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS. are dated ("24th Feby, 1779"), but Hamilton's name is not signed to them; in Clark's Journal they are also dated, but are signed "H. H." In "Bowman's Journal" as printed and in Clark's *Memoir*, both the date and name are appended.

NOTE CI.

AMERICAN AND BRITISH ACCOUNTS AS TO THE FATE OF
A WAR PARTY ON ITS RETURN FROM THE FALLS OF
THE OHIO TO VINCENNES.

(I.) *American Accounts.*

“This moment received intelligence that a party of Indians were coming up from the Falls [of the Ohio] with prisoners or scalps, which party was sent out by Governor Hamilton for that purpose [i. e., to take prisoners or scalps]. My people [meaning his soldiers] were so enraged that they immediately intercepted the party, which consisted of eight Indians and a Frenchman of the garrison. They killed three on the spot and brought four in who were tomahawked in the street opposite the fort gate and thrown into the river. The Frenchman we showed mercy, as his aged father had behaved so well in my party. I relieved the two poor prisoners, who were French hunters on the Ohio.” (Clark’s *Journal* — entry of the 24th Feb., 1779 — Haldimand MSS.)

“Bowman’s Journal” gives this relation of the matter:

“ . . . A party of Indians [came] down the hills behind the town, who had been sent by Gov. Hamilton to get some scalps and prisoners from the Falls of Ohio. Our men having got news of it, pursued them, killed two on the spot, wounded three, took six prisoners [and] brought them into town. Two of them proving to be white men that they had taken prisoners, we released them, and brought the Indians to the main street before the fort gate, there toma-

hawked them and threw them into the river." [*Department of the State MSS.* The Journal as printed (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 107) has substantially the same account.

Clark to Governor Henry of April 29th, has the following: "In the height of this action, an Indian party that had been to war and taken two prisoners, came in, not knowing of us. Hearing of them, I dispatched a party to give them battle in the commons, and got nine of them, with . . . two prisoners, who proved to be Frenchmen." (*Jefferson's Works*, Vol. I., p. 222n.)

Clark's account of the affair in his letter to Mason contains additional particulars: "Some time before, a party of warriors sent by Mr. Hamilton against Kentucky, had taken two prisoners. [This party] was discovered by the Kickapoos, who gave information of them. A party was immediately detached to meet them, which happened in the commons. They conceived our troops to be a force sent by Mr. Hamilton to conduct them in, an honor commonly paid them. I was highly pleased to see each party whooping, hallooing and striking their breasts, as they approached in the open fields. Each seemed to try to outdo the other in the greatest signs of joy. The poor devils never discovered their mistake until it was too late for many of them to escape. Six of them were made prisoners, two of them scalped, and the rest so wounded as we afterwards learned that but one lived. I had now as fair opportunity of making an impression on the Indians as I could have wished for, — that of convincing them that Governor Hamilton could not give them that protection he had made them to believe he could,

and in some measure to incense them against him for not exerting himself to save their friends: I ordered the prisoners to be tomahawked in face of the garrison. It had the effect that I expected. Instead of it making their friends inveterate against us, they upbraided the English parties in not trying to save them; and they gave them to understand that they believed them to be liars and no warriors.

“A remarkable circumstance happened that I think worthy our notice: An old French gent of the name of St. Croix, lieutenant of Capt. McCarty's volunteers from Cahokia, had but one son, who headed these Indians and was made prisoner. The question was put whether the white man should be saved. I ordered them [Clark's men] to put him to death through indignation which did not extend to the savages. For fear he would make his escape, his father drew his sword and stood by him in order to run him through in case he should stir; being painted he could not know him. The wretch, on seeing the executioner's tomahawk raised to give the fatal stroke, raised his eyes as if making his last address to Heaven [and] cried,—‘O, save me.’ The father knew his son's voice [and] you may easily guess of the agitation and behavior of these two persons, coming to the knowledge of each other at so critical a moment. I had a little mercy for such murderers, and so valuable an opportunity for an example, knowing that there would be the greatest solicitations made to save him, that I immediately absconded myself; but by the warmest solicitations from his father who had behaved so exceedingly well in our service, and [from] some of the officers, I granted his

life on certain conditions." (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 73, 74.

(2.) *British Accounts.*

Isidore Chésne, in his *Account*, says that he first heard that seven Indians (they were Ottawas) had been killed. Afterward, he was told that only five were shot down. He then adds:

"The Indians who were killed had just returned from war, — had made two prisoners at the fort at the Falls of the Ohio, and not knowing the enemy [Americans] were in the village [Vincennes], were there surprised and killed." (From the Haldimand MSS.)

Schieffelin (*Loose Notes. Magazine of American History*, Vol. I, pp. 191, 192) gives, from the British side, this rueful picture:

"At the time our flag was sent out from Fort Sackville, an Indian party who had been on a scout returned — the rebels with the inhabitants of the town ran to meet them. The Indians not being apprized of the town having joined the rebels, imagined they came to salute them, when, to their great misfortune, after they had discharged their pieces in the air, as a salute to them, were fired at by the rebels and citizens, several killed on the domaine in sight of our fort, others [were] brought in [and] kicked by them; [then] they marched through the streets [having their prisoners with them, including] two Indian partizans — Frenchmen in His Majesty's service. [All] were [then] seated [that is, all the captured] in a circle when Colonel Clark, the commandant of the rebels, took a tomahawk and in cool blood knocked their [the Indians'] brains out, dipping his hands in their blood, [then] rubbing it [them] several times on his cheeks, yelping as a savage. The two Frenchmen, who were to share the same unhappy fate, were sergeants in the Detroit volunteers, and were saved from this bloody massacre, one by his father, who was an officer with the rebels, [who] did

not know his son until they informed [him] that he was in the circle in Indian dress and [that he was] to undergo this cruelty exercised by the Americans; the other was taken by force by his sister, whose husband was a merchant in the town. This is also a treatment unprecedented even between savages, — to commit hostilities at the time a flag is sent them.

“The dead carcasses of these unhappy fellows were dragged to the river by the soldiery, some who had been struggling for life after being thrown into the river. An Indian chief of the name of Muckeydemengo, of the Ottawa nation, after Colonel Clark had struck the hatchet into his head, with his own hands drew his tomahawk [out] presenting it again to the inhuman butcher, who repeated the stroke. After the Governor and his officers were put on parole in the town, they had seen the blood on the ground of these unhappy men, for a considerable time. The dead bodies who [which] were on the domaine of those they fired at, were stripped naked and left for the wild prey.” (A Reprint from the *Royal Gazette*.)

“Before anything was concluded [as to the surrender of Fort Sackville],” afterwards wrote Hamilton to Haldimand, “the following scene was exhibited, of which I give your Excellency a relation, as it serves to contrast the behavior of His Majesty’s subjects with that of the rebels so often celebrated for humanity, generosity, and, indeed, every thing virtuous and noble:

“About two o’clock in the afternoon [of the twenty-fourth] a party of Indians with some whites returned from a scout, with two Canadians whom they had taken prisoners near the Falls of the Ohio, probably with information for the rebels at the fort [there]. Colonel Clark sent off a detachment of seventy men against them. The Indians numbered fifteen or sixteen men, who, seeing the English flag flying at the fort, discharged their pieces — an usual compliment

with those people. They were immediately fired upon by the rebels and Canadians, two killed on the spot, one shot in the belly, who, however, escaped. The rest were surrounded and taken, bound, to the village, where, being set in the street opposite the fort gate they, were put to death, notwithstanding a truce at that moment existed.

“The manner as related to me by different people and among others by the man at whose door this execrable feat was perpetrated, was, was as follows:

“One of them was tomahawked immediately. The rest, setting on the ground in a ring bound, seeing, by the fate of their comrade, what they had to expect, the next on his left sang his death-song, and was in turn tomahawked. The others underwent the same fate. Only one was saved, and he at the intercession of a rebel officer, who pleaded for him, telling Colonel Clark that the savage’s father had formerly spared his life.”

“The chief of this party,” continues the Lieutenant-Governor, “after having the hatchet stuck in his head, took it out himself and delivered it to the inhuman monster who struck him first, who repeated his stroke a second and a third time; after which, the miserable savage was dragged by the rope about his neck to the river, thrown in, and suffered to spend still a few moments of life in fruitless struggling.” (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781. — Germain MSS.)

NOTE CII.

CONCERNING THE SECOND MEETING OF CLARK WITH
HAMILTON.

It is clear that when Hamilton "went to meet them with Major Hay," he went from the fort, to which he had returned. This then was the *second* meeting, and was evidently held at the church where the first one was held. Hamilton, however, in his letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781, erroneously says the first meeting was at the place he lastly proposed. These are his words :

"Colonel Clark, yet reeking with the blood of those unhappy victims [the Indians tomahawked in view of the British garrison and then thrown into the river], came to the *esplanade before the fort gate* where I had agreed to meet him and treat of the surrender of the garrison."

He spoke with rapture, of his late achievement, while he washed the blood from his hands, stained in this inhuman sacrifice." [The italicising is mine.]

NOTE CIII.

FINAL ARTICLES OF CAPITULATION AGREED UPON.

The wording of the articles of Capitulation, as given by Clark in his Journal, is as follows :

"1st. L't. Gov'r. Hamilton engages to deliver up to Col. Clark Fort Sackville as it is at present, with all the stores, ammuniton, provisions, etc., etc.

"2d. The garrison will deliver themselves up prisoners of war to march out with their arms, accoutrements, knapsacks, etc.

"3d. The garrison to be delivered up to-morrow morning at 10 o'clock.

"4th. Three days to be allowed to the garrison to settle their accounts with the traders of this place and inhabitants.

"5th. The officers of the garrison to be allowed their necessary baggage, etc.

"G. R. CLARK.

"Post Vincent, 24th Feb'y., 1779."

Hamilton, in his letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781, says the Articles he agreed to were his own, which had been changed by Clark. This is true as will be seen by comparing them. The Lieutenant-Governor also gives the Articles in full. He must, therefore, have copied them before sending them back; but, in so doing, he made some unimportant variations. Walker (*The North-west during the Revolution*, p. 22) says that "the unique correspondence between the comparatively illiterate backwoodsman [Clark] and the proud British officer [Hamilton] . . . is in the possession of Mr. [Lyman C.] Draper [of Madison, Wisconsin]." This is published with the approval of the latter; but, as a matter of fact, he never had in his possession *all* of this correspondence. Draper was not the possessor of what was actually sent to Hamilton inside the fort by Clark — only copies of it in the hand-writing of the latter, except the Articles of Capitulation finally agreed upon.

NOTE CIV.

SOME OF HAMILTON'S REASONS FOR SURRENDERING FORT
SACKVILLE.

In his letter to Haldimand of July 6, 1781, Hamilton says: "Half our number [the Canadian volunteers] had shown their poltroonerie and treason; and our wounded must be left at the mercy of a merciless set of bandits." But it is certain not one of his Canadian allies had committed any act of treason;— they, as the Lieutenant-Governor expressly declares, only said: "It was very hard to be obliged to fight against their countrymen and relatives, who they now perceived had joined the Americans."

Two years afterward (that is, in 1783), Hamilton, forgetting what he had written to Haldimand, declares:

"In the month of February . . . they [the people of Vincennes] joined the Americans and fired on the fort. The Canadian volunteers, who made half of my little garrison, deserted, and we were reduced to the horrid necessity of capitulation." (*Hamilton to Com's of His Majesty's Treasury, 1783, MSS.*) This was certainly a falsification; not a single Canadian deserted.

Schieffelin, in his *Loose Notes*, dismisses the subject with a few words: "No way was left us to get off — the provisions exhausted; — these [this] obliged us to agree to a capitulation and surrender to a set of uncivilized Virginian woodmen, armed with rifles."

NOTE CV.

AS TO THE ACCIDENTAL BLOWING UP OF THE CARTRIDGES IN FORT SACKVILLE.

[*Ante. Chap. XIX., p. 332.*]

Schieffelin mentions the casualty (in his *Loose Notes*) thus: "The Rebel Major with some Captains, showing their dexterity in firing cannon as a salute for the day, were blown up by the explosion of a keg of cannon cartridges."

Says Butler (*History of Kentucky*, pp. 86, 87): "This capitulation on the 24th of February, 1779, surrendered Fort Sackville to the Americans; the garrison was to be considered as prisoners of war. On the 25th, it was taken possession of by Colonel Clark at the head of the companies of Captains Williams and Witherington, while Captains Bowman and McCarty received the prisoners; the stars and stripes were again hoisted, and thirteen cannon fired to celebrate the recovery of this most important stronghold upon the Indian frontier." Evidently Butler did not know that the accident cut short the salute.

Capt. Worthington's name is spelled "Witherington" by Butler, as will be noticed by the above extract, and in one place in "Bowman's Journal" (Department of State MSS.), it appears as "Wertherington;" however, it is afterward given there as "Worthington" and is so spelled in the printed Journal (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 108). See also the work last cited p. 65; and Clark to the Gov. of Virginia — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, Vol. I., pp. 315, 316. Besides, Clark's Journal has "Worthington": and it has al-

ready been explained that the Captain was from Kentucky; — there he was known as “Worthington.”

NOTE CVI.

CONCERNING THE ATTACK ON FORT SACKVILLE AND ITS SURRENDER.

“On viewing the strength of the fort [after the capitulation] Colonel Clark was astonished at its easy surrender; but on reflection was convinced that it could have been undermined, as the fort was within thirty feet of the river bank. If even that attempt had failed his information was so exact that on the arrival of his artillery, the first hot shot could have blown up the magazine.” (Butler, in his *History of Kentucky*, p. 87.) But this is all speculation on part of the Kentucky historian.

As to there being only seventy-nine prisoners taken when the fort surrendered, it may be said it is highly probable that when Lieut. Bayley began firing on the fortification a few of the garrison were outside among the Vincennes people. It has already been shown how Maisonville and his companion also St. Croix and another were captured; and it is possible there were still out one or two war-parties headed by white men. In Hamilton's Return of January 30, he enumerates, in all, ninety-five white men as constituting his force. This leaves sixteen to be accounted for that were not in the fort when it surrendered; but, from what has just been said, it is not difficult to make up

the number missing. One of those who escaped was Captain Chésne, as already noted.

Of the many fictions concerning the success of Clark at Vincennes which have been printed, the following is among the most prominent :

“I have myself been informed by some of the ‘*ancient inhabitants*’ of the Post [Vincennes] long since gathered to their fathers, but who were old enough at the time of Clark’s capture of the Post, to recollect the circumstances attending it, that after the surrender, the English flag was kept flying, and that from the large stores of clothing on hand, Clark dressed some of his men in red, the uniform of the British soldiers, and placing a sentry with British uniform at the gate of the fort, after directing the French inhabitants to give no information of the surrender, awaited the arrival of the Indians, who were on one of their murderous forays to the south side of the Ohio, and were to return to Vincennes to join Hamilton in his meditated campaign in the Illinois, for the purpose of attacking Clark and his troops at Kaskaskia. Sullen and silent, with the scalp-lock of his victims hanging at his girdle, and in full expectation of his reward from Hamilton, the unwary savage, unconscious of danger, and wholly ignorant of the change that had been effected in his absence, passed the supposed British sentry at the gate of the fort, without inquiry or molestation. But the moment he had entered a volley from the rifles of a platoon of Clark’s men, drawn up and awaiting his coming, pierced their hearts, and sent the unconscious savage reeking with murder, to that tribunal to which he had so frequently, by order of Hamilton, sent his American captives, from the infant in the cradle to the grandfather of the family, tottering with age and infirmity. *It was a just retribution*, and few men but Clark would have planned the *ruie*, or carried it out so successfully. It is reported that upwards of fifty Indians met this fate within the walls of ‘Fort Sackville’ after its surrender by Hamilton.” (Law: *The Colonial History of Vincennes*, pp. 68, 69.)

When, after the lapse of years, Clark attempts to describe all the circumstances attending the capitulation, from the moment of the first meeting between himself and Hamilton to the time of the final surrender, he confuses his relation in various ways. "We met at the church," he says, "about eighty yards from the fort — Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton, Major Hay (Superintendent of Indian Affairs) Captain Helm (their prisoner), Major Bowman and myself. The conference began." But it had commenced before that — when only Helm was present beside the two commanders. Clark then says: "Hamilton produced terms of capitulation signed, that contained various articles, one of which was that the garrison should be surrendered on their being permitted to go to Pensacola on parole." But this was the last meeting; and the article mentioned does not specify they were to be allowed to go to Pensacola, although that place undoubtedly was understood to be the objective point. The narration continues: "After deliberating on every article, I rejected the whole. He [Hamilton] then wished that I would make some proposition. I told him I had no other to make than what I had already made — that of his surrendering as prisoners at discretion. I said that his troops had behaved with spirit; that they could not suppose that they would be worse treated in consequence of it; that if he chose to comply with the demand, though hard, perhaps the sooner the better; that it was in vain to make any proposition to me; that he by this time must be sensible that the garrison would fall that both of us must [view] all blood spilt for the future, by the garrison, as murder; that my troops were already impatient and

called aloud for permission to tear down and storm the fort: if such a step was taken many, of course, would be cut down, and the result of an enraged body of woodsmen breaking in must be obvious to him: it would be out of the power of an American officer to save a single man." That much of this is a draft on the imagination of the relater, is self-evident.

"Various altercations took place," are the further words of Clark, "for a considerable time. Captain Helm attempted to moderate our fixed determination. I told him he was a British prisoner, and it was doubtful whether or not he could with propriety speak on the subject. Hamilton then said that Captain Helm was from that moment liberated and might use his pleasure. I informed the Captain that I would not receive him on such terms; that he must return to the garrison and await his fate. I then told Lieutenant-Governor Hamilton that hostilities should not commence until five minutes after the drums gave the alarm."

"We took our leave," Clark continues, "and parted but a few steps when Hamilton stopped and politely asked me if I would be so kind as to give him my reasons for refusing the garrison on any other terms than those I had offered. I told him I had no objections in giving him my real reasons, which were simply these: that I knew the greater part of the principal Indian partisans of Detroit were with him; that I wanted an excuse to put them to death or otherwise treat them as I thought proper; that the cries of the widows and fatherless on the frontiers, which they had occasioned, now required their blood from my hands; and that I did not choose to be so timorous as to dis-

obey the absolute commands of their authority which I looked upon to be next to divine: that I would rather lose fifty men than not to empower myself to execute this piece of business with propriety: that if he chose to risk the massacre of his garrison for their sakes it was his own pleasure: and that I might, perhaps, take it into my head to send for some of those widows to see it executed." But it is plain, when this is compared with what the Colonel noted down at the time the conversation took place, that quite all of it has no foundation in fact. What he adds is of the same character:

"Major Hay, paying great attention, I had observed a kind of distrust in his countenance which in a great measure influenced my conversation during this time. On my concluding, — 'Pray, Sir,' said he, 'who is it that you call Indian partisans?' 'Sir,' I replied, 'I take Major Hay to be one of the principal.' I never saw a man in the moment of execution so struck as he appeared to be — pale and trembling, scarcely able to stand. Hamilton blushed, and I observed was much affected at his behavior. Major Bowman's countenance sufficiently explained his disdain for the one and his sorrow for the other. . . . Some moments elapsed without a word passing on either side. From that moment my resolutions changed respecting Hamilton's situation. I told him that we would return to our respective posts; that I would reconsider the matter and let him know the result; no offensive measures should be taken in the meantime. Agreed to, and we parted. What had passed being made known to our officers, it was agreed that we should

moderate our resolutions." [Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 154-156.]

"The British commander," says a recent writer, "has left on record his bitter mortification at having to yield the fort [Sackville] 'to a set of uncivilized Virginia woodsmen armed with rifles.' In truth, it was a most notable achievement. Clark had taken, without artillery, a heavy stockade, protected by cannon and swivels, and garrisoned by trained soldiers. His superiority in numbers was very far from being in itself sufficient to bring about the result, as witness the almost invariable success with which the similar but smaller Kentucky forts, unprovided with artillery and held by fewer men, were defended against much larger forces than Clark's. Much credit belongs to Clark's men, but most belongs to their leader. The boldness of his plan and the resolute skill with which he followed it out, his perseverance through the intense hardships of the midwinter march, the address with which he kept the French and Indians neutral, and the masterful way in which he controlled his own troops, together with the ability and courage he displayed in the actual attack, combined to make his feat the most memorable of all the deeds done west of the Alleghanies in the Revolutionary war." But the achievement greatly redounds to the credit of Clark and his men without crediting to their side (Roosevelt; *The Winning of the West*, Vol. II., pp. 84, 85.) what is not in reality due them. Very little protection did the cannon and swivels give Hamilton and his men. Clark's superiority in numbers certainly aided in bringing about the surrender — as much (if not more) because of the superiority alone as by the effect pro-

duced by the shots of so many assailants. The mention made of "the almost invariable success with which the similar but smaller Kentucky forts, unprovided with artillery and held by fewer men, were defended against much larger forces than Clark's" is not relevant to the attack under consideration. The Kentucky forts were, to a large extent, unlike Fort Sackville — being, in fact, much weaker; but, when assailed, the besiegers were, in all cases where artillery was not employed, almost entirely savages. As to the neutrality of the French and Indians in Vincennes during the siege — there was none in reality; all were on the side of the Americans in their feelings; and if but few were active against Hamilton, it was not for want of interest on their part in the Colonel and his soldiers, but because of the refusal of the American commander to allow them to come to his assistance.

The writer just cited adds: "It [the capture of Hamilton and his fort] was likewise the most important in its results, for had he [Clark] been defeated we would not only have lost the Illinois, but in all probability Kentucky also." Seemingly, this would have been the case; but, as to war movements, little weight is to be given to assertions as to what would have taken place had certain events happened. Such slight causes sometimes in military affairs produce such unexpected results, that conjecture seems but a waste of words.

NOTE CVII.

CAPT. HELM'S CAPTURE OF ST. MARTIN'S CONVOY
AT WEA.

Clark, in his letter to Gov. Henry, of April 29, 1777, says: "Hearing of a convoy of goods from Detroit, I sent a party of sixty men, in armed boats, well mounted with swivels, to meet them before they could receive any intelligence" (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 224n). The Colonel evidently includes officers and men, and, speaking from recollection, makes his statement in round numbers. So, also, in Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 157, it is said: "On the day after the surrender of the British garrison at Post Vincennes, Colonel Clark sent a detachment of sixty men up the river Wabash to intercept some boats which were laden with provisions and goods from Detroit. The detachment under the command of Captain Helm, Major [Captain] Bosseron and Major Legras, proceeded up the river in three armed boats."

"The day before Captain Helm (an American officer who commanded the party sent to take the convoy) arrived at Ouiatanon [Wea], Mr. Dejean heard that we had fallen into the hands of the rebels." (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.) The inference then is, that the American officer ascended the Wabash as far as Wea; and the words of the Lieutenant Governor make it probable that it was there the Captain met the convoy. Clark, in his letter to the Virginia Governor of April 29, 1779, (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222n), says the distance above Vincennes was forty leagues — one

hundred and twenty miles. But Jefferson to Lernoult, July 22, 1779 (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 321), puts the distance at 150 miles, and this agrees very nearly with the estimated distance, from Vincennes to Wea, made in *Bouquet's Expedition*, (Cincinnati Re-print: 1868) p. 144, of 60 French leagues, or 144 English miles. As it appears certain that Capt. Helm went as far up the Wabash as Wea, and as the latter place was *above* the mouth of the Vermillion, a tradition that it was at that river where the convoy was captured (which tradition has been published) must fall to the ground.*

In his letter to Mason, *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 75 — the Colonel says: "Captain Helm, with a party in armed boats . . . made prisoners of fifty, among whom was Dejean, Grand Judge of Detroit, with a large packet . . . and seven boat loads of provisions; Indian goods, etc."

"Bowman's Journal" (in the Department of State MSS.) for March 5th, says: "About 10 o'clock Captain Helm arrived with his party. [They] took seven boats laden with provision, bale-goods, etc. . . from the enemy, with the following prisoners: Mr. Dejean, Grand Judge of Detroit, Mr. Adhemar (Commissary), with thirty-eight privates. Letters taken from the

* "The writer has before him the statement of John McFall, born near Vincennes in 1798. He lived near and in Vincennes until 1817. His grandfather, Ralph Mattison, was one of Clark's soldiers who accompanied Helm's expedition up the Wabash, and he often told McFall, his grandson, that the British were lying by, in the Vermillion river, near its mouth, where they were surprised in the night-time and captured by Helm without firing a shot." (H. W. Beckwith & Son in the *History of Vermillion County* [Ill.], p. 259 n.)

Commissary, dated at Detroit, the 6th of February, say they [the writers] are much afraid of our people in the Spring. [They] pray Gov. Hamilton to come back again."

Dillon (*History of Indiana*, pp. 157, 158) says: "These boats [those captured from the British] . . . were manned by about forty men, among whom was Philip Dejean, a magistrate of Detroit." This is calculated to convey the impression that Dejean helped to man the boats, which is probably error.

"Before Clark's arrival [at Vincennes, February 23, 1779], Hamilton had sent Philip Dejean [from Vincennes] to Detroit for supplies, and on February 9, he and Mr. Adheimer set out [from Detroit] with seven boats loaded with goods, worth \$50,000. Clark was informed of their approach, and sent sixty men to intercept the boats, which, with their stores, were captured on the 26th as they were coming down the Wabash." (Farmer's *History of Detroit and Michigan*, p. 252.) But Dejean, as already shown, was not in Vincennes and could not therefore have been sent to Detroit, and Adhemar was only to go as far as the head of the Maumee. Clark was not informed of the approach of the boats, but only that Hamilton had sent for the goods; besides, the boats could not have been captured on the 26th of February, as that was the day the party left Vincennes to intercept them.

In speaking of the stores taken by Captain Helm, Clark says in his Memoir that "The provisions were taken for the public, and the goods divided among the whole, except about £800 worth to clothe the troops we expected to receive in a short time. This was very

agreeable to the soldiers, as I told them the State should pay them in money their proportions [in addition], and they had great plenty of goods." (Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859, p. 158.) And Clark adds (pp. 158, 159): "The quantity of public goods brought from Detroit added to the whole of those belonging to the traders of Post Vincennes that had been taken, was very considerable. The whole was divided among the soldiery, except some Indian medals that were kept, in order to be altered for public use. The officers received nothing, except a few articles of clothing they stood in need of. The soldiers got almost rich."

On one point in this relation, Clark's memory was at fault; for it will be seen hereafter that some of the goods were sent to the Illinois and disposed of as public stores by the Colonel. "The whole," then, was not divided among the men and officers, "except about £800 worth," as declared in his Memoir.

NOTE CVIII.

CLARK'S THREAT TO IRON THOSE BRITISH OFFICERS WHO HAD ACTED AS PARTISANS WITH THE INDIANS.

If Colonel Clark really had irons made to fetter such of his prisoners as were officers and had been employed as partisans with the Indians, he did not carry out his determination. None were ironed. Schieffelin in his *Loose Notes* gives additional words spoken by the American commander: "At dark [after the capitulation] the British officers were in

the Governor's house, in the garrison, where Colonel Clark used most harsh and insolent expressions, wishing he could have swum in their blood; that, as he desired to fight, he would give Governor Hamilton his garrison [back] and he [Clark], with an equal number of men, would meet them; that he had young fellows that liked the smell of gun powder." (*Magazine of American History*, vol. I, p. 187.)

But, it is evident, if such talk was indulged in by the Colonel (which yet may be doubted), it was mere bravado, only intended to intimidate.

NOTE CIX.

AS TO CLARK'S TREATMENT OF HAMILTON WHILE HOLDING HIM A PRISONER OF WAR.

"We have," says William Frederick Poole LL. D. (*The Early Northwest*, pp. 11-13), "no life of George Rogers Clark, or full history of the stirring events in which he was an actor. The notices of his life which have appeared in print are full of inaccuracies. . . . The "Calendar of Virginia State Papers," and "Haldimand Collection" at Ottawa, bring out many facts supplementing his own [now] printed reports. In the "Haldimand Collection" is the official report of Henry Hamilton, Governor of Detroit, on his campaign and his capture by Col. Clark at Vincennes, Ind., in 1779. This report gives us, from the British [rather from Hamilton's] standpoint, the facts we have needed concerning that important event. On the whole it confirms the accuracy of Clark's several narratives.

Clark regarded Hamilton as responsible for the inhumanities committed upon the Western settlers by the Indian scalping parties sent out from Detroit; and hence Clark called him "the Hair-buying General," and treated him with great severity. . . . Hamilton in his report defends himself from the charge. He admits that he sent out the Indian parties; but states that he was very careful to give the savages instructions not to scalp their captives; and he was confident that they obeyed his instructions, because some prisoners were brought in. He states that he engaged in this sort of warfare with great reluctance, and then only on Lord George Germain's positive instructions. (The report of Governor Hamilton is printed in Michigan Pioneer Collections, IX, pp. 489-516)."

"The story," continues Mr. Poole, "of the butcheries practised upon the Western settlements, during the Revolutionary war, by Indian scouting parties sent out from Detroit, can hardly be exaggerated. To avenge these inhumanities was a leading motive of Clark and his men in making that winter campaign against the "Hair-buying General" at Vincennes. The policy of the British government in its conduct of the war in the West is a subject which will repay investigations; and Gov. Hamilton's defense and his scheme of giving wild savages Sunday-school instruction in the humanities, can then be considered. What those many gross of 'red-handled scalping knives' (Farmer's 'History of Detroit,' pp. 246, 247) were for, which regularly appeared in the official requisitions of merchandise wanted at Detroit, can then be explained."

A careful examination of the stories told by both Hamilton and Clark of the capitulation of the former and of his being a prisoner to the latter, does not confirm the usual report of harsh treatment of the Lieutenant-Governor by the Colonel. Clark's declaration in after years is this: "Almost every man had conceived a favorable opinion of Lieutenant Governor Hamilton — I believe what affected myself made some impression on the whole — and I was happy to find that he never deviated, while he stayed with us, from that dignity of conduct that became an officer in his situation." [Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 157.]

Again: it can hardly be said, in the light of all coteremporaneous evidence which has been preserved, that Clark's winter campaign against the "Hair-buying General," at Vincennes, was to avenge the inhumanities charged against him. The leading idea of Clark was one of self-preservation: "I must take him or he will take me."

NOTE CX.

NUMBER OF PRISONERS SENT EAST AND OF THE SOLDIERS
WHO GUARDED THEM.

If the eighteen privates mentioned in "Bowman's Journal" be added to the officers named (including also St. Martin), the whole number of prisoners sent off to the Virginia settlements east of the mountains by Clark is seen to be twenty-seven. This corresponds with Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.

As to the number of the guard, Hamilton's recollection, after a lapse of over two years, is not to be relied on. He says, "our guard . . . consisted of 23 persons, including officers." I have followed "Bowman's Journal" which gives twenty-five men exclusive of the two officers, Williams and Rogers.

Schieffelin, in his Loose Notes, says they started on March 4th. In his letter to Haldimand, of July 6, 1781, Hamilton gives the date as the 8th. But here, also, I have followed "Bowman's Journal," which says it was the 7th, the record of their departure having been made on the day they left. It is evident that Hamilton had miscalculated the time, as a letter written by him on the day of leaving is dated the 8th. . . . The names given in the printed copy of "Bowmna's Journal" (*Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 109) of such of the prisoners as were not privates are mentioned thus (excepting of course, St. Martin's name): "Lieut. Gov. Hamilton, Major Hays, Capt. Lamoth, Mons. Dejean, Grand Judge of Detroit, Lieut. Shifflin, Doct. McBeth, Francis McVille, Mr. Bell Fenilb."

In the MS. copy of the Journal in the Department of State, the names are written as follow: "Lieut. Governor Hamilton, Major Hay, Capt. Lamotte, Monsieur Dejean, Grand Judge of Detroit, Lieut. Shifflin, Doct. McBeth, Francis Masonville, Mr. Bellfeuill."

The correct spelling of the sir names of each of these officers including also the Commissary is given in the text.

NOTE CXI.

MARCH OF THE BRITISH PRISONERS FROM THE FALLS
OF THE OHIO TO CHESTERFIELD COURT HOUSE.

Concerning this march the words of Lieutenant Schieffelin in his *Loose Notes* are:

“In the morning they [Lieutenant Governor Hamilton and his fellow prisoners] were marched under a heavy guard to Henry Town [Harrodstown; that is, Harrodsburg] one hundred miles through woods, etc., on foot with their necessaries and provisions; the eighth day they reached the fort [at Harrodsburg] commanded by a Colonel [John] Bowman, who treated them as well as his abilities would admit; they remained about ten days, when they were marched for the frontiers of Virginia, depending on providence for provisions, insulted by every dirty fellow as they passed through the country. In May, they got to Chesterfield Court House, where they were kept to its limits under a strong guard.”

NOTE CXII.

JOHN DODGE AND HIS NARRATIVE.

It is evident from the Report of the Virginia Council that it had been placed in possession of Dodge's whole story. The Board gives in brief the treatment he received upon his first imprisonment in Detroit; it recites what he told them about the giving of standing rewards for scalps but offering none for prisoners; it

relates how an unfortunate victim, after being rescued from the savages, who were preparing to burn him, was afterward hunted down, imprisoned, and virtually tortured to death by Dejean by "perpetual assurance" of being restored into the hands of the savages"; and other information: all of which is set forth at greater length in Dodge's Narrative [See *Remembrancer*, vol. VIII (1779).]

Andrew McFarland Davis in his paper, "The Indians and the Border Warfare of the Revolution" (Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 683), says:

"The narrative of the Capture and treatment of John Dodge by the English at Detroit was made public about the same time [as the Report of the Virginia Council, in the 'Case of Hamilton, Dejean and Lamothe'], (*Remembrancer* viii, p. 73). The portion of Dodge's story which relates to the reception by Hamilton of Indians returning with scalps and prisoners, bears a striking resemblance to the report of the [Virginia] Council. Dodge states that Hamilton became so enraged at him that the governor 'offered £100 for his scalp or his body.' In another place he says: 'These sons of Britain offered no reward for prisoners, but they give the Indians twenty dollars a scalp,' etc., etc.; and again: "One of these parties returning with a number of women and children's scalps and their prisoners, they were met by the commandant of the fort, and after the usual demonstrations of joy, delivered their scalps, for which they were paid.'

"Some correspondence passed between Jefferson and the governor of Detroit [in reality, Lernoult, the commandant of the fort], on the question of Hamil-

ton's treatment as a prisoner, in which Jefferson dwells at length upon Hamilton's responsibility for the acts of the Indians, but it is to be remarked that no charge is made against Hamilton for paying bounties for scalps (*Calendar of State Papers of Virginia*, i, p. 321)."

Hamilton in his Official Report speaks of Dodge as a person "known by several Virginians to be an unprincipled and perjured renegade." Lieutenant Schieffelin, in his *Loose Notes*, is equally severe:

"One John Dodge, a blacksmith, who resided at Detroit but who now resides with the rebels at Fort Pitt, had the assurance to propagate the most infamous falsehoods against Governor Hamilton and his officers, — that they had excited Indians to kill prisoners when brought to Detroit, furnishing the rebel authorities with a narrative of his treatment which was as false as himself was infamous."

The *Continental Journal and Weekly Advertiser*, of December 20, 1779; and of January 6, and 13, 1780, in publishing Dodge's Narrative, has this editorial addendum:

"It is worthy of remark that the three persons who make a principal inglorious figure in the foregoing Narrative, viz., Governor Hamilton, Dejean (jailer), and La Mote (captain of scalping parties), were afterwards taken by the brave Colonel Clark, of Virginia, at Fort St. Vincent, and are now confined in irons, in a gaol in Virginia, by order of the Legislature of that State, as a retaliation for their former inhuman treatment of prisoners who fell into their hands, particularly Mr. Dodge, who has the pleasing consolation of viewing his savage adversaries in a similar predica-

ment with himself when in their power — tho' 'tis not in the breast of generous Americans to treat them with equal barbarity."

At the date, however, of the publication of the Narrative by the *Continental Journal*, the three prisoners, it may be premised, were no longer in irons.

The second letter written by Dodge at Pittsburgh was in these words:

"PITTSBURGH, Sept. 18th, 1779.

"DEAR SIR: — After being sent to Quebec a prisoner, I found means to make my escape from there last Winter. I just arrived from Williamsburg where I had the opportunity of seeing Mr. Hamilton, Dejean, and Lamothe in irons in the dungeon, and there they are to remain untill the War is ended; they were put there for the usage they gave me at Detroit.

"Our army has met with great success this year as well as last. Our officers and soldiers are in great spirits.

"Spain has declared war against England and joined their fleets to the French. Count D'Estang has taken several of the most valuable Islands that the English had in their possession.

"I enclose to you a proclamation from the French Admiral and Ambassador. Mendart Fisher and Elbert Gavorot are here and in good spirits. We expect to see you this winter.

"I would recommend to the Commandant at Detroit to be careful how he uses the friends of the United States as he may happen to be called to an account as well as Hamilton. I am with great respect, etc.,

"JOHN DODGE.

"To Philip Boyle, Sandusky."

NOTE CXIII.

HOW HAMILTON'S "OFFICIAL REPORT" (Hamilton to Haldimand, July 6, 1781 — Germain MSS.)

CAME TO BE WRITTEN.

"Yesterday," says Hamilton, "being the fifth of July, [1781] I had the honor of paying my respects to Lord George Germain. His Lordship was pleased to attend to the account I gave of my ill success and the treatment we experienced from the rebels, from the day of our being made prisoners of war — the twenty-fifth of February, 1779 — to the fourth of March, 1781, when we were totally out of their power, by a final exchange. Having mentioned to his Lordship that I had preserved a diary of transactions, he directed me to commit to paper a brief account and transmit the same to your Excellency.

"In obedience to his Lordship's orders, I shall endeavor to avoid detail, and supply as well as may be the want of such papers as were siezed by order of the rebel Governor, Mr. Jefferson, on our being thrown into the dungeon at Williamsburg. Some things previous to the arrival of your Excellency at Quebec, it may be proper slightly to mention."

[Then follows a lengthy statement, by the Lieutenant Governor, of the principal points in his career, from the day of his arrival in Detroit to the time of his reaching England after his captivity. It is really a very complete Official Report. At the conclusion, the following is added:]

"Thus, Sir, I have attempted to give your Excellency some account of my unfortunate failure, with

the causes of it, which while I lament I must attribute chiefly, if not entirely, to the treachery of persons whom I had reason to expect lenity and moderation would have gained, and whose interest it was to be faithful.

“Among those to be raised for this service, there was but little choice, the arts of some rebel emmisaries, and the intrigues of persons still attached to the interest of France, got the better of the good intentions the Canadians might have set out with.

“The difficulties and danger of Colonel Clark’s march from the Illinois were such as required great courage to encounter, and great perseverance to overcome.

“In trusting to traitors he was more fortunate than myself; whether, on the whole, he was entitled to success is not for me to determine. If my conduct appears to your Excellency in a justifiable light, I may hope to be more pitied than blamed; at least your approbation will enable me to support the weight of that censure which seldom fails to accompany an unsuccessful enterprise.

“I have the honor to be, with profound respect,
“Sir,” Your Excellency’s most devoted, most obedient
and most humble Servant,

“HENRY HAMILTON.

“Jermyn Street, London,

“July 6th 1781.”

In vol. IX of the *Michigan Pioneer Collections* (pp. 489-516), this “Official Report” is printed from a copy taken from another copy in the Ottawa (Canada) Archives. By comparing what is thus printed with the MS. before me from the Germain Collection, I note the following (among other) variations:

Page 489. For "the Prisoners and general," read "the prisoners, a general."

Page 489. "For "an ill success," read "our ill success."

Page 490. For "Warrior," read "warriors."

Page 490. For "of future peace urged it," read "of a future peace urged, if."

Page 491. After third paragraph, insert — "On the 11th I had accounts of your Excellency's arrival at Quebec."

Page 491. For "Having received," read "Having reviewed."

Page 491. For "Lieutenant Howe [Showd ?]," read "Lieutenant Showd."

Page 495. For "of complaint," read "for complaint."

Page 495. For "ourselves in this post where we had those," read "a post in this place where we had these."

Page 497. For "Capt. Blomer," read "Capt. Blowser."

Page 497. For "without having taken," read "without taking."

Page 498. After the words "being finished," insert "except the living of the stockade."

Page 500. For "spirit of the," read "spirit and courage of the."

Page 501. After "virtuous," insert "elevated."

Page 501. For "Mr. Maisonville's," read "Mr. Maisonville."

Page 502. For "his situation," read "his intention."

Page 503. For "agreed to them," read "agreed to the conditions."

Page 503. For "our present," read "the present."

Page 503. "For "was found on," read "was to be found in."

Page 504. For "with arms," read "with their arms."

Page 504. For "ten o'clock," read "two o'clock."

Page 506. After "ration," insert "for ten days only."

Page 506. For "a cover," read "a tilt."

Page 506. For "my journey," read "the journey."

Page 507. For "known on the 27th," read "known here on the 29th."

Page 507. For "of escaping," read "of our escaping."

Page 507. For "different times," read "different places."

Page 507. For "General Reidevel," read "General Reidesel."

Page 507. For "of the the march," read "of our march."

Page 509. For "now been," read "now lain."

Page 509. For "our treatment," read "our ill treatment."

Page 510. For "these publications," read "their publications."

Page 510. For "disengenious," read "disengenuous."

Page 511. For "1778," read "1779."

Page 512. For "Governor of Virginia," read "Governor of the Commonwealth of Virginia."

Page 512. For "assertions," read "asseverations."

Page 512. For "windows," read "window."

Page 513. Put a period after "destroyed himself"; and then begin a new paragraph.

Page 513. For "King Williams," read "King William."

Page 513. For "the country," read "the county."

Page 513. For "practicable," read "possible."

Page 513. For "the parole," read "a parole."

Page 513. For "successor," read "successors."

Page 514. For "charter" (twice), read "cartel."

Page 514. For "Captain Grayton" three times), read "Captain Gayton."

Page 515. For "Chartel," read "Cartel."

Page 515. For "General Wilson," read "General Nelson."

Page 515. For "get away," read "get us away."

Page 515. For "a log lime," read "a logline."

Page 515. For "Major General Phillips, Lord Rawdon," read "Major General Philips and Lord Rawdon."

Page 515. For "the brigues," read "the intrigues."

Page 515. For "Colonel Clarke's," read "Colonel Clark's."

There are a number of other variances but, generally, of little importance.

The reason why Hamilton's letter (which, as we have said, is really an Official Report) in this narrative as from the Germain MSS., is, because the copy used is from the original in that collection. This original has its duplicate in the Haldimand Collection. A

copy from this duplicate is the one in the public Archives at Ottawa, Canada.

NOTE CXIV.

ARRIVAL OF THE "WILLING" AT VINCENNES FEBRUARY
27, 1779.

"On the 27th, our galley arrived all safe, the crew much mortified, although they deserved great credit for their diligence. They had on their passage taken up William Myres, express from [the Virginia] government. The despatches gave much encouragement: our own battalion was to be completed, and an additional one to be expected in the course of the Spring." [Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 157.]

Butler (*History of Kentucky*, p. 87) relates that "on the return of this [Helm's] successful expedition, with the British flags still flying, our galley [the *Willing*] hove in sight, and was preparing for an attack upon the little river fleet, supposing it to be the enemy; but soon the beloved ensign of American freedom was hoisted at the masthead, to the joy and triumph of our countrymen." Now this recital of the Kentucky historian has no foundation in fact. The *Willing*, as above related, arrived on the 27th of February, but Captain Helm, as before mentioned, did not return until the 5th of March. Of course, this, to a great extent, spoils Butler's pleasing narrative; although the British flags may have been kept flying

until it was no longer safe when the stars and stripes were run up to the mast head.

The fact that Myres's name is given as "Morris" in Clark's letter of April 29, 1779, to the Virginia governor when printed in Jefferson's Works, is easily accounted for. Clark was a poor speller and had written it "Moires," which, very naturally, was supposed to be intended for "Morris." "Bowman's Journal" spells the name with an *i*, instead of a *y*, thus: "Mires." But Clark, in his *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 159 — has the correct spelling.

Bancroft [*History of the United States* (ed. of 1885), vol. V, p. 314] says:

"The joy of the men of the North-west was completed by the return of their messenger from Virginia, bringing from the house of assembly its votes of October and November, 1778, establishing the county of Illinois, and thanking Colonel Clark and the brave officers and men under his command for their extraordinary resolution and perseverance, and for the important services which they had thereby rendered their country.

"Since the time of that vote they had undertaken a far more hazardous enterprise, and had obtained permanent possession of all the important posts and settlements on the Illinois and Wabash, rescued the inhabitants from British dominion, and established civil government in its republican form."

It is, strictly speaking, not correct to say the messenger, Myres, returned "from Virginia;" as Vincennes, according to the Virginia claim, was in that State; but the positive error is in the words, "*on* the Illinois and Wabash" (the italicising is mine), for "*in* the Ill-

inois and *on* the Wabash"; nor can it be said that these "men of the North-west" had *as yet* established (if indeed, they ever did establish) a government there of any form. The use of the word "rescued" is, perhaps, expressive of too much change in the feelings of the inhabitants, on their coming under American rule.

NOTE CXV.

LETTERS OF COL. GEORGE ROGERS CLARK.*

(I.) *To Patrick Henry, Governor of Virginia.*

"FORT PATRICK HENRY, March 9, 1779.

"DEAR SIR:— By Wm. Moires [Myers] you wrote me, if possible to procure you some horses and mares. Nothing could give me greater pleasure than to serve you, but I doubt at present it is out of my power, as my situation and circumstances are much altered. There are no such horses here as you request me to get and I have so much public business to do, especially in the Indian department that I doubt if I shall be able to go to the Illinois for some time. I find that you have conceived a greater opinion of the horses in this country than I have. The Pawnee and Chickasaw horses are very good and some of them delicate; but the common breed in this country is trifling, as it is adulterated. The finest stallion by far that is in the country, I purchased sometime ago and rode him on this expedition; and I resolved to compliment you by presenting him to you; but, to my mortification, I find it impossible to get him across the drowned lands of the Wabash, as it is near three leagues across at present and no appearance of its falling shortly; but you may depend that I shall, by the first opportunity, send him to you. He came from New Mexico, three hun-

* From the Haldimand MSS.

dred leagues west of this. I don't think it in my power to send you such mares as you want this spring; but in order to procure you the best that can be got, I shall contract with some man of the Spanish Government by permit of the Commandant to go to the Pawnee Nation, two hundred leagues west, and get the finest mares to be had of the true blood; they will be good, as they are all so; if they are handsome, they will please you. I shall give such instructions as will be necessary and am in hopes that you will get them by fall.

"I could get five or six mares soon, at the Illinois, very fine, but I think they are hurt by hard usage, as the inhabitants are barbarous horse-masters; but I shall do it, except I can execute my other plan.

"I thank you for your remembrances of my situation respecting lands in the frontiers. I learn that Government has reserved lands on the Cumberland for the soldiers.

"If I should be deprived of a certain tract of land on that river which I purchased three years ago and have been at a considerable expense to improve, I shall in a manner lose my all. It is known by the name of the 'Great French Lick,' on the south or west side, containing three thousand acres. If you can do anything for me in saving it, I shall forever remember it with gratitude.

"There are glorious situations and bodies of land in this country formerly purchased. I am in hopes of being able in a short time to send you a map of the whole. My compliments to your lady and family. I remain, Sir, Your Humble serv't,

"G. R. CLARK.

"To His Excellency Pat. Henry, Esq., Gov'r. of Virginia, Williamsburg.

"Per. Wm. Moires [Myres]."

(2.) *To Col. Harrison, Speaker of the Virginia House of Delegates.*

"FORT PATRICK HENRY, VINCENNES, March 10, 1779.

"DEAR SIR:—I received your kind letter with the thanks of the House inclosed. I must confess, Sir, that I think my

country has done no more honor than I merited; but you may rest assured that my study shall be to deserve the honor they have already conferred on me.

"By my public letters, you will be fully acquainted with my late successful expedition against Lt. Govr. Hamilton, who has fallen into my hands with all the principal partisans of Detroit. This stroke will nearly put an end to the Indian War. Had I but men enough to take the advantage of the present confusion of the Indian Nations, I could silence the whole in two months. I learn that five hundred men are ordered out to reinforce me. If they arrive, with what I have in the country, I am in hopes it will enable me to do something clever.

"I am with respect, Sir, your very humble servant,

"G. R. CLARK.

"Col. Harrison, Speaker of the House D., Williamsburg.

"Per. Wm. Moires [Myres]."

(3.) *G. R. Clark's Warrant to Myres.*

"FORT PATRICK HENRY, March 13, 1779.

"*To William Moires [Myres].*

"SIR: As the letters you have at present contain matters of great consequence and require a quick passage to Williamsburg, this is to empower you to press for the service anything you may stand in need of. If you cannot get it by fair means, you are to use force of arms. I request of you to lose no time, as you prize the interest of your country. I wish you success, etc.

"G. R. CLARK."

NOTE CXVI.

WILLIAM MYRES AND THREE COMPANIONS START FOR WILLIAMSBURG.

In "Bowman's Journal" as printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois* (p. 110), the fact of Myres

again setting out with three men by water is entirely omitted. They started the second time on the same day of Myres' return.

That Myres did not leave the Falls earlier than the fourth of April is evidenced by the following letter entrusted to his care, written by a brother of Daniel Boone to Arthur Campbell and given verbatim:

"CANTUCKY COUNTY THE FALLS OF OHIO
"April 4th, 1779

"SIR

"I received your letter Dated Dec^m 20th for which I return you grate thanks but in regard to seling the Horse I would much rather I could get him out hear, for the Indians has took my Horses & they are very dear to buy hear. and humbly beg you would send to the Gentleman that has him to send him to me by William Moires and you will much oblige your humble servant

"SQUIRE BOON

"Nevertheless if the Gentleman sees cause to keep him and send me two hundred pounds let him use his pleasure

'To

"Colr. Arthur Comble
"these"

NOTE CXVII.

CONCERNING CLARK'S MS. JOURNAL OF THE TAKING
OF VINCENNES.

That Clark kept a Journal giving an account of his setting out from Kaskaskia to attack Hamilton in Vincennes, of his march to the place last mentioned, and of the capitulation of Fort Sackville by Hamilton, causes a keen regret that all that part giving daily

particulars, to the ending of the 22d of February, 1779, has not been preserved. "This precious document [that is, so much of it as relates events which took place from February 24th to February 27th, inclusive], giving details of the campaign and surrender," says a recent writer, "which are nowhere else to be found, has never been printed; and, so far as I am aware, has never been used, except in a brief summary [in Roosevelt's *The Winning of the West*]." But the same writer, because of an error in a previous publication, is led to the conclusion that Clark's Journal was in the form of a letter, and that it was written on the 24th of February, the day of Hamilton's surrender (William Frederick Poole in *The Early Northwest*, p. 22); whereas the Journal (and a journal it really was) has an entry (and it is the concluding one) of February 27th, 1779, relating to the arrival at Vincennes of the *Willing*. The Journal is from the Haldimand MSS. and has an eventful history hereafter to be related.

NOTE CXVIII.

THE SENDING HOME BY CLARK OF MOST OF HIS PRISONERS FROM VINCENNES.

In Clark's letter of the twenty-ninth of April, 1779, to the Governor of Virginia (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222n) are these words: "The number of prisoners we had taken, added to those of the garrison, was so considerable when compared to our own numbers, that we were at a loss how to dispose of them so as not to interfere with our future operations."

In his Memoir, Clark writes upon the subject at greater length (Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 160, 161):

"A company of volunteers from Detroit," are the subsequent words of Clark, "mostly composed of young men, was drawn up; and, when expecting to be sent off into a strange country, they were told that we were happy to learn that many of them were torn from their fathers and mothers and forced upon this expedition; others, ignorant of the true cause in contest, had engaged from a principle that actuates a great number of men — that of being fond of enterprise; but that they had now a good opportunity to make themselves fully acquainted with the nature of the war, which they might explain to their friends; and that as we knew that sending them to the States where they would be confined in a jail probably for the course of the war, would make a great number of our friends at Detroit unhappy, we had thought proper, for their sakes, to suffer them to return home.

"A great deal more," continues Clark, "was said to them on this subject. On the whole, they were discharged on taking an oath not to bear arms against America until exchanged. They received an order for their arms, boats and provisions to return with; the boats were to be sold and divided among them when they got home. In a few days, they set out." . . . The inference from what is thus given by Clark is that nothing had been said previously by the prisoners as to their desire to be released on parole, and that the whole movement was the result of Clark's policy to alienate the French inhabitants of Detroit from the British interests; but the following letter disproves this (the italicising is mine):

"FORT PATRICK HENRY, VINCENNES, March 20, 1779.

"SIR: In justice to my countryman, Mr. Tho's Bentley, who has been detained in Canada almost two years as prisoner to the ruin of his business and distraction of his family, [I write you to obtain his release]. I hope you will therefore consider the lenity shown to the prisoners that fell into the hands of Colonel George Rogers Clark, at this post, who, *upon application, obtained permission from the Colonel to return to their families at Detroit;* and that you will also apply to the Commander-in-chief in Canada to obtain the permission [release] of the said Tho's Bentley, in order that he may once more return to his family, which suffer much by his absence.

"I am, Sir, Your most humble servant,

"JOSEPH BOWMAN,

"Major in Col. Clark's Battalion.

"On public service,

"CAPT. R. B. LERNOULT, ESQ.,

"Commandant at Detroit."

NOTE CXIX.

COLONEL G. R. CLARK TO CAPTAIN R. B. LERNOULT.

"FORT PATRICK HENRY, VINCENNES, March 16, 1779.

"SIR: As many of the gentlemen that fell into my hands at this post, left letters at their departure for their friends at Detroit, I have enclosed them to you, hoping that you will expedite them to the persons to whom they are directed. As a few of the inhabitants of this town, with a number of your own people, have permits to go to Detroit on their lawfull business, I hope you will not detain such as should want to return, as you may be assured that I want no intelligence from them.

"You have one Mr. Bentley, inhabitant of the Illinois a prisoner among you. I would fondly exchange one for him

of equal rank, if agreeable. I learn by your letter to Govr. Hamilton, that you were very busy making new works. I am glad to hear it, as it will save the Americans some expence in building.

"My compliments to the Gentlemen of your Garrison. I am Yours, etc.,

"G. R. CLARK.

"Capt. Lernoult.

"The officers of Fort Patrick Henry solicit Cap't Lernoult to present their compliments to the officers of his Garrison."

NOTE CXX.

CLARK'S COUNCIL, IN MARCH, 1779, WITH INDIANS AT VINCENNES.

When, after the lapse of years, Clark attempts to recall the proceedings of this council, he varies his language in many ways from what he used in describing it a few months after it took place: "On the fifteenth of March, 1779," are his words, "a party of upper Piankeshaws and some Pottawattomie and Miami chiefs, made their appearance, making great protestations of their attachment to the Americans; begged that they might be taken under the cover of our wings, and that the roads through the lands might be made straight, and all the stumbling-blocks removed; and that our friends, the neighboring nations, might also be considered in the same point of view. I well knew from what principle all this sprang; and, as I had Detroit now in my eye, it was my business to make a straight and clear road for myself to walk, without thinking much of their interest, or anything

else but that of opening the road in earnest, by flattery, deception, or any other means that occurred."

"I told them," is Clark's further narration, "that I was glad to see them, and was happy to learn that most of the nations on the Wabash and Omi [Maumee] rivers had proved themselves to be men, by adhering to the treaties they had made with the Big Knife last fall, except a few weak minds that had been deluded by the English to come to war; that I did not know exactly who they were nor much cared; but understood they were a band chiefly composed of almost all the tribes (such people were to be found among all nations); but, as these kind of people, who had the meanness to sell their country for a shirt, were not worthy the attention of warriors, we would say no more about them and think on subjects more becoming us. I told them I should let the great Council of the Americans know of their good behavior, and knew they would be counted as friends of the Big Knife, and would always be under the protection, and their country secured to them; as the Big Knife had land enough and did not want any more; but, if ever they broke their faith, the Big Knife would never again trust them, as they never hold friendship with a people that they find with two hearts."

Clark also told them according to this his account, "that they were witnesses of the calamities the British had brought on their countries by their false assertions and their presents, which was a proof of their weakness; that they saw that all their boasted valor was like to fall to the ground, and they would not come out of the fort the other day to try to save the Indians that they flattered to war and suffered to be

killed in their sight; and, as the nature of the war had been fully explained to them [the Indians] last fall they might clearly see that the Great Spirit would not suffer it to be otherwise; that it was not only the case on the Wabash but everywhere else; that they might be assured that the nations that would continue obstinately to believe the English, would be driven out of the land and their countries given to those who were more steady friends to the Americans."

"I told them," adds Clark, "that I expected, for the future, that if any of my people should be going to war through their country that they would be protected, which should be always the case with their people among us; and that mutual confidence should continue to exist [between us]."

"They replied," are the concluding words of the narration, "that, from what they had seen and heard, they were convinced that the Master of Life had a hand in all things; that their people would rejoice on their return; that they would take pains to diffuse what they heard through all the nations, and made no doubt of the good effect of it; and, after a long speech in the Indian style calling all the Spirits to be witnesses, they concluded by renewing the chain of friendship, smoking the sacred pipe, and exchanging belts; and, I believe, went off really well pleased." . . .

(Clark's *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), pp. 162, 163.)

In "Bowman's Journal" in the Department of State MSS., there are mentioned Pottawattomies and Miamies, besides the Piankeshaws, as having met Clark in council, but the Kickapoos are not named. As printed in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, the Pian-

keshaws and Miamies are spoken of only, the first named being put down as "Peaians." Clark, in his Memoir as we have just seen, mentions, as making their appearance, "a party of upper Piankeshaws and some Pottawattomie and Miami chiefs." It is certain, however, in view of what the Colonel says in his letter to Mason, that there were at the council upper and lower Piankeshaws, Kickapoos, Pottawattomies and Miamies. The up-river Piankeshaws had their village on the Vermillion about one mile above its confluence with the Wabash. The Miami Indians represented were those of Eel river; but the chiefs present were evidently dissembling as they really stood neutral so far as the Americans and British were concerned. (*History of the Girtys*, p. 107.)

NOTE CXXI.

WHY CLARK RESOLVED TO RETURN TO KASKASKIA.

Clark, in his *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 160 — says that his resolve to return to Kaskaskia was to blind his designs against Detroit. "The enterprise," he declares, "was deferred until the — of June, when our troops were to rendezvous at Vincennes. In the meantime, every preparation was to be made, procuring provisions, etc.; and to blind our designs, the whole, except a small garrison, should march immediately to the Illinois; and orders were sent to Kentucky to prepare themselves to meet at the appointed time. This was now our proposed plan, and directed our operations during the Spring." That

this is error there can be no doubt. So important a fact would not have been omitted by Clark in his letter to the Governor on the twenty-ninth of April following; and especially would he not have been silent on the subject in writing to Mason on the nineteenth of the next November. His words to the latter clearly imply that he *presumed* matters would, in the end, all prove favorable and enable him to undertake the expedition; and he contented himself upon that *presumption*.

NOTE CXXII.

CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED "BOWMAN'S JOURNAL."

"Bowman's Journal." so frequently cited in this narrative, has this heading to the copy in the Department of State MSS.: "A Journal of Col. G. R. Clark's Proceeding from the 29th January, 1779 to the 20th March Inst." In the published Journal, in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, it reads: "Journal of the Proceedings of Col. Geo. R. Clark, from 27th January, 1779, to March 20th inst." The first date given in the last heading is certainly error, as what is recorded as transpiring on that day is known to have occurred on the 29th. Roosevelt, in *The Winning of the West*, vol. II, p. 70n, changes the heading of the one in the Department of State MSS., in this wise: "A Journal of Col. G. R. Clark. Proceedings from the 29th January, 1779 to the 26th March Inst." This, of course, changes the sense, making what follows to be the journal of Clark. And yet, in his next sentence, he explains that the Journal was written

by Captain Bowman. It is generally credited to that officer; and, because of this, it is known as "Bowman's Journal." It was first published in the *Louisville Literary News-Letter*, November 21, 1840, from the "original," but not until it had been "revised"—generally to its harm. It is copied from the *News-Letter* into *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 99-111. The copy in the Department of State MSS., was taken before the revision was made, and it is the most reliable. The Journal is a daily record of what took place on the march to Vincennes and on the arrival there of Clark and his force.

It is proper to mention that citing the document in this narrative, as "Bowman's Journal," has been done so for convenience — not because Captain Joseph Bowman was (as is generally supposed) the author. The last entry shows he was not. He left Vincennes with Clark on the twentieth of March; yet the entry in the Journal on that day shows the writer (whoever he was) to have remained in Vincennes.

But the reason why the Captain has usually been credited with the paternity is, that, in the "revised" Journal, after the ending of the entries proper, it is said by some one — "This Journal was taken from Major Bowman and revised by a person who was in the expedition. He has kept it for his own amusement, but it does not come near what might be wrote [written] upon such an extraordinary occasion, had it been handled by a person who chose to enlarge upon it. It afforded matter enough to treat on." . . .

Now, that the Journal "was taken from Major Bowman" by no means implies that he wrote it. It will be remembered that the Captain was severely

burned when attempting to fire thirteen guns, upon the surrender of Fort Sackville. He could hardly have continued the entries after that, as we find them, in the Journal. It is to be observed, also, that what is written by the person into whose possession the Journal came (see Clark's *Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 111) is not appended to the copy in the Department of State MSS.

"I have the honor," wrote Brodhead from Fort Pitt to the Commander-in-chief of the American armies, "to enclose Colonel Clark's Journal, containing an account of his success against Governor Hamilton of Detroit and the garrison, at Vincennes. . . I cannot conceive how he can justify the murder of men who had surrendered prisoners; and yet I must confess that I think Hamilton, from his general character, as proper an object for the gallows as could have been found." (Brodhead to Washington, May 29, 1779. — Department of State MSS.)

And the Fort Pitt commander again, but to another correspondent, gave his views concerning the killing of the Indians, in these words:

"Col. Clark's Journal, containing an account of every transaction on his last expedition to Vincennes, is in my possession. He took four other officers [besides Hamilton] and about sixty privates, besides some Indians which he killed and threw into the river, which is a part of his conduct I disapprove." (Brodhead to John Heckewelder, June 3, 1779.)

The Journal spoken of by Brodhead as Clark's was the "Bowman Journal". Years after it was sent by the Fort Pitt commandant to Washington, it found its way into the Department of State, Washington,

D. C., along with other papers of the General, where it remains.

That Broadhead should have supposed it was Clark's own Journal is not surprising, as the writer's name no where appears upon the record.

The first mention in print of the Journal is by Butler in his *Kentucky* (p. 81n), where he speaks of it as the "Journal of the march by Major Bowman;" so that it was in the possession of Butler (or he had access to it) as early as 1834 — that is, to the original as "revised by a person who was in the expedition."

In publishing this Journal in the *Louisville Literary News-Letter*, November 21, 1840, the editor says:

"We publish below a journal of the expedition of General [Colonel] Clark against the British post at Vincennes in 1779, commencing with his march from Kaskaskia. It was kept by Joseph Bowman, one of the Captains in the expedition, and is referred to by Mr. Butler in his 'History of Kentucky' as '*Major Bowman's Journal*,' the writer having subsequently held the rank of Major. . . .

"The original manuscript of this journal — much effaced, and in some places illegible — is in possession of the Kentucky Historical Society. The Vincennes Historical and Antiquarian Society have a copy, which we transcribed for them and for the use of our friend Judge Law of that place."

NOTE CXXIII.

CLARK'S RETURN FROM VINCENNES TO KASKASKIA.

In his letter to the Governor of Virginia of April 29, 1779 (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 222n), Clark sums up what was done in Vincennes just before leaving, in these words: "Having more prisoners than I knew what to do with, I was obliged to discharge a greater part of them on parole. Mr. Hamilton, his principal officers, and a few soldiers, I have sent to Kentucky, under a convoy of Captain Williams, in order to be conducted to you. After despatching Moires [Myres] with letters to you, treating with the neighboring Indians, etc., I returned to this place [Kaskaskia], leaving a sufficient garrison at Vincennes."

In his *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 164 — Clark writes: "The water being very high, *we soon reached the Mississippi*; and, the winds favoring us, *in a few days* we arrived safely at Kaskaskia." (The italicising is mine.) Although this statement runs counter to what Clark says in his letter to Mason, I am constrained to believe it is true.

In his letter he declares he spent much time on the way making some observations at different places, consequently he arrived too late at Kaskaskia to hinder a war that had commenced between the Delawares (of White river) and the inhabitants. By this he conveys the idea that he desired to hinder the hostilities; and he gives a reason why he could not. It is the only instance of a seeming dissimulation I have discovered in his letter.

NOTE CXXIV.

CONCERNING THE ERROR THAT JOHN TODD WAS IN
CLARK'S EXPEDITION.

It has been asserted by some of the best of the writers of Western history that John Todd was one of Clark's soldiers on the expedition against the Illinois; but this error had its origin in the following, which is a part of a communication to James T. Morehead by Hon. R. Wickliffe (see *address* of the former, p. 174.): "It appears from depositions taken since his [Todd's] death that he accompanied Col. Clark (since Gen. Clark), in his expedition against Kaskaskia and Vincennes, and was at the capture of those places. After the surrender of those places, it is supposed that he returned to Kentucky; of this there is no record or living evidence; but it appears from a letter written by General Clark that Colonel Todd was appointed to succeed him in the command at Kaskaskia."

The persons who gave depositions to the effect spoken of were clearly in error, — taking, undoubtedly, Robert or Levi Todd for John, both of whom were in the service under Colonel Clark (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. ; also *Butler's Kentucky*, p. 53 n.)—tradition having assigned to Levi, erroneously, the position of aid to the Colonel. (See Note XLVIII, of this appendix.) John was in Kentucky county when appointed Lieutenant of the county of Illinois, but, as such officer, he did not succeed to the command at Kaskaskia.

NOTE CXXV.

DEATH OF WILLIAM MYRES AND CAPTURE OF CLARK'S
JOURNAL.

In his Memoir, Clark clearly states what is erroneous as to the letters and other documents entrusted to Myres. "Poor Myres, the express, who set out on the 15th [of March] got killed on his passage, and his packet fell into the hands of the enemy; but I had been so much on my guard, that there was not a sentence in it that could be of any disadvantage to us for the enemy to know; and there were private letters from soldiers to their friends designedly written to deceive in case of such accidents. This was customary with us, as our expresses were frequently surprised."

In all this there is very little truth except as to the killing of Myres.

Clark's journal which had been entrusted to Myres was taken to Detroit entire; but only that part relating to the capture of Hamilton and his garrison has, it seems been preserved among the Haldimand MSS. The warrant to Myres, Clark's public and private letters, copies of which we have already given, a letter from Major Bowman to Governor Henry of March 12th, thanking him for his (Bowman's) promotion, and other documents, were likewise secured when Myres was killed, and taken to Detroit and are now in the Haldimand collection.* In his letter to Mason

* See Note CXV of this Appendix for some of these, taken from the copies made from the originals by the Public Archivist, Douglas Brymner, of Ottawa, Canada.

of November 19th, 1779, Clark only mentions that, having despatched off Captain Williams and company with Governor Hamilton, his principal officers, and a few [British] soldiers, to the Falls of Ohio to be sent to Williamsburg," he then, "in a few days" sent his letters to the Virginia Governor: he makes no mention of the killing of Myres, of the capture of the papers and documents in his (Myres') possession, or of his writing again to Governor Henry on receipt of the news. In his Memoir, however, Clark says [Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 159]: "I sent [upon learning the death of Myres] a second dispatch to the Governor, giving him a short but full account of what had passed, and our views." This was his letter of April 29th, 1779.

NOTE CXXVI.

JEFFERSON'S REPLY TO CLARK'S LETTER OF APRIL
29, 1779.

As Patrick Henry was no longer Governor of Virginia, Clark's letter of April 29, 1779, from Kaskaskia was delivered of course, to his successor, Thomas Jefferson. It was first published in the Virginia Gazette, of June 26, 1779, and afterward in Jefferson's works, Vol. I, page 222 n. The letter had been entrusted to the care, it is probable, of Mr. St. Vrain, a resident, it is believed, of the Illinois, who returned to Clark with the Governor's brief answer — one that would be perfectly understood by the Colonel but would be misleading in its most important particulars to the British should it fall into their hands.

Jefferson's reply has been preserved but in a mutilated condition. However, the words torn off I have ventured to supply. They are inclosed in brackets in the following :

"WILLIAMSBURG, [June —, 1779].

"Col. Geo. R. Clark,

"SIR: Your letter and verbal [communications] by Mr. St. Vrain was received to-day. Your w[ishes shall be] attended to. Much solicitation will be felt for the result of your expedition to the Wabash; it will, at least, delay their expedition to the frontier, settlement, and if successful, have an important bearing ultimately in establishing our northwestern boundary.

"I am, Sir, your most obedient,

TH. JEFFERSON."

(See *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, p. 2n.)

The letter was probably dated on or about the middle of June. See Jefferson to Washington, from Williamsburg, June 23, — *Jefferson's Works*, Vol. I, p. 221.

In speaking of this letter, Hinsdale (*The Old Northwest*, p. 153) says that it was written before the issue of the campaign of Clark against "the country beyond the river" Ohio was known in Virginia; and Moses (*Illinois: Historical and Statistical*, Vol. I, p. 158) says that it was written "about the date of the inception of the expedition." The Hon. Henry Pirtle, in giving the communication in his "Introductory" in *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, uses these words; "The following letter of Mr. Jefferson shows his anticipation of the importance of this expedition [of Clark to the Illinois]." Other writers have fallen into the same error; while William Wirt Henry wrestles with the subject in this wise (*Life of Patrick Henry*

Vol. I, p. 588 n): "As Jefferson was taken into the counsels of Governor Henry while planning this [Clark's] expedition, this letter throws a strong light upon the motives leading to it, which were not simply the protection of Kentucky." The letter itself bears intrinsic evidence of having been written to Clark in the Illinois by Jefferson *as Governor*. The Colonel's letter was of such importance that it was sent by an express which would not have been the case had it been intended for Jefferson as a private citizen; besides, it evidently needed what it received — an immediate reply. Clark's wishes would naturally be sent to the Virginia's Chief Executive. St. Vrain was, probably, a citizen of Kaskaskia.* Jefferson, even if he were at Williamsburg, would scarcely have informed Clark that his wishes would "be attended to," unless he (Jefferson) had occupied the Executive chair at the time. There is no evidence extant that Clark wrote anything to Jefferson after starting upon his expedition simply because of the friendship existing between them. All his letters to him while upon the expedition, that have been discovered, were a part of his (Clark's) official correspondence. Besides, it is to be borne in mind that the subject of the northwest boundary of the United States had only just then received public attention. An expedition from the Illinois to the Wabash simply, could have no important bearing — ultimately in establishing this boundary; but if continued to De-

* A place called "St. Vrain" is mentioned in Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois* (p. 158), being on the Kaskaskia river a short distance above Kaskaskia, years after; and in the same work (p. 160), is mentioned the brothers St. Vrain.

troit and if successful, the result would prove highly beneficial.

NOTE CXXVII.

CONCERNING CLARK'S SECOND MARCH TO VINCENNES.

"An expedition," wrote Col. Montgomery, Feb. 22, 1783, (See *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, p. 441), "being already planned (or, rather, a manœuvre) to prevent the enemy taking the field and distressing the frontiers, — I was ordered to conduct the troops by water to Vincennes, on the Wabash, Colonel Clark crossing by land to that post with a small escort." Clark, in his *Memoir* — Dillon's *Indiana* (ed of 1859), says: "Early in June, Colonel Montgomery was dispatched by water with the whole of our stores: Major Bowman marched the remainder of our troops by land. Myself, with a party of horse, reached Vincennes in four days, where the whole safely "arrived a short time after." What Clark here states is virtually corroborated by a report which reached De Peyster at Michilimackinac some time after the marching of Major Bowman.

NOTE CXXVIII.

WHY CLARK WAS ANXIOUS TO MARCH AGAINST
DETROIT.

"In a few days (after the arrival at Kaskaskia of County-Lientenant [Tod], Colonel Montgomery arrived. To my mortification I found he had not half the men I expected. Immediately receiving a letter

from Colonel Bowman with fresh assurances of a considerable reinforcement [the officers in general being anxious for the expedition (against Detroit)], I resolved to rendezvous [at Vincennes], according to appointment; and, if not deceived by the Kentuckians, I should still be able to complete my design, as I only wanted men sufficient to make me appear respectable in passing through [the territory] of the savages, by which means I could on the march command those friendly at my ease, and defy my enemies. Three hundred men at this time were sufficient to reduce the garrison at Detroit, as the new works there were not complete nor could be according to the plan before my arrival. The gentlemen of Detroit were not idle (although having sufficient reason to be convinced that they were in no danger from the Department of Pittsburgh) as they were always suspicious of my attacking them, being sensible of my growing interest among the savages.

“In order to give themselves more time to fortify, they would make some diversion on the Illinois. They also engaged a considerable number of their savages to make an attempt on Vincennes. Those Indians that had declared for the American interest, in order to show their zeal, sent word to them that if they had a mind to fight the Bostonians at Vincennes, they must first cut their way through them, as they were Big Knives too. This effectually stopped their operation. Knowing that the expedition depended entirely on the Kentuckians turning out, I began to be suspicious of a disappointment on hearing of their marching against the Shawanese towns.” * . . . (Clark, to Mason — *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois*, pp. 85, 86.

NOTE CXXIX.

JEFFERSON INFORMS WASHINGTON OF CLARK'S MEDI-
TATED ATTACK AGAINST DETROIT AND OF ITS
ABANDONMENT.

"It is possible you may have heard," wrote Jefferson, February 10th, 1780, to Washington, "that in the course of last summer an expedition was meditated by our Colonel Clark, against Detroit; that he had proceeded so far as to rendezvous a considerable body of Indians, I believe, four or five thousand, at Vincennes, but being disappointed in the number of whites he expected, and not choosing to rely principally on the Indians, he was obliged to decline it." (*Jefferson's Works*, vol. I, p. 239.) There can be no doubt that the number of Indians who would have gone with Clark is here greatly overestimated.

NOTE CXXX.

PIANKESHAW DEED TO COLONEL CLARK.

"By the Tobacco's Son, Grand Chief of all the Piankeshaw Nations and of all the Tribes, Grand Door to the Wabash as ordered by the Master of Life, holding the Tomahawk in one hand and Peace in the other; judging the Nations, giving entrance for those that are for Peace, and making them a clear Road, etc. Declaration:

"Whereas for many years past this once peaceable land hath been put in confusion by the English encouraging all people to raise the tomahawk against the Big Knives, saying that they were a bad people, rebellious and ought to be put from under the sun and their names to be no more. —

"But as the sky of our Councils was always misty and never clear, we still were at a loss to know what to do, hoping that the Master of Life would one day or other make the sky clear and put us in the right road. He, taking pity on us, sent a father among us (Col. George Rogers Clark) that has cleared our eyes and made our paths straight, defending our lands, etc., so that we now enjoy peace from the rising to the setting of sun; and the nations even to the heads of the great river (meaning the Mississippi) are happy and will no more listen to bad birds, but abide by the Councils of their great Father, a chief of the Big Knives, that is now among us.—

"And whereas it is our desire that he should long remain among us, that we may take his counsel, and be happy, it also being our desire to give him lands to reside on in our country that we may at all times speak to him. After many solicitations to him to make choise of a tract, he choosing the land adjoining the Falls of Ohio, one the west side of said river.

"I do hereby in the names of all the great chiefs and warriors of the Wabash and their allies declare that so much land at the Falls of Ohio contained in the following bounds, to-wit: Beginning opposite the middle of the first island below the Falls, bounded upwards by the west bank of the river so far as to include two leagues and [a] half on a straight line from the beginning, thence at right angles with said line two leagues and [a] half in breadth in all its parts, shall hereafter and ever be the sole property of our great father (Colonel Clark) with all things thereto belonging either alive or below the Earth, shall be and is his, except a road through said land to his door, which shall remain ours, and for us to walk on to speak to our father. All nations from the rising to the setting of the sun, that are not in alliance with us are hereby warned to esteem the said gift as sacred, and not to make that land taste of blood, that all people either at peace or war may repair in safety to get counsel of our father. Whoever first darkens that land shall no longer have a name. This declaration shall forever be a witness between all nations and our present great father, that the said lands are forever hereafter his property.

"In witness whereof, I do in the name of all the great chiefs and warriors of the Wabash, in open Council, affix my mark and seal. Done at Vincennes, this 16th day of June, 1779.

"FRANCIS, *Son of Tobacco.*"

NOTE CXXXI.

CLARK'S LAST "GENERAL ORDERS" ON HIS EXPEDITION.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT PATRICK HENRY,

VINCENNES, August 5th, 1779.

"General Orders.

"Lieut. Colonel John Montgomery of the Illinois battalion is to proceed with the following detachments under his command to the Illinois:

"Detachment for Fort Clark. — Captain John Williams (to be joined by Captain Worthington's company), Lieutenant Brashear, Lieutenant Gerault, Capt.-Lieut. Harrison of artillery, now at Fort Clark.

"Detachment for Cahokia. — Capt. Richard McCarty (to be joined by Capt. Quirk's company), Lieutenant Parrault, Lieutenant Clark.

"The Garrison at Fort Patrick Henry. — Captain Shelby (to be joined by Capt. Taylor and Capt. Keller's companies), Lieutenant Wilson, Ensign Williams, Capt. Robert Todd (to be joined by Capt. Evan's company), Lieutenant Dalton of artillery, Ensign Slaughter.

"The officers of the artillery at the different posts and garrisons are to take charge of the artillery stores, etc., belonging to that Department.

"Major Joseph Bowman is to proceed with the recruiting parties and to have the direction thereof. The general officers out recruiting are to make reports to him and receive orders and instructions from him.

"Officers for the recruiting service. — Captains Quirk, Evans, Taylor, Worthington, Keller; Lieutenants Roberts, Crockett, Calvit; Ensign Montgomery.

"Captain Robert George of the artillery, Lieutenant Robertson of the same, with their company, go to the Falls of the Ohio with the Commander-in-chief, where Headquarters are to be established.

"Captain Leonard Helm is appointed Indian Agent for Fort Patrick Henry and the Department of the Wabash.

"M. Gamelin of Wea is to fall under his [Capt. Helm's] Department and to make report to Headquarters at the Falls of the Ohio, or to Kaskaskia to Lieut. Colonel Montgomery or other officers commanding [there] for the time being, and is to follow such instructions as he shall receive from myself or any other his superior officer.

"Captain Linctot will appoint an assistant for the upper part of the Mississippi in the Indian Department, near the Dogs Plains [Prairie du Chien], provided the appointment be approved of by Colonel Montgomery or the commanding officer [at Fort Clark] for the time being.

"GEO. R. CLARK.

"[Colonel of the Illinois battalion and Commander-in-chief of the Virginia forces in the Western Department]." (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, pp. 324, 325.)

NOTE CXXXII.

FINAL ARRANGEMENTS BEFORE LEAVING VINCENNES FOR THE FALLS.

Says Clark in his *Memoir* — (Dillon's *Indiana* (ed. of 1859), p. 167) :

"The business, from the first, had been so conducted as to make no [a] disadvantageous impression on the enemy in case of a disappointment, as they could never know whether we really had a design on Detroit or only a finesse to amuse them, which latter would appear probable. Arranging things to the best advantage was now my principal study. The troops were

divided between Vincennes, Kaskaskia, Cahokia, and the Falls of the Ohio. Colonel Montgomery was appointed to the command of the Illinois; Major Bowman to superintend the recruiting business; a number of officers were appointed to that service; and myself to take up my quarters at the Falls as the most convenient spot to have an eye over the whole." By this it seems Clark never learned the particulars concerning the efforts made by Lernoult at Detroit and by De Peyster at Michilemackinac to repel (what they considered was certain) his attack on Detroit.

NOTE CXXXIII.

OF THE FORT ERECTED BY CLARK'S ORDERS AT THE
FALLS OF THE OHIO.

The "Falls' Fort" as Hamilton styles it (it had received no particular name) was a fortification "consisting of a parallelogram of double log cabins, about two hundred feet in length and one hundred in breadth with an inner court about one hundred and fifty feet long and fifty feet wide. Each of the four corners was a block house, with walls projecting along the lines of the cabins and serving the purpose of bastions. On each of the long sides were eighteen cabins, while there were eight on each of the short sides, making fifty-two in all, and affording shelter for two or three hundred persons.

The fort was made of round logs cut from the surrounding forest, and covered with rough boards riven by hand. Wherever there was a chimney, it was made

of wood lined with flat stones at the bottom for a fire-place, and the middle was daubed with clay thence to the top to prevent ignition. The rooms had dirt floors, and there were no windows except holes in the walls, as much for the use of the rifle as for light." (R. T. Durrett, in the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, August 2, 1883.).

NOTE CXXXIV.

THE PRESENTATION OF A SWORD TO CLARK BY VIRGINIA.
ALSO CONCERNING THE CREDIT DUE OLIVER
POLLOCK FOR HIS SACRIFICES IN AID
OF THE EXPEDITION.

"WILLIAMSBURG, IN COUNCIL, Sept. 4th, 1779.

"*Lieutenant Colonel George Rogers Clark:*

"SIR: I have the honor to inform you that by Captain Rogers I have sent the sword which was purchased by the Governor to be presented to you, by order of the General Assembly, as a proof of their approbation of your great and good conduct and gallant behavior. I heartily wish a better [one] could have been procured, but it was thought the best that could be purchased; and was bought of a gentleman who had used it but a little, and judged it to be elegant and costly. I sincerely congratulate you on your successes, and wish you a continuation of them and a happy return to your friends and country; and am, Sir, with great regard, your most ob't serv't,

"JOHN PAGE, *Lt. Gov.*"

A number of traditions concerning the presentation of this sword to the Colonel—all more or less devoid of truth — have found their way into print.

"After his conquest of the Illinois, he [Clark] was voted a sword by the State of Virginia. The bearer of

it met the grave and discontented hero on the bank of the Wabash. He was anxiously waiting for the news that the House of Delegates had passed his accounts, and had voted money to pay them, to enable him to make good his engagements, on sudden emergencies, for supplies to his men. He was disappointed. He took the sword — drew it from its scabbard, and placing the point to the ground, thrust it deep into the soil he had conquered, and broke it off by the hilt. Throwing away the glittering handle, he said, "I asked Virginia for bread, and she sent me a sword," (*Denny's Journal*, p. 218.) But the bearer of the sword did not meet Clark on the Wabash at all. He was found at his headquarters at the Falls (Louisville). He was not "anxiously waiting for the news that the House of Delegates had passed his accounts, and had voted money to pay them." Instead of being disappointed when the sword came, he was highly elated. He did not break the weapon but carefully preserved it as a most precious gift.

As to the measure of credit due Oliver Pollock in sustaining Clark, it may be said that hitherto it has been unjustly overshadowed by praise of M. Vigo for his services. In Clark's letter to the Governor of Virginia, of April 29, 1779, from Kaskaskia, the Colonel was not mistaken in his belief that some of the merchants who advanced considerable amounts would suffer; for such was the case, particularly with Vigo. [Beckwith, in Reynolds' *Illinois* (ed. of 1887), p. 423]. Beckwith says: "He [Vigo] turned out his merchandise to supply Clark's destitute soldiers." But Clark's soldiers were by no means destitute. Vigo would assist Clark — particularly to aid him in his proposed

movements against Detroit. That writer adds that he (Vigo) "sustained the credit of the Virginia continental money by taking it at par or guaranteeing its redemption at its face to those who exchanged their provisions or supplies for it. His advances or liabilities incurred in this way, amounted to more than twenty thousand dollars, which, with Hamilton's confiscations at Vincennes and losses through reprisals of Indians hostile to his side of the war, reduced him to poverty;" that is, he did his best to sustain the Virginia money, but could only do so to the extent of the amounts he took himself or guaranteed. Writers of Western history generally overrate Vigo's sacrifices. For what he did to further the interests of America he should receive praise commensurate with those sacrifices; unfortunately, however, the eulogies bestowed upon him have, as we have before hinted, to a great extent hitherto obscured what was due in a greater degree to Oliver Pollock. John Law (*Colonial History of Vincennes*, p. 21) declares that the whole credit of Clark's conquest belongs to two men: "Gen. George Rogers Clark and Col. Francis Vigo." This of course, is absurd. Between the two should be named Patrick Henry, Oliver Pollock and Pierre Gibault: after the five, Clark's officers and men, General Hand and others are to be mentioned. But it must not be forgotten that, next to the general planning and shrewdness displayed by Colonel Clark, that which most conspired to secure success was the war between England and France and the alliance of the latter with the United States. (See further as to Pollock, Mason's *Early Chicago and Illinois*, pp. 321, 323, 343, 348, 353, 358).

NOTE CXXXV.

GEORGE MASON'S ANXIETY TO MAKE GOOD HIS PLEDGE
TO CLARK.

By the following, it will be seen how anxious was the patriotic Mason that his and his two friends' promises, after the success of Clark and his own force had been assured, should be carried out:

"The Commonwealth of Virginia hath yet given no titles to any lands on the northwest side of the Ohio; but the public faith stands pledged to Colonel Clarke and his officers and men (in all about one hundred and eighty) who reduced the British posts of Kaskaskia and Vincennes, for a liberal reward in the lands they conquered." [George Mason's *Plan of Cession of the Territory of the Northwest to the United States*, dated July 27, 1780. (Kate Mason Rowland's *Mason*, vol. I, p. 365.)]

NOTE CXXXVI.

FOR WHOM CLARK HELD THE COUNTRY HE CONQUERED;
AND IN WHAT WAY VIRGINIA PROFITED
BY THE CONQUEST.

"In 1778, . . . General George Rogers Clark, with the authority of Virginia, advanced into the Northwest with a little army of Kentuckians; and, as the result of a series of remarkable exploits, which figure among the most romantic incidents in American history, seized Kaskaskia, Cahokia and Vincennes and

held the disputed territory for the United States till the close of the war." (R. G. Thwaites: *The Story of Wisconsin*, p. 109.)

It has already been shown that Colonel Clark had, in his "little army," very few Kentuckians, properly so called. His conquests were not only under the authority of Virginia, but they inured at once to that State, which very soon began to exercise civil jurisdiction over the conquered territory, continuing its rule until all its claims were ceded in 1784 to the United States. Strictly speaking, Virginia held the disputed territory until the close of the war rather than Clark, whose military authority soon became more nominal than real after the final conclusion of his expedition and his return to the Falls of the Ohio; as all Virginia troops under his orders were withdrawn from the various posts north of that river in little over a year, although he retained command until May 21, 1783, of the Western Department.*

The immediate and direct profit to Virginia arising out of the conquest was the increased security it gave to her Kentucky settlements; but it must not for a moment be supposed that when Colonel Clark finally made his headquarters at the Falls of the Ohio, those settlements were out of danger; far from it.

In this connection it may be well to record what Clark, in June, 1783, says concerning affairs at Vincennes from the time the Americans first gained possession in 1778 to 1781. The reader will find no difficulty in noticing his errors as to the years 1778, and

* I have not been able to find any evidence that any military order was issued by Clark or his officers after 1781, directly affecting the Illinois or Wabash towns.

1779, from what has already been given in our narrative. As to 1781, we give the following which shows conclusively that Vincennes was not abandoned in that year: "The enemy are approaching Vincennes and fortifying themselves at the Miami [head of the Maumee]; so the inhabitants of Vincennes have petitioned me for an officer and men to uphold the honor of the state there, with which I have complied." (Captain George from Fort Jefferson, February 15, 1781, to Col. Geo. Slaughter at the Falls of the Ohio — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. I, p. 521). "The following hints will sufficiently point out the cause of every article of life on the Wabash being raised to so great price, as charged in some of the Western Accounts: On our getting possession of Vincennes in 1778, and gaining three or four thousand warriors to the American interest all commerce between that country and Detroit immediately ceased. The Chickasaws, part of the Cherokees, and other Southern Indians, warmly attached to the British interest rendered it exceedingly difficult for the merchants to get supplies from the Mississippi, as numbers of them were cut off on their passage up the Ohio by the Indians, who had been instructed by the English to block up that river if possible. These circumstances caused every article at Vincennes to rise at least to four or five prices.

"The garrison kept at the post was obliged to receive its supplies from the inhabitants of the town, who consisted of about three hundred militia, about one-fourth farmers, that scarcely raised a sufficiency of provisions to supply the inhabitants. The British on the Lakes sensible of our growing interest with the savages, spared no pains to regain them by emis-

saries, which made it necessary that the greatest attention should be paid them on our part. Consequently, numbers of savages were constantly at that post counseling. Agents were kept in every quarter of their settlements where we could venture them; and Vincennes became, at one time, the seat of Indian affairs.

“Articles necessary for the solemnity of treaties and support of troops were generally procured for the State by a few merchants — Legras, Bosseron, Linctot and others — whose zeal induced them to advance their fortunes for the public interest. Governor Hamilton, by his enemies in the Pittsburgh country, being informed there was a great number of disaffected persons in that quarter ready to join him, resolved to make a descent on that place, with all the power he could raise. General Carleton approved his plan, but recommended it to him first to drive the rebels out of the Illinois country, otherwise they might possibly step in and take possession of Detroit, as he would have to leave it in a defenceless situation. After putting the latter into execution he might regain of the Indian interest, and complete his force to enable him to execute his first design. The attempt was daring; but the prudent measures that gentleman conducted himself by enabled him to get possession of St. Vincent [Vincennes] without much difficulty. The season being too far advanced, he was obliged to take up his winter quarters at that place, and of course disperse his Indian forces until spring. In the meantime [he] got captured by a superior force, which doubly revived our interest in that quarter and extended our influence nearly to the walls of Detroit; and the great concourse of people that consequently happened for many

months — troops, Indians, etc., — nearly caused a famine.

“The inhabitants not being able to recover their former plenty, in 1781 were obliged to abandon the post for the want of supplies; from which moment our interest with the Indians sunk as rapidly as we had gained it, and nearly the whole engaged in war against us.” (*Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, pp. 501, 502.)

NOTE CXXXVII.

WHAT CLARK CONQUERED AND THE RESULTS OF HIS CONQUESTS.

William Frederick Poole, LL. D., in *The Early Northwest* (pp. 4, 5), says: “The general histories of the United States have been written by Eastern men, and a few of their writers have been tall enough to look over the Appalachian range and see what has happened on the other side. The story of the Revolutionary War has often been told without a mention of the campaigns of George Rogers Clark, who, as a Virginia partisan and with an intelligence and valor which have not been surpassed in ancient or modern warfare, captured from the British the Northwestern Territory.”

And thus R. G. Thwaites (*The Story of Wisconsin*, pp. 117, 118): “But the Revolutionary War closed with the following year [1782] and the entire Northwest, under the definite treaty of peace in 1783, was, regardless of all private claims, apportioned to the United States, having been fairly won with the sword

by George Rogers Clark, and kept for our inheritance by the shrewd diplomacy of Franklin, Adams and Jay."

Congress, in October, 1780, as indicated by its instructions to Jay, looked upon what Clark took possession of — that is, what he captured and won — as extending only to "the important posts and settlements on [in] the Illinois and [on the] Wabash." What he essayed farther to the northward and northwestward — to what is now Peoria, Illinois, and to the present Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin — was only to make friends of the several Indian nations in those regions; but these savages, with few exceptions, again took up the hatchet, before the close of the war, against the Americans. The British, who held the important posts of Detroit and Michilimachinac had control, virtually, over much more territory in the Northwest than was reduced to American sway by Clark; and this was the fact immediately after the conquests of the Colonel, and continued until after peace was declared between the two countries.

A recent author (Hinsdale: *The Old Northwest*, p. 158) says: "The Northwest had been won by a Virginia army, commanded by a Virginia officer, put in the field at Virginia's expense. Governor Henry had promptly announced the Conquest to the Virginia delegates in Congress."

It is evident this is too sweeping a declaration. Clark did not win the Northwest. And that writer had already written (p. 157):

"Clark, who probably did not appreciate the difference between seizing Detroit and seizing Kaskaskia, was compelled to abandon the enterprise, and Detroit

remained in British hands at the end of the war, and, in fact, until 1796. 'Detroit lost for a few hundred men,' was his pathetic lament as he surrendered an enterprise that lay near his heart. Had he been able to achieve it, he would have won and held the whole Northwest.

"As it was he won and held the Illinois and the Wabash." . . .

As to the results of Clark's conquest there has been much discussion. Dr. Poole in his monograph just cited says not only that Clark "captured from the British the Northwestern Territory," but that he held "it until the peace of 1783," thereby securing "to this nation the Mississippi River and the great lakes as boundaries." To this he adds this footnote:

"That, if a right to the said territory depended on the conquests of the British posts within it, the United States have already . . . by the success of their arms obtained possession of all the important posts and settlements on the Illinois and Wabash, rescued the inhabitants from British domination, and established civil government in its proper form over them." (Instruction of Congress to Mr. Jay, October, 1780, *Secret Journals of Congress*, II., 329.)

"From a full confidence that the Western territory now contended for lay within the United States, the British posts therein have been reduced by our citizens, and American government is now exercised within the same." (Report written by Mr. Madison entitled "Facts and Observations in support of the several Claims of the United States," *Secret Journals of Congress*, August, 1782, III., 199. *N. Y. Hist. Collec.*, 1878, p. 139.)

“He [Vergennes] intended to resist the claim which the colonies had invariably advanced of pushing their frontiers as far west as the Mississippi, . . . and to leave the country north of the Ohio to England, as arranged by the Quebec Act of 1774.” (Fitzmaurice’s *Life of Earl Shelbourne*, II., 169.)

At the date of Madison’s Report, the “Western territory” then “contended for” included all the region of country northwest and west of the Ohio to the Mississippi and the Great Lakes. But “the British posts therein” had not been “reduced” as he declares—only a part of them—by “our citizens.” The strongest of the posts, Detroit and Michilimackinac, had not been so “reduced,” and the “American government” was by no means, “exercised within the same.”

Speculation has ever been rife since the conquest by Clark and his men, as to its direct results.

“Their success,” said George Mason, in 1780, only a little over a year after the capture of Hamilton, “has been of great importance to the United States, by fixing garrisons behind the Indian towns and deterring them from sending their warriors far from home, and by drawing from the British to the American interest several tribes of Indians; the frontiers of the middle states have been more effectually protected than they would have been by ten times the number of troops stationed upon the Ohio; and by putting Virginia in possession of these posts, they have not only taken them out of the hands of the British, but have prevented the Spaniards from possessing themselves of them; which, but for that circumstance, they would most undoubtedly have done last year [1779] in their expedition up the Mississippi, when they took posses-

sion of every other British post on that river; in which case that country [that is, the Illinois] would have been lost to the United States and left to be disputed between Spain and Great Britain, upon [their holding] a treaty of peace. The possession of these posts has prevented Spain from meddling with the country on this [the east] side of the Mississippi above the mouth of the Ohio and will afford a strong argument in favor of our claim, upon [our holding] a treaty with Great Britain." [George Mason, July 27, 1780, in his "Plan for a Cession of the Northwest Territory to the United States." (Kate Mason Rowland's *Mason*, vol. I, p. 365.)]

Many writers besides Dr. Poole have declared that the territory northwest of the Ohio was secured to the Republic at the treaty of peace with Great Britain and our western boundary fixed at the Mississippi because of the reduction of the posts of the Illinois and of those upon the Wabash. It is certain that Clark's success and the continuance of possession on part of Virginia of what he had really conquered, until the close of the war, were powerful arguments in upholding the claim of the United States to the Western country; but is it not true that England's jealousy of Spain, who laid claim to this vast territory, (and of France as well, who also coveted this extensive region) and all other facts adduced by the Commissioners of the United States, secured what Clark's conquests had not been able to, in the negotiations which brought peace to our country? An Indiana historian already cited says:

"By it [Clark's Conquest] the whole territory now covered by the three great States of Indiana, Illinois

and Michigan, was added to the Union, and so admitted to be by the Commissioners on the part of Great Britain, at the preliminaries for the settlement of the treaty of peace in 1783; and but for this very conquest the boundaries of our territories west, would have been the Ohio, instead of the Mississippi, and so acknowledged and admitted both by our own and the British Commissioners at that conference." (*Law's Vincennes*, pp. 21, 22.) But an examination of this whole subject does not warrent the conclusion arrived at by that writer.

Draper, in *Appleton's Cyclopaedia of American Biography* blindly follows Law; but Henry Pirtle in his "Introductory" to *Clark's Campaign in the Illinois* is more guarded: "But for this conquest made by Colonel Clark for the United States — and particularly for Virginia — in the midst of the terrible struggle with England, the boundary of our land, conquered in the revolution from Great Britain, would, *in all probability* [the italicising is ours], have been the eastern bank of the Ohio, or the Allegheny mountains, instead of the eastern shore of the Mississippi."

Says Mr. R. G. Thwaites in the *Collections of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, vol. XI, p. 114 n: "While due credit should be given to Clark for his daring and successful undertaking, we must not forget that England's jealousy of Spain, and shrewd diplomacy on the part of America's peace plenipotentiaries, were factors even more potent in winning the Northwest for the United States."

One of the historians before cited reasons thus:

"It is not easy to tell what were the decisive arguments in this Western controversy. It is often said,

and particularly by Western writers, that the issue turned mainly on the George Rogers Clark conquest. This view rests on tradition rather than on historical evidence, and I venture the opinion that it is largely erroneous. No man, at least, can read the reports on the national boundaries submitted to Congress without seeing that far more reliance was laid, by the committees that prepared them, on the Colonial charters than on Clark's great achievement. The report of August 16, 1782, urges the argument: 'The very country in question hath been conquered through the means of the common labors of the United States [but it was only a small part of the country; and it can scarcely be said, with truth, that what was conquered, was through the means of the common labors of the United States. It was so nearly a Virginia conquest, pure and simple, that it ought, with justice, to be called such.] For a considerable distance beyond the Alleghany Mountains, and particularly on the Ohio, American citizens are settled at this day . . . who will be thrown back within the power of Great Britain if the Western territory is surrendered to her.'

"But the same report contains page after page of arguments based on the charters and on colonial history. It was indeed most fortunate that the Virginia troops were in possession of the Illinois and the Wabash at the close of the war, but there is no reason to think that the Clark conquest, separate and apart from the colonial titles, ever would have given the United States the Great West. Writing to Secretary Livingston, the American commissioners give color to the idea that the decision turned on the charters and not on the conquest. They say the Court of Great

Britain 'claimed not only all the lands in the Western country and on the Mississippi, which were not expressly included in our charters and government, but also all such lands within them as remained ungranted by the King of Great Britain.' 'It would be endless,' they add, 'to enumerate all the discussions and arguments on the subject.' It is highly probable that the British ministry, seeing that the West would go to Spain if not to the United States, preferred to give it the latter direction. Moreover, the Clark conquest was much more potent in keeping the West from falling into the hands of Spain than in wresting it from the hands of Great Britain." (Hinsdale: *The Old Northwest*, pp. 183, 184.)

But upon one point all writers of Western history who have mentioned the success of Clark and his men in the conquest of the Illinois and Wabash towns agree: they all praise the sagacity, valor, perseverance and patriotism displayed.

"Of this expedition," says an Indiana historian, in speaking of the one against Vincennes, although at the same time having in his mind also the one against Kaskaskia, "of its result, of its importance, of the merits of those engaged in it, of their bravery, of their skill, of their prudence, of their success, a volume would not be sufficient for the details. Suffice it to say, that, in my opinion, — and I have accurately and critically weighed and examined all the results produced by any contests in which we were engaged during the revolutionary war, — for bravery, for hardships endured, for skill and consummate tact and prudence on the part of the commander, obedience, discipline, and love of country on the part of his followers; for the

immense benefits acquired, and signal advantages obtained by it for the whole Union, it was second to no enterprise undertaken during that struggle." . . . (John Law: *Colonial History of Vincennes*, p. 21.) "When we consider the small force employed, the boldness of the enterprise, the brilliancy of its execution, and the vast consequences which have resulted from it, this expedition may well challenge all history for a parallel." (Henry's *Patrick Henry*, vol. I, p. 580.)

"With respect to the magnitude of its design," says Dillon *History of Indiana*, pp. 114, 115), "the valor and perseverance with which it was carried on, and the momentous results which were produced by it, this expedition stands without a parallel in the early annals of the valley of the Mississippi."

NOTE CXXXVIII.

CLARK'S IDEA OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN KENTUCKY IN 1783.

"Prejudice and party disputes and the want of aids from Government have, in a great measure been the occasion of reducing this Department to a defenceless state, at a time when we might suppose they [the people of Kentucky] were rising superior to the enemy they have to contend with. . . Emmissaries are among them, dividing their councils, and destroying their interest at the seat of Government. [These are] ready to take advantage of the first opportunity to

separate them from the State they live in for the advantage of a few *individuals*, who, at present, rejoice at every misfortune they meet with." (Clark to the Board of Commissioners to Settle Western Accounts, February 25, 1783 — *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, pp. 448, 449.)

NOTE CXXXIX.

AS TO VIRGINIA'S SUBSEQUENT TREATMENT OF CLARK.

Virginia did not neglect or refuse to settle Clark's accounts made necessary because of his expeditions to Kaskaskia and Vincennes. At his dismissal from the "State Line" service, he had no cause of complaint and made none.* No suits were afterward brought against him by private parties for money or necessaries supplied his army by negotiations or impressment while engaged in the West either as a Virginia Lieutenant Colonel or Brigadier General, as has been so often asserted (but particularly in Butler's *Kentucky*, p. 153).

NOTE CXL.

VIRGINIA'S DEED OF CESSION TO THE UNITED STATES SO FAR AS RELATES TO CLARK AND HIS MEN.

In the deed of cession of March 1, 1784, made by Virginia and accepted by the United States, were these

* The general but erroneous idea is, that Clark was arbitrarily and without just cause turned out of office.

words: "That a quantity not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand acres of land, promised by Virginia, shall be allowed and granted to the then Colonel, now [late] General George Rogers Clark, and to the officers and soldiers of his regiment, who marched with him when the posts of Kaskaskia and Vincennes were reduced, and to the officers and soldiers that have been since incorporated into the said regiment, to be laid off in one tract, the length of which is not to exceed double the breadth, in such place on the northwest side of the Ohio as a majority of the officers shall choose, and to be afterwards divided among the officers and soldiers in due proportion, according to the laws of Virginia."

NOTE CXLI.

CONCERNING CLARK'S INTEMPERANCE.

It is wholly unnecessary in our narrative to inquire how early in life Clark acquired a liking for strong drink. We know that before the ending of the Illinois expedition he drank at least once to excess. When in October, 1782, he asked to be recalled from his command in the West, the habit had increased upon him and by reason of that fact he had lost something of the confidence of the people of Kentucky although he led a large force from the settlements against the savages, with success, in November following.

"General Clark is in that country," wrote a Virginian, on the third of October, 1782, in speaking of Kentucky, "but he has lost the confidence of the peo-

ple and it is said become a sot; perhaps something worse." (Arthur Campbell to Wm. Davies: *Calendar of Virginia State Papers*, vol. III, pp. 337, 338.) But his having "become a sot," it will be noticed is only hearsay and beyond question was not true; though it is evident that the General's intemperance brought on many troubles (mostly of them imaginary, however), which increased his desire to give up his command.

During the next three years, his habit made inroads upon both his body and mind. It is painful to read his maudlin talk about his own adventures, indulged in while acting as one of the United States Commissioners in negotiating the treaty of January 31, 1786, with the savages at Fort Finney. (*Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania*, vol. VII, pp. 216-218)

"The cruel ingratitude," says a Western writer who visited Clark when poverty and sickness had claimed him as their own, "to which this distinguished soldier was doomed, for which no justifiable cause can be assigned, and the comparative poverty which made him almost a pensioner on the bounty of his relatives, was more than he could bear. It drove him to intemperance. He sought the inebriating bowl, as if it contained the water of Lethe, and could obliterate from his memory the wrongs he had endured." But Clark was not driven to intemperance by "cruel ingratitude": and "the wrongs he had endured" were mostly imaginary.

It may be stated in connection with this much-to-be-deplored habit of Clark, that most of the errors in his Memoir generally attributed (perhaps charitably)

to his old age, are directly traceable (as we have already hinted) to his intemperance.

This cloud which darkened more than half of Clark's life, is a sad subject to dwell upon; and it is creditable to the writers of Western history who have spoken of it that they have done so in a spirit of kindness.

"Clark's later life is little to his credit, but it should not be forgotten that he rendered the American cause and civilization a very great service." (*Hinsdale: The Old Northwest*, pp. 157, 158.)

NOTE CXLII.

AN ERRONEOUS TRADITION AS TO CLARK'S ATTACHMENT FOR THE DAUGHTER OF THE SPANISH GOVERNOR.

The following tradition mentioned by Draper in his article on Clark in Appleton's *Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, is wholly erroneous; for as a matter of fact, Clark never visited St. Louis to aid in its defense or to relieve it from an Indian attack: "The freedom of Clark's early life had unfitted him for domestic happiness, and he never married. A tradition is preserved in the family that he was fascinated with the beauty of the daughter of the Spanish governor of St. Louis when he relieved that post from an Indian attack. Observing a want of courage in the governor, he broke off his addresses to the girl, saying to his friends: 'I will not be the father of a race of cowards.'"

NOTE CXLIII.

PORTRAITS OF GEORGE ROGERS CLARK.

Concerning the so-called "Jarvis portrait" of Clark, the late talented and much-lamented librarian of Newberry library says:

"The only portrait [from life] of him [Clark] extant was painted by John W. Jarvis, an English artist, who began business in New York in 1801, and painted the heads of many distinguished Americans. He made a trip West and South, during which he made many portraits. The picture of Clark represents him about sixty years of age. The best engraving of it is in the *National Portrait Gallery*, IV., with a biography. It is the frontispiece of Butler's *Kentucky*, 1834, of Dillon's *Indiana*, 1859, and in the Cincinnati edition of *Clark's Campaign*; and wood-cuts are in Lossing's *Field-Book*, II, 287; *Magazine of Western History*, II, 133; *Harper's Magazine*, XXVIII, 302; [Appleton's *Cyclopaedia of American Biography*, article "George Rogers Clark"]; etc. It has been many times reproduced with a modification of details. There have been many rumors as to the existence of a portrait taken earlier in life. Every alleged portrait of an earlier date which I could hear of, I have looked up, and find they are all copies or modifications of the "Jarvis picture." (Dr. Wm. Frederick Poole, in "The West"—Winsor's *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vol. VI, p. 733, foot-note 4.)

Under a poor engraving in the *Magazine of American History*, vol. XXI, p. 387, is the following:

"GEORGE ROGERS CLARK,
After the only oil painting of Clark from life
in existence.
[In possession of the Vincennes University,
Vincennes, Indiana]."

We have in this the assertion not only that the portrait of Clark in the University of Vincennes is from life, but that it is the only one in existence thus painted. The statement is made by E. A. Bryan, in an article entitled "Indiana's First Settlement." Now, as it is evident the Vincennes painting is not the one, executed by Jarvis, it follows that (if what is said by that writer be a certainty), not only another portrait was taken from life, but the Jarvis painting is not in existence. But can all this be substantiated? We think not. It is safe to conclude that the Vincennes portrait is not genuine.

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